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VABSTRACT
THE THESIS IS A STUDY OF THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE PUNJAB BETWEEN 
1839 AND 1872. ITS PURPOSE IS TO ACCOUNT FOR, AND EXPLAIN THE 
SIGNIFICANCE OF, THE PUNJAB’S TRANSITION FROM SIKH KINGDOM TO BRITISH 
IMPERIAL PROVINCE. EARLY-NINETEENTH-CENTURY PUNJAB WAS ESSENTIALLY 
A FRONTIER SOCIETY, WITH VERTICAL, CLAN-BASED POLITICAL CLEAVAGES AND 
A PRONOUNCED MARTIAL SPIRIT. THE SIKH KINGDOM, WHICH EMERGED IN THE 
WAKE OF THE MUGHAL EMPIRE'S COLLAPSE, WAS A MILITARY PATRONAGE STATE,
WHOSE STRUCTURE REFLECTED THE NATURE OF PUNJABI SOCIETY, AND WHOSE 
STABILITY DEPENDED UPON SATISFACTION OF ITS CHIEFTAINS’ AMBITIONS THROUGH 
CONSTANT TERRITORIAL EXPANSION. WHEN EXPANSION STOPPED IN THE MID-1820s, 
TENSION ENSUED INTERNALLY, ESPECIALLY AFTER MAHARAJA RANJIT SINGH’S DEATH 
IN 1839. THE BRITISH, WHO WERE IN THE PROCESS OF BUILDING A NEW 
SUBCONTINENTAL EMPIRE, EXPLOITED THESE TENSIONS, AND IN SO DOING, WERE 
DRAWN EVER DEEPER INTO THE KINGDOM’S DOMESTIC AFFAIRS. PUNJABI 
COLLABORATION AND RESISTANCE DETERMINED THE STAGES BY WHICH THIS PENETRATION 
PROCEEDED. A GENERAL CRISIS OF AUTHORITY IN 1848 RESULTED IN THE 
ANNEXATION OF THE PUNJAB A YEAR LATER. AFTER 1849 THE BRITISH SET ABOUT 
TRANSFORMING THE PUNJAB INTO A TRANQUIL AND PROSPEROUS TERRITORY. THE 
CORNERSTONE OF THEIR POLICY WAS THE DIMINUTION OF THE PRIVILEGES AND 
INFLUENCE OF THE OLD MILITARY AND LANDED ELITES - IN PARTICULAR, THE 
CHIEFTAINS. BUT THE IMPERIAL CRISIS OF 1857-58 COMPELLED THE BRITISH 
TO REVERSE THEIR POLITICAL STRATEGY. IN 1857 THE OLD, ELITIST MILITARY 
FORMATIONS WITHIN PUNJABI SOCIETY WERE QUICKLY REVIVED - FORTUNATELY FOR 
THE BRITISH, THESE FORMATIONS WERE NOT YET EXTINCT - AND PUNJABI COLLABORATION 
ENABLED THE BRITISH TO SURVIVE THE CRISIS. THE DECADE AFTER 1858 SAW 
THE INSTITUTIONALISATION OF THIS REVERSAL OF POLICY. THE ATTENTION OF 
THE OLD MILITARY AND LANDED ELITES, HAVING BEEN TURNED OUTWARDS ONCE AGAIN
IN 1857, WAS PERMANENTLY DIVERTED TO THE ADVANTAGES OF COOPERATION WITH 
THE IMPERIAL STATE. BY THE EARLY 1870s, THE PUNJAB WAS IN MANY RESPECTS 
A CHANGED REGION; BUT, AS THE SUBSEQUENT POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC HISTORY 
OF THE REGION SHOWS, THE OLD MILITARY AND LANDED ELITES HAD MANAGED TO 
ADAPT THEMSELVES REMARKABLY WELL TO THE CHANGED POLITICAL CIRCUMSTANCES.
THE HISTORY OF THE PUNJAB BETWEEN 1839 AND 1872 IS THEREFORE ESSENTIALLY 
THE STORY OF THE CONTINUITY - DESPITE GREAT VICISSITUDES - OF AN INDIGENOUS, 
DOMINANT POWER STRUCTURE AND ITS SYSTEM OF VALUES INTO (AND, EVENTUALLY, 
BEYOND) THE PERIOD OF EUROPEAN, COLONIAL RULE.
vii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This thesis owes much to many people. I am especially grateful to 
my supervisor, Professor D.A. Low, for his patience, encouragement 
and advice. Professor Low's guidance has been an intellectually 
stimulating experience. I am also most grateful to the Australian 
National University for providing the research facilities and financial 
assistance without which the project could not have been undertaken.
The staff at the National Archives of India and the Central Secretariat 
Library, New Delhi, and at the Punjab Secretariat Record Office and 
Library, Lahore, provided courteous assistance during my stay in India 
and Pakistan. I would also like to mention the kindness shown to me 
in Amritsar by Dr Indu Banga^ of the Department of History, Guru Nanak 
University, and in Lahore by my colleague, Dr Imran Ali, and his family.
To all my friends in New Delhi, I am similarly grateful. My colleagues 
in the South Asia History Section, Research School of Pacific Studies, 
Australian National University, and the School of History, University 
of New South Wales, have helped in many ways. I hope they will forgive 
my not mentioning them all by name. But I must acknowledge my debt to 
Dr Michael Pearson, who read all the draft chapters with great promptness 
(and an encouraging degree of enthusiasm), and offered numerous helpful 
criticisms. I am also grateful to Ms Maria Giuffre, who typed the thesis 
and was - as were so many others - always a source of encouragement.
ABBREVIATIONS
Official Positions
BOA Board of Administration
C and S Commissioner and Superintendent
CC Chief Commissioner
COD Court of Directors
DC Deputy Commissioner
EAC Extra Assistant Commissioner
FC Financial Commissioner
GG Governor-General
Go I Government of India
GoP Government of the Punj ab
JC Judicial Commissioner
Offg Officiating
SC Settlement Commissioner
Secy Secretary
SS Secretary of State for India
Official Proceedings
1. National Archives of India
FC Foreign Consultations
FD Foreign Department
FDP Foreign Department Proceedings
FM Foreign Miscellaneous
FP Foreign Proceedings
ix
FPP Foreign Political Proceedings
FSC Foreign Secret Consultations
FSP Foreign Secret Proceedings
NAI National Archives of India, New Delhi
2. Punjab Secretariat Record Office
Bk Book
GDP General Department Proceedings
JDP Judicial Department Proceedings
LRL Lahore Residency Letters
PDP Political Department Proceedings
PS Punjab Secretariat Record Office, Lahore
RD Revenue Department
RDP Revenue Department Proceedings
WE Week Ending
Official Reports and Publications
"CKO" ’’Correspondence relating to the Kooka Outbreak" (Parliamentary
Papers)
DG District Gazetteer
LPD Punjab Government Records: Lahore Political Diaries,
1847-1848
MRR Punjab Government Records: Mutiny Records: Reports
FPC Foreign Political Consultations
PAR General Report on the Administration of the Punjab
"Papers Relating to the Punjab, 1847-1849" (Parliamentary 
Papers)
"Papers Relating to the Punjab Tenancy Act" (Parliamentary 
Papers)
Settlement Report
xi
Table 1:2
Table 1:3
Fig. 2:1
Fig. 2:2 
Table 3:1 
Table 4:1 
Fig. 5:1 
Table 5:1
Table 5:2
Table 5:3
Table 5:4
Table 1:1
LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES
Annual rainfall, area, percentage of cultivation,
population and population density by districts for
region and subregion 7
Page
Distribution of religious communities as percentages 
of total population by districts for region and subregion 14
General distribution of castes and tribes as percentages 
of total population for region and subregion 17
Summary of the development of the rulership concept
in the Sikh mist 34
Principal offices in the two systems of Sikh government 45
Chronology of important events, 1839-46 76
Chronology of important events, 1846-49 129
Principal offices in the British Government of the Punjab 185
Disposition of jagir and cash grants held by two groups 
of regular army officers involved in the late rebellion 219
Disposition of jagir and cash grants held by a group 
of irregular soldiers not involved in the late rebellion 221
Disposition of jagir grants held by two groups of
kardars and their families 223
Disposition of jagir grants held by two groups of
chieftains involved in the late rebellion 224
Table 5:5 Disposition of jagir grants held by four groups of 
chieftains not involved in the late rebellion 226
Table 6:1 
Table 6:2 
Table 6:3
Table 5:6 Disposition of jagir and cash grants held by six 
members of the former Council of Regency not involved 
in the late rebellion
Chronology of important events, 1857
Agricultural prices in Gugera District, 1839-57
Rewards to a group of chieftains who remained "loyal" 
in 1857
xii
229
258
278
280
Table 7:1 Perpetuity jagir increases sanctioned by Canning in 1862 297
MAP 1
xiii
©g
Kabul
* G h a in l
lalalabad :'N ( /  Baramulla
-— sf .£  Shabkadar \ h a t a d a   '"vi )  H A Z A R A  "  -- p . .  _Jam^ F7^-^USh^ y oHaripur \ 'r p-
Kh yb trP a ss ,^^P fsW ur . . .  e Hasan Abdu ll c Poo nch
KASH M IR
S r in d j irV
Tarila'
A FG H A N ISTA N
o Bannu
* J
Qoma! P a ss  -
^  D e ra  Ismail K h a n
X  sD . . Shupaiyan í> ¿ \
/ oPaja-jri ”  i.  . a  . iW ile n ra t
o Pindi Gheb ( e Mirpur ft C M £N A P-^~'1
e Rohtasc \  -  A khnur..'
,. /h“/um0y
U U ^ a t i  > < ^ 1  Gu'araV  nSlo/kol
" f C p u r  ^,o
0 nur„  
Bhimbar
aJnmnu
o H afuabad  n o£m ,natad HalanaurB ° G u jd a sp u ro '  ggXs 1 'v -
°  J o P in d i BhaWen S  fla la /o . ° Q ad ia^~ JCS ! 'g r9 ^ f ^ ' . -----T  -  •
C.hinint'  She Ahupara >77 ■< o' i /  ' "V. /Wa-ic/i ..-\s
Sharakpur° „Shahadara ¿  B e a /  «JULLUNDUR D O A B  *'•//. " ' 5
o,,.™.s *w  i r  - T,?.ïr TTs,w.t
e/a r£c o.
Mankera ,
£>era 0//J Panah 0 Kam aha n
a M ultan
oHarappa 
Pak Paitan
Dipalpurj
oF ero ze p u r
M am  dot
Faridkolo 
Kot Kapur a,
Bhatindaa
Deta G hazi Khane /  M u z a lla rg a rh  
°Shujabnd
Barríala^
Sangrvrp
Sam ara?
^B o la n  Past  
B A L U C H IS T A N
E ah aw a lpu r - V>*J *a Ak'f' f
D ry  b td o l
Miihankoia 
Rojhan°
______ T _ _  ___ wJKiratpur , D.
Phil/aur 0£ M a n t  Popar ^  J .
Jagraon M A L W A  Mani Majra0
°Whadn! Sl,hinc/0 Nahttt &rrTloof
Maler Kef/a0 _  , - Sadhaura °  f
Nabba0 ° D shra Dun
Mus1jfabad0 
Shsbzbad0 Jaoadhari°
# Koruksheira g
,-n A e Ç ^ ^ ^ ^  Thantsary
R. Karlha/0
------- K a rn a l°  Sahararpur’SwM
P a n ip a l0
Hissêr.
S IN D H
0S h ik a r p u r
lOOMncs RAJ PUTAÑA **(Fo u nd »d  b yHanak) 
•  CFounded hy A rjjn )
Rohlak
Vtlhi
Ourgaon0
Sor,'P atc / $  D M n n t l
Source : Khushwant Singh, yl History Of The Sikhs, vol 2, 1839-1964 
(Princeton, N.J., 1966), p.4.
Source 
: 
P.H.M. 
van 
den 
Dungen, 
The 
Punjab 
Tradition: 
Influence 
and 
Authority 
in 
Nineteenth-Century 
India  
(London, 
1972), 
inside 
back 
cover.
1: 
C. 
Collin 
Davies, 
An 
Historical 
Atlas 
Of 
The 
Indian 
Peninsula 
Madras, 
2nd 
edn 
1959), 
p.63.
THE GROWTH OF 
SIKH POWER UNDER 
RAN  J IT  SINGH
A F G H A N S
Ghazni •
« Kandahar
Kalat
> V
Source 
: 
Davies, 
Historical 
Atlas, 
p.65.
¿ ¿ U J  v.."4\/
Ambala J'"
• * MuY * " /Z0Z^i -J p r o t e c t e d  -y\  v., ^ . . c h i e f s /  h ^ n . .
• ^  1 í ^ " ' 7  1 > *•/ <; nar • /fas O V/ I. \
c,^ \ ^ J / W  .o'O9' /  - %  N  \
v srJ «. vM  ^ ^  \De!hi »
Bikaner
^ /’Shikarpu r * ’*■* • w  
/* Sukku^ ¿{ î^ »,
I /j «Khairpur /
; /  ! r a j  p u t a ñ a
I its I N  D I Jal*lmeP
_"l________
• ^ VX ©SMuttra 
. A/r^a
'•v
Aii <H-
MAP 
4
xvii
INTRODUCTION
It is generally agreed that the one hundred years between the 
battle of Plassey in 1757 and the outbreak of the Great Rebellion in 
1857 constitute a crucial period in the history of modern South Asia.
For it was during these years that most of those regional States that 
had emerged in the wake of the Mughal empire's dissolution were overrun 
by a foreign mercantile organisation - the English East India Company - 
and forged into a new, British subcontinental empire. In dismantling 
these regional political systems and replacing them with new provincial 
administrations, and in creating - as a necessary and integral complement 
to their political and economic domination - a bourgeois property system 
and a bourgeois legal and institutional apparatus, the British would 
seem to have been responsible for decisive political, economic and social 
changes. Writing in 1853, at the height of British imperial confidence 
and action in South Asia, Marx observed: "England has to fulfil a 
double mission in India: one destructive, the other regenerating - the 
annihilation of old Asiatic society, and the laying of the material 
foundations of Western society in Asia".* Historians from Marx's time 
onwards have seen in the rise of a British empire in South Asia the triumph 
of a materially superior civilisation; and they have characterised the 
early impact of British rule in terms of such dramatic changes as the 
breakup and transformation of the "traditional" society and economy, the 
emergence of a new "middle class" and the growth oi a "modern", bureaucratic 
State.
Historians nowadays, while they agree that the period between Plassey 
and the Great Rebellion is an important one, are no longer able uncritically 
to accept the sweeping interpretations advanced by observers of South Asian 
society in the nineteenth century, and by historians until the middle 
of the present century. Cohn has noted that generalisations about the 
rise and initial impact of British rule are virtually impossible. He 
points out that the regions that were penetrated by British power over 
the course of these hundred years differed greatly in their social and 
political structures, and that British political and administrative policies
1. Karl Marx, "The Future Results of the British Rule in India", in
David Fernbach (ed), Karl Marx, Surveys from Exile: Political Writings 
(London, 1973), vol 2, p.320.
varied from region to region and changed throughout the period. More 
recently, Stokes has affirmed the essential complexity, rather than 
simplicity, of the relationship of the imperial State to social structure 
and change in South Asia at this time, and has pointed to the static 
nature of the tradition/modernity dichotomy still employed by some social
3scientists. Historians of Africa's colonial period have then argued 
that continuity of indigenous institutions, formations and values is just 
as important a feature of colonial history as change. Changes that do 
occur under colonial rule often have their roots in the pre-colonial 
period.^
The historiography of nineteenth-century Punjab is quite backward.
The story of the Punjab's annexation by the British in 1849 - an act 
that brought to a close nearly a century of Punjabi freedom from direct 
imperial rule - is a highly eventful one. It was studded with diplomatic 
missions from the East India Company to the exotic court of the Sikh 
Maharajas, with intrigues and assassinations at that court, with bitter 
rebellions and great battles, with the clash of grand personalities 
and ideologies. Not surprisingly, it is a story that has been told many 
times before, both by British and by Punjabi historians. Cunningham's 
History Of The Sikhs5 and Hasrat's Anglo-Sikh Relations1799-1849^ are 
amongst the best of these accounts.
2. Bernard S. Cohn, "The Initial British Impact on India: A Case Study 
of the Benares Region", in Journal of Asian Studies, vol xix, no 4 
(Aug 1960), p.418.
3. Eric Stokes, The Peasant and the Raj: Studies in Agrarian Society 
and Peasant Rebellions in Colonial India (Cambridge, 1978), chap 1.
4. See, for example, J.F. Ade Ajayi, "The Continuity of African 
Institutions under Colonialism", in T.O. Ranger (ed), Emerging Themes 
of African History (Dar es Salaam, 1968), chap 17.
5. J.D. Cunningham, A History Of The Sikhs (Delhi, reprint 1972).
6 . Bikrama Jit Hasrat, Anglo-Sikh Relations 1799-1849: A Reappraisal 
of the Rise and Fall of the Sikhs (Hoshiarpur, 1968).
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But for the most part, the literature on this subject is dominated 
by the narrow, subjective concerns of either imperialist or nationalist 
scholarship, and little interest is shown in the deeper, longer-term
7historical processes that might have been at work. The question is 
not whether the British had a right to conquer the Punjab, but why and 
how they did conquer it when they did; not whether certain Punjabis 
betrayed the cause of freedom, but why they acted in the way they did, 
and whether this had any significant bearing on the British takeover.
Similarly, the story of the operation of a British administration 
in the Punjab in the two decades after 1849, of the changes wrought by 
that administration and of the adaptation of Punjabis to British rule, 
has been subjected to certain distortions. For a long time - until 
the British quit the subcontinent in 1947, in fact - colonial censorship 
prevented Punjabis from writing honestly about this period of their history. 
Among the few British studies that were critical of colonial policies 
(but not, it should be added, of the fact of colonial rule) was Thorburn'sg
The Punjab in Peace and War. Otherwise, the historical literature on
this period was dominated until 1947 by the biographies of the great
colonial administrators - in particular, the biographies of the Lawrence
9brothers: Edwardes and Merivale's Life of Sir Henry Lawrence, Gibbon's 
The Lawrences Of The Punjab^  and Bosworth Smith's Life of Lord Lawrence.^
As might be expected, these works tended to glorify the lives of their 
subjects. Implicit in this, moreover, was a glorification of British 
rule per se: all of these works drew a sharp distinction between the 
Sikh period (invariably characterised as having been chaotic and insecure) 
and the early British period (peaceful and increasingly prosperous); and 
all of them contrived to reduce the impact of British rule to an acceptable
7. For example, one of the Punjab's most respected scholars of Sikh 
history, Sita Ram Kohli, has dismissed the political history of the 
Sikh court during the absolutely critical years 1840-49 as having 
"but melancholy interest for the students of Sikh history" : Kohli's 
forward to Laia Sohan Lai Suri, Umdat-Ut-Tawarikh, Daftar iv, pts 
i-iii (trans by V.S. Suri, Chandigarh 1973), p.xxi.
8 . S.S. Thorburn, The Punjab in Peace and War (Patiala, reprint 1970).
9. Herbert B. Edwardes and Herman Merivale, Life of Sir Henry Lawrence 
(London, 18 73).
10. Frederick P. Gibbon, The Lawrences Of The Punjab (London, 1908).
11. R. Bosworth Smith, Life of Lord Lawrence (London, 1901), 2 vols.
XX
laundry-list of "reforms”. Such was the stuff of officially-sponsored
12history in the colonial period.
So powerful, however, was the principal image conveyed by this colonial
literature - the image of a Punjab transformed and modernised after 1849
by a paternalistic British administration - that it left an indelible mark
on the imagination of a whole generation of non-British historians in the
post-independence period. Studies like Chhabra's Social and Economic
13History of the Panjab (1849-1901), Mathur's British Administration of
14Punjab (1849-75) and van den Dungen's doctoral thesis, "LandTransfer, 
Social Change and Political Stability in the Punjab, 1849-1901"^, while 
they are much more objective and analytical in their treatment of the 
early impact of colonial rule than are the older, British accounts, still 
start from the premise that 1849 is the crucial date in modern Punjab 
history, and that the years after 1849 constitute a period of rapid and 
momentous British-sponsored change. Seldom in this comparatively recent 
literature is there more than a perfunctory discussion of the fundamental 
"structural” conditions of change (for example, landscape and human 
geography), or of fundamental continuities of Punjabi institutions and 
traditions. Consequently, the early colonial period retains something 
of the mythical character that it was vested with by the British historians. 
A satisfactory general history of nineteenth-century Punjab, it must be 
concluded, has yet to be written.
This thesis, a study of the political history of the Punjab between 
1839 and 1872, has a fairly specific purpose: to explain the background,
12. Tandon has recalled that as a schoolboy in the Punjab in the 1920s 
he had to read history textbooks that divided Indian history into 
three periods, Hindu, Muslim and British, and ended with a chapter 
titled "Angrezi Raj ki Barkaten - Blessings of the English Raj".
"This was always a standard question in our examinations. There was 
a list of about a dozen blessings like law and order, irrigation 
canals, roads and bridges, schools, railways, telegraph and public 
health" : Prakash Tandon, Punjabi Century, 1857-1947 (Berkeley, 1968), 
p.13.
13. G.S. Chhabra, Social and Economic History of the Panjab (1849-1901), 
(Jullundur, no date).
14. Y.B. Mathur, British Administration of Punjab (1849-75), (Delhi, no date).
15. P.H.M. van den Dungen, "Land Transfer, Social Change and Political 
Stability in the Punjab, 1849-1901" (unpub Ph.D. thesis, Australian 
National University, Canberra, 1966).
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process and short-term consequences of the Punjab's transition from 
sovereign region to British imperial province - its return to empire. 
Nonetheless, it is to be hoped that the thesis will be a contribution 
to scholarly understanding of changes and continuities in South Asia 
more broadly during the nineteenth century. The questions that it 
seeks to answer could be applied - indeed, in certain cases, have been 
applied - to other regions in the subcontinent, and to the Afro-Asian 
world of nineteenth-century European imperialism generally. The 
wider implications of the findings of the thesis are taken up in the 
Conclusion.
If the Punjab's return to empire is to be subjected to the sort of 
reassessment that we have suggested is necessary, the first task will be 
to locate the starting-point of our analysis firmly within nineteenth- 
century Punjab itself. What kind of society was it? Howwasit structured, 
and what were its dynamics? These questions are investigated in Chapter 
One, through an inquiry into the historic impact of landscape and 
geographic position on patterns of population distribution, socio-political 
organisation and economic activity. Chapter Two takes the political 
analysis further, through an inquiry into the evolution, organisation 
and functioning of the Sikh kingdom. The concern here is with the nature 
of the regional political system before the advent of British rule. Who 
had power, and how was that power administered? How was power legitimised? 
What were Maharaja Ranjit Singh's relations with his chieftains? This 
last question is a most important one. It would seem that the Sikhs 
and the British both tried, in different ways, to keep the chieftains 
in check - yet, in the event, neither regime could operate effectively 
without their support. The chieftains of the Punjab are therefore a key 
social and political group: in the third to seventh chapters of this 
thesis an effort is made to follow their fortunes, both collectively 
and with respect to certain prominent families, through the vicissitudes 
of the five "rulership" periods into which we have divided the period 
between 1839 and 1872. This will enable us to answer what is one of 
the primary questions raised by a study like this: when an indigenous 
State is superseded by a colonial State that reorganises the administrative 
system, what happens to those groups and individuals who previously had 
a stake in the exercise of political power?
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The following two chapters examine the politics of the Punjab's 
return to empire. Why did Sikh monarchical authority undergo decay 
between Ranjit Singh's death in 1839 and the outbreak of the first 
Anglo-Sikh war in the winter of 1845-46? Why did Anglo-Sikh diplomatic 
relations deteriorate during this period? Chapter Three looks at these 
questions, and suggests that the conventional answers - the notions 
that the crisis of the Sikh monarchy was due to a lack of aptitude on 
the part of Ranjit Singh's successors and that the war was a result of 
British territorial designs - are far from adequate. Imperial takeovers 
seem seldom to have been the straightforward and sudden conquests they 
are often portrayed as; and the historian need no longer feel like an 
apologist for empire if he detects an element of reluctance on the part 
of the imperialists or a degree of collaboration on the part of the 
indigenous political structure. Chapter Four investigates the gradual 
takeover of the Sikh kingdom by the British from early 1846 to early 
1849: the transition from "informal" to "formal" imperial control.
What were the methods and the stages by which, and the political levels 
at which, the British made this transition? How important was either 
Punjabi collaboration or Punjabi resistance as one of the determinants 
of the move by the British from one stage of control to the next?
The remaining three chapters follow the dual theme of British 
political strategies and Punjabi responses through the first two decades 
of direct British rule in the Punjab. How did the British set out to 
rule the newly-acquired province, and in what ways did their rule differ 
from that of the Sikhs? How did Punjabis adjust to the new circumstances, 
and to what extent were they able to influence British policies? What 
was the extent and nature of the British "impact" by the early 1870s? 
Chapter Five looks at what was perhaps among the boldest political steps 
ever taken by the British in South Asia: the construction of an 
authoritarian and paternalistic provincial administration that by-passed 
almost completely the chieftains and those lesser men of influence whom 
the Sikhs - for all the levelling tendencies of their rule - had still 
recognised as rightful, "traditional" intermediaries. Why did the British 
embark on such an experiment in political exclusivity and authoritarianism? 
How did the old elites of Punjabi society, and the subordinate classes, 
who were supposed to be the beneficiaries of this new style of government,
respond to this experiment? These questions are considered by way 
of an inquiry into the mentality and the work of the "Punjab School" 
between 1849 and 1856. Chapter Six, which examines the Punjab's role 
in the Great Rebellion of 1857-58, raises another important question 
concerning the post-annexation experiment by the British: had it weakened 
decisively the desire and the capacity of Punjabis, especially the Sikhs, 
to rise up against the British again? The answer, in short, would seem 
to be that it had not; and Chapter Six explains how the British were 
able, in the nick of time, to turn the Punjab around from the possibility 
of full-scale insurrection to general collaboration. Chapter Seven 
takes the political story through to 1872. It shows how in the 1860s 
the British sought to shore up their authority in the Punjab by building 
up the wealth, status and power of the old elites. It also shows, on 
the other hand, how the material condition of a large section of the Punjabi 
peasantry was beginning to undergo a marked deterioration by the time 
of the Kuka outbreak of 1872. Was there, in the decade after the Great 
Rebellion, a permanent retreat, at once deliberate and unintentional, 
from the "Punjab School's" earlier experiment? What had the Punjab's 
return to empire come to mean by the early 1870s?
Finally, there is the question of sources for the study of Punjab 
history between 1839 and 1872. This thesis draws heavily on three kinds 
of "primary" sources - all of them British sources. First, there are 
the files of the Political Department of the Government of India for 
the period 1830-65), held in the National Archives of India, New Delhi, 
and the various files held in the Punjab Secretariat Record Office, Lahore: 
the Lahore Residency Letters (1846-49), the Board of Administration 
records (1849-53), the Chief Commissionership records (1853-58) and the 
files of the General, Judicial, Political and Revenue Departments of the 
Punjab Government (the Lieutenant-Governorship) for the period 1858-68.^
16. The other major repository of British files in Lahore is the Board 
of Revenue (the office of the Financial Commissioner, Punjab). I 
applied for, but was not granted, permission to consult these files. 
Similarly, my application for permission to visit the headquarter 
offices of Lahore, Gujranwala and Sialkot Districts had not been 
"processed" by the time I was obliged to leave Pakistan.
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Second, there are the official reports published by the Indian and Punjab 
Governments: census reports, annual administration reports, district 
land revenue settlement reports, and so forth. Third, there are the 
printed documents, including Parliamentary Papers, private papers and 
selections (both official and non-official) from the official records.
Taken together, these three kinds of sources represent a considerable 
body of detailed information on conditions, events and trends in nineteenth- 
century Punjab.
The chief shortcoming of these British sources is, of course, the
fact that they present an almost exclusively British viewpoint; and
the danger is that, if he encounters a particular notion (for example,
the notion that Sikh rule was extortionate in its policies towards the
cultivators of the Punjab) sufficiently often, the historian may be
seduced into mistaking prejudice for historical reality. Alternative
sources for the period covered in this thesis are comparatively few,
17especially for the historian who has no knowledge of Persian. Even
if language were not a barrier, however, the problem of imbalance would
remain. It is not just that nineteenth-century rural Punjab was not a
particularly literate society, but also that British censorship discouraged
most of those Punjabis who were literate from committing their thoughts
18about British rule to paper. Non-British sources for local-level
19studies are by no means absent; but these are of little real use for
17. The chief Persian sources for the Sikh period that have not been 
translated are the Khalsa Darbar Records, held in the Punjab State 
Archives, Patiala. It would seem that these records contain detailed 
information on Sikh land revenue administration and ¿agir grants:
see Sita Ram Kohli, Catalogue of Khalsa Darbar Records, vol 2 
(Lahore, 1927).
18. Barrier has observed: "The patriarchal rigidity that once characterized 
British administration in the Punjab - - - also deterred many prominent 
Punjabis from keeping private correspondence and family records - - - - 
many Punjabi social, political, and religious leaders burned their 
correspondence from fear of British prosecution" : N. Gerald Barrier, 
Punjab History In Printed British Documents : A Bibliographic Guide
to Parliamentary Papers and Select, Nonserial Publications, 1843-1947 
(Missouri, 1969), p.l.
19. For a useful introductory essay on these, see Tom G. Kessinger, "Sources 
For The Social And Economic History Of Rural Punjab", in W. Eric 
Gustafson and Kenneth W. Jones (eds), Sources On Punjab History 
(Delhi, 1975), pp. 9-39.
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a regional, political study like this thesis. In the end, the regional 
historian of mid-nineteenth-century Punjab has no choice but to rely 
heavily on the British sources, and to supplement them with whatever 
(translated) Persian sources are available to him. Still, as this thesis 
hopefully shows, it should be possible to "read" the British sources with 
care, and to write a history of the early colonial period that does not 
do injustice to the people who were on the receiving end of colonial rule.
CHAPTER ONE
TEE FRONTIER SOCIETY
Introduction
Our purpose in this first chapter is to investigate what may, 
for what of a better expression, be called the holistic constitution 
of Punjabi society in the early decades of the nineteenth century.
We want to capture both the essential character of that society - 
the way of working that made it different from other societies - and 
the inner dynamic that had brought it to its existing state on the eve 
of British conquest and would carry it through its immediate colonial 
future.
Given the enormous complexity and diversity of "traditional" South 
Asian society generally, this may appear to be an all but impossible task. 
Certainly, when we begin to probe the structure of Punjabi society at this 
time we soon realise that we are dealing with not one but a number of 
formations - ethnic, status, religious, economic, and so forth - and that 
these overlap in a bewildering variety of ways. Then, perhaps, we are 
forced to retreat to the position adopted by van den Dungen: "There is 
no single uniform way in which society in this region can be described."* 
But if we enquire into the historical and geographical origins of the 
Punjab’s social diversity, the difficulty of describing pre-colonial 
society in holistic terms diminishes markedly. By focusing on the 
historic impact of physiographic environment, we can, in fact, see the 
Punjab as a particular kind of society - a frontier society.
Now the term "frontier society" can mean two things. It can, in 
the first place, mean a society which is situated at the frontier of a 
dominant civilisation or at the boundary of a settled and developed 
territory. To a certain extent, this fits the Punjab, because the Punjab 
was located at the outer limits of both a north Indian civilisation and
1. P.H.M. van den Dungen, "Changes in Status and Occupation in Nineteenth-
Century Panjab", in D.A. Low (ed.), Soundings in Modem. South Asia Eistory 
(London, 1968), p.61.
2a British subcontinental empire. But it would be more accurate to note
that the Punjab was situated at the place where the boundary of north
Indian civilisation met and overlapped that of another dominant
civilisation - a central Asian and overwhelmingly Islamic civilisation -
and that the Punjab had always been a point of cultural transition, and
a channel of human movement, from central Asia to northern India. From
the perspective of historical geography, then, the Punjab is probably best
2characterised as a "route zone". The second usage of "frontier society" 
refers to a general condition of society, to a condition of heterodoxy, 
restlessness, and lawlessness which physical distance from the centre of 
regularised civilisation both permits and encourages. It is primarily 
in this sense that we call the Punjab a frontier society.
In a way, there is nothing new in such a categorisation. It has 
long been recognised that the Punjab’s location at the junction of the 
ancient trade and raid highways out of the nomadic plateaus of Central 
Asia towards the rich and fertile Gangetic plain had, until the arrival 
of the sea-borne European imperialists, made it the primary arena of
3conflict between contestants for political control of South Asia, and 
that this long exposure to political instability had bred in the Punjabi
4people a distinctive temperament of "flexibility, enterprise, and pragmatism." 
One has only to consider the fact that between the beginning of the eleventh 
century and the turn of the eighteenth century the Punjab was invaded on 
no fewer than seventy occasions and ruled by no fewer than a dozen, 
successive non-Punjabi dynasties,^ to appreciate the significance of the 
region's location.
2. Cohn categorises the Punjab as a cultural and political "route" zone 
"transitional between the center around Peshawar or over the Hindu 
Kush [mountain range] into Afghanistan and cultural-political centres 
around Delhi and Agra" : Bernard S. Cohn, India: the Social Anthropology 
of a Civilization (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1971), p.25.
3. See, for example, Hugh Kennedy Trevaskis, The Punjab of To-Day, vol. 1,
An Economic Survey of the Punjab in Recent Years (1890-1925), (Lahore, 
1931), p.l.
4. Satish Saberwal, Mobile Men: Limits to Social Change in Urban Punjab 
(New Delhi, 1976), p.vii.
5. Ikram Ali Malik (ed.), A Book of Readings on the History of the Punjab, 
1799-1947 (Lahore, 1970), pp. iii-xxviii; Leslie S. Saunders, Report 
on the Revised Land Revenue Settlement of the Lahore District in the 
Lahore Division of the Panjab, 1865-69 (Lahore, 1873), (hereafter
SR Lahore 1865-69), p.20.
3Where our approach is somewhat novel is our wish to emphasise, in 
addition to this strategic consideration, the historical importance of 
the Punjab's internal physiography. Indeed, it is the general thrust 
of the argument in this chapter that the main features of pre-colonial 
Punjabi society - its vertical structural cleavages, its sub-territoriality, 
its attachment to honour-bound cultural values, its marked disposition 
towards militaristic and clannish thought and action, and so forth - 
cannot be explained without reference to what Stokes has aptly called 
"economic ecology".^ We shall argue that the uneven distribution of the 
Punjab's two great natural resources - fertile soils and water for irrigation - 
had worked against the economic, political, and cultural integration of 
the different social groups which had, over the course of many centuries, 
moved into the region and settled there. Between nomadic pastoralists 
and settled peasant cultivators, for example, the universal and ancient 
antagonism had persisted, fuelled as it was by competition for resource 
control and, not infrequently, by religious differences. Similarly, the 
ancient tension between town and countryside, which was rooted in mutually 
mistrustful and exploitative relations, had endured. These antagonisms 
and tensions were built into the structure of pre-colonial Punjabi 
society and were its primary moving force. When the authority of the 
overarching State collapsed or was weakened - as happened on several 
occasions during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries - these antagonisms 
and tensions degenerated quickly into open lawlessness and predatory 
violence. It was not for nothing, then, that the British often compared 
the Punjab to that other turbulent society that they knew so well: the 
Highlands of Scotland.
Region and subregion
What exactly do we mean by "the Punjab" and "central Punjab",and 
why have we chosen to make the latter the special focus of our study?
Since the sixteenth century, when it first came into common usage, 
the term "Punjab" has been employed to denote not one but several regions: 
a geographical region, a cultural region, and any of a number of political
6. Eric Stokes, The Peasant and the Raj: Studies in Agrarian Society and
Peasant Rebellions in Colonial India (Cambridge, 1978), p.7..
4or administrative regions. We shall employ it in the geographical sense.
The actual word panjab, which is a Persian compound meaning "five waters",
indicates the region - the "land of the five rivers", the watershed of
the Indus river's five major tributaries: Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Beas,
8and Sutlej. In other words the Punjab region consists of the five 
doabs ("two waters"), or inter-riverain tracts, that lie between the 
Indus and Sutlej rivers. The names of these doabs are Sind Sagar,
Chaj, Rachna, Bari, and Jullundur (See Map 1). Their combined area is
gjust under 52,000 square miles. This region of the five doabs has 
a certain cultural dimension too, since it is the homeland of the Punjabi 
language**“* and of what are claimed to be distinctive, Punjabi customs, 
folklaws, and legends.**
The subregion of "central Punjab" we define, somewhat more arbitrarily,
as the central and upper portions of the Rachna and Bari Doabs - an area
of about 12 , 0 0 0 square miles (or nearly one-quarter of the region).
In the early years of British rule it had an administrative name - the
Lahore Division, made up of five Districts: Amritsar, Gujranwala,
12Gurdaspur, Lahore, and Sialkot (See Map 2). The importance to us of
7. J.S. Grewal, Miscellaneous Articles (Amritsar,1974), pp. 1-10.
8 . These rivers unite to form the Panjnad ("five streams")before 
joining the Indus: O.H.K. Spate, India and Pakistan: A General 
and Regional Geography (London, reprint 1960), p.464. Throughout 
this study the common spelling of Punjab (with "u") and other place 
names (eg "Jullundur") is retained.
9. Report on the Census of the Punjab, taken on 10th January 1868 
(hereafter Punjab Census 1868), no author (Lahore, 1870), General 
Statement no 2.
10. For a map showing prevalent languages, see Census of India, 1891, 
vol xix, The Punjab and its Feudatories, pt 1, The Report on the 
Census (hereafter Punjab Census 1891), by E.D. Maclagan (Calcutta, 
1892), p.261.
11. See H.A. Rose, A Glossary of the Tribes and Castes of the Punjab 
and North-West Frontier Province (Patiala, reprint 1970), 3 vols;
R.C. Temple (ed.), Panjab Notes and Queries(Allahabad, no date), 4 vols; 
and R.C. Temple, The Legends of the Punjab (Patiala, reprint 1962-3),
3 vols.
12. In 1859 a new Amritsar Division was formed out of Amritsar, Gurdaspur, 
and Sialkot Districts. In 1884 the Division was abolished, its three 
districts being restored to the Lahore Division.
5the subregion of central Punjab is that it contains the region’s two
premier cities - Lahore, the traditional capital of the Punjab, and
Amritsar, its commercial capital - in addition to a large number of
the region's towns and villages; and it is the homeland of the Sikhs,
the religious community which exercised political sway over the Punjab
13immediately prior to the British conquest. Most of the political 
events that shook nineteenth-century Punjab had their epicentres in 
central Punjab. We shall gain a better understanding of those events 
if we narrow down the focus of our study, wherever it is practical to do 
this, to developments in this important subregion.
Economic demography
Compared with the dramatic terrains - the Hindu Kush and Himalaya
mountains especially - that surround the Punjab, the internal landscape
is tediously uniform. The badland country of the Salt Range in the
northern Chaj and Sind Sagar Doabs and the rolling sand dunes in the
lower portion of the Sind Sagar Doab do provide some relief; but the
remainder of the Punjab is simply a flat plain of sandy loams and clays.
However, in the pre-colonial period, before the British transformed much
of the landscape through their construction of mighty irrigation canals,
there did exist considerable surface diversity:
The face of the country [wrote the authors of the first 
administration report on British Punjab] presents every 
variety from the most luxuriant cultivation to the most 
sandy deserts, and the wildest prairies of grass and 
brushwood. A traveller, passing through...the northern 
tracts, would imagine the Punjab to be the garden of India; 
again returning by the road which intersects the central 
tracts, he would suppose it to be a country not worth
annexing.14
13. We have excluded the Jullundur Doab from the subregion of central 
Punjab for two main reasons. First, under Sikh rule this Doab was 
relatively peripheral to, and independent of, the political centre. 
Second, the Doab came under British rule three years before the rest 
of the region. Until the formation of the (British) Punjab Province 
in 1859, political and administrative developments in this Doab 
(called the Trans-Sutlej Territories between 1846 and 1849, and the 
Trans-Sutlej Division after 1849) were generally several steps ahead 
of those in the remainder of the region.
14. "General Report upon the Administration of the Punjab Proper [the 
four western-most doabs] for the years 1849-50 and 1850-51"
(hereafter "PAR 1849-51"): Foreign Miscellaneous (hereafter FM), 
no 356, para 4 (National Archives of India, New Delhi [hereafter 
NAI]).
6The crucial factor behind this diversity was, of course, the differing 
availability across the region of water for either cultivation or natural 
vegetation.
This brings us to a most important sociological point: in
pre-colonial Punjab the land - whatever its inherent fertility - was
but minimally productive, and therefore incapable of supporting more
than the thinnest population, without adequate and regular supplies
of water from rainfall, rivers, wells, or canals. This is easily
demonstrated. According to the provincial census of 1868 (the first
remotely reliable enumeration), the population of the Punjab region was
just under 9.5 millions, 4 millions (or 43 per cent) of whom lived in
central P u n j a b . T a b l e  1 : 1 shows the district-wise*^* distribution
of this population, together with cultivation percentages and annual
rainfall figures, from which a direct correlation between annual rainfall
on the one hand and population and cultivation densities on the other can 
17be inferred. The rough pattern that emerges from these statistics is
one of three basic hydrographic zones in early-nineteenth-century Punjab.
These zones swept transversely across the doabs, parallel to the northwest
to southeast inclination of the Himalayas, and were marked out by the
1815 and 20 inch annual \ $ o . As the distance from the
Himalayas increased, the rainfall decreased and the depth of the watertable 
became greater. Hence the supply of water on the land, and with it the 
extent of cultivation and density of population, diminished.
15. Punjab Census 1868, General Statement no 2.
16. In this table, and in subsequent tables of a similar form, the 
districts are listed in the order in which they appear in the 
statements in the Punjab Census 1868. Only those districts of the 
Province lying within the five doabs are listed.
17. This correlation was noted by the authors of both the 1868 and 1881 
census reports: Punjab Census 1868, p.10; Denzil Charles Jelf 
Ibbetson, Report on the Census of the Panjab 1881 (Lahore, 1883), 
(hereafter Punjab Census 1881),p.35.
18. For a map showing isohyets , see Trevaskis, The Punjab of 
To-Day, vo1 1, p .2.
7TABLE 1 : 1 Annual rainfall, area, percentage of cultivation, population 
and population density by districts for region and subregion
District Average 
annual 
rainfall 
in inches*
Area in
square
miles
Percentage 
of cultivat­
ion on total 
area
Population Population 
per square 
mile
Jullundur 30.4 1,333 79.7 794,764 596
Hoshiarpur 36.4 2,086 56.3 938,890 450
Amritsar ) 25.9 2,036 70.5 1,083,514 532
Sialkot ) SUk.J region 38.8 1,970 64.3 1,005,004 510
Gurdaspur) 30.1 1,341 72.3 655,362 489
Lahore ) 17.0 3,624 42.1 789,666 218
Gujranwala) 26.9 2,657 35.3 550,576 207
Rawalpindi 33.3 6,216 24.1 711,256 114
Jhelum 21.7 3,910 30.5 500,988 128
Gujrat 27.4 1,900 51.6 616,347 324
Shahpur 13.6 4,699 13.6 368,796 78
Multan 6 . 6 5,882 16.5 471,563 80
Jhang 1 0 . 1 5,712 1 1 . 1 348,027 61
Montgomery 9.6 5,577 15.0 359,437 64
Muzaffargarh 6 . 6 3,022 18.8 295,547 98
Source: Punjab Census 1868, General Statement no 2. 
* Punjab Census 1881, Abstract no 14, p.35.
8These three hydrographic zones may be identified as the moist zone 
(basically Jullundur, Hoshiarpur, Amritsar, Sialkot, and Gurdaspur Districts) 
which received more than 20 inches of rain each year, and which in 1868 
had a cultivation rating of more than 50 per cent and a population density 
of above 400 persons per square mile; the marginal zone (basically Lahore, 
Gujranwala, Rawalpindi, Jhelum, and Gujrat Districts) which received between
15 and 20 inches of rain, and which had a cultivation rating of between 
20 and 50 per cent and a population density of between 100 and 400 persons 
per square mile; and the arid zone (basically Shahpur, Multan, Jhang, 
Montgomery, and Muzaffargarh Districts) which had a cultivation rating of 
below 20 per cent and a population density of below 100 persons per square 
mile. Thus early-nineteenth-century Punjab consisted of an eastern and 
central zone of agricultural security and a western zone of agricultural 
insecurity, between which lay a zone of transition. Let us briefly describe 
these three zones.
The moist zone was bounded on the north by a narrow strip of
submontane country which, because of its promimity to the Himalayas,
19received as much as 38 inches of rain each year. Most of this rain was
received during the monsoon season (late June to early September), at
which time the rivers often broke their banks, inundating the surrounding
20countryside with silt-laden floodwaters known as sailab. Throughout 
the rainless months the soil was kept moist by the countless mountain 
streams that intersected the countryside and by wells which, because the 
watertable lay close to the surface, were cheap to build and easy to work. 
Elsewhere in the moist zone, where the rainfall was less and the rivers 
generally kept within their banks during the monsoon (the exception was 
the Beas, whose low left bank periodically supplied the Jullundur Doab 
with fertilisations of sailab floodwaters), artificial irrigation was
21more important. The upper Bari Doab was watered by the Shah Nuhr Canal.
19. E.A. Prinsep, Report on the Revised Settlement of the Sealkote 
District (1863) of the Amritsar Division (Lahore, 1865), (hereafter 
SR Sialkot 1863), pp.7-8.
20. John Lawrence's introduction to summary land revenue settlement reports, 
31 March 1848: Foreign Secret Consultations (hereafter FSC), 28
April 1848, nos 57-66 (NAI).
21. For a report on this canal, which supplied water to the Shalamar 
gardens at Lahore and the Har Mandar Sahib ("Golden Temple") at 
Amritsar, see Major R. Napier, "Report on the Husli Canal", 20 Feb 
1848: FSC, 28 April 1848, nos 57-66 (NAI).
9wells both cheap and easy. In the 1840s the countryside about Batala,
22in the Gurdaspur District, was described as "the land of wells".
With ample supplies of water and level, arable soils, the moist zone
offered (as the statistics provided in Table 1:1 indicate) the most
favourable conditions for intensive agriculture in early-nineteenth-century
Punjab. In the subregion of central Punjab the moist zone had an apt
23local name - the Des, or cultivated and inhabited country.
And the watertable was still sufficiently high to make irrigation from
In the marginal zone, which separated the moist zone from the arid
zone, conditions were somewhat different. The riverbanks here were too
steep to permit the construction of canals into the interiors of the doàbs
(thus were the British-built canals, which ran down the centres of the
doabs, such mammoth engineering feats). Wells were no easy alternative:
the watertable here had fallen to 40 or 60 feet; and a fifty-foot well
required the labour of sixteen men and sixteen bullocks, day and night,
24to irrigate about 26 acres. Yet without wells the land was hardly
productive. Thus the country about Tarn Taran, in the south of the
25Amritsar district, was "entirely dependent on well irrigation".
In the vicinity of Lahore city there were, in the 1830s, about twelve
26operative wells to every village. A failure of the rains (which was
22. Edward Lake's report on the summary settlement of the upper Bari 
Doab, 25 Dec 1847: ibid.
23. R.H. Davies, Report on the Revised Settlement of the Gurdaspur District 
in the Amritsar Division (submitted 1856, published Lahore, 1871), 
(hereafter SR Gurdaspur 1856), p .1; Gujranwala District Gazetteer 
1883-84 (hereafter District Gazetteer is abbreviated to DG), pp.2-3; 
J.H. Morris, Report on the Revised Settlement of the Goojranwala 
District in the Lahore Division (effected 1856, submitted and published 
Lahore, 1860), (hereafter SR Gujranuala 1856), p.21; R.H. Davies, R.E. 
Egerton, R. Temple andJ.H. Morris, Report on the Revised Settlement of 
the Lahore District in the Lahore Division (submitted 1858, published 
Lahore, 1860), (hereafter SR Lahore 1858), pp.3, 17-19; SR Sialkot 
1863, pp.7-8.
24. n 21 above.
25. R.H. Davies and W. Blyth, Report on the Revised Settlement of Umritsury 
Sowrian and Turun Taran Pergunnahs of the Umritsur District (Lahore, 
1856), (hereafter SR Amritsar 1856), p.22.
26. Major R. Leech, "Table showing the fertility and produce of the land 
in the vicinity of Amritsar and Lahore in 1837" : FSC, 18 Nov 1843, 
no 17 (NAI).
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fairly common in the marginal zone) spelt calamity for these villages, 
for then all but the deepest wells dried up, the crops were threatened, 
and the spectre of famine haunted the land. In 1783, when there had 
been no rain for five consecutive harvests, the people had been forced
27to eat leaves and bark and even, in some extreme cases, resort to canabalism.
Except in the Hithar, or damp lowlands of the riverbeds, agriculture was
thus a fairly precarious enterprise in the marginal zone. And once again
the local place names reflect conditions accurately. The area to the
28south of Lahore city was known as the Nakka, or border country, while
the triangular piece of doab upland between the cities of Lahore, Amritsar,
29and Kasur was known as the Manjha, or middle country.
In the arid zone, which covered more than half of the Punjab region,
the annual rainfall was below 15 inches - in places it was as little as
5 inches. Moreover, the depth of the watertable, between 80 and 100
feet, virtually prohibited the construction of wells. Cultivation thus
shrank back to the occasional oasis, to the damp riverbeds, and to a
narrow strip of well land along the riverbanks. The interior of each
doab was left a barren and only sparsely inhabited wilderness. The
greater portion of the Sind Sagar Doab was a sand desert known as the Thai.
The waterless central portions of the lower Rachna and Bari Doabs were 
30known as the Bar, described in the middle of the century as a "sad 
and strange scene" of "interminable wastes, overgrown with grass and
31bushes, scantily threaded by sheep-walks and the foot-prints of cattle."
More desolate still was the Bar at the southern end of the Bari Doab.
The following description comes from the British-compiled Multan District 
Gazetteer of 1883-84:
27. SR Lahore 1865-69, pp.36-8; W.G. Waterfield, Report on the Second 
Regular Settlement of the Gujrat District, Panjab (Lahore, 1874), 
(hereafter SR Gujrat 1874), p.173.
28. Lahore DG 1882-84, p.2; J.S. Grewal and Indu Banga (trans and eds), 
Early Nineteenth Century Panjab: From Ganesh Das rs "Char Bagh-i- 
Panjab" (Amritsar, 1975), p.132.
29. Ibidj SR Amritsar 1856, pp. 1, 21, 80; SR Lahore 1858, p.17.
30. SR Gujranwala 1856, p.2 1.
31. "PAR 1849-51" : FM, no 356, paras 5-6 (NAI).
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It is utterly without cultivation, quite destitute of 
anything which can be called grass, and its only trees 
are a few stunted bushes of the inferior class. It is 
simply a vast plain of hard clay (pat) unrelieved by any 
signs of human life as far as the eye can reach.32
However, it is worth pointing out that the southern Bar had not always
been such a desolate place; in early medieval times the extent of
33cultivation there was probably commensurate to that in the moist zone.
Exactly what caused such a dramatic change in the Bar's fortune is not
altogether clear, but it does seem that about eight or nine centuries
ago the Punjab's rivers suddenly shifted course towards the west, leaving
34the cultivated lands literally high and dry. The resultant impoverishment 
was later exacerbated by the nomadic invasions of the Punjab and by the 
great political struggle and social displacement that accompanied the 
collapse of the Mughal empire in the eighteenth century and the emergence 
of Sikh power in the region.
Social organisation
The essential principle of social organisation in nineteenth-century 
Punjab (as in most pre-industrial societies) was kinship rather than 
class. This does not prohibit a general class analysis of nineteenth- 
century Punjab - the division of the agrarian population into general 
categories like landlords, peasant proprietors, and tenant cultivators, 
for example. But it is important to remember that in the full Marxian 
sense, classes are to be defined in terms of their different relationships 
to the production process, and that these relationships cannot be understood 
except within the context of an analysis of the State, in whose structure 
of power and juridical institutions all such relationships are deeply 
embedded. We shall therefore postpone any class analysis until the next 
chapter, wherein an analysis of the Sikh State will be undertaken.
32. Multan DG 1883-84, p.5.
33. See the District Gazetteers and Settlement Reports of Multan, 
Muzaffargarh, Gujranwala, and Lahore Districts.
34. Multan DG 1883-84, p.7; SR Lahore 1858, pp.8-9, 18. For a map 
showing ancient river courses, see K.N. Dikshit, "Exploration along 
the Right Bank of River Sutlej in Punjab", in Journal of Indian 
History, vol XLV, pt 111, Aug 1967, facing p.564.
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The broad kinship units in the Punjab were the caste and the
tribe. Let us define these units, as Weberian "ideal types". The
caste (zat) is an endogamous social group which is based upon
occupation and is ranked within a hierarchical caste system on the basis
of ritual duties and prohibitions. It is divided into a number of
exogamous descent groups (|gots) arranged into a sort of lesser status
hierarchy. Each got is further divided into a number of genealogically
"shallow" lineage groups consisting of a small number of closely related
families. Social relationships within the lineage group, and occasionally
within the got, are channelled through an institution called the biradari
(fraternity) which is made up of adult males. The whole caste system
is a highly fluid one, for changes in the political or economic standing
of the individual got or zat can result in elevation (and, of course,
degradation) on the hierarchical scale - a process which is generally
35termed sanskritisation.
The tribe (also zat), on the other hand, is a more permanent and
a less ritualistically directed social group; it might follow a
particular occupation and entertain notions of social defilement, but
its corporate identity is based primarily upon community of blood and
the corollaries of that - common customs, common language or dialect,
common habitat, and an internal political structure headed (usually)
36by a paramount chieftain. In the Punjab the tribe was often divided
into clans (also gots) which tended, once they had achieved political
and economic power in their own right, to become tribes. The tribal and
clannic equivalent of the biradari was a political assembly called the
37jirgah.
35. M.N. Srinivas, "The Cohesive Role of Sanskritization", in Philip Mason 
(ed), India and Ceylon: Unity and Diversity (London, 1967), pp.67-82.
36. Maurice Godelier, Perspectives in Marxist Anthropology (Cambridge, 1977), 
chap 3.
37. Chiefs and Families of Note in the Punjab: A Revised Edition of "The 
Punjab Chiefs" by Sir Lepel H. Griffin, K.C.S.I., of "Chiefs and 
Families of Note in the Punjab" by Colonel Charles Francis Massy,
Indian Staff Corps, and of "Chiefs and Families of Note in the Punjab" 
by Major W.L. Conran, Indian Army, and Mr H.D. Craik, Indian Civil 
Servicej Revised and corrected up to July 1, 1939, under the orders 
of the Punjab Government by G.L. Chopra (hereafter Griffin et at,
Chiefs and Families), (Lahore, rev edn 1940), vol 2, pp.256, 280.
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The actual predominance of either caste or tribe as the unit of
social organisation in nineteenth-century Punjab was closely connected
to the economic ecology of the region and to its communal demography.
On this last point we should note that there were three great religions
in the Punjab - Islam, Hinduism, and Sikhism. In 1868 Muslims numbered
nearly 6 millions (63 per cent of the total population); in the subregion
they numbered 2.2 millions (55 per cent). Hindus numbered just over 2
millions (in the subregion, 880,000^ and made up 22 percent of the population
in both region and subregion. Sikhs were everywhere the minority community.
Their total strength in the region was less than 800,000 (8 per cent);
in the subregion - their traditional homeland - they numbered just over
38511,000 (less than 13 per cent).
Table 1:2 sets out the district-wise division of the population 
into the three religious communities. From this it will be seen that 
the meridian of Lahore city, which bisects the subregion of central 
Punjab, represented the dividing line between the predominance of Islam 
and the increasing numerical strength, eastwards of this meridian, of 
Hinduism. This is an important point in that it indicates the differing 
extent to which areas of the population had been penetrated by those 
Brahmanical traditions which are so necessary for the evolution and 
maintenance of a caste system.
In the arid western and southern districts, where nomadic
pastoralism was the main economic activity, and where the influence of
Islam - with its normative egalitarianism - was greatest, the tribe in
something like its pure form was predominant. For example, in the
Jhelum and Rawalpindi Districts in the northern portion of the Sind
Sagar Doab the blood-proud and once politically dominant Janjuahs and
Gakkhars occupied unbroken ancestral tracts called ta'aluqas and preserved
the ceremonial custom of investing one clan head with the title of
39paramount chieftain (Sultan or Raja). In the marginal zone and in
the central and eastern districts of the moist zone, where nomadic
38. The figures are from Punjab Census 1868, General Statement no 7.
39. n 37 above.
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TABLE 1 : 2 Distribution of religious communities as percentages of 
total population by districts for region and subregion
Percentage of total population of
District
Muslims Hindus
Jullundur 45.09 40.06
Hoshiarpur 33.86 44.25
*
Amritsar ) 46.36 17.66
Sialkot ) 59.90 21.76
Gurdaspur )SU^45.32 38.12 r region
Lahore ) 59.54 14.73
Gujranwala) 64.94 18.91
Rawalpindi 87.33 8.54
Jhelum 86.66 9.80
Gujrat 87.24 8.63
Shahpur 82.84 14.54
Multan 76.38 18.45
Jhang 77.81 16.46
Montgomery 77.15 19.42
Muzaffargarh 84.54 12.43
Sikhs Others Total
14.74 0.11 100
8.46 13.43 100
24.24 11.74 100
5.00 13.34 100
6.10 10.46 100
15.10 10.63 100
7.07 9.08 100
3.42 0.71 100 
2.77 0.77 100 
3.35 0.78 100 
0.85 1.78 100 
0.19 4.98 100 
0.86 4.87 100
3.42 0.01 100 
0.87 2.16 100
SOURCE: Punjab Census 1868, General Statement no 7.
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of Hinduism began to make itself felt, the clan {got or mooee) occupying
40a smaller territorial section called the tappa was predominant.
The clan was usually headed by a lesser chieftain called the rrruqaddam
or chaudhari. In many cases the clan took its name from the progenitor
who, with his immediate kinsmen, had broken away from the tribe to found
a new colony in the wasteland. The number of new Sikh and Hindu clans
had burgeoned since the mid-eighteenth century, partly on account of the
increased political standing of these communities since the collapse of
Mughal authority, and partly on account of the encouragement given by the
Sikh State to the colonisation of the wastelands in the vicinity of the
capital. In the western districts, on the other hand, few new clans
had been formed., partly because the general aridity presented limited
opportunities for agricultural expansion, and partly because the Sikh
State had not looked with favour upon the desire of intermediate Muslim
41landowners to consolidate their influence at the local level. In
the eastern districts of the Punjab the clan increasingly adopted the
rigid restrictions of caste. This led Sir Denzil Ibbetson, who was the
original ethnographer of the Punjab, to observe in 1881 that the Punjab
Province "affords a peculiarly complete series of stages between the
purely tribal organisation - - - of the [northwest] frontier hills and
the [almost purely caste organisation of the ] village communities of
42the Jamna districts."
Status and power
Given this west to east gradation from the predominance of tribe 
to that of caste, it might be thought impossible to detect any strict
pastoralism gave way to peasant cultivation, and where the influence
40. See Maps Connected with the Report on the Revision of the Land Revenue 
Settlement of the Gujranwala District, 1866-67, and Maps Connected with
- - - Lahore District, 1865-69 for maps of these districts showing the 
tracts occupied by the agricultural tribes and clans.
41. H. Mackenzie, Report on the Revised Settlement of the Goojerat District 
in the Rawul Pindee Division (Lahore, 1861), (hereafter SR Gujrat 1861), 
p.29.
42. Panjab Castes: Being a reprint of the chapter on "The Races, Castes 
and Tribes of the People" in the Report on the Census of the Panjab 
[1881] published in 1883 by the late Sir Denzil Ibbetson, K.C.S.I. 
(Patiala, reprint 1970), (hereafter Ibbetson, Panjab Castes), p.22.
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hierarchical pattern to nineteenth-century Punjabi society. At least
43that is the burden of van den Dungen's assessment. But Ibbetson
would not have agreed with this and nor does McLeod. Ibbetson felt 
that, whatever the ideological and structural differences between pure 
caste and pure tribe may have been, zat membership was, in the final 
analysis, tantamount to membership of broad, socially and politically 
ranked occupational groups. He therefore divided - in the manner of a 
crude class analysis - the various castes and tribes of the Punjab into 
three great groups: the landowning and agricultural; the professional 
and mercantile; and the vagrant, menial, and artisan. The general 
classification of the populations of both region and subregion in 1881 
according to these three groups is given in Table 1:3.
This is not an especially precise classification, for there were
(as Ibbetson was quick to acknowledge) numerous instances of individual
gots following occupations that were quite different from those according
to which their parent zats were classified. Nevertheless, it is a useful
classification in that it underscores McLeod's pertinent observation that
Panjabi society consists of two parallel status hierarchies - one rural
(Ibbertson's landowing and agricultural group) and the other urban (the
professional and mercantile group) - across the bases of which stretch
the low-status and underprivileged classes (the vagrant, menial, and
44artisan group).
Looking at the statistics provided in Table 1:3, we see that the 
landowning and agricultural group was the largest group in both region 
and subregion. Members of the professional and mercantile group - mainly, 
but not exclusively, urban dwellers - represented slightly less than 
one-fifth of the population. Roughly one-third of the region's population, 
and slightly more of the subregion's, fell into the underprivileged group.
43. van den Dungen, "Changes in Status and Occupation", in Low (ed),
Soundings, p.63.
44. W.H. McLeod, The Evolution of the Sikh Community: Five Essays (Delhi,
1975), p.103.
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TABLE 1:3 General distribution of castes and tribes as percentages of 
total population for region and subregion
Caste or tribe Region Subregion
Landowning and agricultural
Biloch, Pathan, etc 3.1 0.8
Jat 18.4 22.1
Rajput, etc 9.8 6.0
Minor dominant tribes (Gakkhars, Awans, Kharrals, 7.1 2.4 
etc.)
Minor agricultural tribes (Sainis, Arains, Ahirs 7.3 7.9 
etc.)
Foreign races (Sheifch, Mughals, Turks, etc.) 2.2 1.6
Total 47.9 40.8
Professional and mercantile
Brahmans, etc. 2.7 3.7
Sayyids, etc. 1.6 1.1
Faqirs 1.0 1.3
Minor professional castes (Nais, Mirasis, Jogis, 3.3 3.7 
etc.)
Mercantile castes (Aroras, Khatris, Banyas, etc.) 9.4 7.6
Miscellaneous castes (Kashmiris, etc.) 1.3 1.8
Total 19.3 19.2
Vagrant, menial, and artisan
Vagrant and scavenger castes 6.9 10.4
Leather-workers 4.6 3.2
Weavers 4.2 4.1
Watermen, cooks, etc. 3.6 4.5
Blacksmiths, carpenters, etc. 4.6 5.9
Potters 2.7 3.2
Washermen, dyers, etc. 1.8 1.9
Oilmen 1.8 2.3
Other artisans and hill menials 2.0 3.8
Total 32.2 39.3
Not given 0.6 0.7
Total 100 100 
Source: Ibbetson, Panjab Castes, Abstract no 64, pp.28-9.
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But when we look at these statistics district by district, we see,
once again, the influence of economic ecology. In the arid western
and southern districts the rural status hierarchy was a relatively large
one. This is to be explained by the fact that nomadic pastoralism did
not produce sufficient surplus wealth to sustain a large urban population,
and that the relative freedom from occupational restraint permitted by
Islam meant that menial and artisan tasks were often performed by members
of the landowning and agricultural tribes. Thus in both Rawalpindi and
Muzaffargarh Districts the landowning and agricultural group accounted
for about 60 per cent, the professional and mercantile group for about
17 per cent, and the vagrant, menial, and artisan group for about 23
4r-per cent of the population. ~ But in the moist central and eastern
districts the rural status hierarchy was a considerably smaller one, a
fact which is to be explained by the class differentiation permitted by
intensive agricultural production and the occupational restrictions imposed
by Hinduism. In Amritsar District, for example, the landowning and
agricultural group accounted for only 36 per cent of the population, whereas
the professional and mercantile group and the vagrant, menial, and artisan
46group accounted for 22 per cent and 42 per cent respectively.
Which tribes and castes occupied the rural and urban status hierarchies? 
In the western districts the apex of the rural hierarchy was occupied by 
frontier tribes such as the Biloch and Pathan. Beneath them were minor 
dominant tribes (those whose dominance was limited spatially or was a 
thing of the past) like the Awan, Gakkhar and Kharral, and minor agricultural 
tribes (those who had never enjoyed dominance) like the market-gardening 
Arain. The urban hierarchy was headed by Hindu mercantile castes like 
the Khatri and Arora (though it should be noted that in the southwest the 
Arora were often an agricultural caste as well).
In the central and eastern districts Jats and Rajputs (upon whom more 
in a moment) occupied the apex of the rural status hierarchy, with minor 
dominant tribes like the Dogr<\ and Gujar, and minor agricultural tribes
45. Ibbetson, Panjab Castes, Abstract no 64, pp.28-9.
46. Ibid.
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like the Arain, Kamboh, and Saini beneath. Khatris and Aroras still
dominated the urban hierarchy, but with a much larger stratum of professional
castes - in particular Brahmans - beneath them. In the sub-hierarchical
group specialised castes (oilmen, blacksmiths, carpenters, and leather-
47workers) were more important than they were in the western districts.
The actual physiographic location of the particular landowning and
agricultural tribes and clans is best illustrated by a north to south
slice through the subregion of central Punjab. In the moist zone
Rajputs occupied the submontane frontier and - with Gujars - the northern
riverbanks. Labanas occupied the southern riverbanks. The doab uplands
48in the moist zone were held by Muslim, Hindu, and Sikh Jats. In the 
marginal zone market-gardening Arains occupied the banks of the Ravi, 
while Muslim Dogra s and Hindu Kambohs occupied the banks of the Sutlej.
Jat clans such as the Aulak, Bhular, Dhariwal, Dhillon, Gil, Man, Sidhu, 
Sindhu, and Virk - all of them Sikh clans - occupied distinct bands of 
upland running across the doabs. Towards the south of the marginal zone 
semi-pastoral Muslim clans of the Rajput and Jat tribes, such as the
49Bhatti, Chatha, and Tarar, and the Bhagsinke nomads were to be found.
In the arid zone the banks of the Sutlej were held by Muslim Rajput clans 
like the Joya and Wattu, the banks of the Ravi by the Kharral, Khatia, 
Fattiana, Murdana, and Wahniwal, and the banks of the Chenab by the Kachala, 
Tahim, and Taragar. These clans were almost exclusively pastoral. Small 
colonies of Khatris, Pathans, and Sayyids were located about Multan city.
The southern Bar, insofar as it was inhabited, was the home of the 
pastoral Langrial.^
How are we to explain this pattern? To the extent that cultivating 
groups occupied the moist zone and the northern portion of the marginal 
zone, while pastoral groups occupied the southern portion of the marginal
47. Ibid.
48. SR Gurdaspur 1856, pp. 1, 44-5.
49. SR Amritsar1 1856, pp. 1, 30, 80; SR Lahore 1858, pp.9-10; Lahore DG 
1883-84j p.65; Gujranuala DG 1883-84, pp.20-3.
50. Gujranwala DG 1883-84, pp. 20-36; Montgomery DG 1883-84, pp.60-2; 
Multan DG 1883-84, p.50.
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zone and the greater part of the arid zone, the pattern is self-explanatory. 
But why Rajputs at the submontane border, Arains and Gujars along the 
northern riverbanks, and Jats in the centres of the northern doabs when 
all were cultivating tribes? The answer has to do with the political 
history of the most important of these tribes - the Jat.
British officers in the nineteenth century, Ibbetson included, doubted 
whether there was much in the way of a real distinction between Jats and 
Rajputs. Rajputs claimed the ancient warrior (Kshatriya) status, whereas 
Jats did not. Rajputs spurned widow remarriage and the use of female 
labour in the fields, whereas Jats did not. Otherwise, Jats and Rajputs 
seemed to be the same - racially, they appeared to be of the same stock; 
and there were many Jat and Rajput gots that had the same name.'’* Perhaps 
Jats were only fallen Rajputs - fallen because they had transgressed 
the social restrictions to which Rajputs still adhered. This was a very 
popular idea amongst British colonial officers, who were inordinately fond 
of patronising the Jat as a manly, stalwart, and practical sort of people.
Recently Habib put forward a new and less romantic theory. Jats,
he suggested, may be traced to a pastoral people of the same name who
migrated northwards from Sind, via Multan, into central Punjab sometime
between the seventh and eleventh centuries. Using an irrigation system
based upon the wooden Persian wheel, these people opened up the dry central
portions of the doabs to settled cultivation. While these Jats gradually
abandoned their old pastoral habits in favour of peasant cultivation,
they still retained their pastoral traditions - notably their militarism -
52and their pastoral social status. It is quite possible that the 
movement of these people from Multan into central Punjab was prompted 
by the westward shift of the rivers that we referred to earlier -
51. Ibbetson, Pan jab Castes, Abstract no 78, p.133.
52. Irfan Habib, "Jatts of Punjab and Sind", in Harbans Singh and N.
Gerald Barrier (eds) , Essays in Honour of Dr Ganda Singh (Patiala,
1976), pp. 92-103.
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on the lower Indus, in the vicinity of Multan city, the term Jat still 
denoted a herdsman or camel grazier in the nineteenth century, whereas 
elsewhere in the Punjab it denoted a landowning cultivator.
Building on Habib’s thesis, McLeod has shown how by the middle of
the seventeenth century Jat peasants had replaced urban Khatris as the
primary social component of the Sikh community, with the result that the
ideology and institutions of Sikhism came to be profoundly influenced by
53Jat cultural and militaristic traditions. By this time the Jats of 
central Punjab occupied the position of landowning and revenue-paying 
elite peasants. The regional information provided in the Ain-i-Akbari 
(c.1595) points to a concentration of Jat zamindars in the Mughal province 
(suba) of Lahore.^
Like so many other rural elites in the subcontinent, the Jats of 
central Punjab seized the opportunity provided by the collapse of Mughal 
authority in the eighteenth century to free themselves from the overlordship 
of the empire’s ruling class.^ In the Punjab at this time the ruling 
class was represented, in the main, by Rajput landlords and revenue 
intermediaries. The rise of Sikh power in the Punjab (which we shall 
examine more closely in the next chapter) began with the process whereby 
Jats - led by Sikh Jats from the Manjha in the Bari Doab - first drove 
the Rajputs back to either the riverbanks or the submontane border^ and
53. McLeod, Evolution of the Sikh Community, pp.9-12.
54. Abul Fazl’ Allami, Ain-i-Akbari (trans by H. Blochmann, Calcutta,
1891), vol 2, pp.310-33. It should be noted that the term zamindar 
is used here as it occurs in the literature on Mughal India - to 
denote a peasant who possessed special rights in the land and a State- 
recognised responsibility for the collection and transmission of the 
revenue - and not in the sense common in the Punjab where it means 
"cultivator" generally. We shall elaborate this distinction - between 
"intermediary" and "primary" zamindars - in the next chapter.
55. Irfan Habib, Agrarian System of Mughal India (Bombay, 1963), pp.318-51.
56. "It is somewhat curious and interesting to observe how closely the 
general boundary between the Rajput and Jat country follows that 
between the submontane and plain zones" : L.W. Dane, Final Report 
on the Revised Settlement of the Gurdaspur District3 1892 (Lahore,
1892), (hereafter SR Gurdaspur 1891), pp.7-8.
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57virtually complete control of the fertile Des for themselves.
then pushed the Muslim pastoral tribes back to the Bar, assuming
In the early-nineteenth century the legacy of this protracted
struggle for land control lingered on. Land, it should be noted, was
essentially a possession held by virtue of the force at the command of
the tribe or clan. Thus in Montgomery District, where the social
superiority of the pastoral clans vis-a-vis the cultivating clans had
58a clear expression, the cultivators used to construct little towers,
59in which a couple of matchlocks were kept, over their wells. And 
within pastoral society itself, inter-clan conflict over access to 
grazing grounds or waterholes was fairly frequent.^
The essentially political nature of land control can be seen in the 
structure of the village, which was invariably an integral part of a 
larger territorial and clannish power structure. Most villages were at 
least partially fortified and extremely suspicious of outsiders. Along 
the turbulent northwestern frontier the village (abadi) was a stronghold 
of the fighting and landlord tribes, and was surrounded by a string of 
hamlets (dhoks) inhabited by tenant cultivators. The area controlled 
by the central abadi could be very large - in the trans-Indus Attock
57. For an account of the struggle between Hindu and Sikh Jat cultivators 
and Muslim pastoralists in the Hafizabad tahsil (administrative 
subdivision) of the Gujranwala District, see Gujranwala DG 1883-84, p.21.
58. The Baghelas, Fattianas, Kharrals, Khatias, Murdanas, and Wahniwals, 
who held land along the banks of the Ravi and grazed their herds on 
the Bari and Rachna Doabs, called themselves "Great Ravi"; all the 
cultivating clans living within their territory were called "Nikki 
(small) Ravi" and recognised the former as social superiors: Montgomery 
DG 1883-84, pp.60-2. It is interesting to note, in this context, that 
in the northwestern districts the agricultural tribes which claimed 
Rajput status and therefore often avoided cultivating their own lands 
themselves (eg the Gakkhar and Janjuah) called themselves "Sahu"
(gentle), or well-born, as opposed to zamindar, which implied low-birth: 
Rose, Glossary of Tribes and Castes, vol 111, p.345.
59. Montgomery DG 1883-84, p.36.
60. G. Ouseley and W.G. Davies, Report on the Revised Settlement of the 
Shahpoor District in the Rccuulpindee Division, 1866 (Lahore, 1866), 
(hereafter SR Shahpur 1866), pp.62-3.
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District it could vary between 80 and 140 square miles, and it could
include between fifteen and twenty dhoks. Further east, where
agricultural security, denser population, and elements of the caste
system combined to produce a more complex rural society, the village
6 2(mauza) was both smaller and more internally structured along the lines
of land control. The village brotherhood - the landowning families -
lived together at the centre of the village, while kamins (artisans and
menials) and what Gandhi was to call harijans ("untouchable" castes)
resided in progressively more distant, outer sections. Furthermore,
these truely peasant villages were often divided into sections (tarafs
vattis, or panas) and subsections (thoks or thulas) along the lines of
63religion and got or sub-got status.
One of the more important functional consequences of the political 
nature of land control was the pivotal position in society of certain 
elite groups. The actual position of these rural elites varied considerably 
over the region. To a large extent, their power depended upon the local 
power of the overarching State. In the arid western and southern districts, 
where State power was necessarily weakest, the position of the tribal 
chieftains and other local notables was strong and patriarchal: they 
were acknowledged, from both above and below, as the "natural" leaders 
of society and defenders of its interests. In the central and eastern 
districts, on the other hand, where tribal association had been fragmented 
by the continuous process of colonisation of the fertile wastes, and 
where peasant cultivation produced a very definite and valuable surplus, 
the position of the elites was both more patrimonial and more prebendal: 
as "influential" landholders, they were widely recruited by the State 
to act as administrative intermediaries of a proto-bureaucratic type.
We shall investigate the social composition of these rural elite 
groups and their operation within a regional political system in greater
61. Attock DG 1883-84, p.47.
62. For example, in Sialkot District the average size of the village was 
only 450 acres with only 270 inhabitants: SR Sialkot 1863, p.38.
63. Trevaskis, The Punjab of To-Day, vol 1 , p.12.
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detail in the next chapter. Here we may simply note that the rural
elites provided the linkage between local-level political systems, which
were comprised of communities united by the tie of kinship and a common
approach to the problem of survival, and a political system at the
regional level. They did this through their leadership of factions.
The faction (paarti) has been identified as a typical feature of Punjabi
politics. It is a leader-based, fairly enduring, vertical structure
of power which is oriented towards the protection of individual and
kin-group honour (izzat) and the securement of favours and services.
These structures, which either enmesh or confront each other, have
diverse patterns of recruitment - they may be organised around patron-
client relationships, religious ties, and kinship - and extend across
the whole political system, linking village with village, village with
64locality, locality with locality, and locality with region.
The British were somewhat astounded by the prevalence of factionalism
in the Punjab. One officer, J.E. Cracroft, who toured Rawalpindi
District in the 1860s, had this to report:
One feature in the constitution of society, as it exists at 
present chiefly in the Western portion, participated in by 
Hindoo and Mohamedan alike, is the spirit of faction. The 
whole of Pindee Gheb is divided into two parties, into the 
politics of which the people of neighbouring tracts zealously 
enter. This spirit tinges all the transactions of life, 
and renders investigation into rights and Judicial cases 
generally very difficult and lengthy.^
In the absence of an effective police and judicial system, factionalism
could easily degenerate into inter-tribe and inter-clan blood feuding.
These feuds, which often began with the abduction of a woman, the theft
of some cattle, or the encroachment of one clan into the territory of
another, might then become the pivotal force in local politics. For
example, in 1847 there was discovered in the Sind Sagar Doab a feud
64. Joyce Pettigrew, Robber Noblemen: A Study of the Political System 
of the Sikh Jats (London, 1975), pp.26, 29-33, 63-77.
65. J.E. Cracroft, Report on the Settlement of the Rawul Pindee District 
(Lahore, 1864), (hereafter SR Rawalpindi 1864), p.32.
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between two groups of villages that had been going on for more than 
twenty years and had involved the deaths of fifty-one men and the theft 
of 3,000 cattle.^
Residence and economic activity
67There were several large cities in nineteenth-century Punjab.
Lahore (with a population of 98,924 in 1868) was the traditional political
capital of the region. Within its walls lay the Red Fort - the palace
of the emperor Akbar and subsequently of Ranjit Singh - the magnificent
Badshahi mosque, and the nine mohallas, or residential blocks, with their
mansions (havelis) and landscaped gardens (baghs). The twelve mohallas
outside the city walls had been razed to the ground during the political
struggles of the eighteenth century, but were re-built during the last
years of Sikh rule and after 1849, when the British established their
cantonment and civil headquarters at Anarkali. Lahore was also famous
for its manufacture of gold-woven fabrics, jewellery, and weapons - the
essential accoutrements of pre-modern aristocracies everywhere - although
after the British conquest the craftsmen of the city turned increasingly
to manufacturing articles for more general consumption. In 1847, two
years before the establishment of British rule, Lahore contained about
fi iR30,000 houses and 9,000 shops.
Amritsar (population 135,813) was the religious capital of the Sikhs, 
the city that had grown up around the Har Mandar Sahib (or "Golden Temple")
66. Punjab Government Records: Lahore Political Diaries, 1847-1848 
(Allahabad, 1909-11), (hereafter LPD), vol 5, Political Diaries of 
Lt. Herbert B. Edwardes> Assistant to the Resident at Lahore3 on 
deputation to Bunnoo - 1847, pp.34-5.
67. Except where otherwise noted, the following descriptions of the cities 
and large towns are based upon Grewal and Banga (trans and eds),
Early Nineteenth Century Punjab; E.D. Lucas, The Economic Life of a 
Punjab Village (Lahore, no date), pp.8-9; and General Report on the 
Administration of the Punjab and its Dependencies for the year 1867-68 
(hereafter PAR 1867-68), pp.83-5. The population figures are from 
Punjab Census 1868, General Statement no 6.
68. For the results of a census of Lahore city taken in 1847, see Foreign 
Secret Proceedings (hereafter FSP), 25 Feb 1848, no 58 (NAI).
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and become the centre of both the Baisakhi and Diwali festivals. It 
was divided into separate localities (katras), each of which was named 
after its philanthropic founder. But as its sanctity had grown so had 
its reputation as a safe haven for merchants, especially Khatri merchants - 
the original converts to Sikhism. By the nineteenth century Amritsar 
was the chief emporium of the Punjab. To the city came the staple
products and manufactures of the region - rocksalt from the Jhelum
69 .District; silk and chintz fabrics from Multan; jewellery and weapons
from Lahore; paper from Sialkot; brocades from Gujrat; cotton fabrics
from the Jullundur Doab - and of the neighbouring countries - precious
70metals, spices, and tea from Tibet; fine shawls from Kashmir; horses,
fruit, and drugs from Afghanistan; gold, copper, and silver from Persia
and Bokhara. These goods were then carried, via either the southern or
the eastern routes, into the subcontinent. The exports of the subcontinent -
British woollens, velvets, and hardware; Indian cottens, base metals,
chemicals, sandlewood, and ivory - were carried back along the same routes
71to Amritsar for local consumption and re-export to Central and West Asia. 
Amritsar city made a tidy living from its profane exertions: in the
mid-1850s its import-export trade was estimated to be worth about £3.5
72millions per annum.
Multan (population 56,826) was a southern river-port city dominated 
by a fortress reckoned to be among the most impregnable in the subcontinent, 
and by a class of Khatri merchant-bankers who carried on one of the more
69. For the value and organisation of the rocksalt industry, see "A 
Geographical Sketch of the Punjab” (1830, no author): FM, no 206 
(NAI).
70. In the early 1830s the Kashmir shawl industry, though on the decline, 
produced shawls for export that were worth, at Amritsar, £180,000 
per annum: FSP, 9 April 1832, no 7; 16 April 1832, no 9 (NAI).
71. For the organisation of this trade, see ibid.
72. Selections from the Records of the Government of India (Foreign 
Department), no XVIII, General Report on the Administration of the 
Punjab Territoriess 1854-55 to 1855-56 (Lahore, 1858), (hereafter 
PAR 1854-56), p.53. An idea of the value of this sum may be gained 
by noting that the aggregate capital of all joint stock companies 
operating in India at the turn of the nineteenth century amounted to
£36 millions: Paul A. Baran, The Political Economy of Growth (Penguin, 
Middlesex, 1973), p.278.
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sophisticated financial operations in that part of the world. Concerning 
the latter, a British officer wrote in a secret report to his government 
in 1846:
The Banking influence of Mooltan is considerable, greater than 
that for which Shikarpore [on the lower Indus] has so long been 
celebrated, and there are Sowcars and Shroffs [financiers] in 
its Bazars who are reputed to be capable of commanding a million 
specie. The Mooltan Hoondees [bills of exchange] are the great 
mediums of transacting business over the whole of the vast countries, 
where agents are scattered, and are always considered as cash from 
the Caspian to the Ganges....73
Besides these three great cities, there were a number of sizeable 
towns, each noted for its specialised manufactures: Jullundur (33,673), 
Batala (28,725), Sialkot (25,327), Gujranwala (19,381), Rawalpindi (19,228), 
Wazirabad (15,730), Kasur (15,209), Gujrat (14,905), and Jhang (9,124).
Nonetheless, the Punjab was for the most part a land of villages 
and small towns: more than 90 per cent of the population in 1868 lived 
in the 21,374 settlements that had fewer than 5,000 inhabitants (and
74nearly 18,000 of these settlements had fewer than 1,000 inhabitants).
What were these little settlements like? In the first place, there was 
no real difference, except that of size, between the small town and the 
village:
Almost all the smaller Punjab towns [wrote Ibbetson] have extensive 
arable areas attached to them, and include considerable cultivating 
communities; and they often have little to distinguish them from 
the true village beyond their larger size, the greater extent, 
activity and importance of their trade, and the superior skill of 
their workmen. The difference, in short, is one of degree rather 
than of kind.75
In the second place, living conditions in the typical village were 
far from idyllic. The village was generally a most insanitary place, 
and there was a high rate of infant mortality and post-natal disease
73. Lt-Colonel (later Sir) Henry Lawrence, quoted in M.L. Ahluwalia and 
Kirpal Singh, The Punjab's Pioneer Freedom Fighters (Bombay, 1963), 
p. 30.
74. Punjab Census 1868, General Statement no 6.
75. Punjab Census 1881, p.18.
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76 77amongst women. Rural life was regulated by the seasons, by the
generosity or otherwise of the local moneylender {sahukar3 shahj or
mahajan), without whose credit the villagers could not sink wells,
build houses, celebrate marriages, or meet the State*s land revenue
78demands, and by an outlook on life that - in twentieth-century 
Western terms - can only be described as superstitious and religious.
But - and this is the third point - few of the villages were the 
isolated, ancient, and self-sufficient "little republics" that they are 
often thought to have been. As we have seen, there was little that was
truely republican about their internal constitutions. Seldom were they
80 81 really cut off from one another or of great antiquity. Most important
76. From The Board of Economic InquiryPunjab: Punjab Village Surveys
- 1. Gaggar Bhanas a village in the Amritsar District (by S. Gian 
Singh, Lahore, 1928). For a similar village description, see C.A.
Rose and W.E. Purser, Report on the Revised Settlement of the Montgomery 
District in the Punjab (Lahore, 1878), (hereafter SR Montgomery 1878), 
pp.53-4.
77. For divisions of time recognised by Hindu and Muslim peasants, see
SR Shahpur 1866, p.33.
78. In the Punjab the peasant cultivator spoke of his shah ("king") 
or mahajan ("great person") as his banker and master. A common 
proverb stated: "No credit without a shah, and no salvation without 
a guru [religious teacher]" : Rose, Glossary of Tribes and Castes, 
vol 11, pp. 59-60; vol 111, pp.44-5.
79. For spirit worship, belief in the evil eye {nazar), and numerous 
superstitions, see ibid, vol 1 .
80. The average distance between villages was as low as 0.8 of a mile in 
Gurdaspur District, and never rose above Shahpur District's figure of 
2.7 miles: Punjab Census 1868, General Statements nos 2 and 6. That 
the rural population was accustomed to travelling considerable distances 
is proved by the hugh crowds of outsiders drawn to the annual fairs 
held at various places throughout the region: "List of Fairs in the 
Punjab": Selected Circular Orders of the Board of Administration in 
the General and Political Departments (Lahore, 1971), Circular no 
36-2815, 16 Sept 1869.
81. Only 355 of Jullundur District's 1,324 villages had been founded prior 
to the middle of the sixteenth century: W.E. Purser, Final Report on 
the Revised Settlement of the Jullundur District in the Punjab (Lahore,
1892), (hereafter SR Jullundur 1891), p.85. In Gujranwala District 
the majority of the villages were founded in the early decades of the 
nineteenth century itself: SR Gujranwala 1856, pp.27-8.
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consumptive goods, by no means unconnected with local or regional 
82markets. In the arid western and southern districts the villages
produced firewood, fodder, and pastoral commodities like wool, meat, and
dairy products (especially ghee , or clarified butter) for sale in the
83marketplace. In the moist central and eastern districts the main
products of the village were those of cultivation - in the spring (rabi)
harvest: wheat, barley, gram, lentils, tobacco, linseed, safflower,
and mustard; in the autumn (kharif) harvest: millet, maize, rice,
84lentils, sugarcane, and cotton. Most of these crops - especially wheat, 
which was the real staple everywhere in the region - were grown for the 
market as well as for domestic consumption.
of all, they were, even though they produced most of their daily
It was in the marginal zone, where the possibility of drought
presented special problems, that the village had the least consistent
connection with the marketplace. In good years, when the rains were
85plentiful, the land produced abundant harvests. But when the rains
failed, as they frequently did, the land became an inhospitable wilderness. 
At such times the cultivators of the marginal zone fell back upon the two 
alternative occupations that agricultural insecurity had long presented 
them with: crime and soldiering. Cattle-rustling was a well organized
82. "In the developed regions, the concept of village self-sufficiency 
can no longer be maintained. The regional sources point towards 
the inter-dependence of groups of adjacent villages on the local 
demands both for commercial crops and non-agricultural products":
B.R. Grover, "Approach and Methodology to the Study of Medieval Punjab": 
unpub Presidential Address, Medieval Section, Punjab History Conference, 
10th session, Patiala, 28 Feb 1976.
83. For example, the Chhapribandi, a pastoral tribe of the lower Indus 
which owned 20,000 buffaloes, 10,000 cows, 10,000 sheep, and 4,000 
camels, produced 15,000 mounds (a maund equals 82 lb) of ghee per 
annum in the 1830s: n26 above. In the 1850s the ghee produced in 
the Bar tract of Gujranwala District was worth £10,000 per annum;
and the shopkeepers and traders of Lahore and Amritsar employed agents 
to follow the herdsmen and collect the ghee, the collection being 
guaranteed by advances of money made to the herdsmen: SR Gujranwala 
1856, p.19.
84. Lt. Col. G.B. Tremenheere, "On the Present State of Agriculture in the 
Punjab": Government of the Punjab: Selections from the Correspondence, 
vol 1, 1853, no XII, appendix 1.
85. For a table showing produce rates in the Hafizabad tahsil of Gujranwala 
District, see ibid. The figures provided therein show that Bar land 
irrigated by wells was more productive, in good years, than tracts 
close to the rivers.
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and almost respectable occupation in the marginal zone. So too was
service in arms. Thus the Manjha in the nineteenth century was a little
Alsatia, where each man was, in addition to being a husbandman, "either
87a robber or a soldier." It was Manjha villages that supplied the 
bulk of the Jat peasant soldiery that did so much to create and defend 
the Sikh kingdom of Maharaja Ranjit Singh.
Conclusion
In this chapter we have posited the centrality of the physiographic 
factor to any investigation into the constitution of pre-colonial Punjabi 
society. This has allowed us to conceptualise that society as an organic 
whole. But that society was not what social anthropologists used to 
call an "integrated" social system. The region’s strategic location, 
and more importantly, the unevenness of its natural resources, had 
prevented the emergence of any desegregational basis to society beyond 
that of language and a certain general, cultural idiom. Thus the 
essential feature of pre-colonial Punjabi society was fragmentation: not 
so much the coexistence of diverse social elements, but rather their 
rivalries - the constant striving of these elements to undercut each other.
We have seen that Punjabi society at this time was a most status­
conscious society, but that the status cleavages, which corresponded to 
the socio-economic cleavages, were vertical rather than horizontal - more 
between town and country, between town and town, and between territorial 
units like the village and the clan section, than between general castes 
and classes. We have seen that this vertical organisation of society was 
productive of fairly constant social tension and turbulence. We have also 
seen that political power in this society typically manifested itself 
upwards, through factions headed by members of the elite groups. For 
these reasons we have chosen to designate pre-colonial Punjab as a frontier 
society. This designation will support and inform our characterisation 
of the Sikh State and our subsequent analysis of the political developments 
that occurred between 1839 and 1872.
86. Cattle - theft was one of the most common crimes in the Punjab:
Punjab Census 1881, p.52. For the organisation of this "profession",
see "Disclosures of a cattle thief", in Annual Report on the Administration 
of the Punjab Territories for the year 1861-62 (hereafter PAR 1861-62), 
pp.15-16.
87. n 22 above.
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THE SIKH KINGDOM
Introduction
By all accounts the eighteenth century was an especially turbulent 
period in the history of the Punjab. Mughal authority in the region 
began to decline after the death of the emperor Aurangzeb in 1707, and 
was finished off by the blows dealt by a series of Persian, Afghan, and 
Maratha invasions and by a Sikh Jat peasant rebellion in the central and 
eastern districts. With the collapse of imperial authority, conditions 
in the countryside became confused and anarchic: "tribe fought against 
tribe, village against village; all but the strongest positions were 
abandoned, homesteads were deserted, and the face of the country became a 
wilderness.
Out of this situation arose the Sikh mists, or warbands, organised 
at first for defence but later for plunder. In the second half of the 
century the misls set about conquering central and eastern Punjab and, 
that achieved, each other. One mist, the Sukerchakia mist, emerged as 
the strongest. Its leader, Ranjit Singh, captured Lahore city in 1799. 
Two years later he assumed the title of Maharaja and began a personal 
reign that lasted until his death in 1839.
Ranjit Singh’s kingdom is of historical interest for at least two 
reasons. In the first place, it was the first indigenous State in the 
Punjab in eight centuries (and the only one in nine centuries if British 
rule, which followed it, is counted). Does this mean that it was 
established on different, indigenous principles, and was it geared towards 
policies that differed from those pursued by non-Punjabi dynasties in the 
region? Secondly, the Sikhs were, as we have already seen, very much 
a minority community in the Punjab. How, then, did Ranjit Singh manage 
to maintain his authority over his numerous Muslim and Hindu subjects?
Was his kingdom a typical "oriental despotism", wherein coercive force 
was freely resorted to? And to what extent were the Maharaja’s policies 
shaped by the ideology of Sikhism? The aim of this chapter is to provide
CHAPTER TWO
1. Gujranwala DG 1883-84, p.22.
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answers to these questions by examining the origin, structure, and
2working of the kingdom established by Ranjit Singh.
From mists to monarchy
When Mughal authority declined in the first half of the eighteenth 
century, and the Punjab became the cockpit of would-be successors, Sikh 
Jats in central Punjab were ideally placed to incite a peasant-based 
liberation movement. They were, as we have already seen, part of the 
dominant peasantry in the central districts. They had a strong militaristic 
tradition. And most important of all, they possessed a sense of historic 
mission and a millenarian ideology, having only recently (1699) been 
forged into the Khalsa - the militant Sikh brotherhood - by Guru Gobind 
Singh (the tenth and last Sikh Guru) in response to Mughal persecution.
The rise of the mists and their coalescence into a single political 
system during the last six or seven decades of the eighteenth century is
3a complex story that cannot be recounted here. However, it might be 
asserted that with respect to the development of a personal rulership 
concept, the mists progressed through five distinct stages, each of which
4represented the operation of the nrist as a political faction on an ever
2. It must be stressed that what follows is intended to serve primarily 
as a background to the political story to be taken up in subsequent 
chapters. Space does not permit a comparative analysis. Clearly,
with respect to matters like land revenue policy, the extent and character 
of jagirdari tenures, the emergence of new intermediate elites, and so 
forth, the Sikh kingdom displayed important dissimilarities as well as 
basic similarities to both the Mughal State and the other regional 
successor States: for references to some of the modern, comparative 
literature, see Richard B. Barnett, North India Between Empires: Awadhj 
the MughatSj and the British3 1720-1801 (Berkeley, 1980), pp.4-6, 11-12.
I hope to make a comparative analysis, in which the implications of 
these similarities and dissimilarities would be followed up, at a later 
date.
3. For a narrative account, see J.D. Cunningham, History of the Sikhs 
(Delhi, reprint 1972), chaps 4-5; Khushwant Singh, A History of the 
Sikhs (Princeton, N.J., 1963), vol 1, pp. 101-84.
4. Pettigrew also sees the mist as a faction: Robber Noblemen, pp. 26,
29-33.
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wider territorial and recruitment basis, and with an ever closer 
approximation of "traditional" (Mughal) rulership. These stages 
(summarised in Fig. 2:1) are highly generalised "pure types". Moreover, 
since different stages frequently evolved in different parts of central 
Punjab at different times, it is difficult to put strict chronological 
dates to them. Nevertheless, the five-stage model is derived entirely 
from the chronological narrative of the period.
Stage one began with the refusal of a village or group of adjacent 
villages to pay the land revenue to the Mughal (or Persian, or Afghan, 
or Maratha) revenue collector. This revolt seems often to have been 
led by an influential lambardar (village headman) or chaudhari (headman 
of a tappa). Cooperation with other local lineage groups (of that got) 
in that, or the neighbouring, tappa was sometimes necessary to resist 
the retributionary forces despatched against them by the authorities of 
the day. Individual zamindars, or perhaps the whole local lineage group, 
might now attach themselves to a rising mist. 5 Otherwise, they proceeded 
to stage two.
In stage two the lineage group leader, who now styled himself Sardar 
(chieftain) and commonly adopted a cognomen taken from the name of his 
ancestral village,^* set off in the company of his kinsmen in search of 
plunder and land control in the villages of other, rival gots in the tappa. 
Spoils were divided according to predetermined shares. As many of his 
earlier followers split away to settle in the conquered villages or became 
sardars themselves, the sardar was joined by new followers from affinally- 
related gots. Towards the end of stage two the sardar often constructed
5. For example, Nodh Singh, who was Ranjit Singh's great-grandfather, 
having become a Sikh (in order to marry the daughter of Gulab Singh 
from the village of Majithia in Amritsar District), procurred a horse 
and weapons and entered the service of Kapur Singh, who was then head 
of the Fyzullapuria mist. See C.M. Wade, "A History of the Origin, 
Life and Progress of Maharajah Ranjit Singh to the Sovereignty of the 
Punjab" (no date): FM, 1830, no 206 (NAI).
6. For example, Ranjit Singh was born in the Gujranwala District but his 
father and grandfather had adopted the cognomen Sukerchakia from the 
Sukerchak village in the Manjha where Daisoo (Ranjit Singh's great- 
great- grandfather) had started the family's fortunes with a small 
patrimony of some land, three ploughs, and a well: ibid.
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Fig 2:1 Summary of the Development of the Rulership Concept in the 
Sikh Misl
Region-level subjugation of misls by Ranjit Singh
A
------- ;------------ ^Inter-^sZ conflict 
Absorption of smaller misls
Stage 5
Hereditary succession to chiefships. 
and growth of clientship.
Reduction of misldars
Stage 4
Ta'aluqa (or district) - level consolidation of misl following official 
recognition. Growth of traditional, personal rulership of sardar. Jagirs 
and specialised administrative posts to misldars
/N
Stage 3
Ta 'aluqa-level establishment of misl. Recruitment 
from outside the got or zat. Marriage alliances with 
other misls. Rakhi levied from unconquered villages
A
Subinfeudation 
into deras 
< ---- 1
Attachment
to misl Stage 2
Tappa - level predatory raids led 
by sardar. Joined by related gots 
A
Splitting away 
of new bands
Attachment 
to misl
Stage 1
Village-level rebellion of localised lineage group. Led by 
lambardar or chaudhari. Joined by related lineage groups.
35
a small mud fort in his tappa to protect his family and followers from
similarly adventurous bands - of which there were as many as four or five
7 8hundred - and from government military parties.
The crucial factor in the transition to stage three was the 
establishment of the sardar and his band as military occupiers and 
revenue receivers of a ta'aluqa, often named after the fortified town 
which the band used as its headquarters. Only now could the band be 
called a misl, its members misldars. The word misl means "equal" or 
"alike". The misl was, at this stage, still a relatively egalitarian 
association: the misldars came together in a common purpose and it was 
recognised that the sardar could exercise strict control over his misldars
9only in times of war. In many cases the misl was subinfeudated into 
sections called deras, each headed by a separate sardar. This reflected 
the fact that members of the misl could now be recruited from outside 
the individual got or even zat. Marriage allowances between the families 
of sardars in different misls led to a sharing of ta'aluqas and their 
revenues. In those areas remaining under the nominal authority of Lahore 
rakhi, or protection money, was extorted from the villages by the misl. ^
In stage four the transition from factional leadership to personal 
leadership occurred, often following the official recognition of the 
individual sardar by the superior political authority of the day - Mughal, 
Persian, Afghan, or Maratha. The sardar who cooperated with the Lahore 
regime, or assisted one side - sometimes both sides simultaneously - in 
the military struggles for control of Delhi, was recompensed with imperial
7. J.S. Grewal, From Guru Nanak to Maharaja Ranjit Singh: Essays in Sikh 
History (Amritsar, 1972), p.87.
8. For example, Charat Singh (Ranjit Singh's grandfather) built a small 
fort at his wife's village of Gujraoli, north of Lahore. The Afghan 
governor of Lahore hired the services of a band of Sikhs and attempted 
to demolish the fort, but without success. See Sir Henry Lawrence, 
"Recent History of the Punjab" (1844), reprinted in Selections from the 
Calcutta Review (Calcutta, 1881), p.165.
9. Major James Browne noted in 1787 that most sardars were distinguished 
from their followers only by their finer horses and weapons: Ganda Singh 
(ed), Early European Accounts of the Sikhs (Calcutta, 1962), p.17.
10. Rakhi was levied from villages subdued but not yet occupied by the Sikhs. 
It varied in amount from one-fifth to one-half of the government share of 
the produce, and was comparable to the chowt, or one-fourth, levied by 
the Marathas in their territories. See Cunningham, History of the Sikhs, 
p.95, n 1 .
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titles, khilats (costumes of honour), jagirs (revenue assignments),
kettledrums and banners, besides substantial, official autonomy - all
the attributes, in short, of a vassal prince.** Many a sardar now
set about consolidating and developing his personal rule in ways that -
in both content and form - represented only a repetition of the practice
of earlier rulers, the Mughals especially. The principle of mulk-giri
(territorial possession) was extended: deserted villages were repopulated
and new ones founded. Administrative and military functionaries were
12appointed. Coins were minted. Jagirs were bestowed on faithful
misldars, and the ancient royal practice of granting jagirs or ma'afis
(revenue-free lands) to pious individuals and religious institutions
(grants known as madid-i-ma'ash or dharmarth) was revived. Ranjit
Singh’s grandfather, Charat Singh, was just one such powerful sardar
13amongst the many who established this sort of rulership.
Stage five, which corresponds roughly with the last quarter of the
eighteenth century, was characterised by a widespread breakdown of the
mist system and a falling out amongst the sardors. An important factor
here would seem to have been the general acceptance of the principle of
14hereditary succession to chieftainships. The role of kinship in the 
mist became less crucial (though it never was entirely obliterated) and 
was increasingly replaced by the concept of a semi-royal chiefly lineage. 
The once-independent followers of the sardar were reduced to retainers 
within a quasi-feudal relationship. A patron-client system was developed: 
specialised administrative posts were awarded to talented commoners or
11. For the example of Ala Singh, see Indu Banga, "Ala Singh: The Founder 
of Patiala State”, in Singh and Barrier (eds), Essays in Honour of
Ganda Singh, pp. 150-60. In many ways the career of Ala Singh illustrates 
perfectly the five-stage development of rulership under discussion.
12. For details on coins minted by sardors, see Singh (ed), Early European 
Accounts, pp. 15-16.
13. See Maps Connected with the Report on the Revision of the Land Revenue 
Settlement of the Gujranwala District3 1866-1867and Mops Connected 
with...Lahore District3 1865-69 for maps showing the distribution of 
petty principalities over the ta'aluqas of these Districts.
14. Grewal, Guru Nanak to Ranjit Singh, p.90.
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non-Punjabis, and not just to misldars.  ^ These non-misldar clients 
also provided the sardar with an alternative source of loyalty and 
acted as a check upon the ambitions of his kinsmen. Thus, there were 
no longer any proper sardar-misldccr combinations, just sardars of 
greater or lesser importance jealously defending their individual 
patrimonies.*^ The leading sardars, who had previously agreed to sink 
their differences and pool their individual military resources to form 
the Dal Khalsa or national army of the Panth (the Sikh community), to 
resist the invasions of the Afghan predator, Ahmad Shah Abdali, now 
turned against each other. Smaller misls fell prey to larger ones.
The most successful was the Sukerchakia mist, raised to greatness by
17Ranjit Singh’s superior military leadership and shrewd marriage alliances.
At the end of stage five Ranjit Singh clinched the transition to a regional
monarchy by assuming the title of Maharaja and beginning the process of
18systematically subduing the remaining, autonomous misls, confiscating 
their properties and reorganising their sardars into a dependent, 
feudalistic aristocracy.
15. For example, Gurmukh Singh Lamba was adopted by Ranjit Singh’s father 
as a playmate for Ranjit Singh; in 1799 Ranjit Singh made him paymaster 
of his forces and superintendent of his treasury: Griffin, et al., 
Chiefs and Families, vol 2, pp. 165-6. Two brothers of the Duggal 
family served the Wazirabadia and Sukerchakia misls as managers of 
jagirs, etc: ibid, vol 2, p.112. Two Brahmins, Chhaju Mai and Lala 
Jawala Nath, whose families had served the Mughal emperors, were 
employed by the Kanheya misl as city ohaudhari (mayor) and the 
Sukerchakia misl as munshi (writer, secretary) respectively:, ibid, vol 
2, p.43 and vol 1, p.308. The ties of clientship thus cut across 
kinship, regional and even religious identities.
16 Grewal, Guru Nanak to Ranjit Singh, p.90.
17. Ranjit Singh took wives from the Kanheya and Nakkai misls and married 
his sons to daughters of prominent Sikh Jat families such as the 
Atariwalas.
18. There were, in popular estimation, twelve major misls at the end of 
the eighteenth century. Seven of these - the Ahluwalia, Bhangi, 
Fyzullapuria, Kanheya, Nakkai, Ramgarhia and Sukerchakia misls - 
occupied lands in the Punjab region and were jointly known as the 
Manjha Sikhs. The remaining five, amongst which the Phulkian misl 
was the most important, arose in the Malwa, or cis-Sutlej region; 
they were known as the Malwa Sikhs.
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When Ranjit Singh captured Lahore and took his new title, his
kingdom was scarcely deserving of the name. Much of central Punjab
was still in the possession of powerful mists like the Bhangi mist.
The Jullundur Doab was held by the Ahluwalia mist. To the northeast,
the lower Himalayas were held by Hindu Rajput chieftains (the Rajas of
Mandi, Nurpur, Suket,etc). To the east of the region, the cis-Sutlej
or Malwa region, from the Sutlej to the Jumna, was held by the Malwa
Sikhs, original settlers and converts to Sikhism, who had also organised
themselves into mists (the Phulkian mist, for example, was composed of a
group of patrilineally - related sardars who founded the royal houses
of Patiala, Jind, Nabha, etc). From the northwest to the south, Ranjit
Singh's dominion was cordoned by a double row of Muslim principalities.
The inner row, beginning in Jhelum District and sweeping through Shahpur,
Jhang, and Montgomery Districts to Kasur, comprised a string of small,
independent chieftainships - the Awans and Biloches of Khushab and Sahiwal,
the Tiwanas of Shahpur, the Sials of Jhang, the Chathas of Rasulnagar,
and the Pathans of Kasur, for example - carved out by Punjabi Muslim
tribes and clans in the eighteenth century. The outer row, mostly lying
outside the Punjab region, comprised the rulerships of Kashmir, Hazara,
Peshawar, Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan, Dera Ghazi Khan, Multan, and Bahawalpur.
These were ruled by Pathan governors on behalf of the Afghan monarch at
19Kabul, though they were by now practically independent rulerships.
It is not surprising, then, that Ranjit Singh should have been
concerned to extend what the mists had begun: the creation of a unified,
expansionist, militaristic State. In the manner of the Rurik monarchs
of Russia in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, he devoted the
greater part of his reign to "gathering in" the Punjab lands and searching
for secure boundaries to his kingdom. Briefly told, the political history
20of his reign falls into three periods.
19. Sita Ram Kohli's foreward to Laia Sohan Lai Suri, Umdat-Ut-Taoarikh, 
Daftar III, pts I-V (trans, by V.S. Suri, Delhi, 1971), pp. x-xi.
20. For a narrative account see Malik (ed), A Book of Readings, pp.7-58; 
Cunningham, History of the Sikhs, chaps vi-vii; Khushwant Singh,
A History of the Sikhs, voi 1, chaps 11-18.
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In the first period (1801-09) Ranjit Singh consolidated his 
position in central Punjab and extended his influence to the northeast 
and southeast. The Bhangi nrisl was subdued by force; the Ahluwalia 
sardar, Fateh Singh, exchanged turbans with Ranjit Singh as a symbolic 
gesture of brotherhood and friendship, though in reality he accepted a 
vassal status; and a number of other smaller sardars were dispossessed of 
their territories. Having been subdued, most sccrdccrs, along with their 
retainers, entered the Maharaja’s army, helping to swell it into a 
formidable fighting machine. In 1807 the Pathan colony of Kasur was 
deprived of its independence and Bahawalpur was turned into a tributary 
state. Two years later Kangra was conquered. In 1806 Ranjit Singh 
had felt strong enough to launch the first of several expeditions against 
the Malwa Sikhs, believing that he might safely bring them into his 
political orbit without coming into collision with the British (who in 
1803 had ended Maratha power in northern India and occupied Delhi).
But the Malwa Sikhs sought British protection. In 1809 the British 
pressured Ranjit Singh into signing the Treaty of Amritsar which bound
him to renounce any designs on the country to the south of the Sutlej.
' 21 The cis-Sutlej states were declared to be under British protection.
Thus, by 1809 Ranjit Singh’s authority in central Punjab was firmly
established; he had been forced, however, to accept the Sutlej as his
22southeastern boundary (see Map 3 ).
In the second period (1810-23) Ranjit Singh turned his attention 
towards the north and southwest. By 1816 most of the small hill 
principalities had been made tributaries of Lahore; the inner cordon 
of Muslim chieftainships had also been broken. Having subdued all the 
chieftains - Sikh, Hindu, or Muslim - who had any pretentions to independent
21. Mian Bashir Ahmed Farooqi, British Relations with the Cis-Sutlej 
Statesj 1809-1823 (Punjab Government Record Office Publications, 
monograph no 19, Patiala reprint 1971); Victor G. Kiernan, Metcalfe’s 
Mission to Lahore (1808-1809), (Punjab Government Record Office 
Publications, monograph no 21, Patiala reprint 1971).
22. This map is incorrect in that it shows the territory occupied by the 
inner cordon of Muslim chieftainships as having been incorporated into 
Ranjit Singh's kingdom by 1809 - in fact it was not incorporated until 
about 1816.
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authority within the Punjab region, and having secured his northern 
and southeastern boundaries, Ranjit Singh then took on the more 
resourceful Pathan rulerships that constituted the outer cordon of 
Muslim power. These principalities were conquered and either annexed 
outright or turned into tributaries between 1818 and 1823: Multan 
(1818), Kashmir (1819), Dera Ghazi Khan (1820), Dera Ismail Khan (1821), 
Peshawar (1823). By 1823 the basic limits to Sikh expansion had been 
reached (Map 3).
In the third period (1824-39) Ranjit Singh made no new conquests
of a major kind - there was scarcely any territory outside his kingdom
that he was capable of acquiring. A Sikh garrison was established at
Ladakh in 1835 for the purpose of exacting tribute and controlling the
shawl-wool trade; but when, after Ranjit Singh's death, Sikh troops
pushed on to Iskardo (1841) the British, who were then at war with China,
demanded that they be pulled back. In 1836 Ranjit Singh decided to
conquer Sind, but was prevented from doing so by the British, who had
already signed a protection treaty with the Amirs of Sind (the British
annexed Sind themselves in 1843). In the last period of his reign
Ranjit Singh devoted his military energies to strengthening the
boundaries that had already been established. For example, following
the fanatical Wahabi insurrection of 1827-31, the northwest frontier,
which had been ruled indirectly through local chieftains after its
conquest in the early 1820s, was re-occupied and placed under the
administration of governors appointed by the Maharaja: Dera Ghazi Khan
was re-occupied in 1831; Peshawar was captured from the Pathans in 1834;
Tank, Bannu, and Dera Ismail Khan were directly annexed between 1832 and
231836.
The structure of Sikh government
European philosophers, political scientists, and historians, from 
Machiavelli onwards have recognised the existence of fundamental differences
23. Narendra Krishna Sinha, "Ranjit Singh and the North-West Frontier
Problem", in Indian Historical Quarterly, vol 5, Sept 1929, pp.513-17.
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It is generally agreed that an essential aspect of feudalism, corresponding
to its localised economic activity, is a localised distribution of power.
In their ideal form, the feudal monarchies of Europe were always restricted
by hereditary and independent aristocracies, by institutions representing
the three great social estates, and by a whole range of jealously protected
civil privileges and immunities. Anderson characterises this situation
as the "parcellisation of sovereignty":
Political sovereignty was never focused in a single centre.
The functions of the State were disintegrated in a vertical 
allocation downwards, at each level of which political and 
economic relations were, on the other hand, integrated. This 
parcellisation of sovereignty was constitutive of the whole 
feudal mode of production.25
The essential feature of "oriental despotism", on the other hand, is
a centralised structure of power: this corresponds to the absence of
private property (especially landed property) which Marx and Engels
26identified as "the key to the whole of the East." In their ideal form,
the empires of the Islamic East were much more despotic than their European,
feudal counterparts. They possessed centralised, patrimonial administrations;
they recognised few, if any, inalienable civil rights; and they were
without real aristocracies. To quote Anderson again, this time with
reference to the Ottoman empire:
For Ottoman political theory, the cardinal attribute of 
sovereignty was the Sultan's unlimited right to exploit all 
sources of wealth within his realm as his own Imperial Possessions.
It followed that there could be no stable, hereditary nobility 
within the Empire, because there was no security of property which 
could found it. Wealth and honour were effectively coterminous 
with the State, and rank was simply a function of positions held 
within it.27
between the power structures of feudalism and "oriental despotism."
What kind of power structure was the Sikh kingdom? By the end of 
Ranjit Singh's reign the kingdom was a strong, militaristic State. It
24. The literature on this subject is vast, and full of controversy. For 
a useful summary of the main trends, see Ervand Abrahamian, "Oriental 
Despotism: The Case of Qajar Iran", in International Journal of Middle 
East Studies, no 5 (1974), pp.3-31.
25. Perry Anderson, Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism (London, 1974), p.148.
26. Engels to Marx, 6 June 1853: quoted in Abrahamian, "Oriental Despotism", 
p.5.
27. Perry Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State (London, 1974), pp.365-6.
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possessed a centralised administration with specialised departments and
28personnel. And it had a standing army of about 80,000 men, which
was equipped and trained along European lines, and which absorbed about
2941 per cent of the total revenues of the State. At the same time,
however, the Kingdom exhibited many of the characteristics of the
30feudalistic, "segmentary" State. Its territorial sovereignty, though
recognised within the Punjab region and at the kingdom’s eastern boundary,
shaded off at the kingdom’s western and southern boundaries (see Map 3)
31into a ritualistic hegemony backed up by periodic displays of force.
The army, though a modern one by contemporary Asian standards, lacked a 
single command structure and was still recruited largely on the basis of 
kinship. The administration was strong and efficient at the centre, 
but there was a segmental duplication and combination of specialised 
offices at subordinate levels, and there were peripheral foci of 
administration over which the centre exercised only limited control. 
Finally, the authority of the Maharaja, which was absolute in theory, 
was restricted by his need to balance the claims of conflicting ideologies 
and social groups. On the continuum of governmental formations, the 
Sikh kingdom must therefore be placed at a position somewhere between the 
ideal, "oriental despotic" State and the feudalistic, "segmentary" State. 
Let us elaborate this observation by examining - in this section - the 
structure of Sikh government, and - in the next section - the politics of 
rulership.
28. A.F.M. Abdul Ali, "Notes on the Life and Times of Ranjit Singh", in 
Bengal Past And Present, vol 31, Jan-June 1926, p.65.
29. Kohli's foreward to Suri, Umdat-Ut-Tatiarikh, Daftar III, pts i-v, pp. 
xvii-xix. Kohli notes that at one stage there were more than forty 
Europeans in the Maharaja’s employ.
30. For Southall’s model of the "segmentary" State, see Aidan W. Southall, 
Alur Society: A Study in Processes and Types of Domination (Cambridge, 
1953), pp. 248-9. For an earlier application of this model to South 
Asia, see Burton Stein, "The Segmentary State in South Indian History", 
in Richard G. Fox (ed), Realm and Region in Traditional India (Duke 
University, Program in Comparative Studies on Southern Asia, Monograph 
and Occasional Papers Series, monograph no 14, 1977), pp.3-15.
31. For example, in 1831 the vassal Nawab of Bahawalpur was ordered to send 
an outstanding amount of tribute. Suri, the chronicler of events at 
Ranjit Singh's court, reports of the order sent to the Nawab: "In 
case of delay triumphant troops would be appointed in that direction to 
lay waste to the country under his sway" : Umdat-Ut-Tawarikh, Daftar III, 
pts i-v, pp. 6, 1 1 .
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Sikh government was comprised of two complementary and interlocking
systems. These may be termed the "national” and "local" systems on
account of their different operational spheres and degrees of accountability
to the political capital. (It must be pointed out that this is only a
heuristic model: the Sikhs did not themselves refer to two systems of
government). The "national" system was a pyramidal structure of authority,
designed to meet the primary tasks of government: the maintenance of
internal and external security, the collection of State revenues, and the
dispensation of civil and criminal justice. Its apex was occupied by
the Maharaja in his court, and it extended down through the province (suba)
to its base at the level of the district (ta'aluqa or pargana). Within
it were found a wide variety of offices, some highly specialised, others
rather indefinite; some primarily military, judicial, or fiscal in
nature, others representing an amalgamation of these functions. Structurally,
the "national" system was a continuation of the administrative format that
had existed in the nrisl and, before that, the Mughal periods, even though
the nomenclature and number of operational units and administrative offices
32had often changed. It was, however, a system that Ranjit Singh and 
his advisors had had to reconstruct, and then modify as political 
circumstances changed. The "local" system, on the other hand, was an 
ancient and virtually unchanged structure of authority - an administrative 
and political remnant of countless, earlier dynasties. It was a solid, 
infrastructural system that was rooted in village society and stretched 
up through the tope and tccppa to engage the "national" system. Through 
their "national" system officers, the Sikhs supported and utilised the 
"local" system to maintain rural law and order, and to secure their share 
of the agrarian surplus. Occasionally, they intervened in the succession 
to its offices. But, unlike the British who were to follow them, they 
generally refrained from interfering with its basic organisation and 
functions. The "local" system thus remained a distinct, semi-autonomous 
structure of authority and power.
32. In her study of the Sikh agrarian system, Indu Banga has noted the 
basic continuity of Mughal administrative procedure: "The Agrarian 
System of the Sikhs (1759-1849)", (unpub Ph.D. thesis, Guru Nanak 
University, Amritsar, 1974); "Sikh Revenue Administration: The 
Framework", in J.S. Grewal (ed), Studies In Local And Regional History 
(Amritsar, 1974), pp.55-85.
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Let us briefly examine the more important offices in each of the
two systems of government (see Fig 2:2). At the darbar (court) level
of the "national" system were certain specialised offices like those of
wazir (chief minister), diwan (head of the finance department), adalat
33(chief judge), deorhiwala (royal chamberlain), paymaster, postmaster,
superintendent of customs, superintendent of the royal seal, and so forth.
Each of these officers headed departments staffed by munshis (clerks
34and record keepers). These officers were appointed by the Maharaja 
from within the ranks of the chieftains and clients at court and were 
directly responsible to him. Most received cash salaries and/or jagirs.
At the level of the suba, or province, was the office of nazim
(provincial governor). It seems that for many years Ranjit Singh divided
his kingdom into seven subas: Kashmir, Peshawar, Wazirabad, Multan, Pind
Dadan Khan (with the salt mines), Kangra (with a portion of the Manjha),
35and the Jullundur Doab. To each of these subas was appointed a nazim,
generally a royal prince or leading chieftain. The nazim entered into
a contract for his office. He might himself submit a tender for the
administration of a particular suba or, conversely, a royal letter (shukka)
addressed to him might propose the contract; often a good deal of
haggling on both sides occurred before a sum of revenue and quantity of
esoterica - camels, hounds, hawks, saffron and slave girls - were agreed
36upon and the contract (;pata-nama) drawn up and signed. The nazim
37was paid a handsome salary, yet it was understood that any extra revenue
33. It is often thought that there was no chief judge in the kingdom.
But Ganesh Das refers to Sardar Waisaka Singh as holding the office
of adalat-i-panjab: Grewal and Banga (trans and eds), Early Nineteenth 
Century Panjab, pp.32, 91, 124.
34. For the evolution of the central administrative departments, see Sita 
Ram Kohli, Catalogue of Khalsa Darbar Records (Lahore, 1927), vol II, 
pp.1-1 1 .
35. FSC, 30 Oct 1847, no 95 (NAI).
36. For examples, see Ganda Singh (ed), The Punjab in 1839-40: Selections 
from the Punjab Akhbarsj Punjab Intelligencey etc. preserved in the 
National Archives of India, New Delhi (Amritsar, 1952), pp. 7, 27, 34; 
Suri, Umdat-Ut-Tawarikh, Daftar III, pts i-v, pp. 185, 193.
37. For salaries of early nazims, see Sita Ram Kohli, "Land Revenue
Administration under Maharajah Ranjit Singh", reprinted in The Panjab 
Past And Present, vol v, pt II, Oct 1971, pp. 434-53.
Fig 2:2 Principal Offices in the Tuo Systems of Sikh Government
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that he managed to extract from his suba by lawful means - by extending
cultivation or encouraging trade, for example - was his to keep. In
theory, he was prevented from rack-renting his cultivators by being
required to submit regular returns of produce and collections; in
practice, he often fudged his returns. Within the territory under his
jurisdiction the nazim was allowed to exercise almost unlimited military,
fiscal and judicial authority. He often appointed his own subordinate
officers: a deputy (makhtar-i-kar) or managing agent (karkun), an
administrator of justice (adalati), governors of military forts (thanadars)
and revenue collectors (kavdax®') • Sometimes, the nazim sub-contracted
38a portion of his suba.
In the middle period of his reign, however, Ranjit Singh, for reasons
of greater economic efficiency, broke up the central subas into smaller
units placed under smaller contractors called ijaradars. We shall
examine this in a moment. In the remaining, peripheral subas two different
sorts of nazims would seem to have emerged. In Kashmir and Peshawar,
tracts that were too distant, too turbulent or too poor to repay the costs
of efficient administration, and where Sikh rule in its completeness was
never really established anyway, the nazim was a temporary and rapacious
governor. Eleven nazims were appointed to Kashmir between 1819 and 1845:
39the longest term enjoyed was seven years. On the northwest frontier
the nazim barricaded himself inside his fort and relied upon the local
tribal chieftains to help keep the peace in the countryside and collect the
land revenue. Because the land revenue demand here was low - one-quarter
or even one-eighth of the gross produce, compared with the one-third or
40one-half share exacted in central Punjab - and because the local chieftains
had to be placated with remissions of one-quarter of the total collections
41(chaharam) the nazim at Peshawar often found it difficult to make an 
honest profit. Sometimes he resorted to cheating his government: an
38. For examples, see Griffin, et at. y Chiefs and Families, vol 2, pp.4-7, 
125; Suri, Umdat-Ut-Tawarikh, Daftar III, pts i-v, p.205.
39. Banga, "Sikh Revenue Administration", pp. 58-9.
40. "PAR 1851": FM, no 356, paras 162-4 (NAI).
41. Attock DG 1883-84, pp.39-40.
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in July 1840 showed that the last three nazims owed the government three
lakhs of rupees.^ In terms of his limited authority, the nazim of
Kashmir or Peshawar was in a position analogous to that of the court-appointed
chieftain in the African kingdoms of Ashanti and Dahomey who was sent
43to "double" and "supervise" distant territorial chieftains.
examination of the Peshawar accounts by the central finance ministers
In Kangra, the Jullundur Doab, and Multan, on the other hand, the
nazims of the later period enjoyed much longer terms of office: Diwan
Sawan Mai acted as nazim of Multan for about fifteen years (and was
succeeded by his son, Diwan Mul Raj, in 1844), while Sardar Desa Singh
Majithia and his son, Sardar Lehna Singh, acted as nazims of Kangra for
44over thirty years. Provided they paid their specified revenues to
Lahore on time and maintained peace and justice, these nazims were left
to rule their subas rather like miniature Maharajas. Diwan Sawan Mai,
for example, constructed an elaborate administrative system, made land
grants, built canals, introduced new crops, and amassed a considerable,
45personal fortune. His land revenue system was characterised by one 
British officer as having been "the highest possible development of the 
oriental theory of revenue administration, under which the producers are 
allowed to retain only so much of the produce as is absolutely necessary 
for their support, and what is not required for this purpose is appropriated
42. Ganda Singh (ed), The Punjab in 1839-40, p.214. A lakh equals 100,000. 
In the nineteenth century 10 rupees (hereafter Rs) were approximately 
the equivalent of 1 pound sterling (£).
43. Ivor Wilks, "Ashanti Government", in Daryll Forde and P.M. Kaberry (eds), 
West African Kingdoms in the Nineteenth Century (London, 1967), pp. 
206-38; J. Lombard, "The Kingdom of Dahomey", in ibid., pp. 70-92.
44. n 39 above.
45. For details on Diwan Sawan Mai's government see Multan DG 1883-84, p.30; 
Muzaffargarh DG 1883-84, pp. 40-1. According to John Lawrence, Diwan 
Sawan Mai and his son "paid Ranjit Singh Rs 21,64,000 per annum and 
collected double that sum from their province": "Statistical Notes on 
the Punjab by the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Trans-Sutlej 
Territories on Special Duty at Lahore", 10 Nov 1846: FSC, 26 Dec 1846, 
nos 1325-7, p. 12 (NAI). A later British report indicates that Multan 
under Diwan Mul Raj yielded an annual revenue of Rs 3,495,542, from 
which he paid Rs 2,166,585 to Lahore and was left with Rs 1,228,957
as profit and management expenses: "PAR 1851": FM, no 356, para 178 
(NAI).
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by the State." Misr Rup Lai, who was the nazim of the Jullundur 
Doab between 1832 and 1839, is reported as having developed a lenient,
yet sophisticated and efficient, system of land revenue administration.
At the level of the ta’aluqa (pargana), or district, were certain
police and judicial functionaries such as the kotwal (town or city police
48chief) and the qazi (Islamic civil judge). The important authority
figure in the ta'aluqa, however, was either the jagirdar, the ijaradar,
or the kardar. Let us begin with the jagirdar. It is well known that,
like earlier rulers, the Sikhs granted jagirs to all manner of servants
and clients - from royal princes, chieftains, senior administrators, and
high priests to soldiers, dancing girls, cultivators, and village holymen -
49in lieu of, or in addition to, cash salaries, or as charitable grants.
It seems probably that these jagirs, together with small ma’afis (grants 
of revenue-free land) and inams (deducations from the land revenue in 
favour of influential landholders), accounted for between 35 and 45 per 
cent of the kingdom's total fiscal resources (land revenue, tribute, and 
customs); in the central districts, close to the capital, the figure was
46
47
46. F.C. Channing, Senior Secretary (hereafter Sen Secy) to Financial 
Commissioner (hereafter FC), Punjab to Secy to Government (hereafter 
Govt), Punjab, 1 June 1882, no 687, p.3. This letter is reprinted 
as preface to Edward O'Brien, Report on the Land Revenue Settlement 
of the Muzaffargarh District of the Punjab3 1873-80 (Lahore, 1882), 
(hereafter SR Muzaffargarh 1873-80).
47. R. Temple, Report on the settlement3 Under Regn IX, of 1833, of the 
District of Jullundhur (Lahore, 1852), (hereafter SR Jullundur 1852), 
pp.12-13.
48. At the outset of his reign Ranjit Singh revived the offices of hereditary 
qazis and muftis (assistants) which had been prevalent in Mughal times.
The services of qazis were used by non-Muslims as well as Muslims.
See Grewal, In the By-Lanes of History, pp. 8-9; "The Qazi in the 
Pargana", in Grewal (ed), Studies In Local And Regional History, pp. 1-36.
49. These grants will be examined in greater detail in chapter 5.
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higher - between 50 and 65 per cent of the district revenues. Each 
one of these grants represented a temporary assignment of a portion of 
the State's legitimate revenues. But the size of individual grants and 
the social and political status of grantees were both subject to wide 
variation. Moreover, not all grants carried that accompanying assignment 
of fiscal and general administrative powers which is usually taken to be 
one of the defining features of a jagir. 51 It is therefore necessary to 
make a broad distinction between two types of jagirdar : the "superior" 
jagirdar and the "inferior" jagirdar.
The "superior" jagirdar, with whom we are concerned here, was either
a royal prince or a member of the feudalistic nobility (chieftains and
commoners elevated to chiefly rank by the Maharaja). His jagirs were
awarded in lieu of, or in addition to, the cash salary that went with his
high administrative office or army post. These were worth upwards of
52several thousands - sometimes several lakhs - of rupees per annum and
5 3
and covered whole ta'aluqas or large portions of ta'aluqas. The "superior"
50. These percentages are only guesses, based on a variety of estimates.
Prinsep quotes Captain Murray's estimate (c.1830s?) of the kingdom's 
total revenues which indicates that jagirs, etc. accounted for 42.3 
per cent: Henry T. Prinsep, Origin of the Sikh Power in the Punjab 
(Patiala, reprint 1970), p.146. Cunningham's estimate of total 
revenues in 1844 indicates a figure of 35.5 per cent: Cunningham,
History of the Sikhs, Appendix xxxviii. John Lawrence's estimate of 
revenues in 1848 (by which time the kingdom had lost Kashmir and the 
Jullundur Doab) indicates a figure of about 40 per cent: John Lawrence 
to H.M. Elliot, Secy to G0I, 31 March 1848: FSC, 28 April 1848, nos 
57-66 (NAI). In Gujranwala District more than 50 per cent of the 
revenue was assigned under the Sikhs: Gujranwala DG 1895, p.164; in 
Montgomery District, 60 per cent: Montgomery DG 1883-84, p.62; and
in Lahore District, 66 per cent: SE Lahore 1858, p.23.
51. Wilson defines a jagir as a tenure "in which the public revenues of a 
given tract of land were made over to a servant of the state, together 
with the powers requisite to enable him to collect and appropriate such 
revenue, and administer the general government of the district": H.H. 
Wilson, A Glossary of Judicial and Revenue Terms of British India 
(Delhi, 2nd edn 1968), p.224.
52. See Major R. Leech, "List and Amount of the Jageers of the principal 
Jageerdars in the Punjab in 1837" (no date): FSC, 18 Nov 1843, no 20 (NAI).
53. For a table showing the allocation of eleven (out of twenty-six) 
ta'aluqas in Gujranwala District to jagirdars by Ranjit Singh, see R.P. 
Nisbet, Report on the Revision of the Land Revenue Settlement of the 
Gujranwala District3 1866-67 (Lahore, ?), (hereafter SR Gujranwala 
1866-67), pp.9-11; Gujranwala DG 1883-84, p.28.
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jagirdar collected the revenue from the villages in his jagirs himself,
or employed kardars for this purpose. Within his jagirs he commonly
exercised additional powers such as those of magistrate and judge. Most
jagirs awarded to "superior" jagirdars, particularly those employed in
the army or non-specialised administrative offices, carried extra service
obligations: the "superior" jagirdar was expected to attend court (darbar),
or keep an agent (vakil) there, and furnish a specified number of cavalrymen
54(sowars) out of his jagirs. Immediately prior to annexation one-quarter 
of the kingdom’s total revenues was assigned to "superior" jagirdars - 
earlier than this the proportion may well have been greater.^ The 
"inferior" jagirdar, on the other hand, was not an office holder as such, 
but merely a member of that vast group of minor officials, soldiers, and 
beneficiaries of the State who received their salaries and allowances in 
jagirs and related grants like ma'afis and inams. His jagir was worth 
anything between several hundred rupees and just a few rupees per annum, 
being the revenue due from a few villages, a single village, or a few wells 
and a piece of land. Occasionally, the "inferior" jagirdar collected 
this revenue himself, but it was more common for him to draw the equivalent 
in cash from the local treasury.^ He exercised little or no additional 
authority within his jagir. The "inferior" jagirdar received his grant 
not only from the Maharaja but also from the "superior" jagirdar out of 
the latter's own jagirs. ^
54. The Sikhs do not seem to have adopted the Mughal practice of double 
ranking mansabdars according to zat (personal rank) and sowar (number 
of soldiers to be furnished). But when, after the annexation of the 
kingdom, the British prepared statements of jagirs held by all the 
leading chieftains, making a distinction between those portions of 
jagirs held on terms of service (the computation was generally made 
at the rate of Rs 25 per annum per sowar) and those held as purely 
personal emolument, the ratio was found to be roughly two-fifths 
service and three-fifths personal.
55. John Lawrence to Elliot, 31 March 1848: FSC, 28 April 1848, nos 57-66 
(NAI). In the following two chapters we shall see that after Ranjit 
Singh’s death in 1839 the proportion of total revenues assigned in 
jagirs rose sharply and then dropped away after the British gained 
control of the darbar.
56. For assignments of revenue through kardars, see Banga, "Sikh Revenue 
Administration", pp.72-3.
57. "Superior" jagirdars commonly made madad-i-ma’ash or dharmarth 
grants and made over portions of their jagirs to their families and 
followers. It might be mentioned that at the death of a "superior" 
jagirdar or resumption of his jagirs for any other reason the Sikhs 
generally acknowledged the first type of sub-grant but not the second.
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or revenue farmer. Towards the end of Ranjit Singh's reign military and
5 8civil government expenditure rose sharply. This created the need for
a more accurate forecast of State revenues and a more certain means of
ensuring their remittance to the central treasury. From the early 1830s
onwards Ranjit Singh therefore encouraged the practice of farming out the
revenues of whole ta'aluqas, or blocks of ta'aluqas for periods of between
three and six years. The royal salt mines at Pind Dadan Khan in the
59Sind Sagar Doab were also farmed out. So were forts and cities: in 
May 1831, for instance, one Wasakha Singh, a "famous resident" of Chandiot, 
an ancient city in the Rachna Doab, presented himself before the Maharaja 
and was granted the contract of Akalgarh fort for Rs 15,000 and that of 
Chandiot for Rs 55,000 per annum.^ The ijaradar made his own arrangements 
for the collection of the revenue. Whatever he managed to collect over 
and above the amount specified in his contract represented his personal 
profit. From time to time he would be called upon to submit his accounts - 
or those of the kardars under him - to the central auditing office.^1*
The ijaradar differed from the nazim in several respects. The territory 
under his jurisdiction was smaller. He seldom received a fixed salary.
He signed a contract for a specific, limited period of time. He seldom 
took on any extra-fiscal powers. And though the ijaradar could also be 
selected from the circle of courtiers, he was more likely to be a minor 
official, like a kardar, or a private speculator from the merchant-banker
t 62class.
The second important official at the ta'aluqa level was the ijaradar,
58. The salary expenditure alone of the army was Rs 30 lakhs in 1835 and 
rose to Rs 46 lakhs in 1840: Kohli, "Land Revenue Administration", 
pp.438-9.
59. "A geographical sketch of the Punjab" (no author, no date): FM, 1830, 
no 206 (NAI).
60. Suri, Umdat-Ut-Tawarikh, Daftar III, pts i-v, p.33. For other examples: 
ibid, pp. 159, 200; Ganda Singh (ed), The Punjab in 1839-40, p.164.
61. An examination of the accounts of Sardar Fateh Singh Ahluwalia's 
kardars in 1831 showed that he was Rs 190,000 in arrears. Ranjit 
Singh struck off Rs 15,000 to meet the expenses of the kardars and 
the same sum for jewellery for the Sardar's son, and ordered him to 
remit the balance: Suri, Umdat-Ut-Tawarikh, Daftar III, pts i-v, p.30.
62. Kohli, "Land Revenue Administration", p.439; Banga, "Agrarian System", 
pp.276-84. For a list of big ijaradars, and nazims, see Major R.
Leech, "List and Amount of the Revenue Farms of parts of the Punjab in 
1837" (no date): FSC, 18 Nov 1843, no 21 (NAI).
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The term kardar was sometimes applied to a whole range of officials in
63the "national" system including, for example, customs officials.
Nevertheless, it was most frequently applied to the official charged
with the general administration of the ta’aluqa - the counterpart, in
other words, of the Afghan anrin or the Mughal ’amil. Some kardars were
direct appointees of the Maharaja and were sent to work under a nazim
ijaradar, or "superior" jagirdar, or in a ta’aluqa over which the only
higher authority was the Maharaja himself. Others were appointed by the
nazim, ijaradar, or "superior" jagirdar. In Multan Diwan Sawan Mai
employed five grades of kardars on salaries of between Rs 180 and Rs 720
per annum. These kardars were assisted by five grades of nruharirs
64(deputies) on salaries of between Rs 96 and Rs 240 per annum.
According to Kohli, the salary of the kardar directly appointed by
the Maharaja was broadly proportional to the annual value of the ta’aluqa
in his charge. Most received between Rs 300 and Rs 1,500 per annum.^
Some had several ta’atuqas in their charge, and their salaries were
correspondingly higher. British officials who had come into direct contact
with kardars in the 1840s were quick to point out that most of them had
supplemented, sometimes even doubled, their fixed salaries by way of
66perquisites, illegal cesses, and bribes. It would seem, however, that
this practice became widespread only after central authority in the kingdom 
collapsed. A strong ruler like Ranjit Singh or a strong nazim like 
Diwan Sawan Mai generally kept a close eye on the kardar’s activities
The third important official at the ta'aluqa level was the kardar.
63. For some of the applications, see Banga, "Sikh Revenue Administration", 
pp.70-1. Many British officials employed the term generically to 
include all provincial officials (nazims, ijaradars and kardars).
But while it is true that an individual could simultaneously be, say, 
both a kardar and an ijaradar, the actual offices were quite distinct.
64. Muzaffargarh DG 1883-84, pp. 40-1.
65. Kohli, "Land Revenue Administration", p.451.
66. For example Barnes (Settlement Officer, Kangra District), quoted in 
J.M. Douie, Punjab Settlement Manual (Lahore, 4th edn 1930), p.20.
The authors of the first PAR wrote that because the pay of kardars 
was "uncertain and precarious", "it seemed to be tacitly understood 
that they must live by the perquisites of their appointments" : "PAR 
1851": FM, no 356, para 19 (NAI).
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and level of affluence. Besides, the kardar was not normally allowed
to serve at one place for a lengthy period, and was thus unable to extend
his power and influence in the ta’aluqa. Ganesh Das's information on
the administrators of Gujrat shows that the average tenure of the kardar
under the Sikh monarchs was only about two and a half years, compared
with the average of about six years enjoyed by the ’amil during the reigns
68of the Mughal emperors Akbar and Shah Jahan.
The kardar who was an appointee of the Maharaja or strong nazim was
the principal representative of government in the countryside. Accordingly,
he exercised a multiplicity of duties. He was a revenue collector, an
agricultural development officer, a treasurer, an excise and customs officer,
and a judge and magistrate all rolled into one. A translated specimen
of Diwan Sawan Mai’s instructions to a kardar makes this very clear.
The kardar is first enjoined to treat his subjects well, extend cultivation,
and collect the revenue diligently. Then follow detailed instructions
on the apprehension of criminals, the remittance of the kharif and rabi
revenues in regular instalments, the recording of current prices, the
annual settling of accounts, the maintenance of irrigation canals, the
assessment of the revenue in consultation with "local" system officials,
69and the payment of salaries to soldiers under his charge. Other duties
expected of the kardar included the organising of religious festivals and
70the entertaining of important visitors to the locality. In some ways, 
then the kardar resembles the Chinese local magistrate during the Ch’ing 
period or the French intendant under Bourbon Absolutism.
As the official directly responsible for the assessment and collection 
of the land revenue, and for the implementation of the State’s general 
agrarian policies, the kardar provided the link between the "national"
67
67. For example, a translated specimen of Diwan Sawan Mai's instructions 
to a kardar includes the following warning: "Subsist on your pay. 
Covet not from any one, and rest your hopes on no one, nor let your 
muharirs do so. If you do, you are strictly responsible" : SR
Muzaffargarh 1873-80, p.52.
68. Grewal and Banga (trans and eds), Early Nineteenth Century Panjab, 
pp. 64-6.
69. SR Muzaffargarh 1873-80, p.52.
70. Suri, ¡Jmdat-Ut-Tawarikh, Daftar III, pts i-v, pp. 4, 34, 55.
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and "local" systems of government. To appreciate this point we need to
outline briefly the theory and practice of land revenue administration
under the Sikhs. Who owned the land? Who paid the revenue? How
much of the surplus product did the State demand? How was it collected?
The full answers to these questions are exceedingly complex, partly because,
as we have already seen, there was considerable diversity in the productivity
of the land and the kinds of communities it supported, partly because Sikh
rule was stronger in some tracts than in others, and partly because Sikh
revenue administration was a constantly evolving, rather than static,
system. What we have to say here therefore represents a series of highly
71generalised statements.
When Marx described private property in land as "the great desideratum
72of Asiatic society" he was echoing the conclusion reached by many British
officials in India that, since nearly everyone connected with the land
possessed some recognised right in it, the land was owned communally, or
rather - if the European definition of property be applied - not owned
73by anyone. This conclusion is correct up to a point. In the Bar
tracts of the arid zone, where grazing land was plentiful, proprietary
rights in land scarcely existed. The only prescriptive rights to which
the pastoral tribes attached any importance were the right to use certain
74wells and the right to enjoy a certain territorial sphere of influence.
71. A more detailed picture will emerge in later chapters (especially 
Chapters 4 and 5) when we examine the land revenue settlements made 
by the British.
72. Karl Marx, "The Future Results of the British Rule in India" (1853), 
in David Fernbach (ed), Karl Marx, Surveys from Exile: Political 
Writings (London, 1973), vol 2, p.320.
73. Trevaskis wrote: "Prior to British rule the English conception of 
property in land as a transferable marketable commodity, absolutely 
owned and passing from hand to hand like any chattel, did not exist": 
Hugh Kennedy Trevaskis, The Land of the Five Rivers: An Economic 
History of the Punjab from the Earliest Times to the Year of Grace 1890 
(London, 1928), p.234.
74. G. Ouseley and W.G. Davies, Report on the Revised Settlement of the 
Shahpoor District in the Rawulpindee Division, 1866 (Lahore, 1866), 
(hereafter SR Shahpur 1866 ), p.62.
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In the cultivated tracts, where several cultivating groups often claimed
an interest in the same piece of land, the rights were sometimes so
conditional, so overlapping, so grudgingly admitted by the State that
they could hardly be called proprietary rights. But, at the same time,
sale and mortgage of land were not unknown: in most cases the Sikh
rulers treated authenticated deeds of sale and mortgage as being of
75immutable validity. Moreover, the Sikh rulers frequently cut through 
the maze of conflicting claims to land to create what were practically 
exclusive proprietary rights. Under Sikh rule landownership was not 
simply a question of either abstract principles or time-honoured rights 
and responsibilities. It was, rather, a highly political question 
involving the strength and fiscal imperatives of the State on the one hand 
and the resilience or adaptability of the cultivating communities on the 
other.
Basically, the Sikhs recognised two kinds of proprietors in most
76villages: "primary" zamindars and "intermediary" zamindars. Where 
Sikh rule was strong the position of the "primary" zccmindars was strongest; 
where Sikh rule was weak the position of the "intermediary" zconindars was 
strongest. The Sikhs had a clear preference for the former. "Primary" 
zccmindars were peasant proprietors who cultivated the land themselves 
or with the help of hired village labour. Wherever possible, the kardar 
made the revenue settlement with them. In suba Multan the kardars employed 
by Diwan Sawan Mai created "primary" zconindars either by inviting 
cultivators to establish new villages in the waste, for which they were 
granted small agricultural loans (takavis) to cover costs, or by ousting
75. See the abstracts of sale and mortgage deeds in B.N. Goswamy and
J.S. Grewal, The Mughal and Sikh Rulers and the Vaishnavas of Pindori:
A Historical Interpretation of 52 Persian Documents (Simla, 1969), 
pp. 45-6, 48, 50-1. In some places, particularly in the densely 
populated riverbank tracts, the cultivators exercised the right of 
mortgaging their cultivation: SR Gujranuala 1856, p.55.
76. SR Gujrat 1861, pp. 104-7; SR Jullundur 1852, pp. 25-33; SR Muzaffargarh 
1873-80, p.91. The British used a variety of terms to describe the
two kinds of proprietors: "inferior proprietors" and "superior 
proprietors"; maliks (landowners) and malguzars (revenue payers); 
malik adnas (inferior proprietors) and malik alas (superior proprietors).
I have preferred the terms "primary" zccmindars and "intermediary" 
zccmindars in keeping with Hasan's classification of medieval rural India 
into autonomous "chieftains", "intermediary zamindars" and "primary 
zamindars": See Nurul Hasan, Thoughts on Agrarian Relations in Mughal 
India (New Delhi, 1973), pp. 30-40. The position of the chieftains 
under Sikh rule will be examined in the next section of this chapter.
56
the old cultivators from their villages and locating more enterprising
77cultivators (often Brahmans and Khatris) in their place. The rights
of these "primary” zamindars, which included sale and mortage, were
conditional on continuous economic performance:
Under Sawan Mai there was a great deal of personal interference 
with the cultivators.... The kardars managed for the cultivators, 
made them cultivate, made the Hindus lend them money, and made the 
borrowers repay. The agriculturists were pitted against one 
another to cultivate. If on^gman did not cultivate his land, it 
was given to another who did.
In the northern tracts, particularly in the Manjha and Des, where the
"primary" zamindars were members of the dominant got or gots in the village,
the kardar's interference was tolerated less. These villages were
coparcenaries, the lands and wells being divided amongst the cultivators
on the basis of fixed, customary shares. Strangers were jealously excluded.
Rarely was a cultivator permitted to transfer his share to an outsider
even though he might be a resident of a neighbouring village or a member
79of the same got. Tenant cultivators who enjoyed hereditary occupancy
rights and paid the revenue themselves can be counted as "primary" zamindars;
but other tenants were not allowed to engage for the revenue, plant trees
or sink wells since these activities might be treated by the kardar as
conferring "primary" zamindar status. As long as these peasant proprietors
paid their revenue and kept up their village in a high state of cultivation
the kardar left them to their own affairs. Indeed, he would assist them
to preserve their traditions, to adjust their shares at the departure or
80death of a member of the coparcenary and to keep outside parties away.
"Intermediary" zamindars were all those persons who possessed a 
recognised right to a certain share of the produce of land which they 
were not cultivating themselves. Often, they enjoyed special rights in 
the waste land of the village - the right to graze their animals or gather 
fuel, for example - as well. A zamindar who possessed occupancy and
77. For an example, see the entry for Wara village in Arthur H. Cock's 
report on the summary settlement of the lower Rachna Doab, 21 Feb 1848: 
FSC, 28 April 1848, nos 57-66 (NAI).
78. SR Muzaffargarh 1873-80, p.87.
79. We shall examine the position of tenant cultivators in later chapters. 
Here we may simply note that because land was plentiful in pre-modern 
Punjab, tenants were not numerous; seldom did they exceed half the 
number of the proprietary cultivators.
80. SR Juilundur 1852, p.27.
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cultivating rights in a piece of land but leased it to a tenant (who
paid rent to the zamindar and revenue to the kardar) was an "intermediary"
zamindar. Tribal chieftains who received the chaharam remission from
the revenues were "intermediary" zamindars. Descendants of the original
grazing tribes, former "primary" zamindars now ousted, former jagirdars
or ijaradars who had managed to acquire some permanent control over the
land, and "local" system officials (chaudharis, lambardars, qanungos and
patwaris - upon whom more in a moment), all of whom received inams out of
the village revenues, may be included in this category. It was a feature
of Sikh rule that "intermediary" zamindars were never permitted to gain
control of the village communities and their revenues in the manner of
81the taluqdars of northern India. In fact, wherever possible, the
Sikhs tried to reduce ’intermediary" zamindars with any pretensions to
ruling power to the status of "primary" zamindars or even tenant cultivators.
In the western portion of Rawalpindi district, where Sikh rule was established
late and was always fairly weak, the old ruling tribes - Gakkhars, Junjuas,
Goleras and Dumals - retained control of their lands and paid a light
revenue. But in the eastern portion of the district Sikh rule was strong
and uncompromising. Where the tribes were prepared to accept the heavier
revenue demand the engagement was made with their village headmen.
Where the tribes were not prepared to accept the revenue demand the
villages were farmed out to ijaradars, outside cultivators were placed
in the villages with all the rights of "primary" zamindars and the previous
owners were expelled. At the same time, the tribal chieftains were
gradually reduced. At first they were granted jagirs which were later
resumed and replaced with chaharam grants; ultimately the chaharam grants
82were absorbed and replaced in a few instances with paltry inams. It 
might be noted that this process was not effected without bloodshed and 
considerable political commotion. Nor were the lost rights quickly 
forgotten, as the British were to discover when they came to make their own 
land revenue settlements.
81. Of course a nazim like Diwan Sawan Mai could be regarded as having 
been similar to a taluqdar. But, in theory at least, he was a non­
proprietary State servant.
82. SR Rawalpindi 1864, pp. 117-18.
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According to the ancient law of the land the ruling power in India
83has always been entitled to a share in the produce of the soil.
In theory, the Sikhs claimed an even half share, but this portion was 
actually taken only from the richest tracts. Over most of the kingdom, 
except at the periphery, where Sikh authority was limited, or in those 
tracts where cultivation was not yet fully established, the State's portion 
fluctuated between one-third and two-fifths of the gross produce depending 
on the seasons, the quality of the soil, the availability of water for 
irrigation, and the strength of the proprietary community. There were 
at least five modes of assessing the revenue. During the first and 
second periods of Ranjit Singh's reign (until 1824) the most common mode 
was the simple one of batai, or division of the harvested crop on the 
thrashing-floor into the shares of the cultivator and the State. The 
State's share was marked with a government seal (tappa) and stored in a 
warehouse until sold to a local merchant. Not infrequently, however,
84the kardar took up the speculation of the produce through his own agents.
From about 1824 the batai mode was supplemented by a new procedure called
kankut, whereby the areas of standing crops were measured, the harvest
estimated, and the State's share sold back to the cultivator at prices
equal to, or above, the current market rates. The advantages to the
kardar of the kankut mode was that he could collect the revenue in cash
before the harvest and the fall in prices. But it was a calamitous
system for the cultivator who, having to pay the revenue before the harvest,
85became indebted to the moneylender. Certain crops that were difficult 
to divide or whose harvest was difficult to estimate - sugar, cotton and 
tobacco - were assessed by the zabti method, whereby fixed cash rates per
83. This paragraph is based on Cocks's report on the summary settlement 
of the lower Rachna Doab: FSC, 28 April 1848, nos 57-66 (NAI); "PAR 
1851": FM, no 356, paras 162-4 (NAI); Kohli, "Land Revenue 
Administration", pp. 437-48; and Douie, Punjab Settlement Manual, 
pp. 19-21.
84. SR Sialkot 1863, pp. 52-3.
85. Lake's report on the summary settlement of the upper Bari Doab: FSC,
28 April 1848, nos 57-66 (NAI). Lake reports that the moneylenders 
charged interest rates of between 10 and 12 per cent. Also, SR 
Gurdaspur 1856, p.12. Davies mentions an interest rate of 25 per cent.
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unit of land under the crop were applied. The fourth mode was the
assessment of wells at rates varying between Rs 20 and Rs 80 per annum
and ploughs at rates of between Rs 5 and Rs 30 per annum. Fifthly,
the grazing tax (timi) was levied from the pastoral tribes on the basis
of the number of animals in their possession. It should be added that
besides the revenue proper, a number of cesses (abwdbs) were imposed on
the cultivators, presumably as a way of recovering at least part of the
amount paid out of the State's share of the produce in inams and other
86petty expenses. It is doubtful whether the kardar remitted all of
this extra revenue as he ought to have done. Cocks described the abwab
system as a "complicated" system that provided "a screen behind which
local authorities could conduct their nefarious activities", and enumerated
87more than a dozen items which fell within its scope.
The actual collection of the revenue from the "primary" zamindars,
and much of the detailed administrative work that accompanied it, were
performed by officials in the "local" system of government. The chaudhari
and lambardar (or muqaddam) were the "big-men" of village society, the
hereditary headmen of the dominant lineage groups. Under Sikh rule and,
before that, Mughal rule, they wielded considerable influence, and this
was recognised by the kardar as well as by the village community. As
we saw when we examined the origins of the Sikh misl, the chaudhari and
lambardar were ideally situated to create supralocal forms of organisation.
The Sikh authorities, especially the kardars, were at all times anxious
to keep them on side. The chaudhari was headman of the tappa, or circle
of villages. He helped the kardar collect the revenue from the "primary"
zamindars and generally looked after the interests of his villages. In
return for these services he was permitted to hold an inam of revenue-free
land (or wells) and receive a commission of 5 per cent (pachotra) on the
revenues collected. Very often, he managed to wring additional presents
88and privileges out of the kardar. The duties and allowances of the
86. The amounts recorded under this head in the returns of certain kardars 
are equal to between 5 and 12 per cent of the revenue proper: Kohli, 
"Land Revenue Administration", p.447.
87. Cock's report: FSC, 28 April 1848, nos 57-66 (NAI). Also, SR 
Jullundur 1852, p.26.
88. For example, many chaudharis told the British settlement officers that 
their grandfathers had been "Palkee Nisheen" (entitled to ride in a 
palanquin): SR Sialkot 1863, p.108.
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jurisdiction was the single village (mccuza) or lineage section (taraf or
89patti) of the village. Under the kankut system of assessment the
surveyors (kachohus) and appraisers (kaniyas) were generally recruited
90by the kardar from the headmen families.
The other branch of the "local" system of government was concerned
with the maintenance of revenue records. Here, too, the offices were
hereditary. Traditionally, the records of each district had been compiled
by an accountant called the qanungo. Since late Mughal times, however,
there were often three or four qanungos to each ta'aluqa, which suggests
that the qanungo ’s jurisdiction was the tappa. The qanungo kept a
register of village boundaries and collected statistics on cultivation,
harvests, and the disposal of the produce according to the assessment.
He was paid either a cash salary of about Rs 360 per annum or a small
91percentage of the produce. Many qanungos were Khatris whose families
92had held the office since Mughal times. The patwari was a lesser
version of the qanungo, just as the lambardar was a lesser version of the
chaudhari. His jurisdiction was the tope, which could cover a large
village or several adjacent villages. He followed the kardar and kaniyas
at the time of assessment and recorded the details of the assessment in
his field book (khet khusrdh). His remuneration was usually a commission
of between 1 and 2 per cent on the collections. In theory, the patwari
was as much a servant of the village community as he was of the State.
In practice, however, he often used his position as repository of all
information relating to proprietary and cultivation rights to exert a
93personal influence over village affairs generally. Unlike the British, 
who attempted to subject the whole "local" system of government to direct 
State control, the Sikhs were not particularly concerned about who the
89. SR Amritsar 1856, p.104; SR Gurdaspur 1892, p.57; SR Lahore 1858, 
p.12; SR Sialkot 1863, p.94.
90. Sialkot DG 1883-84, p.93.
91. Kohli, "Land Revenue Administration", p.452.
92. Throughout his work, Char Bagh-i-Panjab, Ganesh Das makes numerous 
references to Khatris holding the office of qanungo on an hereditary 
basis: Grewal and Banga (trans and eds), Early Nineteenth Century 
Panjab.
93. SR Gujranwala 1866-67, p.48.
lambardar were almost identical, the main difference being that his
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patwari was, how he came to hold his office or what his relationship 
with the cultivators was, so long as the revenue kept flowing in.
Ranjit Singh and the chieftains
We may conclude this chapter with an examination of the politics of 
rulership. What sort of ruler was Ranjit Singh? What was the basis 
of his authority? What kinds of relationships existed between him and 
the chieftains?
We would suggest that, at a theoretical level, the answers to these
questions are to be found in Weber’s concept of ’’decentralised patrimonial
94authority.” Weber defined the "patrimonial" sub-type of "traditional 
authority" as that authority within a corporate territorial group that is 
still primarily oriented to tradition (as is the case with "gerontocracy" 
and "patriarchalism'') but in its exercise makes the claim of full personal 
powers (as is the case with "sultanism"). "Patrimonialism" is also 
characterised by the presence of an "administrative staff" - especially 
a regular military force under the ruler's direct control. When, in a 
system of "patrimonial authority", particular powers and the corresponding 
economic advantages have become '-'appropriated", by members of the corporate
Qgroup or the "administrative staff", that authority has become "decentralised.,r
The effect of the transition from "patriarchalism" to "patrimonialism” 
is to emancipate an important part of the structure of authority from the 
direct control of tradition. The ruler’s authority is still traditionally 
legitimised, but the detailed means and ends of its exercise have fallen 
within the sphere of his personal prerogative. One consequence of this 
emancipation from traditionalism is the sudden and massive enlargement
94. Max Weber's The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (ed by 
Talcott Parsons, New York, 1964), pp. 341-58. For an excellent 
application of Weber's theory to the history of an East African 
kingdom, see Martin Southwold, Bureaucracy and Chiefship in Buganda:
The Development of Appointive Office in the History of Buganda (East 
African Studies, No 14, Kampala, no date). The theoretical discussion 
of the following paragraphs is based on these two works.
95. Weber uses the examples of the Indian jagirdar and revenue farmer in 
his definition of "decentralised patrimonialism" : Theory of Social 
and Economic Organization, pp. 349-50.
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of the ruler's orbit of free individual action and planning. But
another equally fundamental consequence is the unloosening of a potential
struggle for power which could not have developed under primary
traditionalism. How can the ruler reconcile old kinship norms of
96authority, often still prevalent, with new state norms? How can the 
members of the group be expected to demonstrate their blind loyalty - 
or, indeed, any kind of loyalty - to the ruler when many of the ties 
that traditionally bound them to him have been cut away? How is the 
ruler to ensure, where authority has become "decentralised", that his 
subordinates are not doing unnecessary governing?
Weber pays particular attention to the power struggle between the 
ruler and his "administrative staff". Where the administrators have 
appropriated certain powers and economic advantages, there is every 
possibility that they will build up a body of followers whose primary 
loyalty is to the administrators themselves, and will turn against the 
ruler. The ruler's task is to prevent this - to check the tendency 
for the administrators to transform themselves from a "status group" 
into an "aristocracy". Thus, he commonly adopts the following measures: 
he appoints the subordinates of the administrators himself and makes them 
responsible to himself, not the administrators; he frustrates the 
formation of local groups loyal to the administrators by frequently 
transferring the administrators from one place to another; he checks the 
aggregation of power groups based upon descent ties by avoiding the 
succession of kinsmen to important administrative posts; he exercises 
the right and the power to appoint whoever he chooses as administrators 
and to dismiss them, as he sees fit; he claims the right to attach any 
portion of an administrator's private wealth that could be said to be 
derived from administrative posts awarded by, and powers appropriated 
from, the ruler; and he demands extra-administrative service, particularly 
military service, from the administrators.
96. Fallers has demonstrated that the simultaneous establishment of
authority in African kingdoms on kinship norms and State norms was 
often conducive to political instability and conflict: Lloyd A. Fallers, 
Bantu Bureaucracy (Cambridge, 1956), pp. 12-17, 227-3 8.
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For their part, the administrators attempt to resist the successful 
implementation of the ruler's measures, either by publicly opposing them 
or by privately subverting them. Two important measures, which stop 
short of open rebellion, that they can adopt, are to jointly appeal for 
the ruler's acknowledgement of the inviolability of traditionalism (the 
ideological foundation of the State or a former sharing of power) and 
to individually claim exceptional treatment on the grounds of outstanding 
personal service or social rank.
If the resistance of the administrators becomes serious, the ruler
is almost obliged to build up a "new staff", recruited from the ranks of
the commoners in the corporate group or from outside the corporate group.
The function of the "new staff" is to weaken the power of the "aristocracy"
by providing the ruler with a group of more loyal administrators. The
"new staff" may be appointed to a new set of offices alongside those
occupied by the "aristocracy", in which case the relative power of the
latter is reduced; or it may be appointed to those offices occupied by
the "aristocracy", in which case the latter is at least partially driven
from positions of power. When the ruler creates a "new staff" a crisis
situation arises: the "aristocracy" may revolt and appoint a new ruler
who is sympathetic to their expectations and demands; or, if the ruler
is politically weak, the "new staff" may quickly transform itself into
an "aristocracy", in which case the process of creating a "new staff"
must be repeated. However, if the ruler survives the crisis and neither
possibility eventuates, his own power will be considerably enhanced.
As Southwold remarks:
In such societies, therefore, provided the monarchical 
principle itself is not repudiated, there is likely to be 
a repetition of such processes under their various forms.
Provided no Aristocracy succeeds in firmly entrenching its 
power, it is likely that the power of the Lord will gradually 
increase, since the residues of each cycle come to produce a 
system of such complexity that the sovereign alone has extensive 
freedom to manipulate it.97
When the personal authority of the ruler becomes maximised, and the
primary stress is upon arbitrary will emancipated from any traditional
limitations, "patrimonial authority" could be said to have developed into
"sultanism".
97. Southwold, Bureaucracy and Chief ship in Buganda, p.4.
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The Sikh kingdom provides much of Weber's theory with specific 
historical confirmation. Ranjit Singh legitimised his authority by 
associating it with two important traditions - the tradition of Indian 
rulership and the tradition of Khalsa rulership. On the one hand, he 
consciously adopted most of the ancient rituals and symbols employed 
by Indian kings. For example, he sat on a throne [gaddi), held court 
(<darbar), granted costumes of honour (khil'ats) , patronised important 
festivals (like Baisakh and Divali), employed court astrologers, maintained 
ceremonial elephants, and possessed a special emblem of sovereignty (the 
famous "Koh-i-Nur" diamond). On the other hand, he consciously invoked 
the mystic authority of the Khalsa. He styled his government as the 
"Sarkar Khalsa" and had his coins (Nanakshahi rupees) minted not with his 
own profile but with the seal of the Khalsa. It is reported that he 
generally refused to wear the turban and other costumes of royalty, and
nothat he preferred to be approached with a simple form of address("Sarkar").
But Ranjit Singh was no religious bigot; given the minority position of
the Sikhs in the Punjab, he could not afford to be. In fact, he was
always determined to dampen the enthusiasm of the militant Sikh sects -
in particular the Akalis, who never abandoned the hope that the monarchy
would one day be transformed into the theocratic republic prophesied by
99Guru Gobind Singh.
Ultimately, however, Ranjit Singh derived his authority from, and 
owed his success to, his ability to exert an immense personal influence 
over the political affairs of his kingdom. We know, from the accounts 
of European visitors to his court, that he possessed an extraordinarily 
keen and inquiring mind.*^ We also know, from written copies of his 
orders, that he possessed an indefatigable capacity for work, and that,
98. Abdul Ali, "Notes on Ranjit Singh", pp. 52-3; Prinsep, Origin of
Sikh Power, p.143; Khushwant Singh, History of the Sikhs, vol 1, p.201.
99. For the role of the Akalis (devotees of Akal\ "The Eternal One, God") 
within the Sikh community, and for their notoriously reckless militarism 
(in which capacity they were known as Nihangs: "those without fear"), 
see Rose, Glossary of Tribes and Castes, Vol 11, pp. 9-10. For 
punitive measures taken against disorderly Akalis and Nihangs, see 
Suri, Umdat-Ut-Tawarikh, Daftar III, pts iv, pp. 174, 255-6, 400,
449, 593.
100. For some vivid - and most flattering - European impressions of Ranjit 
Singh's character, see Abdul Ali, "Notes on Ranjit Singh", pp. 42-4.
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in military matters especially, he insisted on knowing the minute details 
of his government.**“** But his greatest asset by far was his ability to 
manipulate and restrain the chieftains. In the thirty-eight years of 
his reign as Maharaja there were possibly only two instances of rebellion
on the part of chieftains who had previously tendered their allegiance to
, . 1 0 2him.
Ranjit Singh could not do without his chieftains. His system of
government was never so monocratic or so universalistic that he could
afford to ignore their high social and political status. The chieftains -
comprising sardars who had survived the eclipse of the mists, tribal
leaders who were taken into service following their subjugation, and
commoners who were elevated to the ranks of the titled - formed the core
of his ’’administrative staff”. As we have seen, some of them managed
to entrench themselves in top offices such as that of nazim. Others
103entrenched themselves in the army. Broadly speaking, however, Ranjit
Singh always desired to retard, rather than encourage, the growth of their
powers and privileges - to limit them to an amorphous, dependent status
category, rather than permit them to develop into an ’’aristocracy” capable
of independent action. It was his policy to mix men of different background
104and religion in his army regiments in order to prevent mutiny. He
continually siphoned off the upper level of army officers, giving them 
duties as nazims or ijaradars or reducing them to "superior" jagirdars 
burdened with service obligations. In their place he elevated a whole 
new class of military commanders recruited essentially from the Sikh Jat
101. S.R. Kohli, "A Book of Military Parwanas", in Indian History Congress 
Proceedings, vol 4, 1940, pp. 367-71.
102. At any rate, I have encountered only two instances; one occurred in 
1821, the other in 1826 (both were short-lived and unsuccessful).
For details, see Griffin, et at., Chiefs and Families, vol 1, pp. 480-1; 
Abdul Ali, "Notes on Ranjit Singh", p.51.
103. The family of Jai Singh Man, for example, at one time held no fewer
then twenty-two top military posts: Griffen^ et al.3 Chiefs and Families3 
vol 2, p.157. Most chieftains placed at least one of their sons in 
the Dera Khas - a regiment for sons of chieftains, from which officers 
were drawn: ibid, vol 1, p.495; Gulshan Lall Chopra, The Panjab as 
a Sovereign State (Hoshiarpur, 2nd edn, 1960), p.162.
104. Ibid, p.169.
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villages of the Manjha.  ^ The process involved a continuous recruitment 
of troops from the base of the "local system" of government and a transference 
of military and administrative officers back and forth between the top of 
the army and the upper levels of the "national system" of government.
It was also Ranjit Singh's policy to undermine, as far as could
safely be done, the rural power base of the chieftains. Towards this
end he adopted a number of strategies. Jagir grants to chieftains were
usually located in the central districts, close to the capital, and were
constantly shifted about and kept fragmented so as to prevent the grantees
from establishing local root s. Ch ie f ta in s were often forbidden to
107hold more than a small portion of their ancestral lands in jagir. When
a chieftain died his jagirs were usually resumed and released to his
family only after they had paid one-quarter or one-half of the value of
the jagirs to the Maharaja as a gift (nazrana) which re-affirmed their 
108vassalage. Ranjit Singh encouraged the chieftains to build their
palaces (havelis) in or close to the capital and to lead sumptuous lives.
He quickly despatched his army to demolish any unauthorised forts
109constructed in the provinces by the chieftains. He made himself an
accessible source of ultimate authority and justice to the zamindars so 
that they could petition him, either at public darbar or during one of 
his many tours through the countryside, to intervene in any revenue 
dispute between them and their ijaradar, kardar, or j a g i r d a r . He 
frequently played off one chieftain family - or one internal family faction -
105. SR Lahore 1858, p.18. For the example of the Mokal family, who under 
Ranjit Singh rose from village cultivators in Lahore District to 
"considerable power" in the kingdom and held jagirs worth Rs 135,000, 
see Griffin, et al., Chiefs and Families, vol 1, p.371.
106. This is made clear in the jagir statements drawn up by the British 
after the annexation of the kingdom. We shall refer to these 
statements in Chapter 5.
107. For example, Atar Singh Majithia was permitted to hold his ancestral 
ta'aluqa of Dhani in ijar but not in jagir: Griffin, et al., Chiefs 
and Families, vol 1, p.415.
108. Ibid, vol 2, pp. 86-90. For an example of 63 per cent of a jagir 
being demanded as nazrana, see Foreign Political Proceedings (hereafter 
FPP), 3 April 1850, no 280 (NAI).
109. Suri, Umdat-Ut-Tawarikh, Daftar III, pts i-v, pp. 169, 533.
110. Ibid, pp. 298, 533; SR Rawalpindi 1864, pp. 65-6.
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against another, and always asserted his right to decide succession questions.
An effective counterweight to the ambitions of the older, established
chieftain families was found in what might be called a "new staff",
comprising administrators initially recruited as clients and frequently
later elevated to chieftain rank. We cannot say that at a particular
stage in his reign Ranjit Singh felt compelled to create a "new staff"
in response to an attempt on the part of the older chieftain families
to turn themselves into an "aristocracy", because the patron-client
relationship, as an alternative to the suzerain-vassal relationship,
had been steadily developing ever since the misl period. Nevertheless,
there are signs that a "new staff" had edged the older chieftain families
out of many positions of power and influence by the end of Ranjit Singh's
reign. Take the office of kardar, for example. There is evidence to
suggest that in the early years of Sikh rule the office was dominated by
112Sikh and Muslim Jats. But out of 107 kardars holding office between
the mid-1830s and the late-1840s, only twelve were Muslims and only
fifteen were Sikhs (and we may assume that some of these belonged to zats
other than the Jat zat). The remainder were mostly Brahmans and Hindu 
113Khatris. The fact that many of them had titles like lalla, misr and
diwan - which denote skills of literacy and administration - suggests
that, as the kingdom's revenue administration became more complex and
more dependent on the maintenance of accurate records, they were recruited
114out of consideration for their experience and expertise. Members of
the "new staff" also occupied important posts at the darbar level of the 
"national" system of government. We may cite the examples of Diwan Dina 
Nath, a Kashmiri Brahman (his father had served the Mughal emperors at 
Delhi), who became diwan of Ranjit Singh's civil and finance departments 
in 1834; Faqir (Muslim title of respect) Aziz-ud-Din Bokhari, who became 
one of the Maharaja's most trusted vakils; and Jamadar (head domestic
111. Griffin, et al.. Chiefs and Families, vol 1, pp.230,431; Suri 
Umdat-Ut-Tawarikh, Daftar III, pts i-v, p.23.
112. SE Jullundur 1852, p.13.
113. I have collected the names of these kardars from a variety of records.
114. Ganesh Das, himself a Khatri, wrote: "In the beginning, theKhatris 
did not enter the service of the Sikh rulers on account of the regard 
they had for their own honour. They took to business. When the 
Sikh rulers realized that the affairs of government and finance could 
not be set right by degrading the Khatris they called the Khatris with 
due respect and entrusted all financial matters to them. Gradually, 
they came to serve the Sikh rulers with loyalty as they had served the 
rulers of former times. In the reign of Maharaja Ranjit Singh their 
respect and status increased and they were given high positions" :
Grewal and Banga (trans and eds), Early Nineteenth Century Panjab, p.123.
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servant) Khushhal Singh, son of a Brahman shopkeeper, who rose from 
palace guard to deorhiwdla and thence to a top military command.
The most powerful members of the "new staff", however, were the
Rajput Dogra brothers from Jammu: Gulab Singh, Dhian Singh, and Suchet
Singh. Their rise to power was nothing short of phenomenal. In 1814
they had been troopers in the Jammu cavalry on Rs 3 per day each.*^
By 1837 they had been created Rajas, and had come to hold a strong grip
on the kingdom's financial and political affairs. Raja Gulab Singh
Dogra held revenue farms worth Rs 26 lakhs. Raja Dhian Singh Dogra
was wazir, or chief minister, and held revenue farms worth Rs 100 lakhs
117and jagirs worth nearly Rs 23 lakhs. His son, Raja Hira Singh Dogra,
became one of the Maharaja's great favourites. In 1837 a royal command
118was issued granting Hira Singh the privilege of a chair at the darbar.
The Dogras used their proximity to the Maharaja to lord it over the other
chieftains at the darbar. They secured administrative positions and
119presented bids for revenue farms for their relatives and followers.
They accepted nazrana from other chieftains for interceding to secure
120the restoration of lost jagirs or the confirmation of hereditary titles.
Many of the older chieftain families bitterly resented the intrusion
of the Dogras and responded either by attaching themselves to one of the
121royal princes as a means of insurance against loss of power and wealth.
115. Griffin, et al. 3 Chiefs and Families, vol 1, pp.256-1, 296-307; vol
2, pp. 139-44.
116. Kohli, Catalogue of Records, vol II, p.50.
117. Leech, "List of Jageers" and "List of Revenue Farms": FSC, 18 Nov 
1843, nos 20-1 (NAI).
118. Royal commands {farmans) addressed to Hira Singh are summarised in 
Hari Ram Gupta, Panjab on the Eve of the First Sikh War (Hoshiarpur, 
1956), pp. xxxv-xxxvi.
119. For an example, see Ganda Singh (ed), The Punjab in 1839-40, p.7.
120. For an example, see Griffin, et al., Chiefs and Families, vol 1, p.371.
121. The princes Kharak Singh, Nao Nihal Singh, Sher Singh, Kashmira Singh 
and Peshawara Singh administered revenue farms worth a total of Rs 
2,624,168 in 1837, besides substantial jagirs: Leech, "List of Revenue 
Farms": FSC, 18 Nov 1843, no 21 (NAI). Many chieftain families 
profited by the marriage alliances they made with the princes: for
an example, see Griffin, et al.y Chiefs and Families, vol 2, pp. 55-6.
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or by building up the number of their own followers in the hope of
122being recognised as a powerful patron. In other words, politics
in the kingdom tended to operate according to factions. While he 
was alive and active, Ranjit Singh was able to manipulate these 
factions by playing them off against each other, or by breaking them 
up by transferring their leaders from one post to another and from one 
part of the kingdom to another. War was a useful tool for controlling 
the factions, too, for when the chieftain establishments were stripped 
down to their military elements and sent on campaigns an important change 
was achieved: what had previously been informal groupings around nuclei 
of influence and patronage now were formalised into lines of command 
headed by the Maharaja himself.
However, towards the end of his reign, when his health began to
fail and there were few military campaigns to provide a distraction,
Ranjit Singh's ability to control the factions diminished. In 1835,
when the Maharaja fell seriously ill, "extensive combinations are said
to have been formed and mutual pledges of support exchanged among the
123different chiefs." The crucial issue that began to crystallise was
whether "new staff" chieftains like the Dogras were going to be permitted 
to continue lording it with upstart pride over the older chieftain families 
like the Sindhanwalias (who were collaterals of the royal Sukerchakias), 
the Mans, and the Povindias. We shall see, in the following chapter, 
that after Ranjit Singh's death in 1839, the kingdom was all but destroyed 
by the attempts made to settle this issue.
122. Many chieftains supported a large number of family retainers as well 
as sowars out of their jagirs: for the example of Sardar Jodh Singh, 
whose jagirs supported fifty family retainers, see Foreign Proceedings 
(hereafter FP),, General "B" series, Feb 1862, nos 67-9 (NAI).
123. C.M. Wade, Political Agent (hereafter Pol Agent) to Governor-General 
(hereafter GG) at Ludhiana, to W.A. Macnaughten, Secy to Government 
of India (hereafter Gol) with the GG, 1 Jan 1838: Foreign Political 
Consultations (hereafter FPC), 14 Feb 1838, no 58 (NAI).
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An inquiry into the origin, structure, and working of the Sikh 
kingdom yields several broad conclusions which are of significance for 
the rest of this study. First, the kingdom was essentially an expansionist, 
militaristic State. It followed from this that government was limited 
largely to the same basic tasks - the expansion and defence of the State, 
the exploitation of the wealth produced by the subjects through taxation, 
and the maintenance of internal law and order - that had preoccupied 
earlier, non-Punjabi rulers. Sikh government was also patterned, to a 
considerable extent, along the lines of previous governments, notably 
that of the Mughals. There was a centralised administration. There 
was also a decentralised, "segmentary" component to government and a 
distinction between what we have termed the "national" and "local" 
systems; this was in accordance with the fragmented nature of society 
that we pointed to in the first chapter. We suggest, then, that there 
was a general continuity to governmental strategy and structure throughout 
the pre-British period. Whether or not this continuity was broken with 
the coming of British rule is something that we shall have to investigate.
Second, despite this continuity, Sikh rule was responsible for some
important changes in Punjabi society. The position of the "intermediary"
zamindars was reduced considerably. This process was not as far-reaching
or widespread as has been suggested by Kessinger - as we have seen, much
depended on the strength of Sikh authority in any given tract - but he
is correct in observing that the preference of the Sikh for "primary"
zamindars "was a basic factor in the development of a system of land
tenure under the British in which village cultivators who owned and
124farmed small holdings were predominant." Sikh rule enhanced the
prestige of the Sikh community, and probably encouraged more Hindus and 
Muslims to enter its ranks than would have been the case had the kingdom 
not emerged. Sikh rule also produced a new chieftain class - or, more 
correctly, maintained the important elements of that chieftain class
Conclusion
124. Tom G. Kessinger, Vilyatpur 1848-1968: Social and Economic Change 
in a North Indian Village (Berkeley, 1974), pp. 29-31. We cannot 
agree with Kessinger when he writes that Sikh rule "eliminated" the 
position of "intermediary" zamindar.
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which had been thrown up during the period of the misls and elevated 
new groups to chieftain status. How the Sikh community was affected 
by the demise of Sikh rule, and how the chieftains fared under British 
rule, are important questions that will have to be tackled later in 
this study.
Third, Ranjit Singh's authority was essentially of the "decentralised 
patrimonial" type. This meant that politics, for Ranjit Singh, was the 
art of manipulating society - and, in particular, the various factions 
within his government - in an effort to find an equilibrium that would 
leave his own position unthreatened. We shall have to consider, when 
we examine the growth of British authority in the Punjab, whether the 
agents of British imperialism employed similar tactics. Before that, 
however, we must look at what happened within the kingdom when Ranjit 
Singh was no longer around to keep these factions in check: we turn 
now to the decay of monarchical authority between 1839 and 1845.
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Ranjit Singh died on 27 June 1839. To his successors he left a 
kingdom that stretched from the Sulaiman range to the Sutlej, and from 
Kashmir to Multan, with a formidable military machine, a full treasury, 
and a fairly efficient administration. Within seven years of his death, 
however, the hard-won gains of his thirty-eight years as Maharaja had 
been squandered to the extent that the continued existence of the kingdom 
lay entirely in the hands of the British. The gaddi once occupied by 
the "Lion of the Punjab" was by early 1846 the seat of a lapdog of the 
British. In the words of Sir Lepel Griffin, "The Sikh monarchy founded 
by Ranjit Singh was Napoleonic in the suddenness of its rise, the brilliancy 
of its success and the completeness of its overthrow."^
Why did the authority of the Sikh monarchy collapse in so spectacular
a fashion? At least three factors can be isolated. First, the succession
was disputed. Although it had widely been assumed that Kanwar (Prince)
Kharak Singh - Ranjit Singh’s eldest son - would succeed to the gaddi,
Ranjit Singh had avoided making this explicitly understood until the last
2possible moment - until only a week before his death, in fact. The 
wisdom of his policy on the succession had been questioned amongst British
3envoys to the darbar, but there had been a practical side to his vagueness. 
By deliberately creating uncertainty on this point he had hoped to prevent, 
and was successful in preventing, the growth of secondary power centres 
around his younger sons that might oust him from power before his death 
(as Shah Jahan had been ousted by Aurangzeb). At his death, however,
1. Quoted in Abdul Ali, "Notes on Ranjit Singh", p.43.
2. Ganda Singh (ed), The Panjab in 1839-40, pp. 49-50.
3. See, for example, Lieut. Alexander Burnes, "Report on the Military 
Power and Political Relations of the Punjab as ruled by Runjeet 
Singh": FSP, 21 May 1832, no 10 (NAI); Wade to Macnaghten, 1 Jan 
1838: FPC, 14 Feb 1838, no 58 (NAI).
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the younger royal princes could not accept the decision to install 
Kanwar Kharak Singh, who was widely reported to be an imbecile and 
who was certainly without talent or influence, on the gaddi; and, 
supported by their followers and flatterers, they set about pressing 
their own claims. For all Ranjit Singh's careful planning, the 
succession was not a smooth affair.“*
Second, the succession dispute brought into sharp focus another 
structural weakness in the kingdom's polity, a deeper political issue - 
namely, the antagonism between the older chieftain families and the 
largely non-Sikh, and often non-Punjabi, "new staff" chieftains. We 
saw, at the end of the previous chapter, that it had been a measure of 
Ranjit Singh's political skill that, having consciously fostered this 
antagonism, he had been able to keep it on a slow boil and derive a 
personal advantage from it. Only a successor stamped with his qualities 
would have been able to do the same. However, Kharak Singh, partly 
because of his incompetence and partly because of the insecurity of his 
position, played himself into the hands of first one faction then another. 
By the time that his brother, Kanwar Sher Singh, ascended the gaddi, the 
antagonism had developed into an unmanageable confrontation. Just as 
the Mughal court had become divided along racial and family lines over 
the Deccan issue after Aurangzeb's death, so the Lahore darbar split over 
the issue of Dogra influence at Lahore and in the northern regions of 
the kingdom after Ranjit Singh's death. As had happened in the Mughal 
case, the violence generated by this issue converged on the office of 
wazir, or chief minister. And just as the conflict at the Mughal court 
had been settled by the creation of a separate Deccani kingdom ruled by
4. These were Sher Singh, Tara Singh, Peshawara Singh, Kashmira Singh, 
Multana Singh and Dalip Singh. It is highly likely that Kharak 
Singh was Ranjit Singh's only real or legitimate son. Sher Singh 
and his "twin brother", Tara Singh, for example, were purchased from 
their respective parents by Rani Mehtab Kaur's mother and presented 
to Ranjit Singh as his own sons. Ranjit Singh was not deceived in 
the matter, but he always treated the children as his own: Barkat
Rai Chopra, Kingdom of the Punjab 1839-45 (Hoshiarpur, 1969), pp.5-6,95.
5. It is worth noting that many central African kingdoms either fell 
apart or were absorbed by an external power after the death of a 
strong ruler because their systems of succession easily allowed for
the possibility of civil strife and external intervention: Jan Vansina, 
Kingdoms of the Savanna (Madison, 1966), p.246.
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the wazir's family, so the conflict at the Lahore darbar was eventually 
settled by the creation of an independent Dogra kingdom in Kashmir.
Third, the monarchy's authority was undermined by the emergence of 
the army as a major political force. As the succession question and 
the rivalry between the different darbar factions became dependent upon 
armed force for their resolution, the Sikh army became increasingly drawn 
into politics, first as the shadow maker of Maharajas and wazirs in the 
successive darbar revolutions, and ultimately as the de facto supreme 
authority. Ironically, it was the very source of the kingdom's strength, 
its large army, that, having been democratised in order to bolster the 
authority of the monarchy, eventually brought about the collapse of the 
monarchy and (as will be seen in the following chapter) the extinction 
of the kingdom.
These three factors are bound together in the history of the Punjab 
between 1839 and 1846. The collapse of the monarchy might not have 
occurred had only one of them been present. Together, however, they 
made up a fatal combination. In this chapter we shall examine the mix 
of these factors during each of the three crises of succession that 
occurred after Ranjit Singh's death. We shall also investigate the 
repercussions of the monarchy's collapse on the functioning of the 
provincial administration, and review the deterioration of Anglo-Sikh 
political relations leading up to the outbreak of the first Anglo-Sikh 
war. Basically, the events of the period 1839-46 (summarised in Table 
3:1) created the social, political, and economic conditions for the later 
transference of power in the Punjab from Sikh to British hands. At the 
end of the chapter we shall suggest that British rule, in its earliest 
stages, was to a large degree dependent upon the cooperation of a group 
of men who came to the forefront of Punjabi politics during this period.
The three crises of succession
The morbid events at the Lahore darbar during the period 1839-46 
have been studied in detail before now, but in a rather unstructured,
6. For the Mughal story, see Satish Chandra, Parties and Politics at 
the Mughal Court, 1707-1740 (Aligarh, 1959), pp.4-10.
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unanalytical way. We suggest that they may be divided into three 
periods, each of which started with a crisis of succession to the gaddi 
but soon developed into a crisis of a much wider political magnitude. 
Events in the first and second periods followed almost identical patterns, 
which may be summarised as follows. At the outset of his reign the 
Maharaja (Kharak Singh or Sher Singh) was almost entirely dependent on 
his waziv (Raja Dhian Singh Dogra) to ward off the claims of, or on 
behalf of, his younger brothers. However, once his succession was secure 
the Maharaja attempted to undercut the waziv's influence by encouraging 
one of his favourite servants (in both cases the manager of the former 
prince's revenue farms and jagivs) to act as a surrogate waziv. In order 
to arrest the decline of his own influence the legitimate waziv destroyed 
the upstart rival. For a short while thereafter relations between the 
Maharaja (or, in the case of the first period, the Maharaja's son) and 
the waziv were cordial. But soon the Maharaja again attempted to reduce 
the waziv's influence; this time he turned to the anti-Dogra faction for 
support. The waziv responded by building up his own power base at the 
darbav and in the countryside, especially the Jammu hills. Just as the 
hostility between the Maharaja and the waziv appeared to be on the verge 
of a showdown, the Maharaja (and, in the case of the second period, the 
waziv also) died. As we shall presently see, the major differences 
between the two periods were firstly, the different alignments amongst 
courtiers and chieftains that were produced, and secondly, the differing 
degrees to which the army became involved. Events in the third period 
followed a very different pattern. The new waziv (Raja Hira Singh Dogra) 
set aside the claims of the remaining adult princes to install a minor 
(Dalip Singh) on the gaddi, and then set about consolidating his own 
position. But by this stage the army had begun to assume an overtly 
political role, and the waziv was dependent on its goodwill (secured, 
in the main, by financial bribes) to keep the other royal princes and the 
anti-Dogra faction at bay. When the waziv could no longer satisfy the
7. Chopra, Kingdom of the Punjab', Bikrama Jit Hasrat, Anglo-Sikh Relations 
1799-1849: A Reappvaisal of the Rise and Fall of the Sikhs (Hoshiarpur, 
1968), chaps xl-xvl; Sita Ram Kohli, Sunset of the Sikh Kingdom 
(ed by Khushwant Singh, Bombay, 1967).
Table 3:1 Chronology of Important Eventss 1839-46
76
1839
1840
1841
1843
1844
1845
1846
June Death of Ranjit Singh
Accession of Kanwar Kharak Singh 
Raja Dhian Singh Dogra confirmed as wazir 
October Assassination of Chet Singh
November Death of Maharaja Kharak Singh and Kanwar 
Nao Nihal Singh
January Kanwar Sher Singh proclaimed sovereign
June Assassination of Rani Chand Kaur
September Assassination of Maharaja Sher Singh, Kanwar Partab 
Singh and Raja Dhian Singh Dogra 
Assassination of Sindhanwalia chieftains 
Kanwar Dalip Singh proclaimed sovereign and Raja 
Hira Singh Dogra appointed wazir 
Army becomes supreme authority
March Rebellion of Kanwars Kashmira Singh and Peshawara
Singh
Rebellion of Raja Suchet Singh Dogra 
May Rebellion of Sardar Atar Singh Sindhanwalia, Bhai
Bir Singh and Kanwar Kashmira Singh 
December Assassination of Raja Hira Singh Dogra and Pandit 
Jalla
April Chastisement of Raja Gulab Singh Dogra
May Jawahir Singh appointed wazir
July Rebellion and assassination of Kanwar Peshawara Singh
September Execution of Jawahir Singh 
November Raja Lai Singh appointed wazir 
December Sikh army crosses the Sutlej 
British declaration of war 
Battle of Mudki 
Battle of Ferozeshah
January Battles of Baddowal and Aliwal
February Battle of Sobraon 
March Treaty of Lahore
Treaty with Raja Gulab Singh Dogra
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demands of the army he fell from power. Thereafter the army sold 
itself to the highest bidder, appointing its own creatures to the office 
of wazir and other high posts in the administration. At the end of 
the third stage, on the eve of the first Anglo-Sikh war, the authority 
of the Maharaja and the darbar was but a shadow of that which had prevailed 
in Ranjit Singh's day.
Let us now examine each of these three periods in a little more
detail. The day after Ranjit Singh died the wazir, Raja Dhian Singh
Dogra, called a meeting of a small group of courtiers to discuss the
future of their jagirs and offices. This meeting was attended by the
priest-chieftains, Bhai (Sikh title of respect) Ram Singh and Bhai Gobind
Ram; the Bokhari brothers, Faqir Aziz-ud-Din and Faqir Nur-ud-Din; the
ex-deorhiwala, Jamadar Khushhal Singh; the wazir's son, Raja Hira Singh
Dogra; and the diwan of the civil and finance departments, Diwan Dina
Nath. With the assistance of the toshdkhania (keeper of the treasury),
Misr Beli Ram, they drew up a confirmatory deed, to be signed by the new
Maharaja, guaranteeing the security of their jagirs, "naslan ba'd naslin,
batanan ba'd batanin" (literally, "from generation to generation, from
loin to loin"). The following day Maharaja Kharak Singh and Raja Dhian
Singh Dogra signed this deed and each of its authors in turn swore
8allegiance to the new Maharaja and his wazir.
This meeting is significant in three respects. First, none of 
the established chieftains, the Sikh and Muslim chieftains of the misl 
period who now held top posts outside the inner darbar circle, in the 
provincial administration and the army, were invited to attend. With 
the possible exceptions of the two Bhais and the two Faqirs, none of 
those who did attend had any traditional social or political standing 
in the Punjab - in other words, they were "new staff" chieftains.
Second, the purpose of their meeting, and of the deed that they drew 
up, was not simply to forge a new client-patron relationship with a new 
Maharaja, but rather to extract new concessions from a politically weak 
Maharaja. They claimed the right to hold their jagirs on an hereditary 
basis, a privilege that hitherto had been enjoyed by only the most powerful
8. Ganda Singh (ed), The Panjab in 1839-40, pp.68-70.
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of the established chieftains. They also claimed the right to act
as a council of permanent ministers, to make decisions on the running
of the kingdom on their own initiative. That this was a novel proposition,
without precedent in recent Punjab history or ideological justification
in Sikh political tradition and theory, is evident from their observation
to the Maharaja that:
as it is customary with the British authorities that whatever 
the members of Council do, is approved and confirmed by the 
King of England, we have come to this resolution like the members 
of Council, and, therefore, such a resolution is mature and very 
proper.9
In terms of the Weberian theory discussed in the previous chapter, we 
could say that what was happening here was an attempt by a small group 
of dependent "new staff" chieftains to turn themselves into a small 
independent "aristocracy". For what they were proposing amounted to a 
transformation of the very nature and structure of traditional rulership: 
they wanted to transform that rulership from the patrimony of the Maharaja 
to the heritage of a privileged ruling class. It must be pointed out 
that although Kharak Singh was obliged, by virtue of his weak position, 
to acknowledge these demands, they never came to much. Political events 
soon overtook them. Third - and this follows on from the last point - 
though this meeting of "new staff" chieftains called by the waziv represented 
a meeting on the basis of common interest and common status, there were 
many occasions over the next seven years when individual "new staff" 
chieftains deserted the waziv by joining the anti-Dogra, established- 
chieftain faction, or by refusing to associate themselves with any faction. 
This highlights an important feature of the political factions that operated 
in the period 1839-46 - namely, that while their leadership structures 
remained fairly constant and committed to specific, long-term goals, their 
membership structures were highly ephemeral, tending to fluctuate with 
each change in the wider political situation, with individual members 
joining or dropping out as the faction promised to be, or ceased to be, 
a vehicle for the realisation of their own ambitions.
For the first few weeks of Kharak Singh's reign the alliances between 
the Maharaja and the waziv, and between the waziv and the other "new staff" 
chieftains, provided mutual protection against the attempts of other royal
9. Ibid.
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princes to repudiate the succession. Kanwar Sher Singh, Ranjit Singh's
second son, had begun enlisting large numbers of soldiers in the vicinity
of his estates in the upper Bari Doab, and had tried to induce the
thanadav of the Kangra fort to hand over possession of the fort to him.^
The waziv instructed the thanadars of the various hill forts to remain
loyal to the new Maharaja.^ He then granted Sher Singh a written
guarantee of safety that he might come in to Lahore to acknowledge his
12brother's succession. When Kanwar Nao Nihal Singh, the new Maharaja's
son, who had been sent to the Peshawar border as military commander at
the time of Ranjit Singh's death, began issuing his own orders regarding
political matters there, the waziv sent a strongly-worded command prohibiting
13his interference in any matters not connected with his military duties.
Once these challenges had been overcome, however, Maharaja Kharak
Singh found a new advisor in his favourite servant, Sardar Chet Singh 
14Bajwa, who put himself forward as a rival to the waziv. The waziv
was quickly deserted by the other "new staff" chieftains, as the Punjab
Akhbar (intelligence report compiled by British agents at the davbav)
of 16 July 1839 notes:
Bhaees Ram Singh and Gobind Ram, Missurs Beilee 
Ram and Ram Kisshun, though keeping up appearance 
with Raja Dhian Singh, are in reality attached to 
Koonwur Now-Nihal Singh. Dewan Deena Nath is 
anybody's. The Fuqeers keep neutral. ^
10. Ibid, p.50.
11. Lala Sohan Lai Suri, Umdat-Ut-Tawavikh, Daftar lv, pts 1-111 (trans 
by V.S. Suri, Chandigarh, 1973), pp.6-7.
12. Ganda Singh (ed), The Panjab in 1839-40, pp.78-9.
13. Ibid, pp. 52, 80.
14. Chet Singh was married to the niece of Mangal Singh Sindhu, brother- 
in-law of Kharak Singh. Since 1834 Chet Singh had displaced Mangal 
Singh as manager of Kharak Singh's civil and financial affairs:
Griffin et al., Chiefs and Families, vol 2, p.56.
15. Ganda Singh (ed), The Panjab in 1839-40, p.91.
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The wazir found a new supporter of his own, with the appropriate name
of Sardar Wazir Singh.^ Chet Singh ordered the imprisonment of Wazir
Singh - this was effected with the maximum of humiliation - and the
17confiscation of his property. When Kanwar Nao Nihal Singh returned
from Peshawar the wazir persuaded him that the ambitious favourite would
have to be removed. Not surprisingly, the Maharaja refused to accept
their joint advice that Chet Singh be dismissed. So, on the night of
8 October 1839 a party of courtiers, led by the wazir and the prince,
assassinated Chet Singh in his master's presence. The first chieftain
had been struck down. Chet Singh's property, valued at about Rs 60
lakhs, was seized. Misr Beli Ram, the toshakhania, and his two brothers,
Misr Meg Raj (the treasurer of Gobindgarh fort) and Misr Rup Lai (until
recently the nazim of the Jullundar Doab), had made the mistake of siding
with Chet Singh before his assassination. They were now imprisoned
18and their property, valued at about Rs 80 lakhs, was seized.
After this episode Kharak Singh all but retired from the political
scene. Real authority was assumed by his son, Kanwar Nao Nihal Singh.
At first relations between the prince and the wazir remained cordial
and constructive. But before long the prince, too, desired to free
himself from the wazir1 s embrace, and he found flattering supporters in
the two Bhais and Tej Singh, the nephew of Jamadar Khushhal Singh. On
the advice of the Bhais, the prince started dismissing old servants of
the State who were suspected of having pro-Dogra leanings. One of the
wazir 's staunchest followers, Malik Fateh Khan Tiwana, the ijaradar
of the Mitha Tiwana country in the Chaj Doab, was imprisoned for being
in arrears with his revenues, but this was basically an anti-Dogra
19measure. In June 1840 the Bhais suggested that since most of the army 
garrisons were under Dogra influence Nao Nihal Singh should disband them
16. The wazir secured for Wazir Singh the farm of Sialkot for Rs 18,000 
per annum: ibid, p.123.
17. Two companies of troops carried Wazir Singh and his brothers through 
the bazaar, "beating them with shoes and with every other degredation": 
Punjab Akhbar, 7 Oct 1839: FSC, 6 Nov 1839, no 24 B (NAI).
18. Punjab Akhbar, 8 Oct 1839: ibid.
19. Griffin et al. y Chiefs and Families, vol 2, p.195.
and replace them with his own soldiers. A start was made on this.
Certain revenue farms and jagivs in the hill region were taken from
21the Dogras. The waziv responded to these challenges to his influence
22by attempting to place the prince under the Maharaja's direct supervision.
The court became split into two factions: the prince was supported by
the two Bhais, Sardar Atar Singh Sindhanwalia, Jamadar Khushhal Singh
and Sardar Tej Singh; while the waziv was supported by his brother, Raja
23Gulab Singh Dogra, and Faqir Aziz-ud-Din Bokhari. However, before the
split could develop into an armed clash both Kharak Singh and Nao Nihal
Singh died in early November 1840. At the time it was widely rumoured,
though there has never been any evidence for it, that the Maharaja had
died from regular doses of poison administered on the waziv's orders,
and that the collapse of the city archway that killed the prince on the
24following day had also been engineered by the Dogras. Later events 
were to show that the waziv was not incapable of resorting to such 
measures in order to protect his position, however.
The second period began with a new succession crisis. Of the six 
remaining royal princes with claims to the gaddi Kanwar Sher Singh was 
the eldest and the only one who had been entitled to a chair at Ranjit 
Singh's davbav. He had failed in his attempt to get precedence over 
Kharak Singh at the death of Ranjit Singh, but now that the senior line 
of succession had come to an end his claim was admitted by the leading 
courtiers. But the Sindhanwalia chieftains, who were collaterals of the 
royal Sukerchakia family, regarded Sher Singh as an illegitimate impostor 
and upstart, and refused to recognise his claim. They found an alternative 
ruler in Rani (queen) Chand Kaur, widow of Kharak Singh and daughter of 
the late chieftain of the Kanheya mist. Rani Chand Kaur announced that
20. Ganda Singh (ed), The Panjab in 1839-40, p.216.
21. Chopra, Kingdom of the Punjab, pp.63-4.
22. Ganda Singh (ed), The Panjab in 1839-40, p.259.
23. Chopra, Kingdom of the Punjab, pp. 49, 63-4.
24. Griffin, et al. y Chiefs and Families, vol 2, pp. 22-4.
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one of Nao Nihal Singh’s widows was pregnant and demanded that she be 
accepted as regent while the birth of her grandchild was awaited. It 
was immediately admitted by the courtiers that Nao Nihal Singh’s child, 
if a boy, would have a superior claim to that of Sher Singh. But the 
question remained as to whether Sher Singh or Rani Chand Kaur should act 
as regent.
Over this question most courtiers and chieftains divided into two
sharply opposed factions. Rani Chand Kaur was supported by the
Sindhanwalia family, Fateh Singh Man, Gulab Singh Povindia, the two Bhais,
Jamadar Khushhal Singh and Tej Singh. Kanwar Sher Singh was supported
by the Dogra Rajas, Bhai Gurmukh Singh (the arch rival of Bhai Ram Singh),
the Atariwala family and Faqir Aziz-ud-Din Bokhari. Only Diwan Dina Nath
25and Sardar Lehna Singh Majithia remained entirely neutral. At length 
a compromise solution was reached: Rani Chand Kaur became regent, assisted 
by a council of ministers, while Kanwar Sher Singh retired to his estates 
at Batala, leaving his son, Partap Singh, as his representative at Lahore. 
The wazir, realising that his presence at the darbar was despised, took 
leave from his duties and retired to Jammu. Before he left Lahore, though, 
he sent a secret message to Kanwar Sher Singh advising the prince to hold 
himself ready for an opportunity to seize the gaddi. Messages were sent 
to army officers who were sympathetic to the prince's cause urging them 
to join the prince when the call came, and promising them pay increases 
and other rewards.^
After the wazir1 s departure the central administration fell into a
27state of confusion and inefficiency. In January 1841 Kanwar Sher 
Singh responded to a call from the wazir and marched to Lahore. There 
he won over a large portion of the army with liberal cash handouts and
25. Ibid, pp.24-6.
26. Suri, Umdat-Ut-Tawarik, Daftar lv, pts 1-111, p.133.
27. In the flowery language of the darbar chronicler: "the sweetheart 
of control and administration of the countries and troops could not 
be taken into lap": ibid, p.134.
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and promises of pay increases. It was at this point, as an armed
clash between the prince's party and the queen's party became imminent,
that Raja Gulab Singh Dogra took his Jammu troopers over to the queen's
side. The reason for this action was not that he had broken with his
brother, the waziv, but that Dogra wealth and influence might be preserved
29regardless of the battle's outcome. Sher Singh's force began the
assault on the 16 January. After several days of fighting the fort was
captured by the prince's troops and the queen's supporters driven out.
Rani Chand Kaur was pensioned off with a jagiv and the Sindhanwalia
chieftains retired to British territory to the south of the Sutlej.
Kanwar Sher Singh ascended the gaddi on 20 January 1841. At the Maharaja's
ceremonial investiture a week later the khil’at of investiture as waziv
30was again presented to Raja Dhian Singh Dogra. For the time being the 
crisis was over.
31Maharaja Sher Singh was determined to be a strong, personal ruler.
Raja Dhian Singh Dogra was no less determined to be a strong waziv. When
Sardar Jawala Singh, the former manager of Sher Singh's jagivs, began to
aspire, as Chet Singh had done in Kharak Singh's reign, to the position
of waziv, Dhian Singh Dogra maneuvered him into rebellion and then
32convinced the Maharaja of the need to destroy him. When Rani Chand
Kaur re-commenced her intrigues with the Sindhanwalias, the British and
the Sikh army, Dhian Singh Dogra persuaded the Maharaja to leave Lahore
on a hunting expedition while he arranged for the Rani to be battered to
33death by her maid-servants.
28. It is estimated that Sher Singh gave away Rs 5 lakhs during the 
twenty-four hours before the assault on the Lahore fort began; Chand 
Kaur gave away Rs 3 lakhs: Kohli, Sunset of the Sikh Empive, p.34.
29. We will see, in the next chapter, that at times of crisis this was a 
fairly typical mode of survival behaviour.
30. Griffin, et al. 9 Chiefs and Families, vol 2, pp. 26-30.
31. It is interesting that Sher Singh had both his name and the title of 
Maharaja inscribed on his seal and on the coins minted during his reign, 
something that previous Maharajas, including Ranjit Singh, had never 
allowed: Kohli, Sunset of the Sikh Empive, pp. 44-5.
32. Ibid, pp. 45-6. Jawala Singh's soldiers surrendered their leader only 
after they were granted a cash donation of Rs 30,000.
33. Suri, Umdat-Ut-Tawavikh, Daftar lv, pts 1-111, pp. 168-70. It is 
probable that the Maharaja and the waziv also conspired to have poison 
administered to Nao Nihal Singh's widow, which resulted in the delivery 
of a still-born child and her death.
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But, as had happened soon after Nao Nihal Singh became effective
ruler following Chet Singh’s assassination, the Maharaja soon realised
that if he were to exercise any real authority he would need to put a
little distance between himself and the wazir. On the advice of Bhai
Gurmukh Singh, but against the wazir's wishes, Maharaja Sher Singh
restored Misr Beli Ram and his brothers to their old posts. Misr Beli
Ram and Bhai Gurmukh Singh attempted to form an anti-Dogra, anti-wazir 
34party at Lahore. The wazir responded by recruiting some 6,000 new
35soldiers, mostly non-Sikhs from Jammu and the other hill provinces.
He also built up his own followers: Malik Fateh Khan Tiwana was given
36new revenue farms and several of his relatives were appointed as kardas;
officials dismissed by Sher Singh’s party were picked up by the wazir and
37given new posts in the Dogra estates.
Maharaja Sher Singh attempted to free himself from this bipartisan
struggle by raising a fresh "new staff". A number of traditional chieftain
families which had fallen into oblivion during Ranjit Singh's reign were
now resurrected: Jhanda Singh and Ganda Singh Butalia received new jagirs
and positions of trust at the darbar; Gurmukh Singh Lamba was given a
new jagir worth Rs 25,000; Atar Singh Kalianwala had his jagirs increased
in value by Rs 89,300 and received the post of adalati at Lahore and a
38rank in the cavalry. By 1843 Sher Singh had also created several new 
39chieftains. The Maharaja took steps to restrict the ability of chieftains
to attach followers to themselves by writing orders conferring land in
charity or granting other immunities. The wazir protested that the
40Maharaja's orders were contrary to custom. The Maharaja invited the
34. Griffin, et al., Chiefs and Families» vol 1, p. 363.
35. Kohli, Sunset of the Sikh Empire, p.41.
36. Griffin, et al.y Chiefs and Families, vol 2, p.195.
37. Ibid, p.129.
38. Ibid, pp. 81, 167; vol 1, p.424.
39. Lieut. Col. Richmond, Agent to GG at North-West Frontier (hereafter NWF), 
to J. Thomason, Secy to Gol, 5 Sept 1843, no 156: FSC, 23 March 1844,
no 455 (NAI).
40. "Items of Intelligence from Lahore", 23-8 Aug 1843: FSC, 23 March 1844, 
no 456 (NAI).
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soldiers to make complaints to him about their officers, the idea being
41to discover which officers were in league with the Dogras.
Sher Singh's growing antipathy towards his old allies, the Dogras,
drew him steadily closer to his old enemies, the Sindhanwalias. Since
the assassination of Rani Chand Kaur the Sindhanwalias had lost most of
their influence at the darbar. However, they had not given up their
designs on the gaddi. They had allowed Clerk, the British Governor-
General 's Political Agent at Ludhiana, to negotiate a reconciliation
with Sher Singh and, that achieved, had returned from their exile in
October 1842. Their jagirs had been restored and they had resumed their
old places at the darbar. Having won Sher Singh's confidence they
persuaded him to enter into a plan with them whereby the wazir would be 
42assassinated, although it was their real intention to assassinate the 
Maharaja as well, which would enable the Sindhanwalias to wield the whole 
power of the State as guardians of the young Kanwar Dalip Singh. Sher 
Singh's reign ended, as it had begun, in violence. On 15 September 1843 
Sardar Ajit Singh Sindhanwalia and his uncle, Sardar Lehna Singh, 
assassinated the Maharaja, the heir-apparent, Partab Singh, and the wazir, 
Raja Dhian Singh Dogra. But within a matter of hours the wazir's son,
Raja Hira Singh Dogra, and the wazir's brother, Raja Suchet Singh Dogra,
43won over the bulk of the army and destroyed the Sindhanwalia chieftains.
The third period began when Raja Hira Singh Dogra set Ranjit Singh's
youngest son, the five year-old Dalip Singh, on the gaddi with himself 
44as wazir. One of his first actions after that was to order the
confiscation of the property of the Sindhanwalias and their followers,
and the murder of Bhai Gurmukh Singh, Misr Beli Ram and Misr Ram Kishen
45for the part they had played in the assassination of his father.
41. "Items", 31 Aug 1843: FSC, 23 March 1844, no 457 (NAI).
42. Suri, Umdat-Ut-Tawarikh, Daftar lv, pts 1-111, p.247.
43. Griffin, et al.3 Chiefs and Families, vol 1, pp. 404-7.
44. Hira Singh bestowed gifts worth about Rs 54,300 on various influential 
people in order to secure their support at the installation of Dalip 
Singh: Kohli, Catalogue of Records, vol II, p.250.
45. Griffin, et al. > Chiefs and Families, vol 1, pp. 363, 407-8, 508; vol
2, p.136.
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This meant that in three days (15-17 September 1843) nearly a thousand 
men, including a Maharaja, a prince, a wazir and almost a dozen high 
dignitaries of the darbar, had lost their lives. With a Dogra Raja 
back in the office of wazir, it seemed as though the Dogra - Maharaja - 
Sikh equation had hardly changed, despite the great loss of life. By 
this stage, however, a fourth factor - the army - had entered the equation. 
Substantial political authority was beginning to be transferred from the 
darbar to the barracks.
Ever since Ranjit Singh's death there had been serious problems of
discipline, involving desertions and claims for arrears of pay, within
46the ranks of both regular and jagirdari troops. During Sher Singh's
reign the army had established regimental committees called panchayats,
47on the pattern of the traditional village council. These panchayats
had enjoyed direct access to the Maharaja for the expression of grievances,
and they had been used to dismiss officers who were out of favour with
the darbar or unpopular with the troops. Recruitment to the army -
often without the darbar’s prior sanction - was stepped up considerably
during the period 1839-46. For example, the Dogras raised the strength
of Rajput and Muslim contingents as a counter-poise to the predominance
of Sikh Jats, and the anti-Dogra faction took appropriate retaliatory 
48measures. As a result the kingdom became an even more militaristic
state than it had been in Ranjit Singh's day. In the late 1830s the
total strength of the army (including garrisons) had been about 80,000
49men. The total cost of this army had been equal to about 41 per cent 
of the state revenues.^ In 1844 the army had a total strength of 123,800 
men (92,000 infantry, 31,800 cavalry), 228 pieces of light artillery and
46. Ganda Singh (ed), The Panjab in 1839-40, pp. 102, 106.
47. The village panchayat was a small council, made up of the 
representatives of the different sections of the village, which met 
to regulate social behaviour and settle small disputes.
48. Fauja Singh Bajwa, Military System of the Sikhs (Delhi, 1964), p.102.
49. Abdul Ali, "Notes on Ranjit Singh", p.65.
50. Kohli's foreward to Suri, Umdat-Ut-Tawarikh, Daftar 111, pts 1-v, p.xvll.
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384 heavy field-guns. The total cost of this gigantic military machine 
was equal to about 66 per cent of the state revenues.^
During Hira Singh Dogra's short ministry the army began styling
itself as the Khalsaji - and hence the embodiment of traditional Sikh
legitimacy - and extorting promises of better service conditions and
52regular salary increases from the darbar. The panchayats endeavoured
to prevent disorderly behaviour on the part of the soldiery, with only 
53partial success. The prestige of the darbar was now so low that a
large section of the army adopted a completely mercenary attitude towards
Hira Singh Dogra's administration and its problems. In March 1844
Kanwars Peshawara Singh and Xashmira Singh led an unsuccessful revolt
against the wazir and the minor Maharaja. The same month Raja Suchet
Singh Dogra attempted to overthrow his nephew and was killed. In May
Sardar Atar Singh Sindhanwalia (who had not taken a direct part in the
assassinations of Sher Singh and Raja Dhian Singh Dogra), Bhai Bir Singh
and Kanwar Kashmira Singh were killed when they attempted to capture
control of the kingdom. Raja Hira Singh Dogra was able to survive these
challenges to his authority and the darbar’s authority only because he
54was able to offer larger bribes to the army for its allegiance.
In the end, however, it was the army's extortionate demands that 
proved to be the undoing of the wazir. The reckless distribution of 
jagirs to the chieftains and cash handouts to the troops during the 
tumultuous years since Ranjit Singh's death had drained the treasury. 
There was now an urgent need to recover some of this wealth. Obviously, 
it would be political suicide to subject the army to a retrenchment 
programme: instead, the chieftains would have to disgorge some of their 
ill-gotten wealth. The wazir’s counsellor, the Kashmiri Brahman, Pandit
51. Hasrat, Anglo-Sikh Relations, p.229; Bajwa, Military System, pp. 83, 
96-7. The regular, trained army accounted for about one-third of
the total strength, the remaining two-thirds representing the jagirdari 
levies.
52. Bajwa, Military System, pp. 97, n 5, 102-3.
53. Ibid, p.158.
54. Hasrat, Anglo-Sikh Relations, pp.224-6.
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Jalla, introduced a programme of wide-spread and systematic jagiv
reductions and resumptions. Not surprisingly, the chieftains were
enraged by this. Even those who had supported the Dogras against the
Sindhanwalias, like Mehtab Singh Majithia, now turned against the waziv
and his counsellor. ^  As the waziv 's authority at the periphery of the
57kingdom began to dissolve as well, the majority of chieftains, davbav
officials and army panchayats combined to denounce the Dogra ministry
and demand the installation of Kanwar Peshawara Singh, exiled in British
territory, as waziv. On 21 December 1844 Hira Singh Dogra and his
counsellor, knowing that their days of power at Lahore were over, attempted
58to flee to Jammu. But the army pursued them and killed them.
Kanwar Peshawara Singh was not interested in the office of waziv - 
he claimed the gaddi; but support for him on this was as yet limited.
So over the next five months a compromise between civil government and 
army rule was achieved with the establishment of a Supreme Council made 
up of leading chieftains and elected panchayat leaders (chaudhavis).
Rani Jindan, the mother of the minor Dalip Singh, set herself up as regent 
assisted by her brother, Sardar Jawahir Singh. There could be little 
doubt, however, that real power lay with the army. In April 1845, for 
example, the panchayats brought Raja Gulab Singh Dogra (who had been 
steadily building up his strength in the northern hills) to Lahore as a 
hostage and exhorted from him a promise of loyalty and an indemnity of
55. Ibid, p.240.
56. Griffin, et at.s Chiefs and Families, vol 1, p.496.
57. Ibid, p.482; vol 2, p.99.
58. Suri, Umdat-Ut-Tawavikh, Daftar lv, pts 1-111, pp.310-12. "The Army", 
wrote Sir Henry Hardinge, The Governor General, to Lord Ellenborough, 
the previous Governor-General, "sold Heera for [Rs] 300,000 and a rise 
in their pay to 14 rupees a month, being exactly the double of the 
British sepoy's pay": Hardinge to Ellenborough (Private), 8 Jan 1845: 
Bikrama Jit Hasrat (ed), The Punjab Papevs: Selections fvom the Pvivate 
Papevs of Lovd Auckland, Lovd Ellenborough3 Viscount Hardinge, and the 
Marquis of Dalhousie, 1839-1849 on the Sikhs (Hoshiarpur, 1970), p.79.
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nearly Rs 7 lakhs. A few days later the panchayats appointed Sardar 
Jawahir Singh as waziv.
The new waziv was little more than a puppet of the army, with only
nominal power and authority. But if he could attach to himself a body
of clients and supporters, as each of his predecessors had done, his
power and authority might be considerably enhanced. Thus, once again
a great shuffling of client chieftains took place. For example, Jhanda
Singh Butalia (who had been picked up by Sher Singh) was now made adalati
of Lahore in conjunction with Diwan Hakim Rai (one of Nao Nihal Singh's
old favourites).^  Similarly, the family of Diwan Kahan Singh Gharjakh
(imprisoned by Hira Singh Dogra for having been retainers of the
Sindhanwalias) were now given new jagivs and offices. ^ 1 But as long as
Kanwar Peshawara Singh had designs on the gaddi, the waziv's position
was uncertain. In July 1845 the prince rebelled again. He captured
Attock on the northwest frontier with the help of the local Muslim
tribes and proclaimed himself ruler of the Punjab. The waziv's knew
that the only chieftains who could be counted upon to march against the
popular prince were Malik Fateh Khan Tiwana (the old client of Raja
Dhian Singh Dogra) and Sardar Chatar Singh Atariwala (the nazim of
Hazara and the client of Raja Gulab Singh Dogra). Jawahir Singh desired
to rid himself of the prince's challenge once and for all. He secretly
instructed Fateh Khan Tiwana and Chatar Singh Atariwala to capture and
kill the prince, hoping that since they were Dogra clients the assassination
would appear, or could be made to appear, to be the outcome of a Dogra 
62conspiracy. When they received news of the prince's death, however,
59
59. Some idea of the lawlessness of the troops by this stage is provided 
by the davbav chronicler's account of the march to Jammu to collect 
Raja Gulab Singh Dogra: "On their way they plundered and looted every 
village that they came across and robbed every Thakavdwava [temple], 
Dhavmsala [rest-house] and Takia [abode of a faqiv] of Mussalmans that 
came in their way and in addition to that went into the house of every 
Zamindav and villager and seized all the belongings in the houses and 
committed adulteries and other such bad deeds with respect to the 
ladies....the condition of the protected country of the Maharaja became 
so devastated and disgusting that it could not be so even if it were 
overrun by an enemy": Suri, Umdat-Ut-Tawavikh, Daftar lv, pts 1-111, 
pp.313-14.
60. Griffin, et al. 3 Chiefs and Families, vol 2, p.81.
61. Ibid, p.136.
62. Ibid, p.197; vol 1, p.482.
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the army panchayats were not at all deceived in the matter. In September
1845 Jawahir Singh was summoned before them, judged responsible for the
6 3prince's death, and executed on the spot.
The army was, for all practical purposes, the supreme authority now.
It had made - and unmade - a wazir. It began issuing orders under its 
own seal (Sarbat Khalsa) to the regent, the military commanders and the 
civil administrators. How long this political arrangement might have 
lasted, or what it might have developed into, cannot be known, for within 
a few months, during which diplomatic tension between the kingdom and 
the British mounted, the army voluntarily abandoned its experiment with 
democratic republicanism in favour of a return to the old authority 
structure. In November 1845 the army appointed a new wazir, Raja Lai 
Singh. This man, a Brahman, had long been a client of the Dogras, and 
of Raja Hira Singh Dogra in particular. General Tej Singh, the nephew 
of Jamadar Khushhal Singh, was made commander-in-chief of the armed forces. 
It is difficult to say just how much real power and authority the army 
panchayatas intended to restore to the darbar by these appointments.
The new wazir and the commander-in-chief were put into office for one 
purpose only, to provide traditional and peremptory leadership of the 
whole political system at a time of national crisis: presumably, if 
they failed in this they would be removed from office just as easily.
What these appointments revealed fairly clearly is that however much the 
army had used the troubles of the darbar to further its own material and 
political aims, it was not a revolutionary force with any long-term 
political programme. For when the opportunity came to use their military 
strength in a politically decisive manner, as it did in late 1845, the 
panchayats voted in favour of defending the monarchy and placing themselves 
under the command of darbar chieftains whom they had previously treated 
with contempt. As it turned out, this was the very worst decision they 
could have made. The darbar saw in the war an opportunity to break the 
over-powerful army, and treacherously cooperated in its defeat by a 
numerically inferior British army.
63. Hasrat, Anglo-Sikh Relations, pp.256-7.
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Before we consider the origin and outcome of the first Anglo-Sikh
war we may pause momentarily to examine the situation in the Punjab
countryside after 1839. Information on this is extremely patchy -
primarily because of the attention devoted to Lahore events by the
chroniclers and intelligence reporters of the day - but still the general
picture can be reconstructed. As might be expected, the tumultuous
events at the capital had a profound impact on the stability and prosperity
of the countryside. After 1839 the authority of the darbar in the
countryside, and particularly at the periphery of the kingdom, underwent
a sharp decline. In 1839 minor insurrections broke out in the tributary
Rajput States of the lower Himalayas and in the vicinity of Tank on the
64far side of the Indus. On the near side of the Indus the Biloches
rebelled in 1842, the Ghebas in 1 8 4 5 . In 1843, and again in 1845,
the pastoral tribes of the lower Sutlej and Ravi took advantage of the
political situation at Lahore to resume their old predatory habits.^
Several chieftains in the countryside used the opportunity provided by
67the events at the capital to settle old scores with rival families.
None of these disturbances remained unchecked for long, but while they
lasted they posed a serious problem for the provincial administrators.
This was because of the mutinous state of the provincial garrisons during
this period. On numerous occasions between 1841 and 1844 the troops
stationed on the kingdom’s borders refused to follow orders until they
received the same pay increases that had been extracted from the central
68authorities by the troops at Lahore.
The increase in the cost of the army after 1839 was passed on to the 
zemindars in the form of an increased land revenue demand. This created 
further tensions in rural society. At Hazara, for instance, where the
64. Ganda Singh (ed), The Panjab in 1839-40, pp.97-8, 100-4^ 125.
65. Griffin, et al.3 Chiefs and Families, vol 2, pp. 97, 338.
66. SR Montgomery 1878, p.38.
67. Griffin, et al. 3 Chiefs and Families, vol 1, p.367; vol 2, p.338.
68. Chopra, Kingdom of the Punjab, pp. 160-7, 317-19.
A disrupted countryside
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1842-44, resistance to the local administrators was so great that only
one-third of the State’s demand assessed by the kankut method was
69actually collected. Over the greater portion of Rawalpindi District
the revenue demand rose by 12 per cent in the period 1840-46 (and this
despite a severe locust plague in 1843-44). But here the increased
demand was realised only at the cost of increased zamindar indebtedness
70and forced transfer of proprietary rights. Elsewhere it was necessary
71for kardars to overcome zamindar recalcitrance with force. With the
rise of the army to political power, the zamindars of central Punjab -
especially the Manjha - found protection against the kardar in their
soldiering kinsmen. Diwan Ajudhia Parshad, a contemporary darbar
official whose sympathies were obviously with the kardars, left this
account of the situation in the central districts after Jowahir Singh’s
execution by the army:
Despite the best efforts of the Raja [Lai Singh, the new wazir\ 
...the Fauj-i-Ghair-Ain [irregular militia] became more insolent 
than ever. The kardars were seriously frustrated in the 
administration of the country. Kinsmen of soldiers refused to 
pay the taxes with the excuse that more than enough revenue had 
already been collected, or that their own receipts had become 
very little. If a report was lodged against them at Lahore, 
some members of the army maintained their cause. Often a gang 
of soldiers arrested a kardar or his agent and wrested from him 
the dues which he had managed to realise on the plea that the 
taxpayer’s produce had not been adequate, or that the balance of 
their pay was to be adjusted. Only such kardars escaped this 
high-handedness as had friends among the troops, but those 
"benevolent" soldiers required a "fee" from the kardar....From 
every side the kardars complained about the refusal of persons 
to pay their dues to the Government, which made administration
impossible.72
land revenue demand rose by between 8 and 25 per cent in the period
69. LPD, vol 4,' Journals and Diaries of the Assistants to the Agent,
Governor-General North-West Frontier, and Resident at Lahore, 1846-1849 
[Journal of Capt. J. Abbott], p.96.
70. SR Rawalpindi 1864, pp. 69-70. The ta'aluqa of Kuller in this district 
was given in jagir to Raja Gulab Singh Dogra in 1843. He increased 
the revenue demand by 18 per cent over that prevailing in the period 
1838-42: ibid, p.72. An examination of Sikh and British revenue 
records covering the period from the beginning of Sikh rule to 1864 
showed that in nineteen out of twenty-five ta'aluqas in Rawalpindi 
District the highest revenue demand occurred during the period 1839-46: 
ibid, pp. 81-108.
71. Ganda Singh (ed), The Panjab in 1839-40, pp.110, 123, 128, 175, 238.
72. Vidya Sagar Suri (trans and ed), Some original sources of Panjab history: 
analytical catalogues of some outstanding Persian manuscripts and 
annotated translations into English of contemporary chronicles entitled 
Dewan Ajudhia Parshad's Waqai-i-Jang-i-Sikhan (Pheroshehr and Sobraon, 
1846) and Muhammad Naqis ' Sher Singh Nama (Tarikh-i-Punjab), (Lahore, 
1956), pp.54-5.
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obstruction of the work of the kardars by soldiers amounted to only
half the story - that many kardars took advantage of the political
instability throughout the kingdom to extend their own power and wealth.
They did this in a number of ways. First, and most obviously, many
of them simply fell behind in their revenue remittances and waited until
the darbar threatened them with punishment before sending any instalment
in to Lahore. As early as August 1843, during the reign of Sher Singh,
the annual loss to the State from districts under darbar-appointed kardars
73was reported to be in the vicinity of Rs 20 lakhs. Second, a number of
kardars became quite rapacious in their dealings with the revenue-paying
"primary" zamindars. In some cases the kardar bribed the members of the
panohayat, the village council, to support his illegal demands from the 
74zamindars. In other cases he enlisted the support of local notables,
religious leaders in particular, by alienating in their favour the greater
75portion of inams that were normally reserved for zamindars. An idea of
the extent of the kardar's rapacity may be gained from the following example.
In 1845 the total revenue collected from Bar Miani ta'aluqu, a group of
twenty-nine villages in the Chaj Doab, was Rs 18,000. Of this sum, Rs 4,000
(22 per cent) was realised by way of additional cesses and illegal fines.
The following year the total collections rose to about Rs 20,000 of which
76Rs 4,000 (20 per cent) represented illegitimate demands. Generally, the
kardar got away with these illegitimate demands because the central
administration’s auditing of district accounts became very defective. Most
kardars maintained false records, or no records at all, and patwari establish-
77ments were often permitted to run down. As the first British Administration
There is sufficient evidence, however, to suggest that the
73. "Items of Intelligence from Lahore", 23-8 Aug 1843: FSC, 23 March 
1844, no 456 (NAI).
74. LPD, vol 6 , Political Diaries of Lieutenant Reynall G. Taylor, Mr P. 
Sandys Melvill, Pandit Kunahya Lai, Mr P.A. Vans Agnew, Lieutenant 
J. Nicholson, Mr L. Bowring and Mr A.H. Cocks 1847-1849, p.368.
It ought to be noted, however, that the kardar did not always get his 
own way with the villagers. Bowring recorded: "There is a story 
that the Punches were going to prefer a complaint against the late 
Kardar of Kuchee [in the Sind Sagar Doab], Doonee Chund, which he 
stopped by presenting them with pairs of gold bracelets. They took 
the bracelets, and then turning round, persuaded all their zemeendars 
to make the very same complaint against him": ibid, p.371
75. Ibid, p.431.
76. Ibid, pp. 400-1.
77. Ibid, pp. 371-2, 394.
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Report pointed out: "There can be no doubt that all this laxity
encouraged the fiscal officers to cheat the state, and overtax the
78people." Third, some kardars built up their rural power bases by
extending their jurisdictions, horizontally or vertically. The
British officers who toured the countryside in the winter of 1847-48
reported several instances of this. In the upper Bari Doab a British
officer, Lake, found a kardar, Lalla Tej Chand, who had a large number
of ta'aluqas under his control. "The extreme points of his jurisdiction",
79wrote Lake, "cannot be less than ninety miles apart." Nicholson
found that at Chuniot, in the Rachna Doab, the kardar, Ram Rakha, had
80placed himself in authority over four other kardars. And Bowring,
a British officer who was on duty at Numul, in the Sind Sagar Doab, made
this diary entry in early December 1847:
There is a curious arrangement regarding kardars here, by 
which Sain Das is set up as a kind of Nazim. Each of the 
districts under him has a kardar of its own, appointed by 
the Durbar, and he has consequently no less than 5 kardars 
[one of whom was his nephew] under his orders....81
We may assume that in some cases these new administrative 
arrangements would have been worked out with the darbarrs knowledge 
and consent, for example, where a kardar extended his jurisdiction 
horizontally by taking up the administration of additional ta'aluqas 
on the ijar system. But it also seems likely that in some cases the 
new arrangement, especially where it involved the kardar 's setting 
himself up over other kardars as a sort of de facto nazimy was worked 
out by the local power groups, without reference to the darbar 's 
wishes. In such cases a struggle between the local power groups might 
be involved. For instance, another British officer, Cocks, reported 
on a power struggle at Ramnagar, in the Rachna Doab, between three groups
78. "PAR 1851" : FM, no 356, para 20 (NAI).
79. Lake’s report on the summary settlement of the upper Bari Doab, 25 
Dec 1847: FSC, 28 April 1848, nos 57-66 (NAI).
80. LPD, vo1 6 , p.304.
81. Ibid, p.375.
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centred around the former kardar, the recently appointed kardar, and
"the Council, as they call some Khutrees here, who appear at present
the ruling faction and have arrogated to themselves the power of
82imprisoning, fining whom they like." The important point about all 
of this is, of course, that a strong central government, headed by a 
strong ruler like Ranjit Singh, would never have permitted the kardars 
to use their offices as a means to personal profit and influence in this 
manner.
Nor would a strong central government have permitted the responsibility
for revenue collection at the provincial level to fall into the hands of
a small number of inter-connected families. Yet this is precisely what
seems to have happened in the period 1839-46. In November 1846 John
Lawrence, the Commissioner and Superintendent of the British Trans-Sutlej
83Territories, then on special duty at Lahore, submitted to his government
a series of statistical returns of the kingdom’s revenues based upon
certain darbar records that he had been able to consult during his stay
84at the Sikh capital. Part Four of his returns is a list of the different
diwanis, or collectorships, into which the kingdom's territories were
divided. Lawrence listed thirty-six diwanis, together with the names
of the diwans, the location of the different ta'aluqas held by the diwans,
and the details of the revenues of each ta’dluqa. Between them, the
thirty-six diwans were responsible for the collection of 98.7 per cent
85of the total gross land revenue, or 90 percent of the total gross
86revenues if customs revenues are included. Sixteen of these diwans
82. Ibid, pp. 425-6.
83. The administrative arrangements made at the conclusion of the first 
Anglo-Sikh war will be considered presently.
84. "Statistical Notes on the Punjab by the Commissioner and Superintendent 
of the Trans-Sutlej Territories on Special Duty at Lahore", 10 Nov 
1846: FSC, 26 Dec 1846, nos 1325-7 (NAI).
85. The remaining 1.3 per cent were in the hands of "various persons" 
administering "various villages" worth Rs 120, 350 per annum: ibid.
86. See part three, "Abstract", of Lawrence's returns: ibid.
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were kardars or ijaradars administering a single ta'aluqa3 whose land
revenues ranged from Rs 7,500 to Rs 269,985 per annum. The remaining
twenty diwans were either nazims or large kardars or ijaradars, with
smaller kardars beneath them, administering between two ta’aluqas
worth Rs 80,745 per annum and twenty-nine ta'aluqas worth Rs 1,965,443
per annum. Twelve of these twenty diwans administered ta1 aluqas whose
revenues amounted to 53 per cent of the total gross land revenue of the
kingdom. Now an examination of the names and backgrounds of these
thirty-six diwans reveals some interesting patterns of zat status,
religious affiliation, and kinship and affinal connection. Of the
thirty-six, only four can be identified as Sikh by religion and only two
as Sikh Jat by zat. Two only were Muslims. The overwhelming majority,
thirty in number, were Hindus, mostly Brahmans and Khatris, with titles
like lalla3 misr and diwan - titles of literacy and administrative expertise.
In the previous chapter we saw that towards the end of Ranjit Singh's
reign the office of kardar, or district revenue collector, became
monopolised by Brahmans and Khatris, members of a traditional, urban-based
administrative elite. We suggest that between 1839 and 1846 the officers
of nazim and ijaradar, or provincial revenue collectors, were also taken
over by members of this elite. A list prepared by Major Leech of the
thirteen great revenue farms of the kingdom in 1837 (in which he included
subas under nazims’) shows that all but two farms - suba Multan under
Diwan Sawan Mai and suba Jullundur under Misr Rup Lai - were held by royal
87princes and great, landed chieftains. But by 1846 only one of the 
diwans in John Lawrence's list - Raja Gulab Singh Dogra - belonged to 
that powerful social group. The rest were all members of either the 
minor chieftain group (that is, those chieftain families who in Ranjit 
Singh's day had held only subordinate positions in the army or the 
administration) or the traditional, urban-based administrative elite 
from which Ranjit Singh's "new staff" had been recruited).
An examination of the background of some of these diwans shows the 
existence of family connections between them, and between them and members
87. Leech, "List of Revenue Farms": FSC, 18 Nov 1843, no 21 (NAI).
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of the central administration. The following examples should serve 
to illustrate this point. One diwan, Misr Sunder Das, was a nephew 
of Misr Beli Ram, the ex-toshdkhania. Another, Misr Sukhraj, was Misr 
Beli Ram’s brother. Mulraj, the nazim at Pind Dadan Khan, was also 
related to this family. Misr Amir Chand was a first cousin of Raja 
Lai Singh, the wazir appointed by the army in November 1845. Ram Dial 
was a first cousin of Harsukh Rai, also a diwan. Harsukh Rai’s family 
was connected by marriage to the family of Diwan Sawan Mai of Multan.
Two of Harsukh Rai's uncles had earlier served Diwan Sawan Mai as kardars. 
Devi Dial was a nephew of Diwan Mul Raj (Diwan Sawan Mai’s son). Two 
diwcms, Rattan Chand Duggal and Hakim Rai, were connected by way of a 
marriage between their families. Hakim Rai’s son, Kishen Kour, was also 
a diwan. Hira Singh was Rani Jindan’s brother. Chirag-ud-Din Bokhari 
was the son of Faqir Aziz-ud-Din Bokhari. Because almost all the other 
diwans had relatives who were employed in some other administrative 
capacity - often as kardars under themselves, in fact - we may conclude 
that during the period 1839-46 there was a marked tendency for key 
administrative offices in the countryside and at the darbar to become 
monopolised by a restricted number of influential, inter-connected 
urban-based families. It is not difficult to understand why and how 
this situation came about. The violent upheavals at the darbar during 
this period not only had wiped out a large number of the top chieftains 
and courtiers (as a result of which their followers often lost their 
offices), thus creating an opening for subordinate administrators, but 
had also produced a situation in which administrators in the countryside, 
at both district and provincial levels, had been freed from the darbar's 
strict supervision and had thus been able to consolidate and extend their 
own authority and influence. In the early 1840s Diwan Sawan Mai, for 
example, had strengthened his fort and built up his own troops at Multan 
with a view to declaring his independence from Lahore should a suitable 
opportunity present itself. With this in mind he had placed a number 
of his own relatives and stalwart clients into administrative offices in 
and adjacent to suba Multan. In September 1844, however, he had been 
assassinated by a soldier. His son, Diwan Mul Raj, had taken over as 
nazim. The darbar demanded of Mul Raj a nazrana of 10 million rupees 
(one crore)for its acknowledgement of his succession. At that time the 
two Sikh battalions stationed at Multan by the darbar had mutinied,
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demanding higher pay. Mul Raj's followers had attacked the mutineers
and totally dispersed them. This victory had so baffled the darbar
and strengthened Mul Raj's position that the new nazim had actually been
able to negotiate the payment of a much smaller nazrccna: after a period
of intense bargaining the darbar had accepted Mul Raj's offer of Rs 18
88lakhs, which was less than one-fifth of its original demand.
The implication of developments at Multan and in other parts of the
countryside after 1839 was that the centrifugal tendencies of Punjabi
political culture were once again overtaking its centripetal tendencies.
Throughout the 1840s it became increasingly evident that, left to its
own inclinations, the kingdom would shortly disintegrate into several
parts - a Khatri State at Multan, a Dogra State in the Jammu hills, an
autonomous trans-Indus frontier, and a small, pure Sikh State in the
89central districts. In the past similar sets of circumstances had 
also carried with them the very real possibility of external intervention. 
So it was in the mid-1840s. Before the internal disintegration of the 
kingdom could occur the first Anglo-Sikh war broke out, and the political 
future of both the kingdom and its provincial power centres took on a 
rather different perspective. Our study of the period 1839-46 therefore 
properly ends with an examination of the origins, prosecution, and outcome 
of the war.
The first Anglo-Sikh war
The outbreak of hostilities between the Sikhs and the British in 
December 1845 was, as we shall presently see, very much the denouement 
of events within the kingdom since 1839. But it must also be understood 
in the wider context of Anglo-Sikh political relations since the beginning 
of the century. Even in the early 1840s there existed a widespread belief 
that war was inevitable, and had been for a long time. Yet, naturally,
88. Griffin, et al. 3 Chiefs and Families, vol 2, pp. 97-100.
89. See Lord Ellenborough's correspondence with the Duke of Wellington,
20 Oct and 18 Dec 1843, and with Major C.M. Broadfoot, British Political 
Agent at Ludhiana, 18 Nov 1844, in Hasrat (ed), The Punjab Papers, 
pp. 67, 69, 78.
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the reasons for this belief were not always the same on one side of 
the Sutlej border as on the other.
To Ranjit Singh and his successors in particular, and to the Punjabi
populace in general, it had seemed that the English East India Company
had all along been bent on encircling the kingdom with a view to its
absorption at an appropriate moment, and that sooner or later the Sikhs
would be forced to fight in order to delay that moment. As Cunningham,
who was a British officer with pro-Sikh leanings, pointed out in the late
1840s, such a perception was consistent with an Eastern view of history
and civilisation: were not the British the rising star in the Indian
firmament? Was their destiny not great, and the fire-power of their
90cannon not irresistible? Nor was evidence of British ambition lacking, 
since almost every British Governor-General since Lord Wellesley (1798-1805) 
had contributed to their kingdom's encirclement. Wellesley had sanctioned 
Lord Lake's pursuit of Holkar, the remaining Maratha warlord, across the 
Sutlej to within a march of Amritsar (1804-5). Lord Minto (1807-12) had 
blocked Sikh expansion into the Cis-Sutlej region by moving British troops 
up to Karnal and Hariana, by placing the Cis-Sutlej chieftains under British 
protection, and by establishing a British garrison and Political Agency 
at Ludhiana (1808-10). Lord Auckland (1836-42), using the doctrine of 
escheat, had made Ferozepur, on the right bank of the Sutlej to the south 
of Lahore, a British cantonment (1838), thereby directly threatening the 
Sikh capital. Lord Ellenborough (1842-44) had used the Punjab as a 
military highway for the Afghanistan expedition (1838-42) , the purpose 
of which had been to place a British puppet on the throne at Kabul, and 
had later scrapped the Tripartite Treaty (between the British, the Sikhs 
and Shah Shuja-the puppet) without consulting the Sikhs (1842). Ellenborough 
had also sanctioned Napier's malapert annexation of Sind (1843). Sir 
Henry (later Viscount) Hardinge (1844-48), the veteran of the Napoleonic 
wars, had taken the aggressive steps of doubling the total strength of 
British troops along the Sutlej border and assembling a fleet of boats 
that could be used to form a pontoon bridge across the river (1844-5).
There is little wonder, then, that the Sikhs had come to regard a war with
90. Cunningham, History of the Sikhs, p.248.
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To be sure, there were British officers, both civil and military,
who regarded the expansion of the Company into the Punjab as a natural
and necessary mission of Christian civilisation, and who relished the
thought of a war with the pugnacious Sikhs. "The Sikhs", wrote Auckland
to Sir John Hobhouse, the President of the Board of Control in London,
in early 1840, "are a swaggering and restive nation and proud of their
military strength and there is not an officer in our army who does not
92avow an appetite for a Sikh war." Yet official British policy towards 
the Punjab had always been rather less straightforward than the Sikhs 
had feared or individual British officers had hoped. In part this is 
explained by the reluctance of the Company's Directors at home to sanction 
financially expensive wars and commercially dubious annexations at a 
time when the Company had seemed to be over-committed in the subcontinent 
already. It also needs to be remembered that official British policy 
towards the Punjab was tied up with a wider northwest frontier strategy 
that was itself not constant but rather an alternation between the
93"forward" and "moderate" schools in influence both in London and in India.
We do not have the space to make a detailed review of the vicissitudes 
of official policy since the turn of the century, but we may notice the 
main trends.
Towards the end of the costly Maratha campaign (1803-05) Lord 
Cornwallis had been sent out to India as Wellesley's replacement with 
specific instructions from the Company's Court of Directors not to engage 
in any more wars or make any more annexations. A treaty of friendship 
with Ranjit Singh had accordingly been signed in 1806. Its key proposition 
had been that the British would fall back to the Jumna in return for Ranjit
91the British as being just a matter of time.
91. S.S. Thorburn, The Punjab in Peace and War (Patiala, reprint 1970), 
p.32; Jagmohan Mahajan, Circumstances Leading to the Annexation of 
the Punjab, 1846-1849 (A Historical Revision), (Allahabad, 1949), 
pp.24-6.
92. Auckland to Hobhouse (Private), 23 Jan 1840: Hasrat (ed), The Punjab 
Papers, p.35.
93. The best study is Hasrat, Anglo-Sikh Relations.
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Singh's causing the removal of Holkar from the Punjab. But within a 
few years both Ranjit Singh and the Company had changed their minds 
about the importance of the Cis-Sutlej region that lay between their 
territories: the Sikh monarch had felt strong enough to bring the 
chieftainships of the region into his orbit, while the Company, largely 
in response to a supposed Franco-Russian design on its Indian possessions, 
had come to see the region as a potentially troublesome frontier. Minto, 
the new Governor-General in 1807, had been instructed to make preparations 
for defending British possessions in the east against Britain's European 
rivals. He had therefore adopted the grand strategy of erecting a series 
of bulwarks - in Persia, Afghanistan, Sind and the Punjab. Metcalfe's 
mission to Lahore in 1808 (Malcolm had been sent to Persia, Elphinstone 
to Afghanistan, Seton to Sind) had coincided with Ranjit Singh's decision 
to launch his conquest of the Cis-Sutlej chieftains. Ranjit Singh had 
indicated his willingness to join the British in an anti-French pact 
provided that they recognised his claim to sovereignty over the Cis-Sutlej 
region. However, Minto had not been prepared to countenance the extension 
of Sikh power into that region (Sikh resistance in the face of a French 
invasion, it had been felt, could not be counted on), and while Metcalfe 
had spun things out at Lahore the Cis-Sutlej chieftains had been taken 
under British protection. Realising that his army was no match for the 
troops assembled by Minto, Ranjit Singh had backed down and signed the 
Treaty of Amritsar (1809) which bound him to renounce any claim to 
sovereignty over the territories to the east of the Sutlej.
The anticipated French expansion eastwards had never materialised, 
and after the collapse of the Napoleonic empire in Europe British interest 
in the politics of northwestern India had declined. During this lull 
in Anglo-Sikh relations (1809-30) Ranjit Singh had extended his own power 
towards, and then beyond, the Indus. The British, content to let the 
Sikhs grapple with the problems of stabilising the Indus frontier, had 
turned their attentions towards the more pressing matters of building up 
the opium-tea trade with China, overhauling their Indian administration 
and dealing with the Gurkhas (1815-16), the Pindaris (1817), the erstwhile 
Maratha confederacy (1818), and the Burmese (1824-26). While Ranjit 
Singh had established his dominion over the Punjab, the Company came to 
establish its dominion over most of the rest of the subcontinent.
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It had not been until the early 1830s that the British had again
adopted a "forward” policy towards the northwest. In part this change
of policy had reflected a growing commercial interest in the Indus river
system. Following Alexander Burnes's navigation of the Indus in 1831 -
conducted under the pretext of delivering to Ranjit Singh the King of
England's gift of a team of cart horses - and calls for a commercial
94treaty "in the interests of Commerce and Civilisation", a Navigation
Treaty had been forced upon both the Amirs of Sind and the Sikh Maharaja.
Within a few years, however, the commercial potential of the Indus river
95system had been found to be somewhat limited. A more important reason
for the change of policy had been the anticipation of a Sikh expansion
into Sind, which might have undermined the Company's position in Kutch
(occupied in 1819), and fears of a Russian expansion into British India
via Turkey and Persia. The Sikhs had been warned, in no uncertain terms,
against making any advance into Sind, while the Amirs had been obliged
to accept, as the price of British protection, the posting of a British
Political Agent at Hyderabad (1838) - the first stage in the establishment
96of British imperial domination of Sind. At the same time, however, the 
supposed Russian threat to India had highlighted the strategic importance 
to the British of the Sikh kingdom. It had been essential that the
94. Wade, "Observations on the Commerce of the Punjab", enclosed in Wade 
to H.T. Prinsep, Secy to GG, 27 Feb 1832, no 7: FSP, 9 April 1832,
no 7 (NAI). Burnes had also regarded the opening of the Indus system 
as providing "an increased outlet for the commodities of our Commercial 
Country": Burnes, Assistant to the Resident, Kutch, "On the 
Commercial Relations of the Punjab and the Probable Effects thereon 
by Opening the Indus", enclosed in Burnes to Macnaghten, 19 Feb 1832: 
FSP, 16 April 1832, no 9 (NAI).
95. The navigability of the Indus and its tributaries had proved to be 
restricted. Moreover, in 1837 both Burnes and Wade had reported 
that the exorbitant customs duties which Ranjit Singh permitted his 
officials to levy (a subject upon which various British envoys had 
failed to interest the Maharaja) placed a great hindrance on the 
region's commercial activity: Burns to Macnaghten, 4 Sept 1837:
FPC, 20 Oct 1837, no 67 (NAI); Wade to Macnaghten, 6 Oct 1837:
FPC, 20 Oct 1837, no 68 (NAI). In 1838 an Anglo-Sikh commercial 
expedition had carried samples of Punjab export commodities to Bombay, 
but most of the samples had proved to be of inferior quality and 
difficult to sell: FPC, 25 April 1838, nos 45-6; 26 Dec 1838, no 32 
(NAI).
96. The Sind Story is told in Robert A. Huttenback, British Relations With 
Sind, 1799-1843 (Berkeley, 1962).
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kingdom henceforth be built up and maintained as a non-Muslim buffer
state between British India and the Muslim powers to the west of the
Indus. For example, in early 1838 Wade, the British Political Agent
at Ludhiana, propounded to his government the need to
Secure the integrity of the Sikh nation as far as the 
Indus and mould these people and their already half 
disciplined troops to our wishes. Then we could make 
the Indus a formidable barrier and command an influence 
throughout Afghanistan either with one sovereign or 
separate chiefships as now existing....97
Wade's approach had been adopted: the Sikhs had been drawn into the
Tripartite Treaty of 1838, by which Shah Shuja was to be restored to
the throne at Kabul, and their sovereignty over the Punjab had been
guaranteed by the British. From this time onwards, until the annexation
of the kingdom a decade later, British policy towards the Punjab had been
founded on the notion of maintaining a buffer state. In its details,
however, British policy had come to be shaped by political developments
within the kingdom.
So long as Sikh authority had been strong, the long-term British
objective had been attainable without any sort of interference in the
internal affairs of the kingdom. In particular, the British had
scrupulously avoided associating themselves with any of the political
factions that had been formed during the last years of Ranjit Singh’s
reign. On two occasions in the past - in 1830 and in 1836 - the British
had politely refused Kharak Singh’s secret overtures for support of his
98claim to the gaddi at his father’s death; this line of policy had now 
99to be continued. Even when Ranjit Singh had died the British had 
stood aloof from the first succession crisis. Wade, then on a mission 
to Peshawar, had been instructed to observe ”a perfect neutrality” in 
all the darbar's own affairs.'*'^ Once Kharak Singh had ascended the 
gaddi, Wade had been instructed to use his influence with the different
97. Wade to Macnaghten, 1 Jan 1838: FPC, 14 Feb 1838, no 58 (NAI).
98. Political despatch from Court of Directors (hereafter C o D), 10 Nov 
1830, no 13: FP, voi 35 (NAI); Wade to Macnaghten, 10 Aug 1836: 
FPC, 19 Sept 1836, no 47 (NAI).
99. no 97 above.
100. T.H. Maddock, Offg Secy to G o I with GG, to Wade, 2 July 1839:
FSC, 7 Aug 1839, no 12 (NAI).
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even though it had long been felt in influential British quarters that
Sher Singh would be the only fit successor, capable of averting a resurgence
102of anarchy in the Punjab following Ranjit Singh's death.
- chieftains he met to ensure their continued allegiance to the new Maharaja,
But with Nao Nihal Singh's assumption of de facto authority in late
1839, and his fomenting of an anti-British feeling amongst the Sikh
soldiery, with a view to consolidating his position, many junior British
officers had begun questioning the wisdom of a non-intervention policy.
Several of the political officers in direct contact with the darbar had
even taken policy decision-making into their own hands - to the annoyance
of the darbar and the embarrassment of their own government. Wade, for
example, had taken it upon himself to accuse Nao Nihal Singh in public
of having usurped power, and to obstruct his authority, as a result of
which the darbar had refused to recognise Wade's agency and demanded his
recall. In April 1840 Auckland had been obliged to recall Wade from
103Ludhiana and replace him with George Clerk. Another embarrassing
situation created by the actions of an over-zealous "man on the spot" had
occurred a year later, when the second succession crisis had broken out at
Lahore. Auckland, with the Court of Director's approval, had decided
to abandon the official policy of strict neutrality towards the darbarrs
affairs to the extent that the British would support Sher Singh against
Rani Chand Kaur and the Sindhanwalias, if called upon to do so, and in
104return for certain considerations. A British force of 12,000 men
101. H. Torrens, Dept Secy to G o I with GG, to Wade, 11 July 1839: FSC,
4 Dec 1839, no 80 (NAI). At that time Auckland, the then GG, had 
written to Hobhouse: "I sincerely lament the loss of an old ally 
[Raniit Singh]. I will use my best endeavours with those who stand 
in his place to preserve unimpaired the relations which have so long 
subsisted between the British Government and the Punjab" : Auckland 
to Hobhouse (Private), 14 July 1839: Hasrat (ed), The Punjab Papers, 
p .31.
102. For example. Burnes, "Report on the Military Power and Political 
Relations of the Punjab as ruled by Runjeet Singh" : FSP, 21 May 
1832, no 10 (NAI).
103. The darbar 's angry reaction and Auckland's embarrassment are discussed 
in Auckland to Hobhouse (Private), 23 Jan 1840: Hasrat (ed),
The Punjab Papers, p.35.
104. India despatch from Secret Committee, 30 April 1841: FSC, 30 April 1841, 
no 733 (NAI). Clerk had been informed that British assistance would 
require the surrender by the darbar of its Cis-Sutlej estates to the 
British, and all its trans-Indus territories to Afghanistan. Further,
a sum of Rs 40 lakhs would have to be paid by Sher Singh to cover the 
cost of any military operations: Hasrat, Anglo-Sikh Relations, p.204.
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had been collected at Ferozepore "to watch the Sikhs and act if necessary.
Clerk, however, had regarded the events at Lahore as favouring a more
bold pursuit of British interests, and had overstepped his duties to
propose to Sher Singh an immediate occupation of the Sikh capital by the
British. This proposal, which had done nothing to bolster Sher Singh's
reputation, had so infuriated the Sikh army that Clerk, then at the Sikh
capital, had hastily retired to Ludhiana. Nor had Auckland been happy
with his Political Agent's unsolicited initiative. Publicly the Government
of India had acquiesced in it, for Auckland had rebuked Sher Singh for
having failed to restrain his army. Privately, however, the Governor-
General had rebuked his Political Agent as well:
I am always a little surprised [he had written to Clerk in March 
1841] at your warlike tone in regard to Lahore, and I should find 
it more difficult, than you seem to think it would be, to frame a 
declaration of war with the Sikhs. Naunihal Singh was not without 
secret sins against us but he is dead and gone. Every demand made 
upon the Darbar has been complied with. Our convoys [to Afghanistan] 
and our merchants continue to traverse the Punjab frequently under 
Sikh escorts with stores and treasures of immense value.
But nothing justifies our interference.106
The political development that had convinced Ellenborough, Auckland's
successor, that military interference in the Punjab by the British would
probably have to he undertaken, regardless of the darbar's wishes, had
been the emergence of the republican Khalsa army as the major political
force at Lahore after the onset of the third succession crisis late in
1843. It was highly possible, Ellenborough had felt, that Raja Hira
Singh Dogra would seek to strengthen his position as wazir, and weaken
the army's political power, by directing a movement of aggression against
107the British. Even so, the new Governor-General had not been persuaded
by the arguments of those officers who had advocated a "defensive" first 
strike against the Sikhs: for one thing, he had not yet entirely abandoned 
hope that a stable government at Lahore might somehow emerge; for another, 
the British had been far from ready at this stage to undertake military
105. Ellenborough to the Duke of Wellington (Private), 26 Oct 1841: Hasrat 
(ed), The Punjab Papers, p.57.
106. Auckland to Clerk (Private), 21 March 1841: ibid, p.45.
107. Ellenborough to Governor of Sind, 24 Dec 1843, no 30: FSC, 23 March
1844, no 18 (NAI).
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contest with the Sikhs had therefore been started at this time, with
109November 1845 as the projected date of completion. Until these
preparations were completed, it had been of the utmost importance that 
a premature outbreak of hostilities should not occur. "I will never 
threaten”, Ellenborough had told Lord Ripon on 4 July 1844, "when I 
cannot strike, and I will never strike unless I strike very hard, and 
one blow will be enough. We have no cause of striking yet."^^
Ellenborough had been recalled from India in July 1844, mainly
because the Court of Directors had been unhappy with his part in the
annexation of Sind, and with his adventuristic measures in Bundelkhand
and Gwalior. However, his broad strategy towards the Punjab - that of
fortifying the Sutlej frontier and simply watching events at Lahore,
rather than becoming directly involved in them - had not been publicly
condemned; indeed, such a strategy had been continued by his successor,
Hardinge. Military preparations were pushed ahead, so that by January
1845 Hardinge was able to report the presence on the frontier of 36,000
men for offensive operations, with a rear-guard of 200,000 men for defensive
purposes. By this time Raja Hira Singh Dogra had been assassinated
and the army had appointed Jawahir Singh as wazir. But Hardinge had
been unwilling to interfere, even though several darbar chieftains as well
112as his junior officers had urged it. The military democracy of the
operations along the Sutlej border. Preparations for a military
108. Ellenborough to Wellington (Private), 20 Oct 1843; Ellenborough*s 
Minute, 1 Nov 1843: Hasrat (ed), The Punjab Papers, pp. 67-8.
109. Ellenborough to Wellington (Private), 20 Nov 1843; 9 May 1844: ibid, 
pp. 69, 74.
110. Ellenborough to Ripon (Private), 4 July 1844: ibid, p.76.
111. Hardinge to Ellenborough (Private), 8 Jan 1845: ibid, p.79.
112. In early 1845 Raja Gulab Singh Dogra and several other influential 
darbar chieftains had approached Major Broadfoot, the GG's Agent 
on the North-West Frontier, with various proposals for assisting a 
British occupation of Lahore in return for guarantees of their 
preservation. Broadfoot had been instructed to decline these 
proposals. For an example, see FSC, 4 April 1845, nos 115-17 (NAI). 
Sir Frederick Currie, the GG's Political Secy, had informed Broadfoot 
of the G o  I's reluctance to interfere, even though the withholding of 
aid that might be solicited "must bring about the destruction of the 
Sikh power" : Currie to Broadfoot (Private), 19 Jan 1845: Hasrat 
(ed), The Punjab Papers, p.81.
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panchayats, Hardinge had agreed, was most dangerous; still, the trial 
of awaiting the emergence of a strong Sikh government must run its
1 1 7
course. But, as we have already seen, a strong Sikh government centred
on the darbar had not emerged: the army panchayats had taken more and 
more power into their own hands. By the middle of 1845 British intelligence 
reports indicated that British war preparations were being countered, with 
equal feverishness, on the other side of the Sutlej.
After the execution of Jawahir Singh by the army in September 1845, 
Hardinge finally admitted the improbability of a stable Sikh government 
being formed out of the remaining darbar elements, and the probability 
of a violent solution to the problem. The few remaining darbar chieftains 
of influence had become fearful of the army, and desirous of its destruction 
so that they might regain their former power. But it was not worth using 
a British army to destroy the greater portion of the Sikh nation, Hardinge 
reasoned, simply to replace a few inconsequential chieftains in power.
British interests would be better served by remaining aloof, yet fully 
prepared, until cause for an all-out war had been given.
The spark that ignited this tense situation into one of open 
confrontation came sooner than most had expected. Early in November 
Broadfoot, who was the Governor-General *s Agent on the North-West Frontier, 
had placed two villages near Ludhiana, villages that were the property of 
Maharaja Dalip Singh, under sequestration, on the grounds that criminals 
concealed in them had not been surrendered. This extraordinary measure, 
together with news of Hardinge*s rapid advance towards the frontier, had 
removed any lingering doubts that the panchayats might have had as to the 
inevitability of war.1^  The darbar, seeing an opportunity to rid itself 
of the army, now accepted the military leadership role demanded of it by
113. Hardinge to Ellenborough (Private), 8 March 1845: ibid, p.86.
114. For Broadfoot*s reports, see FSC, 20 June 1845, nos 33, 56, 58; 15 
Aug 1845, no 34 (NAI).
115. Hardinge to Ellenborough (Private), 23 Oct 1845: Hasrat (ed),
The Punjab Papers, p.92.
116. "The men would assemble in groups and talk of the great battle they 
must soon wage, and they would meet around the tomb of Rani it Sineh 
and vow fidelity to the Khalsa" : Cunningham, History of the Sikhs, 
p.258.
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the panchayats. On 11 December 1845 the Sikh army, under the joint 
command of General Tej Singh, the commander-in-chief, and Raja Lai Singh, 
the wazir, began crossing the Sutlej. Two days later Lord Hardinge, at 
the head of an advancing British army, issued a declaration of war, 
charging the Sikh state with having broken the treaty of 1809. The 
long - awaited contest between the two best armies in the subcontinent 
had begun.
The first Anglo-Sikh war, or Sutlej Campaign, was a short but very
sharp affair. The two basic points about it that are of interest to
us are first, that the ordinary Sikh soldiery proved to be - despite
their inferior leadership - much more formidable opponents than the
British had ever anticipated, and second, that the darbar was essentially
more interested in the annihilation of its own army than in a victory
against the British. A word should be said here about the respective
strengths of the two armies. The combined British Army of the Sutlej
117had a strength of about 32,000 fighting men, most of whom were well-
118trained Indian mercenaries, and 109 heavy guns. At the time it was
supposed that the Sikh army was three or four times larger. But historians
have subsequently demonstrated that the estimates of Sikh strength given
in the despatches of General Sir Hugh Gough, the British Commander-in-Chief,
were grossly exaggerated, although they have not agreed upon an alternative
figure. Gough and Innes, whose work is still the best account of the
war, put the total Sikh force at about 100,000 men; they acknowledged,
however, that no such force was ever collected at any one time against 
119the British. Cunningham, who was known for his pro-Sikh sympathies,
120gave a figure of 35,000 or 40,000 men, with 150 pieces of heavy artillery. 
Thorburn gave a figure of 30,000 regulars, 150 guns and 'unnumbered swarms
117. It should be remembered that in those days camp followers outnumbered 
the actual soldiers by six to one: Thorburn, The Punjab in Peace and 
War, p.43, n 1.
118. Hasrat, Anglo-Sikh Relations, pp. 266-7.
119. Gen. Sir Charles Gough and Arthur D. Innes, The Sikhs and the Sikh 
Wars: the Rise, Conquest, and Annexation of the Punjab State 
(Patiala, reprint 1970), pp. 66-7.
120. Cunningham, History of the Sikhs, p.262.
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of horsemen and Akalis [militant warrior-priests]". Hasrat, the
most recent authority, and one who made a critical analysis of all the
official British despatches, gave a figure of about 50,000 men and 
122108 guns. It would seem reasonable to accept as valid Cunningham’s
general observation that, while numerous bodies of irregular horsemen
and infantrymen might have swelled the Sikh army to more than double
that of their opponents, the regular troops of the Sikhs never exceeded
123those of the British by more than a half.
Discipline and leadership, rather than weight of numbers and calibre
of guns, were the decisive factors in the war. When the Sikh army crossed
the Sutlej, its immediate object should have been to capture the unfortified
British cantonment at Ferozepur before British reinforcements could arrive
from Ludhiana. Instead, the Sikh commanders adopted the plan of isolating
Ferozepur by placing half their army at Ferozeshah, a village situated
about 10 miles to the southeast of Ferozepur, while the other half marched
on to intercept the main body of the advancing British army. This plan
backfired. The first battle took place at the village of Mudki, about
20 miles to the southeast of Ferozepur, on 18 December 1845. There a
British force of 12,000 men, with forty-eight guns and four troops of
horse artillery, inflicted a defeat upon a Sikh force of 3,500 cavalry,
1242,000 infantry and twenty guns. British losses were 215 men killed
and 657 wounded; Sikh losses, though to have been great, were never 
ascertained.
121
121. Thorburn, The Punjab in Peace and War, p.35.
122. Hasrat, Anglo-Sikh Relations, p.35.
123. Cunningham, History of the Sikhs, p.262. In the following paragraphs 
the estimates of battle forces and casualties have been taken from 
Hasrat, rather than from Gough and Innes, where the two authorities
do not agree.
124. Just to demonstrate the disparity between the estimates of other 
historians, Gough and Innes referred to the official British despatches, 
wherein the Sikh force at Mudki was estimated at between 20,000 and
30,000 men with forty guns {The Sikhs and the Sikh Wars, p.78), while 
Cunningham gave a figure of less then 2,000 infantry and between 8,000 
and 10,000 cavalry with twenty-two guns {History of the Sikhs, p.265).
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At the battle of Ferozeshah, three days later, a British force 
of 16,700 men and sixty-nine guns came very close to being beaten by 
a Sikh force of about 10,000 men and 100 guns. The first day of 
Ferozeshah was essentially an artillery battle, and the heavier calibre 
of the Sikh's guns (said to have been treble that of the guns used in 
the Napoleonic wars), together with the superior marksmanship of their 
gunners, initially told in their favour: by nightfall, one-third of 
the British guns had been put out of action, and their ammunition was 
nearly exhausted. However, during the night, while the Sikh guns 
continued to play with deadly effect, a British cavalry charge, led by 
the Governor-General himself, succeeded in breaking through the Sikh 
lines. By day-break, British victory seemed assured; but the cost had 
been great: half the British guns were out of action, and 2,415 men had 
died; on the Sikh side, between 4,000 and 5,000 men and seventy-three 
guns had been lost. As the sun rose on the second day of Ferozeshah, 
a most remarkable event occurred. A second Sikh force of about 30,000 
men under Tej Singh's command arrived on the battlefield. As Tej Singh's 
artillery opened up, and his infantry advanced, the exhausted British 
army grimly prepared for a second battle. A Sikh victory now seemed 
inevitable; but Tej Singh, whether out of cowardice or an incompetent 
assessment of the situation, suddenly retired from the field, much to 
the amazement and relief of the British commanders.
After Ferozeshah, both armies retired to lick their wounds. A 
month later the Sikhs re-crossed the Sutlej and engaged the British in 
the minor battle of Baddowal (21 January 1846), in which a small British 
force was obliged to retreat from the field, and then fought the Battle 
of Aliwal (28 January), in which Sardar Ranjor Singh Majithia's force of 
about 15,000 men was thoroughly routed by an 11,000 - strong army under 
the command of General Sir Harry Smith. Here the Sikhs lost 3,500 men 
and sixty-seven guns : British casualties amounted to 151 men killed. 
Aliwal was a welcome victory for the British, doing much to restore 
flagging morale amongst their Indian mercenaries. The Sikhs fell back 
to the Sutlej to prepare for a last, all-out battle.
The decisive Battle of Sobraon was fought on 10 February. The Sikhs 
had dug themselves in at a bend in the Sutlej river, with a bridge of 
boats connecting them with Tej Singh's artillery on the opposite bank, to
Ill
their rear. The British army, re-supplied from a convoy that had
arrived from Delhi two days earlier, took u d  its positions in a six-mile
arc, facing the Sikhs. At day-break, as the fog lifted, the guns of
both armies opened up, and continued firing for nearly three hours.
Cunningham described the scene:
The field was resplendent with embattled warriors, one moment 
umbered [sic] in volumes of sulphurous smoke, and another 
brightly apparent amid the splendour of beaming brass and the 
cold and piercing rays of polished steel. The roar and loud 
reverberation of the ponderous ordnance added to the impressive 
interest of the scene, and fell gratefully upon the ear of the 
intent and enduring s o l d i e r . 125
The Sikh artillery, pride and joy of Ranjit Singh, was proving equal to
the British best.
By early morning it became clear to the British commanders that
only a cavalry and infantry charge like that undertaken at Ferozeshah
could dislodge the Sikh troops and silence their guns. The order went
out for a direct assault on the Sikh positions. Wave upon wave of
British cavalry and infantry fell upon the Sikh entrenchments until at
last a breach was made. As the heavy guns gradually lessened, and then
fell silent, the battle became one of bayonet and sword, during which
British soldiers experienced fiercer hand-to-hand fighting than on any
previous occasion in India. Cavalry and infantry eventually won the
day for the British at Sobraon as they had at Ferozeshah. This time
Tej Singh did not even appear on the battlefield to threaten a reversal:
when the British charge began, he and Lai Singh fled to Lahore, leaving
behind them a sunken boat in the middle of the pontoon bridge and a
condemned Sikh army. When the Battle of Sobraon was over, the Sikhs
had lost every gun and more than 3,000 men - Gough and Innes gave a
126figure of 10,000 - many of whom had been driven into the Sutlej and 
drowned. British casualties amounted to 320 killed and 2,063 wounded. 
Sobraon was a massive, decisive victory for the British.
It has been asserted by some Punjabi historians that the British 
won the first Anglo-Sikh war owing to the treacherous collaboration of
125. Cunningham, History of the Sikhs, p.282.
126. Gough and Innes, The Sikhs and. the Sikh Wars, p. 182.
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the Sikh commanders, Tej Singh and Lai Singh, who were interested only
in saving their own skins and retaining their status and wealth. For
example, it has been pointed out that shortly after the Sikh army crossed
the Sutlej in mid-December, Lai Singh contacted the British to suggest a
desultory Sikh offensive in return for considerate treatment at the
termination of the war, and that shortly before Sobraon he sent emissaries
to the British with valuable information concerning the position and
strength of Sikh entrenchments. It has also been claimed that Tej
Singh deliberately retired from the field at Ferozeshah when he could
have won, and that he purposefully sank the bridge of boats at Sobraon
127in order to cut off the Sikh retreat. This assertion - that, but
for the treachery of their leaders, the Sikhs would not have lost the war -
would appear to be wishful thinking. Certain representations to the
British undoubtedly were made, as they long had been made, but there is
scant evidence to suggest that the British actually benefitted by them -
their own intelligence methods, after all, were not exactly unsophisticated.
Nor is there conclusive proof that Tej Singh's actions at Ferozeshah and
Sobraon were the result of anything more than military ineptitude on his 
128part.
This is not to say that the darbar, of which Tej Singh and Lai Singh
were prominent members, seriously desired a military victory over the
British, if that were possible. On the contrary, all the evidence points
to the conclusion that the darbar, no less than the British, desired the
humiliation of the Sikh army and the destruction of its republican authority.
After the Battles of Mudki and Ferozeshah, Raja Gulab Singh Dogra, who
had kept aloof from the war, but had continued to offer his services to
the British, was invited to Lahore and offered the post of wazir so that
he might begin negotiating a settlement with the British that would ensure
129the survival of the darbar. To the British, the Dogra's intercession
127. Mahajan, Circumstances Leading to the Annexation of the Punjab, pp. 
27-32; Ahluwalia and Singh, The Punjab's Pioneer Freedom Fighters, 
pp. 8 , 21-5.
128. Hasrat, Anglo-Sikh Relations, pp. 283-4; Gough and Innes, The Sikhs 
and the Sikh Wars, pp. 65, 104, 138.
129. Hardinge to Ellenborough (Private), 7 June 1846: Hasrat (ed),
The Punjab Papers, p.95.
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was highly welcome. Three days after the Battle of Aliwal, Hardinge
informed his wife that negotiations were under way:
I have a communication from Rajah Golab Singh, which may lead 
to overtures for an arrangement; he is to be made minister 
and says he is ready to do whatever we like to order. I am 
obliged to be very cold and haughty; but propose to allow him 
to come to propose terms and make a beginning. It is indispensable 
that the Sikh Army should be disbanded. Their state of anarchy 
and mutiny is the cause of all the mischief. [British] India 
is already so overgrown and large that we do not want territory.
We shall keep what we have confiscated on this side [the Trans- 
Sutlej region], make them pay the expenses of the war, clip their 
wings and lessen their power, but I have always been averse to 
annex [the Punjab] and I still hope to keep up a Sikh nation. 1 30
Just before the Battle of Sobraon an agreement was reached between Raja 
Gulab Singh Dogra and the British, to the effect that the darbar would 
openly denounce the actions of the Sikh army and Dalip Singh would remain 
as the minor Maharaja, provided that the British army could occupy Lahore 
unopposed. The ordinary Sikh soldiery were not informed of this agreement, 
and went to their deaths in their thousands at Sobraon, fully believing 
that they were fighting for the preservation of their kingdom.
The British army moved across the Sutlej after the Battle of Sobraon, 
and occupied the Sikh capital on 20 February 1846. By the Treaty of 
Lahore, signed on 9 March 1846 by Frederick Currie and Henry Lawrence on 
behalf of the British Government, and by seven darbar chieftains on behalf 
of Maharaja Dalip Singh, the Lahore Government formally surrendered to 
the British its Cis-Sutlej estates and the Trans-Sutlej province (the 
Jullundur Doab), and agreed to the payment of an indemnity of Rs 1.5 crores 
(£1.5 million). Since the Lahore Government would probably not be able 
to pay this sum, additional territories situated in the hills between the 
Beas and the Indus, including the provinces of Kashmir and Hazara, were 
surrendered as equivalent for Rs 1 crore. Other important articles of 
the treaty stipulated that the Sikh army should be pruned back to 20,000 
infantry and 12,000 cavalry; that the British should control tolls and 
ferries on the rivers Beas and Sutlej as far as the Indus confluence; 
that British troops should have free passage through the Maharaja’s 
territories; that the Lahore Government would recognise the independent
130. Hardinge to Lady Hardinge, 31 Jan 1846: ibid, p.101.
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sovereignty of Raja Gulab Singh Dogra in such territories as the British 
Government decided to make over to him; and that, while the British 
Government would not exercise any interference in the internal administration 
of the Lahore State, the Governor-General would exercise the right of 
giving his advice on any matters that might be referred to him.
Two days later a number of supplementary articles were added to the 
Treaty. One stipulated that at the Lahore Government’s solicitation a 
British force would remain at Lahore until the end of the year to protect 
the minor Maharaja and the citizens of his capital during the reorganisation 
of the Sikh army. Another provided the Lahore Government with the 
assistance of the local British authorities for the recovery of revenue 
arrears due from the kardars, ijaradars and nazims. On 16 March 1846 
a separate treaty was signed by Raja Gulab Singh Dogra and the British 
Government. The provinces of Kashmir and Hazara, which the British 
had taken in part payment of the war indemnity, were made over to the 
Raja and his lineal male heirs in perpetuity in return for the payment
131of Rs 75 lakhs (£750,000) and the acknowledgement of British supremacy.
With the signing of these treaties an important chapter in the history of 
the Punjab came to a close.
Conclusion
There are two broad conclusions to be drawn from our study of the 
period 1839-46. The first is that Sikh monarchical authority collapsed 
as a result of a basic structural weakness in the kingdom's political 
system. The inability of the darbar to throw up another Maharaja stamped 
with the qualities of Ranjit Singh after 1839, and the tumultuous events 
that stemmed from that failure, have usually been explained in terms of 
the weak characters of the various royal princes and the venality of most 
of the chieftains. Some historians have also stressed the republicanism 
of the army or the external pressure exerted by the British. We do not 
deny the importance of these factors, but would see them essentially as
131. The Treaty of Lahore, the list of Supplementary Articles, and the 
treaty with Gulab Singh Dogra are reproduced in Cunningham, History 
of the Sikhs, appendices xxxiv-vi.
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symptoms of the Sikh-Dogra antagonism that Ranjit Singh had deliberately 
incorporated into the political system of his kingdom. During his reign 
this antagonism had worked in his favour. After his death, however, it 
worked to the detriment of the whole kingdom. We have shown that it was 
the "prime mover" of events within the kingdom after 1839 - that it lay 
at the bottom of the three succession crises, the emergence of the army 
as a rival political force, the weakening of the bonds between the 
provincial and central levels of the "national" system of government, 
and the drift towards a war with the British.
With the creation of an independent Dogra kingdom in Kashmir at the
end of the war, this antagonism was removed from its place at the heart
of Punjabi politics. But by this time the accumulated costs in human
lives were quite appalling. Between the death of Ranjit Singh and the
termination of the war, no fewer than two Maharajas, one queen, four royal
princes, and at least forty-five prominent chieftains (including three
wazirs) died. Most were the victims of a bout of political violence
that was unusual even for Punjabi society. For example, thirty-six of
the forty-five chieftains who had died were killed in the factional warfare
of the period; of the remaining nineteen, twelve were killed in the first
132Anglo-Sikh war, while only seven died of natural causes. In all
probability, the darbar, the Sikh community, and the Punjab generally,
were better off for the elimination of some of these personalities.
But the deaths of others represented a serious loss. The heroic death of
Sardar Sham Singh Atariwala at Sobraon, for instance, deprived the kingdom
133of one of its most capable, senior chieftains. The loss of life
amongst the ordinary populace was even more tragic. How many petty 
chieftains, soldiers, servants and innocent by-standers were killed in 
the factional warfare cannot be known, but the figure would doubtless be 
in the hundreds. Thousands of warriors, acknowledged by the British to
132. Major G. Carmichael Smyth (ed) , A History of the Reigning Family of 
Lahore, with some account of the Jummoo Rajahs, the Seik Soldiers
and their Sirdars (first published 1847, reprinted Lahore, 1961), "List 
of Sirdars and Chiefs", pp. xxxix-1.
133. For the story of Sham Singh Atariwala, see Ahluwalia and Singh,
The Punjab's Pioneer Freedom Fighters, chap 1.
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have been some of the best they had ever encountered in India, perished
on the battlefields of the war. The British Commander-in-Chief wrote
of the slaughter of the Sikh soldiery at Sobraon:
Policy prevented my publicly recording my sentiments of the 
splendid gallantry of a fallen foe, and I declare, were it 
not from a conviction that my country's good required the 
sacrifice, I could have wept to have witnessed the fearful 
slaughter of so devoted a b o d y . 1^4
Still, if there were numerous losers as a result of the Sikh-Dogra
antagonism, there were many winners as well. Raja Gulab Singh Dogra
is an obvious example. By the end of the period he had realised, largely
as a result of his astuteness (Hardinge called him "the greatest rascal 
135in Asia" ) and his impeccable sense of timing his two life-long ambitions: 
he had been, temporarily, wazir at Lahore, and he had got his own kingdom 
in his native hills. Of particular interest to us, however, are two 
groups of men who managed to ride out the political storms of the period, 
and in some cases to profit by them. The first comprised that small elite 
of Hindu, professional administrators who took advantage of the situation 
at the capital by building up their wealth and power in the provinces.
We have examined the methods by which these nazims, ijaradars and kardars 
extended their influence in the countryside, and the relative powerlessness 
of the darbar to do anything about it. In the next chapter we shall 
examine the attempts made by British officers, working through the darbar, 
to reduce the influence of these provincial administrators, and the 
resistance that these measures provoked. The second group comprised 
those chieftains and administrators who, though they were always close to 
the centres of the political storms at Lahore, emerged at the end of the 
period unscathed. How had they managed to survive? The answer to this 
question is worth pursuing in some detail because it will not only assist 
our understanding of the operation of factional politics during this 
period but also suggest the important role played by these men in the 
transition from Sikh to British rule.
Basically, these men - men like General Tej Singh and Diwan Dina 
Nath - survived because they were able to use the factions that were 
spawned by the Sikh-Dogra antagonism as vehicles for the realisation of
134. Quoted in Gough and Innes, The Sikhs and the Sikh Wars, p.138.
135. Hardinge to Lady Hardinge, 2 March 1846: Hasrat (ed), The Punjab Papers, 
p.104.
117
their own ambitions, without ever fully committing themselves to those 
factions. In the political idiom of modern India, they were the "chamchas" 
of their day. The word "chamcha"is a wholly indigenous term (it is 
derived from chamach, meaning "spoon", and has been popularised by Bombay 
filmland, whose heroes and heroines have used it to describe a person who 
ingratiates himself and does another's dirty work - as a spoon takes the 
place of fingers in the eating of food). We may note that it has stronger 
pejorative connotations than "flatterer" or "opportunist". As a political 
species, the "chamcha" might come into full bloom in stages - for example, 
he might first appear as a follower or assistant, then go on to become a 
flatterer, and finally assign to himself the role of conscience keeper1"^ - 
but whatever the stage of his evolution his sole concern is essentially 
the maximisation of his own advantage. Though it is derived from an 
Indian political situation far removed in time and context from that of 
mid-nineteenth-century Punjab, and though it carries very definite 
pejorative overtones, the concept of the "chamcha" may not be entirely 
inappropriate to our study. For one thing , it ascribes a more active, 
calculated role in factional politics than does the concept of the 
"faction member". For another, it implies an ability to adapt to and 
gain personal advantage from a changing political situation as well as 
a relatively static one. The men whom we would dub the "chamchas" of 
the period 1839-46 were ideally placed, and ideally talented, to benefit 
by the transition from Sikh to British rule. Moreover, as we shall see, 
they played a crucial role in that transition. The concept of the "chamcha" 
might therefore be regarded as an indigenous variation on that of the 
"collaborator".
Some examples may prove instructive. Harsukh Rai was an administrator 
who possessed remarkable political resilience. He belonged to a respectable 
Khatri family from Gujranwala District. Several members of his family 
had married into the family of Diwan Sawan Mai, the nazim of Multan, and 
had served him as kavdars. Harsukh Rai had come to Lahore in 1836 and 
had attached himself to Raja Dhian Singh Dogra, who had found him a
136. This analysis is attributed to Mr Atal Bihari Vajpayee; it was made 
in 1978 when he was India's External Affairs Minister in the Janata 
government: S. Sahay, "A Close Look: Role of Hangers-On in Politics", 
in The Statesman Weekly (Calcutta and New Delhi), 16 Feb 1980, p.12.
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lucrative post at the darbar. Sher Singh, when he became Maharaja,
appointed Harsukh Rai kardar at Sheikhupura. When Sher Singh and Dhian
Singh Dogra fell out in 1841, Harsukh Rai transferred his allegiance to
Sher Singh; but the wazir was still powerful enough to procur his
dismissal in retaliation. Harsukh Rai was later appointed kardar at
Haveli, where he became very unpopular on account of his grasping
administration. In 1845 he sided with Kanwar Peshawara Singh against
Jawahir Singh, the wazir, and lost his office, his jagirs and his personal
property. But when Raja Lai Singh rose to power Harsukh Rai attached
himself to him and rose also. He was appointed to a high military rank,
and received the command of the brigade which Lai Singh had begun forming
as his personal body-guard. He was also made kardar at Patti. But
when the wazir fell from power after the Battle of Ferozeshan Harsukh Rai
again lost his rank and office. It would seem that he kept aloof from
the rest of the war. At the end of the war he attached himself to the
British and through their influence received the post of kardar of the
Manjha. Although he was soon dismissed from his new post because of
his oppressive conduct, he remained loyal to the British; and after the
annexation of the kingdom he served as a tahsildar and then as an Extra
137Assistant Commissioner.
Malik Fateh Khan Tiwana had a rather similar career. The Tiwanas 
of Shahpur had served Ranjit Singh as rough-riders and jagirdari officers 
after he had conquered their country. Fateh Khan had come to Lahore in 
1837 and had attached himself to Raja Dhian Singh Dogra, from whom he 
had received various appointments. In 1840 he was imprisoned by Nao 
Nihal Singh essentially because he was one of the wazir's creatures.
On the death of Nao Nihal Singh the wazir regained his influence, and 
Fateh Khan's fortunes, and those of his relatives, rose accordingly.
When Maharaja Sher Singh and Raja Dhian Singh Dogra were assassinated by 
the Sindhanwalias in September 1843 Fateh Khan was present. But he 
avoided his patron's fate:
137. Griffin, et al., Chiefs and Families, vol 2, pp. 117-18.
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Fateh Khan was with the Raja just before his murder; but 
as the assassins and their victim passed into the Lahore 
fort, he fell behind and allowed himself to be shut out.
No man was more versed in intrigue than he; he saw a 
catastrophe was impending, and had no such love for the 
Raja as to desire to share his fate.138
Accused by Raja Hira Singh Dogra of complicity in his father's death,
Fateh Khan fled across the Indus to Bannu. There he instigated a
rebellion amongst the Indus tribes against the darbav; this rebellion
was quelled, and Fateh Khan again retired to the other side of the Indus.
When Hira Singh Dogra and Pandit Jalla fell from power he hurried back
to Lahore, knowing that he would be well received by Jawahir Singh, the
new waziv, with whom he had been in communication. Jawahir Singh made
him a nazim. But, as we saw, there was a price to this favour, and
that was the doing of the waziv ’s dirty work: in July 1845 Fateh Khan
assisted in the capture and murder of the rebel prince, Peshawara Singh.
Jawahir Singh lost his life at the hands of the panohayats for his role
in this gruesome affair. But not so Fateh Khan: he once again sought
refuge beyond the Indus, and then in the Tiwana country. When the war
broke out Fateh Khan decided that it was time to desert the Sikhs
altogether, and offered his military services to the British (there is
no evidence that his offer was acutally accepted, however). After the
war Fateh Khan was imprisoned by the darbar for refusing to settle his
revenue arrears. But the British obtained his release when the Multan
rebellion broke out, and Fateh Khan then fought on the British side in
the second Anglo-Sikh war. There he was killed. The Tiwanas, however,
remained steadfast in their loyalty to the British after the annexation
of the kingdom, and rose to become one of the wealthiest and most
139politically influential families in British Punjab.
General Tej Singh, Diwan Dina Nath, Bhai Ram Singh and Faqir 
Nur-ud-Din Bokhari are examples of leading "new staff" chieftains and 
darbar officials who survived the collapse of the monarchy and the 
violence generated by the Sikh-Dogra antagonism because they were able 
to give the appearance of neutrality during the various crises at Lahore.
138. Ibid, p.196.
139. Ibid, pp. 195-210.
Their loyalty, they often declared, was to the memory and the example
of the Sarkar, the late Ranjit Singh. In actual fact they cared only
for themselves. True, at the critical moment of each succession crisis,
when violence became imminent, they publicly announced their support
for one political faction (usually the stronger faction), but that did
not prevent them from privately indicating their support for the rival
faction. Nor were they really so neutral at other times as they claimed
to be. Their survival strategy was to back all comers - including the
British (hence Tej Singh’s "treachery") - rather than associate themselves
consistently with any particular individual or group. Smyth, a contemporary
British observer of darbar politics, wrote in 1847 that they
were always in fact found to be the very people that have
done and continue to do more injury than any other - as
they are never on one side but always sure to be trifling
and deeply intriguing on both sides of every matter and
question. They are always and in reality unconnected with
any party, but in fact at the bottom instigating in both or every
party. It may be said that they are even unconnected among
themselves, and each, to forward his own private ends, would
sacrifice his nearest of kin; and, it is remarkable, that those
very people always, at least to the present moment, contrived
and so managed their policy, that while they benefitted themselves
during all the disturbances, well feathered their nests - still
not one of them ever has been a sufferer in any of the disturbances.
It should not surprise us to discover that these men collaborated with
the British after 1846. In fact they really had no option, for - though
the Sikh-Dogra antagonism had been finally settled - the basic contest
between "traditional" and "new Staff" chieftains remained unresolved.
We shall see in the next chapter that some mist - descended, "traditional"
chieftains hated these men for their shameless "treachery", and continued
to regard them as upstarts who needed taking down a peg or two. The
British, for their part, depended on the administrative experience of these
men, but realised that their vulnerable position as collaborators could
easily induce them to play a double game. Consequently, there was always
a strong likelihood of the British raising a "new staff" of their own, in
which case these men would be left isolated and ineffectual. Thus, although
men like Tej Singh and Dina Nath had survived the period of competition
and conflict following Ranjit Singh's death, there were serious tests of
their political skills yet to come.
140. Smyth (ed), History of the Reigning Family, "A List of the Principal 
Sirdars and Chiefs in the Punjaub, classed according to the party 
they were supposed to side with after the death of Shere Singh", pp. 
xliii-xliv.
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If the first broad conclusion is that the collapse of monarchical 
authority and the failure or otherwise of the elites to avoid being 
pulled down with that collapse are to be explained in terms of the 
structure of the kingdom’s political system, the second conclusion must 
be that the British had, by the end of the war, taken a very important 
step towards annexing the Punjab. Since the beginning of the century 
the Sikh kingdom had figured as a pawn in the "Great Game" of global 
hegemony played out between Britain and her European rivals, Russia and 
France. A strong Sikh State under Ranjit Singh had been tolerated - 
to an extent even encouraged - by the British because it had acted as a 
non-Muslim buffer State between British possessions in India and the 
Muslim countries beyond the Indus via which first the French and then 
the Russians had been expected to make their conquests in the East.
The Sikh kingdom had been a bulwark against a turbulent northwest frontier.
For several years after Ranjit Singh's death in 1839 the British
hoped that the kingdom would continue to fulfil this role. Such a
hope was shattered, however, by the emergence of the Sikh army as a
political force, for this development turned the Punjab itself into a
turbulent frontier. We would argue that this represents the first 
141"local crisis" in the story of the establishment of British imperial 
rule in the Punjab. The fact that no direct British action on this 
crisis occurred until two years later is to be explained by British 
military unpreparedness. As we have seen, it was only when the arming 
of the Sutlej frontier was completed that the British abandoned all 
restraint in their dealings with the darbar and virtually challenged the 
Sikhs into making their desperate crossing of the Sutlej.
The war was fought not for possession of the Punjab but for the 
destruction of Sikh military power. That this was so is abundantly 
evident from the policy adopted by the British at the end of the war.
In a letter to Hobhouse in September 1846 Hardinge outlined the three
141. The concepts of "local crisis" and "indirect" rule are drawn from the 
arguments of Robinson and Gallagher on nineteenth-century British 
imperialism. These arguments will be examined in greater detail in 
the next chapter.
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alternative courses of action that had been open to him. The first
was to annex the whole kingdom up to the Peshawar border. This 
certainly would have solved the problem of pacifying the Punjab, but 
it would have brought the British into direct contact with an even more 
turbulent frontier beyond the Indus. Moreover, possession of the Punjab 
would have been a source of weakness rather than strength at this 
particular period of British rule in India. Given the fact that the 
Punjab rivers were flooded for half of every year, occupation of the region 
would have required the stationing of a separate British force in each of 
the doabs. It was also estimated that military and civil administrative 
costs would exceed the total revenues of the Punjab by more than one 
million sterling, at a time when opium revenue was precarious and the 
Company was already suffering an annual fiscal deficiency of that amount. 
The second course was to recover the costs of the war by annexing the 
territory up to the Ravi (the heartland of Sikh power), and by dividing 
the three remaining doabs into smaller principalities. Hardinge had 
rejected this course on the grounds that frequent and inconvenient 
interference on the part of the British would be required to keep these 
small principalities in check. The third course of action was to weaken 
the Sikh kingdom by depriving it of one-third of its territory (the 
Jullundur Doab alone was worth about Rs 20 lakhs per annum in revenue) 
and obliging it to reduce its armed strength considerably. The weakened 
kingdom could still be expected to act as a non-Muslim buffer State without 
the power to be a disruptive force.
As we saw, Hardinge adopted the third course of action. By the 
treaties signed in March 1846 the Sikhs were given another chance to 
establish their authority over the greater portion of the Punjab. Dalip 
Singh was recognised as the rightful, minor ruler, and a British army 
was stationed in Lahore until the end of the year to ensure that his 
subjects also recognised his title. Raja Lai Singh was again appointed 
wazir. Rani Jindan was recognised as regent. And a British military 
officer, Major (later Sir) Henry Lawrence, previously the British Resident
142. The rest of this paragraph is based on Hardinge to Hobhouse (Private),
2 Sept 1846: Hasrat (ed) , The Punjab Papers, (London, 1873), p.417.
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at Nepal, was posted to Lahore as the Governor-General1s Political 
Agent for the North-West Frontier, charged with the task of transmitting 
directly to the darbar the British Government's advice and goodwill.
But this amicable arrangement, which was lauded in the Governor-General's
official proclamations as furnishing the proof of his forbearance towards
the Sikhs, did nothing to disguise, from those who had eyes to see, the
fact that the Punjab was now a client State of the British. Privately,
Hardinge admitted as much.
In all our measures taken during the minority [he wrote to Henry 
Lawrence on 23 October 1847], we must bear in mind that by the 
Treaty of Lahore, March 1846, the Punjaub never was intended to 
be an independent State. By the clause I added, the chief of the 
State can neither make war nor peace, nor exchange nor sell an 
acre of territory, nor admit an European officer, nor refuse us a 
thoroughfare through his territories, nor, in fact, perform any 
act (except its own internal administration) without our permission.
In fact, the native Prince is in fetters, and under our protection, 
and must do our bidding.
Thus, in early 1846 the kingdom constructed by Ranjit Singh was in the
curious position of being governed, formally, by a minor Maharaja who
had no real power, and, informally, by the British who had the real power
though they sought to camouflage this. The question that engrossed many
Punjabis and Englishmen then, and that must engross us now, is how long
this paradoxical situation could continue before fresh "local crises"
either forced the British to withdraw from the Punjab or pulled them in
still deeper.
143. Quoted in Herbert B. Edwardes and Herman Merivale, Life of Sir Henry 
Lawrence (London, 1873), p.417.
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There was a time when the suggestion that European imperialism 
in the nineteenth century was not primarily motivated by industrial 
capitalism's need for politically subject markets, and that imperial 
annexations were often caused as much if not more by changes in Afro- 
Asian political and economic systems as by changes in the European system, 
would have been treated by all but apologists of empire with scepticism 
if not outright ridicule. That was before Robinson and Gallagher put 
forward their revisionist interpretation. Not that their interpretation 
has not itself been criticised as an incomplete theory or even as a 
deliberate whitewash of economic imperialism. But since its first 
formulation, nearly thirty years ago, many cherished notions of what 
nineteenth-century imperialism was and how it operated have had to be 
at least re-examined. Thanks to Robinson and Gallagher the study of 
imperialism as a major epoch in world history has been rescued from its 
former descent into oblivion. 1
The essence of the Robinson-Gallagher argument is that nineteenth 
century imperialism was an "excentric" historical phenomenon. That is 
to say, it was properly a function of neither a Eurocentric sphere of 
influence nor an Afro-Asian sphere of domestic politics and economics 
but rather of the varying intersections of both spheres. It occurred 
because of, and at the point of, the meeting of the two worlds. Their 
argument begins with a re-examination of the British sphere of influence 
in the nineteenth century. They call this sphere of influence the "empire 
of free trade". Contrary to received wisdom, they argue, official 
perceptions of this empire, and of the best methods for its protection,
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1. J. Gallagher and R. Robinson, "The Imperialism of Free Trade", in 
Economic History Review, 2nd series, vol vl, pt 1, 1953, pp.1-15;
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(ed), Hew Cambridge Modem History, vol xl, Material Progress and 
World-Wide Problems, 1870-1898 (Cambridge, 1962), chap 22. Ronald 
Robinson, "Non-European foundations of European imperialism: sketch 
for a theory of collaboration", in Roger Owen and Bob Sutcliffe (eds), 
Studies in the Theory of Imperialism (London, 1972), chapt 5. Selected 
works of Robinson and Gallagher, together with selected responses from 
their critics, have been reprinted and discussed in Wm. Roger Louis 
(ed), Imperialism: The Robinson and Gallagher Controversy (New York, 
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remained constant throughout the century. The apparent aggressive 
imperialism of late-Victorian statesmen, as manifested in the "scramble" 
for Africa, was in fact inherently little different from the apparent 
anti-imperialism preached by their counterparts in the mid-Victorian 
period. It is easily demonstrated that the earlier period was in fact 
no less one of territorial expansion; but that is not really the point.
The crucial point is that by and large British statesmen in both periods 
preferred to protect this "empire of free trade" (which was based upon 
power in India, established in the previous century) by controlling 
non-European countries"informally" (through gun-boat diplomacy and the 
dangled loan) rather than by controlling them "formally" through expensive 
and potentially troublesome annexations. According to Robinson and 
Gallagher, British global strategy might be summed up in their famous 
dictum: "trade with informal control if possible; trade with rule when 
2necessary".
But of course annexations did occur with marked regularity throughout 
the nineteenth century. What made them necessary, Robinson and Gallagher 
argue, were not so much new economic interests as strategic interests 
arising out of the need to protect existing economic interests. Furthermore, 
what caused new territories to be annexed were not so much threats to 
strategic interests as a result of political changes in Europe, though 
these did exist (witness the "Great Game" played out in northwest South 
Asia between Britain, France and Russia), as threats to strategic interests 
as a result of "local crises" in the political systems of Africa and Asia. 
Thus, for example, the feverish partition of Africa by the European powers 
in the last quarter of the century was set off by changes in the domestic 
politics of Egypt and South Africa, which in turn placed Britain's control 
of India, and thence her entire Afro-Asian "free trade empire", in jeopardy. 
These non-European "local crises" which sucked the European powers into 
an annexationist situation occurred at the periphery, as well as along 
the main communication routes, of empire. For this reason the concept 
of the "turbulent frontier" is also often advanced in explanation of 
European imperial expansion. 3
2. Gallagher and Robinson, "The Imperialism of Free Trade" (in Louis 
[ed], Imperialism) y p.67.
3. John S. Galbraith, "The 'Turbulent Frontier' As A Factor In British 
Expansion", in Comparative Studies In Society And History, vol 2, 
1959-60, pp. 150-68.
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The Robinson-Gallagher argument goes further than this, however, 
in that it sees a crucial non-European component to the nature and process 
of imperialism. This is the Afro-Asian sphere of domestic politics and 
economics. European imperialism’s innate obsession with commercial 
efficiency - what Stokes has called its "constant tendency towards economy 
4of effort" - meant that neither "informal control" nor "formal rule" 
would have been feasible were it not for the collaboration of local brokers 
with a vested interest in the establishment and maintenance of the imperial 
connection. Imperial agents were simply too thin on the ground, too 
powerless and often, despite their inborn sense of superiority, too out 
of their depth in an alien culture effectively to dominate these societies 
by themselves. They had to work with and through local brokers, who for 
their part saw in the imperial agent, and later the whole imperial 
superstructure, a means to the realisation of their own personal interests. 
The actual equation struck between imperialists and collaborators varied 
greatly as to place and time, but generally speaking it made imperialism 
a two-way relationship of dependence and exploitation. It is in this 
sense that imperialism must be understood as an "excentric" phenomenon.
Furthermore, collaboration and its counterpart, resistance, can be 
seen as constituting a dual mechanism by which both the motivation and 
mode of imperialism were determined once the initial intersection of the 
two spheres of interest was made. For, if one indigenous elite chose to 
collaborate with the imperialists there was often a counter-elite that 
opted for resistance. Or, an elite that had at first chosen collaboration 
frequently grew disenchanted with the imperialists and swung over to 
resistance. Either way, the imperialists were obliged to take some 
responsive action to restore the balance or else they were forced to leave. 
Thus the collaborative-resistance mechanism largely determined not only 
the style of imperialism but also its whole chronological process, from 
its establishment through to its final breakdown. For example, the 
"local crisis" that caused the imperialists to move from "informal control" 
to "formal rule" was nearly always a collapse of an indigenous collaborative 
system that had been working well. Whether this collapse was due to the
4. Eric Stokes, "Traditional Resistance Movements And Afro-Asian Nationalism: 
The Context Of The 1857 Mutiny Rebellion In India", in Past and Present, 
no 48, August 1970, p.102.
rise of a resisting counter-elite or to a change of heart on the part
of the original collaborating elite, the imperialists could only involve
themselves still deeper in domestic politics, unless they were to withdraw
altogether. In the words of Robinson:
...the transition from one phase of imperialism to the next was 
governed by the need to reconstruct and uphold a collaborative 
system that was breaking down. The breakdown of indigenous 
collaboration in many instances necessitated the deeper imperial 
intervention that led to imperial takeover.5
Critics of the Robinson-Gallagher argument have claimed that it 
works best - some have said only at all - when it is applied to the 
histories of the peripheral regions of empire, to chose annexations that 
occurred at the geographical and commercial outer limits of established 
empire. Strategically important these peripheral regions might well 
have been (particularly if they were "turbulent frontiers"), but commercially 
important they generally were not (initially, at least). The classical 
model of economic imperialism cannot properly be re-assessed, much less 
refuted, from such a limited perspective. It is not our purpose to enter 
into this controversy. But we would acknowledge the applicability of 
the Robinson-Gallagher argument to the history of the Punjab in the 
nineteenth century. We have already seen that for the first forty years 
of the century British policy towards the Punjab had been shaped more by 
strategic considerations than by any desire to exploit the region's rather 
limited commercial potential. These strategic considerations, being 
of global significance, had dictated that the Sikh kingdom be maintained 
as a vigorous but friendly State. It could be said that British policy 
during these decades had rested upon a "pre-imperialist collaborative 
relationship", for Ranjit Singh had been happy to play the role of regional 
strongman and ally in return for British recognition of his sovereignty 
over the Punjab. This relationship had broken down after his death with 
the onset of a number of domestic political crises which had turned the 
Punjab into a "turbulent frontier". The British had then found it necessary 
to intervene militarily and to establish their "informal control" over 
a revamped and weakened kingdom. In this chapter we shall examine the 
operation of this "informal control" and the reasons for its abandonment, 
on 29 March 1849, in favour of "formal rule". We shall argue that the
127
5. Robinson, "Non-European foundations", p.139.
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transition from the one to the other was a gradual process, that the 
British were drawn progressively deeper into domestic affairs as they 
responded to new political crises produced by the indigenous mechanism 
of collaboration and resistance.
Basically, the events of the years 1846-49 (summarised in Table 4:1) 
may be divided into four chronological periods, each representing an 
enlargement of the scale of imperial penetration, and each characterised 
by a different pattern of political cooperation, competition, and conflict. 
In the first period, from March to December 1846, the system of ’’informal 
control" established by the Treaty of Lahore was put to the test when the 
wazir, a headstrong and ambitious man, attempted to dominate the kingdom’s 
administration. The British representative at the darbar, the Political 
Agent for the North-West Frontier, counselled the wazir on the need for 
moderation, but in doing so allowed himself to become the nucleus of 
opposition to the wazir*s policies. A solution to the problem of who 
was to dominate darbar politics - the wazir or the Agent - was found in 
December 1846, when the wazir*s complicity in the Kashmir revolt was used 
to banish him from the kingdom and draw up a new protection treaty. In 
the second period, from December 1846 to August 1847, the British Resident 
at Lahore (as the Agent was now re-designated) assumed a more active, and 
a more direct, role in the kingdom’s administration. In this period the 
Resident acted rather like a wazir, working with and through the darbar 
to have his reforms implemented, yet always dominating the darbar.
Moreover, just as wazirs in the past had found it necessary to bolster 
their authority and make their reforms palatable by distributing jagirs, 
offices, and honours, so the Resident was obliged to perform the role 
of political patron. Opposition to the Resident arose, but it was firmly 
dealt with: the Prema conspiracy was crushed, recalcitrant kardars were 
punished, and the former queen regent was removed from the capital because 
of her intrigues. In the third period, from August 1847 to April 1848, 
the Resident superseded the authority of the Sikhs in all but the strict 
legal sense. The political and administrative authority of the darbar 
was parred back to a minimum necessary only to maintain the illusion that 
the kingdom was an autonomous State. During this period the Resident 
and his British assistants undertook reforms that only a strong Maharaja 
could have contemplated. Many of these reforms were highly unpopular, 
however, so that by early 1848 dissatisfaction was rife throughout the
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Table 4:1 Chronology of Important Events3 1846-49
1846 March
September
December
Treaty of Lahore 
Kashmir revolt
Banishment of Raja Lai Singh 
Treaty of Bhyrowal
1847 February
August
December
Prema conspiracy
Removal of Rani Jindan to Sheikhupura 
Resignation of Diwan Mul Raj
1848 April
May
August
September
November
Murder of Anderson and Vans Agnew at Multan
Removal of Rani Jindan to Benares
Hazara revolt
Seige of Multan begun
Desertion of Raja Sher Singh
Battle of Ramnagar
1849 January
February
March
Battle of Chilianwala 
Fall of Multan 
Battle of Gujrat 
Annexation of the Punjab
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kingdom. In the last period, from April 1848 to March 1849, a general 
crisis of authority developed. A purely local revolt against the darbar 
blew up into a political crisis that engaged practically the whole society. 
The second Anglo-Sikh war was in fact a civil war between collaborators 
(supported by the British) and resisters, with important communal and 
millenarian overtones. Once the war was over the general crisis of 
authority was resolved by Lord Dalhousie's decision to annex the Punjab.
Informal control tested
Following the signing of the Treaty of Lahore Rani Jindan, the mother 
of the minor sovereign, was recognised as queen regent. Raja Lai Singh 
and General Tej Singh were reconfirmed in their offices of wazir and 
commander-in-chief respectively. They and the other chieftains who had 
signed the peace treaty - Bhai Ram Singh, Diwan Dina Nath, Faqir Nur-ud- 
Din Bokhari, Sardar Chatar Singh Atariwala, and Sardar Ranjor Singh Majithia 
- formed an ill-defined regency council. Henry Lawrence was appointed 
Agent to the Governor-General for the North-West Frontier and was stationed 
at Lahore for the conduct of political relations with the darbar. His 
brother, John Lawrence, was appointed Commissioner and Superintendent of 
the Trans-Sutlej States (the Jullundur Doab), while the protected Sikh 
chieftains of the Cis-Sutlej States were placed under the supervision of 
Major Mackeson.^
It was clear from the outset that the Agent's tasks of political
reconciliation and supervision of administrative reform placed him in a
very delicate situation. Two days after the signing of the peace treaty
Hardinge warned Lawrence of the possible dangers:
The Sikh chiefs, excluded from power, will probably intrigue 
against the present Government, and may attempt to excite the 
soldiery against those who were parties to the Treaty of Peace 
.... It will therefore be necessary to be at all times in a 
state of military vigilance... 7
6. Mackeson's former position, that of Political Agent at Ambala, was now 
transformed into a Commissionership. For the punishment (which included 
the confiscation of land, imprisonment, abolition of police jurisdiction 
and customs duties) of the minor Cis-Sutlej chieftains (those of Ladwa, 
Rupar, Anandpur and Kapurthala) who had sided with the Lahore State 
during the war, see Ambala DG 1883-84, pp. 25-6.
7. Hardinge to Lawrence, 11 March 1846: quoted in Edwardes and Merivale,
Life of Lawrence, p .386.
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For his part, Lawrence believed that the way around these dangers lay in 
his ability to persuade the darbar to respect the jagirs of the chieftains 
and to disband the Sikh army and settle its arrears of pay in a methodical 
and equitable manner. But this was advice which the wazir was reluctant 
to act upon.
Rajah Lai Singh was not a popular wazir. He had many enemies amongst 
the chieftain families (it will be remembered that he had long been a client 
of Raja Hira Singh Dogra) and was greatly despised by the bulk of the 
soldiery not only for his cowardly leadership during the war but also for
g
his open liaison with the Rani. His method of overcoming this disability 
was the complete reverse of that advocated by the British Agent. Rather 
than conciliate his enemies, he embarked upon a path of deliberate 
confrontation in the hope that if he was not liked he might at least be 
feared. He deducted two month's pay from the arrears of all troops and
9called it a "congratulatory offering from the soldiers themselves". He
resumed or reduced the jagirs of at least eleven powerful families. 10
Lawrence reported that Sher Singh Atariwala was dismissed from the post
of nazim at Peshawar, and that when he applied for the farm of Julalpur
district he received from the wazir "what is now a common reply, viz.,
that he should have it if he would raise the revenue" . 1 1 Such retrenchments
were necessary and might even have proved acceptable to the chieftains
were it not for the fact that simultaneously the wazir was promoting new
12client chieftains of his own and even transferring jagirs worth Rs 10 
lakhs to himself and his family. Lawrence cautioned Lai Singh against 
the employment of double standards:
8. Hardinge to Hobhouse (Private), 2 Sept 1846: Hasrat (ed), The Punjab 
Papers, p.107.
9. Quoted in N.M. Khilnani, British Power in the Punjab, 1839-1858 (New 
York, 1972), p.36.
10. Griffin, et al., Chiefs and Families, vol 1, pp. 337, 356, 372, 415, 425, 
447, 477, 500, 503; vol 2, pp. 57, 201.
11. Lawrence to Frederick Currie, Foreign Secy to Gol, 8 Aug 1846, no 155:
FSP, 26 Dec 1846, no 1008 (NAI).
12. Griffin, et al., Chiefs and Families, vol 2, pp. 116, 289-90.
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The Durbar has confiscated many Jagheers [he wrote to him on 11 
July 1846]; in reference to them I would again observe that it 
is neither politic nor just to deprive old faithful families of 
their bread, and that you must reckon on the future enmity of the 
families of all those who are now so deprived. But when these 
retrenchments are accompanied by lavish grants to yourself, the 
measure becomes altogether unjustifiable.13
So little was the wazir amenable to this advice that he next proceeded to try ant
topple the virtually autonomous nazim of Multan.
The suba of Multan, which included the districts of Multan, Leiah,
Dera Ghazi Khan and Khangarh and part of Jhang district, had since 1829 
been governed by Diwan Sawan Mai on an annual payment to the Lahore 
government of Rs 21 lakhs. As we saw in the previous chapter, Sawan 
Mai was assassinated in September 1844. Raja Hira Singh Dogra, who was 
then wazir, had demanded a succession nazrana of Rs 1 orore^  from 
Mul Raj, who was the ex-nazim’s son. Mul Raj, as we saw, managed 
eventually to have the nazrana reduced to Rs 18 lakhs. The war had then 
broken out, and Mul Raj had been able to evade responsibility for the debt.
But now that peace had returned the darbar’s claim could not be denied.
Raja Lai Singh regarded Mul Raj as an old enemy and eagerly desired his 
ruin. He demanded of the nazim the payment of the outstanding nazrana 
and Rs 7 lakhs of arrears. When Mul Raj flatly refused these demands 
a Lahore military force was sent to subdue him. The wazir's demands 
were perfectly justifiable, but it was widely rumoured - and Lawrence 
was inclined to agree - that his real motive was to establish his brother 
as nazim of Multan. 1 3 After a sharp skirmish between the nazim’s troops 
and the Lahore force, in which the latter came out second best, the nazim 
appealed to the British Agent at Lahore for a safe conduct to the capital 
in order that he might put his case to the darbar. Mul Raj arrived at 
Lahore in October 1846 and began immediately to bargain for more easy 
terms than had been previously granted. Lawrence, back in Lahore after 
a short absence due to illness, used his influence over both the nazim,
13. Trans letter Lawrence to Lai Singh, 11 July 1846: FSP, 26 Dec 1846, 
no 956 (NAI).
14. Major G. Macgregor, the Assistant Agent, reported that the nazrana 
demanded by Hira Singh Dogra had been Rs 50 lakhs: Macgregor to 
Lawrence, 6 May 1846, no 43: FSP, 26 Dec 1846, no 908 (NAI). We 
have treated the higher figure given in Griffin et a l C h i e f s  and 
Families, vol 2, p. 100 as the more authentic.
15. Lawrence to Currie, 16 July 1846, no 128: FSP, 26 Dec 1846, no 956 
(NAI).
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and the darbar to settle the dispute. Mul Raj was confirmed in the 
office of nazim, but was obliged to make good his debts. The districts, 
including portions of Leiah and Jhang, which had been occupied by the 
Lahore force - amounting to one-third of suba Multan - were detached and 
placed under the darbar's immediate control. The contract for the 
remainder of the suba was revised, so that Mul Raj was now bound to pay 
the darbar an annual sum of nearly Rs 20 Zakhs, which represented an 
enhancement of 27 per cent on the former sum paid for these districts.1^
The details of the settlement of the Multan dispute are important for two 
reasons. First, they demonstrated the British Agent’s concern to bolster 
the central authority of the darbar against the centripetal forces within 
the kingdom. Second, and in the long term more significantly, they were 
eventually to lead to the Multan revolt that challenged the darbar's 
authority and then caused its extinction altogether. But at this point 
we must backtrack a little, for while the Multan dispute was being settled 
events of a more immediate significance were occurring.
In August 1846 John Lawrence, who was on duty at Lahore during his
brother's temporary absence, reported that Raja Lai Singh was busy enlisting
17Afghan and Punjabi Muslim troopers as his personal body-guards and that 
a large force of men and guns had been placed under the command of his
18cousin, Misr Amir Chand, the nazim of Rawalpindi in the Sind Sagar Doab.
It looked as though Lai Singh was playing communal politics in order to 
strengthen his own position. In September John Lawrence heard rumours 
that Lai Singh was in contact with Dost Mohamed Khan, the Afghan king, 
and that the substance of their communications was that Lai Singh and his 
supporters would assist the Afghans to recover Peshawar from the Sikhs
16. Griffin, et a Z C h i e f s  and Families vol 2, p. 100; Hasrat, AngZo-Sikh 
ReZations, p.292.
17. John Lawrence to Currie, 24 Aug 1846, no 3: FSP, 26 Dec 1846, no 1029 
(NAI). It was later discovered that Lai Singh had secretly cast nine 
cannon for his personal use: LPD, vol 3, PoZiticaZ Diaries of the Agent 
to the Govemor-GeneraZ, North-West Frontier and Resident at Lahore,
1st January 1847 to 4th March 1848, p.27.
18. John Lawrence to Currie, 4 Sept 1846, no 9: FSP, 26 Dec 1846, no 1039 
(NAI).
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if the Afghans would help Lai Singh to establish himself in his Rawalpindi 
jagirs on a permanent basis. "Raja Lai Singh, it strikes me", wrote 
John Lawrence, Mhas all along had his thoughts bent on securing to himself 
a principality in the Punjab in the event of being unable to secure himself
v • .. 19 as Vazir".
The wazir's activities did not pass unnoticed or unchallenged by his
enemies, however. Already the Sikh troops stationed at Peshawar had
threatened mutiny if their pay arrears were not settled forthwith, while
at Rawalpindi more than a thousand Sikh soldiers had actually deserted
20their posts on the grounds that four months’ pay was being withheld.
Many chieftains took their complaints to the acting Agent. John Lawrence
had been instructed by Hardinge to sound out each of the leading chieftains
on their opinions on the likelihood of Raja Lai Singh's administration
surviving the withdrawal of the British garrison from Lahore at the end of
the year. Diwan Dina Nath assured John Lawrence that the wazir's regime
21would survive. But most chieftains expressed doubt on the matter.
Faqir Nur-ud-Din Bokhari warned that the withdrawal of the British garrison
would be the signal for mutiny and rioting by the Sikh troops; Khushhal
Singh Katgarhia informed John Lawrence that the wazir was "widely despised",
and that the only chieftain around whom the influential men of the kingdom
would rally was Sardar Lehna Singh Majithia (who was acceptable because
22he was a political moderate) ; and Sardar Mungul Singh, who was the late
Maharaja Kharak Singh's brother-in-law, complained that recently his jagirs
23had been reduced from Rs 175,000 to Rs 30,000. Sardar Chatar Singh
19. Ibid.
20. Lawrence to Currie, 8 Aug 1846, no 155: FSP,26 Dec 1846, no 1008 (NAI).
21. Hardinge to Hobhouse (Private), 2 Sept 1846: Hasrat (ed), The Punjab 
Papers, p .107.
22. Hardinge described Lehna Singh as "a well informed and a clever Sikh".
He would "be a much more popular minister than Lai Singh, but...is 
personally timid, and in all probability, would shrink from the attempt 
[to place him in office]": ibid.
23. John Lawrence to Currie, 24 Aug 1846, no 3: FSC, 26 Dec 1846, no 1029 
(NAI).
Atariwala and his son, Sardar Sher Singh, also complained about the wazir's
maltreatment of "old and faithful servants" of the Sikh State, and suggested
24that the British might check his "misconduct".
Faced with all these complaints, John Lawrence met the wazir and
three senior darbar chieftains on 1 September. He warned them of the
need for a conciliatory darbar policy on jagirs. He got them to agree
that a return of all large jagirs should be drawn up and examined by the
darbar and the British Agent. The claims of those chieftains whose
jagirs had been reduced should be reconsidered, and compensation offered
where necessary; furthermore, future reductions on account of fiscal
needs should be made on a pro rata basis, and outright resumptions•should
25occur only in cases of proven misconduct. The wazir bitterly resented
the acting Agent's interference because this new jagir policy would, if
implemented by the darbar, reduce greatly both his own ill-gotten wealth
and his powers of patronage. Not surprisingly, he proceeded to try and
subvert the new policy. On 4 September the acting Agent reported that
the wazir had given instructions for the preparation of false jagir
26statements. A few days later the wazir called together the leading
chieftains and berated them for having taken their complaints to the acting
Agent. He insisted that they sign a document affirming their allegiance
27to him and the minor Maharaja. Most signed. But Ranjor Singh Majithia,
Mangal Singh Siranwali and Fateh Khan Tiwana refused to comply with the
28wazir’s demand. All three had been victims of his malice, and were 
now disposed to look to the Agent for protection. In fact Ranjor Singh 
Majithia even approached John Lawrence with what he claimed was a
24. Abstract trans letters Chatar Singh and Sher Singh to John Lawrence (no 
date): FSP, 26 Dec 1846, no 1032 (NAI). It should be pointed out 
here that Chatar Singh was an old client of Raja Gulab Singh Dogra, 
for whom the wazir, although he had been a client of Raja Hira Singh 
Dogra, had a bitter enmity.
25. John Lawrence to Currie, 2 Sept 1846, no 8: FSP, 26 Dec 1846, no 1037 
(NAI).
26. John Lawrence to Currie, 4 Sept 1846, no 9: FSP, 26 Dec 1846, no 1039 
(NAI).
27. John Lawrence to Currie, 7 Sept 1846, no 12: FSP, 26 Dec 1846, no 1040 
(NAI).
28. John Lawrence to Currie, 9 Sept 1846, no 14: FSP, 26 Dec 1846, no 1041 
(NAI).
widely-supported suggestion: the British should take over the direct
management of the kingdom until the minor Maharaja came of age - about
• 1 . 2 9  eight years away.
This was an idea which John Lawrence had already put to his government
30himself. We do not know, but perhaps he had also planted it in the 
minds of some of the chieftains. In any case, it was an idea which was 
well received in Calcutta: writing to Hobhouse on 19 September Hardinge 
observed that since the darbar was now united in its concern for the future 
of the kingdom after the withdrawal of the British garrison, an opportunity 
existed to permit the occupation to be extended on the condition that a 
British minister would carry on the government in the name of the minor 
Maharaj a.
This [he continued] would be the second step gradually preparing 
the way, with the consent of the people, and without any violation 
of good faith for the exercise of British preponderance in the 
Punjab. Such a system would enable the British Government to 
govern the Punjab up to Peshawar more easily and cheaply than on 
any other terms.^
Hardinge made it clear, however, that such an arrangement was not to be
proposed to the darbar; it could come into being only from "the supplication
32of the assembled Chiefs".
The political crisis at Lahore now moved quickly to a head. News 
was received that Gulab Singh Dogra had been unable to take possession of 
Kashmir, that Shaikh Imam-ud-Din, the nazim, had acted on Raja Lai Singh’s 
advice to expell Gulab Singh's officers. The British Government acted 
quickly on what was seen to be a breach of the March treaties, despatching 
eight British regiments, supported by 17,000 Sikh troops, to bring the rebel
29. Ibid.
30. John Lawrence to Currie, 29 Aug 1846, no 5: FSP, 26 Dec 1846, no 1032 
(NAI).
31. Hardinge to Hobhouse (Private), 19 Sept 1846: Hasrat (ed), The Punjab 
Papers, pp. 113-14.
32. Ibid.
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nazim to heel. On 1 November Shaikh Imam-ud-Din surrendered to Henry
Lawrence on the condition that if he could substantiate his claims that
he had acted on Raja Lai Singh’s orders, his own conduct would be overlooked.
He handed over to the Agent documents signed by Raja Lai Singh which proved
conclusively that the wazir had encouraged the revolt. Here was the
perfect opportunity, recognised by the darbar and the British alike, to
get rid of Raja Lai Singh once and for all. On 3 and 4 December 1846 a
Court of Inquiry, presided over by Frederick Currie, the Foreign Secretary
to the Government of India, and comprised of the two Lawrence brothers and
two British military officers, was held at Lahore. No darbar members
participated in this inquiry into the wazir’s conduct, presumably because
the wazir was a member of the darbar and because a unanimous verdict and
a harsh sentence were required. But almost every chieftain and official
of status was present to hear the wazir pronounced guilty of having
instigated the Kashmir revolt. Lai Singh was stripped of his office,
33his title and his jagvrs (which were valued at Rs 194,849 ). On 13
34December he was banished from the Punjab, never to return.
After Lai Singh's removal from office the darbar again requested 
the continued presence of the British Agent and the British garrison at 
Lahore after the expiration of the period laid down in the Articles of 
Agreement signed at the beginning of the year. On 15 December Frederick 
Currie called a meeting of all the chieftains at his camp at Lahore to 
communicate to them the terms on which the Governor-General would agree 
to the darbar’s request. Currie had been instructed to emphasise that
33. Kohli, Catalogue of Khalsa Darbar Records, vol 2, p.306. Twelve 
months after Lai Singh's removal from office treasure belonging to 
the ex-wazir worth Rs 23 lakhs was unearthed and confiscated to the 
state: John Lawrence, officiating Resident at Lahore, to H.M. Elliot, 
Foreign Secy to Gol, 12 Jan 1848, no 4: Lahore Residency Letters, 
1847-49 (hereafter LRL), Book (hereafter Bk) 178, no 4(Punjab 
Secretariat, Lahore [hereafter PS]).
34. Lai Singh lived at Agra in British territory on a monthly pension of 
Rs 2,000 until Oct 1852 when he was permitted to move to Dehra Dun.
In 1862 his request to return to the Punjab was refused. He died
in Sept 1867, after which his son, Ranbir Singh, was allowed to reside 
in the Punjab. The full story of Lai Singh's trial is told in R.R. 
Sethi, Trial of Raja Lai Singh (Punjab Govt Record Office Publications, 
monograph no 16, Lahore, 1933).
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the darbar, not the British Government. The paper which was read to
the chieftains therefore began with an assertion of the Governor-General's
"strong belief in the need for an independent government at Lahore".
But, it went on, if the Maharaja and the chieftains sincerely desired the
maintenance of British assistance the Governor-General would be prepared
to revise the earlier treaty. The paper proceeded to the conditions:
If solicited to aid in the administration of the Government 
during the minority of the Maharaja, the British Agent must 
have full authority to interfere in and to control all matters 
in every department of the State for the benefit of all connected 
with the Reasut [State authority].35
The actual details of administration would be superintended by a Council
of Regency appointed by the Governor-General and acting under the control
and guidance of the British minister. The Rani was to be relieved of her
duties as regent. The right of the Governor-General to order the occupation
of any fort or military post in the interests of internal security was to
be recognised. Furthermore, a fixed sum in monthly instalments would be
set apart from the State revenues to pay for the British peace-keeping force.
After some debate between Currie and the chieftains on the sum to be paid
for this force, a figure of Rs 22 lakhs per annum was agreed upon.
36Thereupon - each chieftain signed his accordance with these conditions.
The next day the articles of Currie's paper were drawn up and ratified as
37the Treaty of Bhyrowal. The Council of Regency was constituted with
the following members: Bhai Nidhan Singh (who was nephew to Bhai Ram Singh),
Diwan Dina Nath, Faqir Nur-ud-Din Bokhari, Sardar Tej Singh, Sardar Atar
Singh Kaliwala, Sardar Ranjor Singh Majithia, Sardar Shamsher Singh
38Sindhanwalia, and Sardar Sher Singh Atariwala. We do not know the 
criteria on which the Council members were selected, other than that they 
were to be competent and influential chieftain-administrators. Still, 
it may be worth noting that a neat balance was struck between "new staff" 
and "traditional" chieftains: the first four members named above represented
his negotiations with the chieftains resulted from an initiative made by
35. A copy of Currie's paper and a report on his meeting with the chieftains 
is included in Currie to Hardinge, 15 Dec 1846: FSP, 26 Dec 1846,
nos 1275-6 (NAI).
36. Ibid.
37. The treaty is reproduced in Hasrat, Anglo-Sikh Relations, appendix 15.
38. FSP, 26 Dec 1846, no 1278 (NAI).
139
the "new staff" raised by Ranjit Singh, the second four the "traditional"
misZ-descended Sikh families. With the constitution of this Council Rani
Jindan’s services as regent were no longer required. Under the terms
of the Treaty she surrendered all her authority, and was awarded an annual
pension of Rs 150,000. Hardinge was pleased - and not a little surprised -
that the arrangement planned in September had been implemented with so little
fuss. The experience of the conquest of Sind had made him "cautious" in
Punjab affairs, and had convinced him of the necessity of "sliding gradually 
39into annexation". That slide, which was not without its perils, had 
now begun.
Informal control extended
With the eclipse of both the wazir and the regent queen, Henry
Lawrence (whose official designation was now British Resident at Lahore^0)
became the most powerful figure in Punjabi politics. It was not just
that the Treaty of Bhyrowal vested almost viceregal powers in his office
and backed those powers with the authority of 10,000 British bayonets,
but also - and equally importantly - that he was looked upon by the people
of the Punjab as a source of justice and largesse. The lists of "Visits
Paid And Received" by Lawrence, which are appended to his weekly political
diaries, show that he was swamped with requests for appointments and jagirs.^
Some visitors to the Residency were tireless in their efforts to recommend
themselves and their families for service. Of Rai Kishen Chand, who was
a prominent darbar official, Lawrence wrote: "A more persevering suitor
for jageers, etc. I never met. For once that he comes to me on public
42business, he comes twice to me about his own affairs".
39. Hardinge to Hobhouse, 21 Jan 1847: Hasrat (ed), The Punjab Papers, 
p.117.
40. Henry Lawrence was Resident from 1 Jan 1847 to 30 Nov 1847. John 
Lawrence was acting Resident from 21 Aug to 17 Oct 1847 while his 
brother was at Simla. When Henry Lawrence travelled to Europe on 
sick leave on 30 Nov 1847 John Lawrence officiated as Resident until 
the arrival of Henry Lawrence’s replacement, Frederick Currie.
Between 18 Oct and 30 Nov 1847 John Lawrence was on special duty at 
Lahore (while still holding his post of Commissioner and Superintendent 
of the Trans-Sutlej States). After Feb 1847 Henry Elliot was the 
Foreign Secretary to the Government of India.
41. LPD, vol 3, p.9, for example. On 29 Jan 1847 a weekly timetable was 
drawn up to regulate visits to the Residency: ibid, p.12.
42. Ibid, p.177.
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Lawrence's real wish was to get on with the business of disarming
the countryside and restoring the efficiency of the administration,
especially the revenue system. But these matters could not be attended
to until the claims and grievances of the chieftains had been settled.
Towards the chieftains a conciliatory policy was adopted. Many chieftains
who had lost their jagirs under Raja Lai Singh now had them restored at
43the Resident's instigation. In August 1847 Diwan Dina Nath informed
the darbar that the Resident had fixed the sum of Rs 364,400 to be distributed
44in jagirs amongst the members of the darbar. A number of new administrative
appointments also provided an opportunity to assuage the feelings of
chieftains who had recently been elbowed out of their posts. For instance,
Chatar Singh Atariwala was restored to the post of nazim at Hazara on a
salary of Rs 12,000 per annum, which he drew in addition to his jagirs
which were worth Rs 298,000. His naib (deputy), on a salary of Rs 5,000,
was Jhanda Singh Butalia, previously adalati (judge) at Lahore in conjunction
45with Diwan Hakim Rai. Diwan Hakim Rai was appointed adalati at Peshawar
on the Resident's recommendation. Gulab Singh Atariwala, who had served
under Lawrence during the Afghan campaign, at which time he had given
"great satisfaction", was appointed nazim at Peshawar, again on the
46Resident's recommendation. Lehna Singh Majithia, who had retired to
Benares "on pilgrimage" just before the war had broken out, returned to
the capital at the Resident's invitation in February 1847 and was re-appointed
47nazim of the Manjha. His half-brother, Ranjor Singh, who had been a 
leader of the anti-British party at the darbar in 1845 but had subsequently
43. Griffin, et a l C h i e f s  and Families, vol 1, pp. 415, 425, 447, 503.
44. LPD, vol 3, p.241.
45. Ibid, pp. 132, 188; Griffin, et al. 3 Chiefs and Families, vol 2, p.81.
46. Lawrence to Elliot, 15 April 1847, no 43: FSC, 29 May 1847, no 119 
(NAI); LPD, vol 3, p.25.
47. Lawrence to Currie, 7 Jan 1847, no 4: FSC, 30 Jan 1847, no 176 (NAI); 
Lawrence to Elliot, 15 April 1847, no 43: FSC, 29 May 1847, no 119 
(NAI). Amongst his compatriots Lehna Singh had a reputation of timidity: 
when, on returning to Lahore, he requested to be received with a salute, 
the other darbar chieftains laughed and asked, "What country Lehna
Singh has been conquering?": LPD, vol 3, p.19.
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implored the British to maintain their control over the kingdom, was
48appointed adalati of Lahore city and its environs.
Naturally, these conciliatory measures were well received by the
chieftains. On 8 June 1847 Diwan Dina Nath obsequiously read to the
Resident a letter which he was sending to John Lawrence expressing
gratitude for the confirmation of his jagirs (and, no doubt, his inclusion
in the Council of Regency also): "Formerly [he wrote of himself] he fed
49from the Maharajah’s table; now he feeds from that of the British."
And at dorbar on 2 August Tej Singh "expatiated on the devotion of the 
Council to the...Resident. These measures might have reconciled the 
chieftains to the presence of the British Resident, but they had done 
little to reconcile the chieftains to one another; behind all the 
"chcancha-esque" platitudes of obeisance and gratitude towards the Resident 
the old inter-chieftain rivalries continued in much the same manner as 
before. In attempting to find solutions to these rivalries the Resident 
was drawn ever deeper into Punjabi politics.
One of the first rivalries with which Lawrence had to contend was 
that between Lehna Singh Majithia and his half-brother, Ranjor Singh. 
During Lehna Singh’s absence from the kingdom Ranjor Singh had collected 
and spent the revenues from the Majithia estates. On returning to the 
Punjab, however, Lehna Singh disputed Ranjor Singh's right to any part 
of the patrimony on the grounds that Ranjor Singh's mother was only a 
slave-girl. Lawrence proposed a compromise solution to the sharing of 
the patrimony, but Lehna Singh rejected it, saying that he would invoke 
the authority of the ancient laws, the Dharma Shastras, if necessary. 
Ranjor Singh retaliated by misappropriating the revenues of his office and 
building up a secret store of weapons. Lawrence had no choice but to
48. Currie to G.A. Bushby, Offg Secy to Gol, 9 Jan 1846, no 8 : FSC, 26 
Dec 1846, no 272 (NAI); Lawrence to Elliot, 15 April 1847, no 43: 
FSC, 29 May 1847, no 119 (NAI).
49. Quoted in LPD, vol 3, p.163.
50. Ibid, p.241.
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recommend Ranjor Singh's dismissal from office. This the darbar promptly-
ordered in May 1847.51 This case of inter-family rivalry might have been
unique in its public prominence, and in its severity of solution; but it
was not so unique in its occurrence:
I am very much troubled [Lawrence reported in August 1847] by 
family contentions between brother chiefs; almost every family 
has its feud, and the matter of a well, or a house, affects 
individuals with a more lively anxiety than the most important 
affairs of the State.^2
More serious, from Lawrence's point of view, were the rivalries
that threatened to break up the Council of Regency. A bitter rivalry-
developed between Sher Singh Atariwala and Tej Singh which took on the
features of a "traditional" chieftain - "new staff" chieftain contest.
Tej Singh's lowly origins, his previous "treachery", his public boasting
that he enjoyed a special influence over the Resident, his habit of calling
darbars at his own home, rather than at the palace, in order that he might
53dominate the Council: all these things earned him Sher Singh's odium.
In reply, Tej Singh accused Sher Singh of corruption, and observed that
had it not been for the generosity of the Resident the Atariwala family
54would have sunk into oblivion. So bad was the feeling between the two 
chieftains that by February 1847 the Council and the darbccr as a whole 
had become split into two sharply opposed factions, one led by Sher Singh, 
the other by Tej Singh. 55 On 7 February Tej Singh informed the darbar 
that he had discovered a plot to assassinate him. This became known as 
the Prema conspiracy case. Gradually, the plot was unravelled amid 
mounting suspicions and accusations. Prema was a Kashmiri soldier who 
had recently been expelled from Maharaja Gulab Singh's service. He came 
to Lahore early in February and fell in with certain minor darbar officials, 
amongst whom was included Rani Jindan's confidential munshi (secretary),
51. Ibid, pp. 42, 65, 71, 84, 89, 91-2, 94, 108-11.
52. Lawrence to Elliot, 2 Aug 1847: Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, 
vol 41, "Papers Relating to the Punjab, 1847-1849" (hereafter "PP"), 
inclosure 2 in no 8 .
53. LPD, vol 3, pp. 42, 50, 103, 165.
54. Ibid, pp. 85, 134-5.
55. Ibid, pp. 45, 147.
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and certain holymen, whose leader was Bhai Maharaj Singh, a Sikh guru
who was said to be much venerated by the women of the Manjha and to
number amongst his disciples the mothers and wives of several prominent
chieftains.5  ^ Rani Jindan, whose hatred of Tej Singh was well known,
was thought to be the instigator of the plot. The plan adopted by Prema
and his accomplices was to assassinate Tej Singh - and, so said some witnesses
57at the subsequent trial, the British Resident and his assistants as well.
The names of nearly every chieftain except Tej Singh, Dina Nath and Nur-ud-
Din Bokhari were linked with the conspiracy, and for that reason the darbar
58was reluctant to make a proper investigation. But the Resident insisted
that the suspects be brought to trial. Bhai Maharaj Singh escaped.
Prema and the others were seized, however. They were tried, convicted
59and sentenced to various terms of imprisonment. Rani Jindanfs complicity 
could not be proved, although the Governor-General was in favour of banishing 
her from the kingdom regardless. *^0
Lawrence now decided that Rani Jindan and the chieftains had been
sufficiently humoured, and that it was time for him to exert his command
over them. He therefore took a number of measures that undermined their
power. He decided not to order the disarming of the people of the
western, Muslim majority districts in order that "the Durbar should be
kept in some degree of awe of their ability to rise and redress their own
grievances. " ^ 1 He imposed on the Rani new rules for her conduct which
62restricted her ability to entertain visitors at the palace. He issued
56. Ibid, p.182.
57. "Abstract of the Depositions in Preyma’s Case": "PP", inclosure 3 in
no 9; "Remarks on the Preyma Case by Mr John Lawrence": ibid, inclosure 
4 in no 9.
58. "Remarks on the Preyma Case by the Resident", 11 Aug 1847: ibid, 
inclosure 5 in no 9.
59. The sentences ranged from five years imprisonment to life imprisonment. 
The prisoners were sent to jails in British India. For details see 
John Lawrence to Elliot, 14 Sept 1847: idib, inclosure 3 in no 12.
60. Hardinge to Hobhouse (Private), 14 Aug 1847: Hasrat (ed), The Punjab 
Papers, p.120.
61. The people of the Manjha and other districts occupied by Sikh Jats, on 
the other hand, were to be "deprived of fire-arms, and as close a 
watch [was to] be kept over them as [was] possible without irritating 
interference": Lawrence to Elliot, 15 April 1847, no 43: FSC, 29 
May 1847, no 119 (NAI).
62. LPT), vo 1 3, pp. 102, 134-5, 162, 167, 181.
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a rubakari (pronouncement) to the effect that one of his assistants
would attend darbar on Wednesdays and Fridays (the Resident himself only
attended darbar on Saturdays), at which time the minor Maharaja should
make an appearance. Tej Singh and Dina Nath perceived correctly that
this arrangement was meant to put their administrative work under closer
63British scrutiny. Lawrence made moves to stop the practice of chieftains
64holding private darbars. He got the darbar to agree to two important 
principles. The first was that henceforth no darbar chieftain was to take 
on a revenue farm or arrange for a revenue farm to be given to one of his 
dependants. ^ 5 The second was that henceforth no jagir was to be resumed, 
released, or bestowed without reference to the Resident and no jagir title 
(,sanad) regarded as valid without the Resident's countersignature on it.6^
However, the most significant measure taken by Lawrence was his
decision to place the judicial and revenue administration of the countryside
under closer British supervision. This represented a two-pronged move
against the power of the chieftains (at both the darbar and suba levels of
the "national” system of government) and the power of the kardars (at the
ta'aVuqa level). This two-pronged move was made in three ways. First,
Lawrence sent four of his young assistants to the northwest provinces to
manage the local administration. Lieutenant Nicholson was sent to the
Sind Sagar Doab, Major George Lawrence to Peshawar, Captain Abbott to Hazara
and Lieutenant Edwardes to Bannu. Their duties were to oversee the work
of the nazims and kardars, to maintain the safety of the roads, to protect
the people from criminals, and to uphold discipline amongst the government 
67troops. This was the system of management that was successfully used 
by Sir Richard Jenkins during the minority of the Raja of Nagpur, and by
63. Ibid, pp. 207-8.
64. Ibid, pp. 50, 165.
65. Ibid, p.89.
6 6. Ibid, pp. 109, 183. In August an order was sent out to all jagirdars 
informing them of the new rule and directing them to produce their 
sanads: ibid, p.249.
67. See, for example, Lawrence to Nicholson, 25 June 1847: "PP", inclosure 
7 in no 6 .
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Sir Charles Metcalfe when he was Resident at Hyderabad. It worked
well in the Punjab too. When George Lawrence sent his brother a letter
he had received from Diwan Hakim Rai, the addlati at Peshawar and a
long-time favourite of Diwan Dina Nath, in which he had "taken airs"
by claiming his "right" to receive presents and bribes from the local
populace, the Resident at once sent the letter to the darbar with the
request that Diwan Hakim Rai be dismissed from office. "His recall",
Lawrence wrote, "will do good, and convince parties that they must look
69to us and not to Dewan Deena Nath."
Second, Lawrence decided to place the country between the Chenab
and the Indus, which from a political and military point of view was less
sensitive than the northwest frontier, under three chieftains as "Governors
and Chief Adalutees over the Kardars" in the manner that the Manjha was
under Sardar Lehna Singh Majithia and Lahore city and its environs was
under Sardar Ranjor Singh Majithia (and after his dismissal, General Kahn 
70Singh Man). This proposed arrangement provided Lawrence with an
opportunity to raise a "new staff" of his own, to appoint to these posts
chieftains whose newly acquired wealth, power, and influence would offset
that of the darbar chieftains. The Resident took that opportunity.
71Mangal Singh Siranwali, a "plain soldier-like sort of man" was made
adalati of the Rachna Doab. Ram Singh Julawala was made adalati of the
Chaj Doab. And General Lai Singh Moraria, who in 1846 had been called
72the leader of the discontented party at Lahore, was made adalati of the
Sind Sagar Doab. Lawrence portrayed Lai Singh Moraria as a man who was
much disliked by the majority of the Durbar; feared by some, 
hated by others, but allowed by all to be a clever fellow.
His sudden rise is offensive to many of^he Sirdars whose own 
grandfathers were ploughmen or barbers.
6 8. Elliot to Lawrence, 3 July 1847: ibid, inclosure 8 in no 6.
69. Lawrence to Elliot, 2 Aug 1847, no 95: FSC, "C" series, 28 Aug 1847, 
no 186 (NAI).
70. Lawrence to Elliot, 15 April 1847, no 43: FSC, 29 May 1847, no 119 (NAI).
71. no 69 above.
72. John Lawrence to Currie, 22 Sept 1846, no 19: FSP, 26 Dec 1846, no 1046 
(NAI).
73. no 69 above.
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Lawrence cared not a whit about the social origins of Lai Singh Moraria,
Ram Singh Julawala, and Mangal Singh Siranwali so long as they possessed
the personal qualities he was looking for.
They are all men [Lawrence wrote on 2 August 1847] who are much 
more influential and more enterprising than any of the old Sirdars: 
they are also more easily satisfied. All had already been more 
or less mulcted of the gains of the days of anarchy and feared to 
lose what remained; simply leaving alone such men would not have 
satisfied their minds, and I could perceive in Lai Singh's demeanour 
the anxiety that he felt. We must have sent him and the others 
out of the country, or imprisoned them (which would have been most 
arbitrary); or have done as we have: Rs 12,000 a year, added to 
their jagheers, makes them rich, and the command over a Doab is an 
honor they could never have aspired to under Runjeet S i n g h .74
Not that the Resident's "new Staff" appointments were seen in this
light by those who stood to lose by them. Already, several kardars had
indicated that they would rather abandon their ta'aluqcus than serve under
Sardar Lehna Singh Majithia; "if they do", Lawrence had observed, "they
75shall not get others". The Resident was now even more determined to
stand by his appointees: when two kardars, on the part of themselves and
their regiment of cavalry, petitioned against being put under the command
of Lai Singh Moraria, who they denigrated as being "a 'new man', but
yesterday getting Rupees 2 a day; whereas the Ghorchurrahs [cavalrymen]
76are the best blood of the Punjab", the Resident intervened quickly.
The darbar's proposal was to furnish the two kardars with a different
contingent of soldiers. Nothing doing, protested Lawrence: the days
when the Sikh soldiery could choose their own stations and their own
commanders had ended; and as for the kardars, they were at liberty to
77resign and retire to their homes. And in August 1847 Lawrence informed 
the darbar that it should fine the kardar of Gujrat for neglecting the 
orders of, and being disrespectful to, Ram Singh Julawala, the adalati 
of the Chaj Doab. Lawrence was eager to demonstrate "to all parties
78that I will support the Nazims and Adaluttees even agains the Durbar."
74. Ibid.
75. LPD, vo1 3, p.6 6.
76. Quoted from the intelligence report, 26 June 1847: ibid, p.191.
77. Ibid.
78. no 69 above.
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Obviously, the kardars s who had grown accustomed in the past seven
or eight years to ruling their ta’aluqas as though they were their own
patrimonies, had to be brought into line. This was Lawrence's third
move. The central accounts of darbar-appointed kardars and ijaradars
were inspected, and where necessary orders for the immediate settlement
79of arrears were issued. Kardars were ordered to furnish fortnightly
accounts, to keep a book of fines imposed on the zamindars, to show
their zamindars the papers which indicated the extent of their revenue
80obligations, and to refuse bribes. They were also warned of the
consequences of exceeding their specific duties:
Ram Diyal [reads an extract from the Resident's diary], Kardar 
of Goonjah, is reproved by the Durbar for interfering in the 
customs collections of Umritsur, which is the business of Misr 
Saheb Diyal and not his. Misr Saheb Diyal is reproved for 
interfering in the judicial administration of the same city which 
is entrusted to Jymul Singh; and Jymul Singh is reproved for the 
same offence as Ram Diyal. The division and distinct independence 
of appointments is a thing little understood by native officials; 
or rather all offices are looked upon as sources of profit, and 
every man tries to monopolize as much as he can. The consequence 
is a great clashing of rival authorities, most injurious both to 
public business and to private interests.81
In June two kardars were dismissed, on the Resident's orders, for breaches
82of these new regulations. One was fined Rs 3,700 by the darbar. On
3 July Lawrence reported that seven kardars had been removed from office,
one having been imprisoned. "I propose", the Resident continued, "in
gross cases, to fine and imprison, and even to confiscate Jagheers, where
83they are held, as is generally the case." A perusal of his weekly 
diaries reveals that over the next few months a good many nazims3 ijaradars 
and kardars were so punished for proven misconduct, and that the vacant
79. LPD, vol 3, pp. 56, 119, 369.
o00 Ibid, pp. 41, 142, 144, 269-70.
CO
 h-* Ibid, p.164.
82. Lawrence to Elliot, 18 June 1847: "PP", inclosure 2 in no 5
00 c» Lawrence to Elliot, 3 July 1847: ibid, inclosure 1 in no 7.
offices were filled by men known to him and appointed on his recommendation.
Of course the Hindu professional administrators who had until now monopolised
these offices bitterly resented the attack on their wealth and power, and
what seemed to them to be an ungrateful repudiation of their past services 
85to the State. But there was little they could do about it, except to
grumble amongst themselves. Even their friends and patrons at the darbar,
who in the old days would have protected and extended their interests,
were powerless to help them now. Lawrence's diary entry for 26 June 1847,
made on his return from that morning's darbar, illustrates this point.
At darbar Lawrence had taken the opportunity provided by reports of
misconduct on the part of two kardars to express his displeasure at the
general conduct of all kardars. This had evoked a challenge which,
according to Lawrence, had easily been defeated:
Dewan Deena Nath warmly defended the Kardars, with whom he is 
generally supposed to have good reasons for friendship [it will 
be remembered that he was the head of the finance department].
If these reports are true his corrupt practices will be materially 
interfered with by the removals and disappointments of his creatures.
I do not, however, forget that the Dewan has many enemies who lose 
no opportunity to blacken him. He was opposed to the recall of 
either Dewan Moolraj [the kardar of Pind Dadan Khan] or Devee Diyal 
[the kardar of Kadurabad], 'respectable men', he said, 'whose hearts 
would be sufficiently broken by this public discussion'. I said 
I did not understand the respectability of men who robbed and 
ill-treated their neighbours; on the contrary, the higher the rank 
of the offender, the greater the offense and necessity for an example 
.... He almost instantly recovered his tone and temper, allowed 
that the Kardars were much to blame and in his blandest tone 
commenced a long story on another subject. In the end, as soon 
as I had left the Durbar, it was agreed to recall the two Kardars 
in question as soon as ever arrangements could be made to supersede 
them. 86
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Of course this is only the Resident's version of the incident: had 
the Diwan and other members of the darbar also been in the habit of 
maintaining personal diaries we might be obliged to reconstruct a somewhat 
different story. Nevertheless, the impression that is conveyed, either 
directly or implicitly, by the extant sources for the period May-July 1847
84. LPD, vol 3, pp. 80-1, 153, 190, 202, 207-8, 217, 284, 293-4.
85. Ibid, p.81, for example.
8 6. Ibid, pp. 189-90.
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is one of a British Resident imposing his will, and his own standards of
administrative, efficiency, upon a rather dissolute Sikh darbar. At
darbar on 6 July, according to Lawrence, Diwan Dina Nath "complained
that orders followed one another in such quick succession that it was most
87difficult to attend to them all." Shortly thereafter Lawrence reported,
somewhat smugly, that the twice-weekly attendance of his assistants at
darbar, the purpose of which was to "force the arrears of justice through
88the Courts," was proving highly "inconvenient". But perhaps the most 
telling evidence of the Resident's domination of the darbar is a piece 
of humour - always an indicator of tension and serious intent. In June 
the Resident had issued a rubakari (pronouncement or order) calling upon 
the darbar to prepare a nakshah (official report) of State expenses, 
listed under forty-one different headings. Amongst the rmmshis and 
chieftains of the darbar this nakshah, whose preparation was only slowly 
and unwillingly undertaken, became proverbially known as the "forty-one 
column rubakari" - or roster of fortyvone reforms which the Resident was 
desirous of implementing.^
By early August Lawrence was able to report that he had gained the
upper hand at Lahore:
On the whole [he told his government's Foreign Secretary], the 
Durbar and the Chiefs give me as much support as I can reasonably 
expect. There has been a quiet struggle for mastery; but as, 
although I am polite to all, I allow nothing that appears to me 
wrong to pass unnoticed, the members of the Council are gradually 
falling into the proper train and refer most questions to me, and, 
in words at least, allow more fully even than I wish that they 
are only executive officers to do as they are bid.90
Now was the moment for Lawrence to play his trump card against the chieftains
of the darbar. If the chieftains had finally conceded that ultimate
political power rested with the British Resident, not with themselves, why
not reward their concession, and at the same time bind them more closely
to the Resident by granting them titles of honour for good services to the
State during the period of British occupation? And, since these titles
would be the more appreciated if they could be vested with traditional
87. Ibid, p.208.
8 8. Ibid, p.222.
89. Ibid, pp. 190, 208, 256.
90. Lawrence to Elliot, 2 Aug 1847, no 95: FSC, "C" series, 28 Aug 1847, 
no 186 (NAI).
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legitimacy, why not get the minor Maharaja to grant them at a special,
ceremonial darbar? Lawrence drew up a list of seventeen chieftains and
darbar officials whom he wished to reward, and passed it on to Dalip
Singh. On 7 August Lawrence and his assistants were received at the palace
with a salute of eleven guns - the number of guns, the exact timing of
their entrance and other details of etiquette had previously been fixed
as auspicious by the palace astrologer. Each of the seventeen recipients
of titles was handed his sanad (title deed) and khil'at (robe of honour)
by Dalip Singh, and in return offered his nazrs (cash presents) to the
Maharaja and the British officers. Lawrence signed all the sanads on
91the back as a witness of their gift.
It is evident that Lawrence had drawn up the list of recipients
with care. All eight members of the Council of Regency were rewarded
with titles. Tej Singh, who had long been despised by the "traditional"
families as an upstart, was elevated to the rank of Raja of Sialkot, a
92rank that brought him additional jagirs worth Rs 28,000 per annum.
Of course his enemies did not welcome his elevation to the aristocracy,
as we shall presently see, but they must have recognised the point that
Lawrence was making by these titles - collaboration with the British was
now the surest route to status and wealth. Amongst the remaining nine
recipients were included representatives of the most respectable Sikh
families, such as Sardar Arjan Singh of Rangar Nangal, and long-standing
servants of the darbar, such as Misr Rulla Ram, who for forty years had
been the head of the customs department, and who since late 1846 had been
the kardar of the large ta'aluqa of Jhang (which had been separated from
suba Multan after the dispute between Diwan Mul Raj and Raja Lai Singh).
One chieftain, Mehtab Singh Majithia, was given the title of Sardar in
order to reduce his influence: Lawrence candidly admitted, "I thought
I could not better get rid of him as a General than by promoting him to 
93be a Sirdar." By and large, however, the purpose of these titles was 
to conciliate the chieftains and win them over to a more cooperative
91. LPD, vol 3, pp. 245-6.
92. Griffin, et at.. Chiefs and Families, vol 2, p.148.
93. Lawrence to Elliot, 7 Aug 1847, no 97: FSC, 25 Sept 1847, no 84 
(NAI).
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interests were now inextricably bound up with those of the British:
Having during the last few months to carry many measures not 
altogether agreeable to the chiefs [Lawrence told Elliot], and 
having latterly been obliged to press them to much more exertion 
in the way of business than they had ever been accustomed to, these 
honors and the declaration that every official shall, according 
to his position and exertions, receive a fair salary, has given 
great and almost universal satisfaction. Heretofore, on all 
changes of ministry many were glad to save their lives at the 
expense of their jagheers and offices. Since December last no 
man, not even Rajah Lai Singh’s Brothers, has lost an 
account of his connection with the fallen minister...
position. Hopefully, the chieftains would realise that their personal
The ceremonial dccrbar of 7 August produced what was for Lawrence
a further happy ending as well. Ever since he had imposed restrictions
on Rani Jindan’s public life, following her suspected involvement in the
Prema affair, she had done her best to circumvent the Resident’s authority
(she had, for example, written letters of complaint to the Governor-General),
and to discredit her arch-enemy, Tej Singh. On hearing that Tej Singh
was to be invested with the title of Raja she had grown furious, and had
successfully counselled her son, Dalip Singh, against applying the tika
95(forehead mark) of rank to Tej Singh. This incident, which had marred
an otherwise perfect ceremony, was now seized upon by the Resident as an
opportunity to remove the Rani from the capital. He would have preferred
her banishment from the kingdom altogether, as her former lover, Raja Lai
Singh, had been banished. But the Council of Regency, afraid of becoming
caught up in a national scandal, begged the Resident to take a more lenient 
96measure. So, on 19 August 1847 Rani Jindan was sent to Sheikhupura 
fort, about twenty-five miles northwest of Lahore, there to face what 
Lawrence called an ’’honourable retirement” on a reduced pension of
94. Ibid.
95. LPD, vo1 3, pp. 184,200, 244-5.
96. Lawrence to Elliot, 20 Aug 1847: "PP", inclosure 8 in no 9; Hardinge 
to Hobhouse (Private), 5 Sept 1847: Hasrat (ed), The Punjab Papers, 
p.1 2 0.
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Rs 48,000 per annum. With the removal of Ranjit Singh's contumacious 
widow from the capital, and from direct access to her eight year-old son, 
the political ascendancy of the British Resident was - at once symbolically 
and in fact - completed.
The supersession of the Sikhs
Between August 1847 and April 1848 the Resident and his assistants 
enjoyed a respite from political tensions at the darbar which enabled 
them to get on with the business of ruling the kingdom. The keynote of 
their work during this period was reform: the last of the disbanded Sikh 
regiments were discharged and paid up; the customs system was reduced 
and simplified; a penal code was drawn up and sent to the administrators 
of justice; the finances of the State were scrutinised, and arrears from 
revenue collectors demanded; and a fixed, cash land revenue assessment 
was made and implemented. The fact that these reforms succeeded in 
restoring - and even extending - the centralised efficiency of Ranjit 
Singh's administration indicates that by this time the British had succeeded 
the Sikhs as rulers of the Punjab in all but the strictly legal sense.
The man who was mainly responsible for these reforms, and whose 
personality dominated Punjabi politics during this period, was John Lawrence. 
Between 21 August and 17 October 1847 he acted as Resident while Henry 
Lawrence was away at Simla. Between 18 October and 30 November 1847 he 
was on special duty at Lahore. And from 1 December 1847 until 6 March 
1848 he officiated as Resident while Henry Lawrence travelled to Europe on 
sick leave and the Resident-designate, Frederick Currie, made his way up 
to the Punjab from Calcutta. John Lawrence was a quite different man 
from his elder brother. Both, of course, were hard-working and capable 
officers of the Company, and both were extremely paternalistic in their
97
97. Lawrence to Elliot, 20 Aug 1847, no 118: LRL, BK 175, no 118 (PS). 
The official proclamation of 20 Aug 1847, announcing the Rani's 
removal to Sheikhupura, concludes with the words: "Let all ranks, 
therefore, rejoice, throughout the kingdom, that the Right Honourable 
the Governor-General of India has so much at heart the peace and 
security of this country, the firm establishment of the State, and 
the honour of the Maharajah, and his Ministers": "PP", inclosure 9 
in no 9.
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dealings with Indians (as befitted the Utilitarian and Evangelical ideals
of the day with which they had been indoctrinated). But there the
similarities ended. Whereas Henry was a soldier-diplomat, with a touch
of romanticism to his character, John was a civil administrator, whose
only passion was for justice, order, and efficiency. Henry stood for
the rule of the enlightened individual; John stood for the rule of
dispassionate law. Henry, whose career had taken him to several native
courts (where, one suspects, he had developed an envy of the pomp and
splendour of aristocratic life), was a defender of the princes and chieftains
of India. These men, he believed, could be turned into useful allies if
British officers combined respect and kindness with firmness in their
dealings with them. John, on the other hand, had been trained in the
revenue department of the North-Western Provinces of British India (where
he had become a staunch advocate of the Bird-Thomason policy of light
revenue assessments) and saw himself as a protector of the poor. He
regarded the princes and chieftains of India as being parasitic jagirdars
98and political allies whose worth was dubious. They should, he thought,
be reduced in importance or, better still, done away with altogether
99wherever British rule was imposed.
In time this difference of opinion as to the worth of a native 
aristocracy was to set the two brothers at loggerheads. But for the time 
being each brother was able to follow his own administrative policy without 
antagonising the other. It was characteristic of Henry Lawrence that the 
most important measure undertaken by him during the short period that he 
was at Lahore was his calling of another ceremonial darbar on 26 November 
1847 at which nineteen chieftains and officials were awarded traditional
98. "The existence of the Jageerdar", he wrote in October 1847, "is as 
inconsistent with the civilization and improvement of the country 
[the Trans-Sutlej States], as that of the Baron of the feudal ages 
would be now in Europe.... They will always...be opposed to our 
dominion, and ready for a change; gradually therefore to get rid 
of them is a political and social necessity": John Lawrence to 
Elliot, 16 Oct 1847, no 209: FPC, 31 Dec 1847, no 2288 (NAI).
99. For a fuller (but highly eulogistic) sketch of the characters of 
Henry and John Lawrence see Philip Woodruff (Philip Mason), The Men 
Who Ruled India, vol 1, The Founders (London, 1953), pt III, chap xl. 
See also, Frederick P. Gibbon, The Lawrences Of The Punjab (London, 
1908).
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titles in recognition of their good services. This must have been a
highly popular measure, for Lawrence reported that after he had announced
the distribution of titles to be conferred, the chieftains spoke "of
my being 'a second Runjeet Singh1 to them. " 100 The analogy was appropriate,
not only in the sense that it was now the Resident who was the fountainhead
of patronage but also because, like the former Maharaja, Lawrence used
these titles as a means of balancing out the claims and ambitions of the
rival chieftains. Eleven chieftains were granted titles denoting
aristocratic status. Raja Tej Singh was granted a bombastic Persian title,
similar in its wording to that granted to him by Ranjit Singh in 1837. 101
Diwan Dina Nath was made Raja of Kalanaur, and received additional jagirs
102worth Rs 20,000 per annum. Sardar Sher Singh Atariwala, who was
another member of the Council of Regency and who was Tej Singh's bitter
103rival, was also made a Raja. The other eight chieftains, who represented
the leading Sikh families, were granted the title of Bahadur (meaning 
"brave warrior") - a title often given to the nobles of the Mughal court. 
Eight officials, including Diwan Mul Raj, the nazim of Multan, were given 
traditional Persian titles denoting administrative excellence.10^
A few days after the bestowal of these titles Henry Lawrence left 
the Punjab and John Lawrence became officiating Resident at Lahore. Over 
the past four months, when he had acted as Resident and then been on special 
duty at Lahore, John Lawrence, had demonstrated a flair for pushing through 
dramatic reforms that his elder brother had only suggested, in a tentative 
manner, to the darbar. The lambardars of some thirty Sikh villages in 
the Manjha had been summoned to Lahore to help frame a code of basic Sikh 
civil and criminal law which had then been issued to the various adalatis. 105
100. LPD, vol 3, p.352.
101. FSC, 31 Dec 1847, no 137 (NAI); Suri, Umdat-Ut-Tawarikh, Daftar III, 
pts i-v, p.359.
102. Griffin, et al.3 Chiefs and Families, vol 1 , p.259.
103. It had been proposed to bestow the title on his father, Sardar Chatar 
Singh, but at the last moment Chatar Singh requested that his eldest 
son receive it instead: ibid, p.483.
104. FSC, 31 Dec 1847, no 137 (NAI). For an account of the ceremony which 
closely followed that of 7 August, see LPD, vol 3, p.362.
105. "PAR 1851": FM, no 356, pp. 26-7 (NAI); LPD, vol 3, p.350.
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With a view to encouraging the kingdom's commercial activity John
Lawrence had got the darbar to agree to the abolition of customs duties
on nearly half the articles of trade which had previously been taxed
by the S t a t e . A n d ,  despite sustained resistance offered by some of
the Sikh members of the darbar, he had also persuaded the darbar to
withdraw the eighty year-old prohibition against the calling of the Muslim
107azan} or public summons to prayer. Now that he had Punjabi affairs
to himself John Lawrence set about renovating the kingdom’s administrative 
system.
He was most concerned to reduce wastage and what he regarded as
unnecessary expenditure. He personally scrutinised the returns of
kardars and ijaradars and ordered the darbar to punish those officers
108who were found to be guilty of maladministration. He cut the minor
Maharaja's daily expenditure on alms back to Rs 100, which, according to
the darbar, was about one-thirtieth of the sum previously spent by Ranjit 
109Singh. On 16 December 1847 he told Elliot:
At present we are practising as much economy as possible. Not 
a rupee is paid away, but on an order countersigned by the Resident. 
The daily receipt and expenditure are punctually recorded and 
examined by myself, and I steadily refuse to allow of the 
disbursement of any sum which can be avoided.HO
"The Administration of the Punjab" (no author), in The Calcutta Review, 
vol 21, pt 41 (1853), pp. 229-30; LPD, vol 3, p.287. This reform 
was much appreciated by the merchants of Amritsar and Lahore: they 
sent a deputation to John Lawrence to convey their satisfaction, and 
in Lahore they illuminated the city for two nights: John Lawrence 
to Elliot, 25 Sept 1847, no 153: FSC, 30 Oct 1847, no 95 (NAI).
LTD, vol 3, pp. 249, 275, 287, 294, 359, 372-3, 378. John Lawrence 
displayed a commendable sense of justice (but a lack of knowledge 
of Punjabi history) when he wrote: "They [the members of the darbar] 
cannot understand the political advantage of toleration to every form 
of religion": John Lawrence to Elliot, 25 Sept 1847, no 153: FSC,
30 Oct 1847, no 95 (NAI). Hardinge supported this measure, and 
indicated his readiness to uphold it by force if necessary: Elliot 
to John Lawrence, 30 Sept 1847, no 322: FSC 30 Oct 1847, no 96 (NAI).
John Lawrence to Elliot, 12 Jan 1848: FSP, 25 Feb 1848, no 56 (NAI); 
LPD, vol 3, pp. 293-4, 369, 373, 377, 379.
LPD, vol 3, p.372.
John Lawrence to Elliot, 16 Dec 1847: FSC, 25 Feb 1848, no 42 (NAI).
106.
107.
108.
109.
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That day he also drew up a set of new rules to govern the duties of the 
various classes of administrators. The darbar was to meet daily at a 
fixed hour, and business was to be transacted according to a prescribed 
agenda. Dalip Singh was to make an appearance at each darbar, after 
which he would receive lessons in the Persian language and would also be 
tutored by one of the British Assistants in English literature and science. 
Each member of the Council of Regency was given specific administrative 
duties. For instance Raja Sher Singh Atariwala was to have charge of 
the minor Maharaja and the fort; Raja Tej Singh was to issue all reports 
and preside over the Council, where he was to have a casting vote; Raja 
Dina Nath was put in charge of revenue matters; Faqir Nur-ud-Din Bokhari 
was made responsible for public works; Bhai Nidhan Singh was to superintend 
religious matters. All orders issued by the darbar with respect to fiscal 
matters, military affairs, and administrative appointments or dismissals 
were to be forwarded to the Resident for his countersignature. Regulations 
governing the work of the adalatis3 kardars, and other provincial officers 
were laid down. Those who violated these regulations more than once were 
to be fined or removed from office. 111
The next step was to renovate the land revenue system by negotiating
a more equitable revenue demand with the zanrindars, and by further
rationalising the administrative machinery by which that revenue was
collected. John Lawrence was a self-acknowledged advocate of moderate
land revenue assessments:
As an officer bred up in the revenue department [he had written 
to his government in September 1847], I may give undue value to 
the matter. I have, however, seen the British provinces, before, 
and after, a good settlement; with a high assessment and a low 
one...and the result of my experience is that, to benefit the 
people at large, and render the country truely flourishing, you 
must fix a moderate land-tax for the Government, and secure to 
the community that they shall enjoy, on paying that quota, the 
results of their own industry.H2
111. John Lawrence, "Rules for the Guidance of the Lahore Durbar", 16 Dec 
1847: FSC, 25 Feb 1848, no 43 (NAI).
112. John Lawrence to Elliot, 25 Sept 1847: "PP", inclosure 6 in no 12.
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During the winter of 1847-48 he sent his Assistants - Abbott, Bowring,
Cocks, Edwardes, Lake, and Nicholson - to those districts that were
under darbar— appointed kardars to make cash land revenue settlements
for a period of at least three years. These settlements achieved an
113abatement of about 10 per cent on the previous land revenue demand;
with the simultaneous abolition of rural customs duties, kardars' fines,
114and extra cesses {abwabs), the abatement amounted to about 28 per cent.
For a variety of reasons these Summary Settlements (as they became known) 
broke down within a few years, and had to be replaced with even more lenient 
settlements. We shall examine this in some detail in the next chapter.
For our present purposes it will be sufficient to explore their administrative 
and political ramifications.
Most significantly, the Summary Settlements reduced the power and 
wealth of the kardars to pre-1839 levels, and imposed upon these officials 
a code of public service that looked forward to the days of British rule 
rather than back to the early days of Ranjit Singh. Three points should 
be made on this. First, the kardar could no longer treat his office as 
a means to acquiring a personal fortune. The amount of revenue that he 
was to collect from his villages was precisely determined and fixed for 
at least three years by the officiating Resident's Assistants, leaving 
him no scope for overtaxation. Because he was to collect this revenue 
in cash he could not play the grain market as he had been able to under 
the old batai (division of the harvest) method of assessment. All extra 
cesses except the grazing tax (tirni) were abolished, and this, together 
with the simultaneous abolition of customs duties on many items of rural 
trade (such as wheat and ghee , or clarified butter), deprived him of a large 
portion of his former, unlawful income. He was now prohibited from 
levying from the zamindars any kind of fine without the express authorisation 
of the provincial adalati, who was a superior judicial authority. 115
113. John Lawrence to Elliot, 31 March 1848, no 60: FSC, 28 April 1848, 
nos 57-66 (NAI).
114. Over the four doabs (excluding suba Multan) the gross revenue demand 
was reduced from Rs 7,444,244 to Rs 5,369,930: "PAR 1851": FM, no 356, 
p.167 (NAI).
115. LPD, vo1 3, p.281.
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Furthermore, John Lawrence's new regulation fixing a time limit of twelve
years to cases of rural debt that might be brought before the adalati 's
court prevented the money-lending Khatris - to which zat most kordars
belonged - from claiming interest on, or settlement of, loans to zamindars
116that were - as was often the case - several generations old.
Second, the kardar’s influence over village politics was reduced greatly.
The fact that the new revenue settlements were made directly with the village
headmen (lambardars) and other "primary" zamindars (the members of the
panchayats, or village councils, for example) circumvented the kardar's
ability to manipulate the zamindars. In fact the relationship between
the kardar and the zamindars became reversed, at least temporarily, as
the report of Arthur Cocks indicates:
All my enquiries were made corampopulo [in public]. The whole 
district I may say seated around me in the open air. The 
zumeendars were most unsparing in their remarks, and the officials 
[the kardars] in a state of anxiety as to what would transpire.
I found no information was to be obtained from the local officers 
[the qanungoes and patwaris], who were either under the influence of 
fear or gold. Their replies to my interogations consisted of 
backing up the most unscrupulous demands of the people.
Formerly, the lambardars and panchayat members had depended on their
kardar's charity for receipt of their inamy or remission of part of the
village revenue. All legitimate claims to inams of 5 per cent of the
village revenues, including those that had long been disallowed by the
118kardar, were now recognised and granted.
Third, the number of kardars was reduced with a view to eliminating
all but the most efficient. "Hitherto", reported Cocks, "the authority
of a person drawing a salary of Rs 30 a month, and appointed to the charge
of perhaps ten [villages], has been as unlimited as [that of ] the Nazim
119of the District [some nazims drew Rs 5,000 a month in salary]."
116. Ibid, vol 6 , p.416.
117. Cock's report on the summary settlement of the lower Rachna Doab, 
including the district of Jhang: FSC, 28 April 1848, nos 57-66 (NAI).
118. Ibid; LPD, vol 6 , pp. 394, 403.
119. n 117 above.
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In the Bari Doab the number of kardars was reduced from nineteen to
120six. In the suba of Jhang, which comprised sixteen ta’aluqas
and 980 villages, the number of kardars was reduced from forty to 
121six. Each of the four doabs (the suba of Multan being excluded since
Diwan Mul Raj’ s contract had not yet expired) was divided into a number 
of smaller revenue circles each based on a large town. To each circle 
was appointed (or -re-appointed, as the case might be) a single kardar 
possessing strictly defined fiscal and judicial powers and presiding over 
a small administrative establishment which might include, amongst a set 
number of clerks and troopers, up to two deputy kardars. So far as was 
possible the extent of territory and the monthly salary of each kardar 
was fixed according to a uniform rate. At the same time, it was deemed 
necessary to encourage the more ambitious and efficient kardars: Arthur 
Cocks thought it to be "advisable to have some appointments better paid
than others; the most zealous officers to be promoted to them as vacancies
„122 occur."
Naturally enough, the professional administrators who had hitherto
dominated and exploited the office of kardar were highly antagonistic
towards the new land revenue settlements which did so much to reduce
their power and wealth; but, apart from a few individual attempts to
123obstruct the passage of the new settlements, there was little that they 
could, or were prepared at the moment to attempt to, offer in the way of 
resistance. The real resistance came - and this is the second significant 
aspect to the Summary Settlements, for it was to solidify the "ordinary 
peasant" approach that the British were to take on later land revenue 
settlements - from the elites of village society, the "primary" zamindars. 
Although their inams were now guaranteed, and their autonomy vis-a-vis the
120. John Lawrence to Elliot, 31 March 1848, no 60: FSC, 28 April 1848, 
nos 57-66 (NAI).
121. LTD, vol 6 , pp. 436, 441; n 117 above.
122. Ibid. The average salary of the six kardars re-appointed at Jhang 
was Rs 1,700 per annum. The average expenditure allowance (for the
payment of wages, etc) was increased from Rs 2,819 to Rs 11,750 per 
annum.
123. LPD, vol 6, pp. 318-19, 322, 434.
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kardar considerably enhanced, the lambarbars and panchayat members
disliked the new cash assessments and clamoured for a return to the old
batai and karikut methods under which:
the amount of revenue paid by each person bears an inverse 
proportion to his respectability. He who can afford to 
bribe the appraiser pays little or no revenue, whereas he 
who is too poor to pay his way is ground down to the d u s t . 124
The power of the "primary” zamindars to mobilise the rest of the village
against the new cash settlement was quite formidable. Bowring recorded
his experience of one such encounter with contumacious villagers in the
Sind Sagar Doab in the following manner:
The villagers came out in a body shouting and demanding justice 
in the most perservering manner, and making a desperate attempt 
at a bonfire to show the darkness of the land. On enquiry into 
the cause of the tumult, it appeared that they had had a bad crop 
and had some difficulty in paying up their revenue for the last 
season, although their [new] assessment was so light that it did 
not amount to more than 2/3 of what they had been accustomed to 
pay for a long series of years. I believe nothing would satisfy 
them completely, short of taking off the revenue altogether.125
Elsewhere it was reported that the villagers had refused to accept their
pattas (revenue agreements) altogether (in which case the British officers
had signed the patta with a revenue farmer and left him to deal with the
villagers) or had sent their women as emissaries to the British officers
126in the expectation of receiving a more lenient assessment. "It was",
concluded John Lawrence, as he submitted to the Government of India the
various settlement reports, "a work of much difficulty to introduce the
new system - the ignorance and indifference of one party, and the venality
of the other opposed many obstacles which may now be said to be fairly 
127overcome." He was right about the obstacles, but on the degree to
which they had been overcome he was expressing undue optimism.
Late in September he had informed his government that the Punjab was 
"tranquil" and that its population was "day by day learning to appreciate
124. Lake's report on the summary settlement of the upper Rachna Doab: 
FSC, 28 April 1848, nos 57-66 (NAI).
125. Bowring's diary entry 24 Nov 1847: LPD, vol 6 , p.368.
126. nos 117 and 124 above; LPD, vol 4, p.138.
127. John Lawrence to Elliot, 31 March 1848, no 60: FSC, 28 April 1848, 
nos 57-66 (NAI).
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the benefits of British interference.” Comforting though this
assessment might have been to his government it was quite fictitious.
By early 1848 the signs were there that if some Punjabis had reason to
be thankful for the British supersession of the Sikhs at least as many
had reason to think, and talk, about a return to the halcyon days of
Sikh monarchical rule when the opportunities for a well-connected or
ambitious man had virtually been without limit. Amongst the disbanded
soldiery, for whom the Khalsa army had always been such an important
ladder to wealth and honour, these feelings were bound to run very high.
It is necessary to note at this point that since 1846 the army reductions
had been made largely at the expense of Sikh Jat soldiers: in 1845
fifty-two of the sixty-two battalions of regular troops had been basically
Sikh Jat in composition, while only eleven of the twenty-five battalions
permitted under the terms of the Treaty of Lahore were Sikh Jat; in other
words no fewer than forty-one Sikh Jat battalions had been disbanded by 
129the end of 1846. The majority of these unemployed soldiers had returned
to their Manjha villages where they had been penned up on land that was
almost entirely dependent for its fertility upon a scanty and unreliable
rainfall (and where in the past a large portion of the land revenue demand
130had been met from soldiers1 remittances). In April 1847 Henry Lawrence
had expressed surprise that the army reductions, though they were obviously
131causing considerable distress, had occasioned no great anti-British feeling.
Within the year, however, there existed unmistakable signs that such a
feeling had developed. In January 1848 John Lawrence discovered that it
was a common idea amongst the citizenry of Lahore that the British were in
the habit of enticing ordinary people into a certain chieftain's house and
there distilling human fat from them by roasting them over a slow fire, heels
132uppermost. Three months later his successor, Frederick Currie, reported
128. John Lawrence to Elliot, 25 Sept 1847, no 153: FSC, 30 Oct 1847, no 95 
(NAI).
129. FSC, 26 Dec 1846, no 1029 (NAI). The retrenchment had been pushed 
even further after the Treaty of Bhyrowal, with the upper limit to the 
Sikh army's strength being brought down from 32,000 to 26,690: FSP,
31 March 1848, no 52 (NAI).
130. "PAR 1851”: FM, no 356, p.23 (NAI).
131. Lawrence to Elliot, 26 April 1847, no 46: LRL, Bk 175, no 46 (PS).
132. LTD, vol 3, p.413.
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that "prophetic rumours" of a coming day of revolt against the British
133were circulating in the Manjha villages. And in October he referred
in one of his reports to "a very general spirit of disaffection pervading
the length and breadth of the land, and affecting particularly the army
134and the disbanded soldiery." Clearly, a general crisis of authority
was now at hand.
The general crisis of authority
The crisis was set off by a revolt at Multan. Towards the end of
1847 the nazim of Multan, Diwan Mul Raj, had journeyed to Lahore to complain
against the interference of the darbar in the management of his suba, and
- in the event of his complaints being set aside - to tender his resignation.
John Lawrence had been quite keen to take over the direct administration of
the suba - but not just yet. He had persuaded Mul Raj to accept an extension
to his contract until the end of April 1848 (the beginning of the rabi
harvest). Late in March 1848 Sardar Kahan Singh Man was appointed as
Mul Raj's successor, although in reality his position was to be only nominal,
for his work was to be supervised by two British Officers, Vans Agnew and
Anderson. A fortnight later the three men, escorted by a body of Sikh
troops, made their way down to Multan. On their arrival there Vans Agnew
reported to Currie: "Everything seems to bear out the character Mooltan
135has always borne for peace and quietness."
Actually, Multan was seething with disaffection, primarily on account 
of false rumours that Mul Raj's soldiers and officials were all about to 
lose their jobs. On 19 April one of his soldiers attacked and wounded 
Vans Agnew as the British officers rode out of the Multan fort. The next 
day the guns of the fort were turned on the mosque where the two British 
officers and the nazim- designate were camped. The Sikh escort joined
133. Currie to Elliot, 6 April 1848, no 6 6: LRL, Week Ending [hereafter 
WE] 8 April 1848, nos 202-6 (PS).
134. Currie to Elliot, 4 Oct 1848, no 246: LRL, WE 7 Oct 1848, no 1669 (PS).
135. Vans Agnew to Currie, 14 April 1848: "PP", inclosure 8 in no 26.
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the mutinous soldiery, Kahan Singh Man was taken prisoner and Vans Agnew
136and Anderson were brutally hacked to death. It is almost certain that
Mul Raj had no part in this mutiny - in fact he seems to have been virtually
137a prisoner of his own soldiers when the attack on the Mosque took place. 
Within a few days, however, he assumed leadership of the mutiny, turning 
it into a revolt. A proclamation was issued under his authority, calling 
for the ousting from the kingdom of the hated farangis (foreigners), the 
restoration to power of the young Maharaja and his mother, and the
réintroduction of the death sentence - lifted by John Lawrence - for cow
..... 138 killing.
News of the revolt quickly spread across the country, triggering off
further disobedience. In the first week of May a plot by some disbanded
soldiers to capture the Lahore fort with the assistance of the Hindustani
139sepoys was uncovered, and two men were executed. Rumours had it that
Rani Jindan was the brains behind this plot - that even from within the
Sheikhupura fort she continued to exert a malevolent influence. A formal
trial of the queen based on scanty evidence was out of the question, for
it would only provoke increased hostility towards the regime. But she
had to be silenced. The solution adopted by the British was to remove
her from the fort and banish her to Benares; furthermore, her pension was
140again reduced, this time to Rs 12,000. Any hopes that the British might
have had that her banishment could be passed off as an honourable retirement 
to a pilgrimage centre were soon dashed, however, for a week after her 
departure the Sikh soldiers were reported to be enraged by the action,
136. Vans Agnew to Currie, 19 April 1848: "PP", inclosure 9 in no 26;
K.C. Khanna, "The Multan Outbreak of April 1848"in Punjab University 
Historical Society Journal, vol 2, Dec 1933, pp. 166-74.
137. Sita Ram Kohli, Trial of Dewan Mul Raj (Punjab Govt Record Office 
Publications, monograph no 14, Lahore, 1932); Griffin, et al. 3 
Chiefs and Families , vol 2, pp. 100-4.
138. For a translation of the proclamation of the Multan Sikhs, addressed 
to the troops under Edwardes, 22 April 1848, see "PP", inclosure 3 in 
no 27.
139. Currie to Elliot, 11 May 1848, no 90: LRL, WE 13 May 1848, no 405 (PS).
140. Currie to Elliot, 16 May 1848, no 93: LRL, WE 20 May 1848, no 440 (PS); 
GG's Secret Despatch to Secret Committee, no 50 of 1848: FD (NAI).
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saying amongst themselves that there no longer was any legitimate
141authority worth upholding except Mul Raj's.
The first important show of solidarity with the Multan rebels came 
from Bhai Maharaj Singh, the religious leader from the Manjha. Ever since 
the Prema conspiracy he had evaded capture by the authorities. With his 
hand of followers, some two or three hundred in number, he had roamed up 
and down the Bari Doab, preaching of the day when the Khalsa would again 
triumph, but never remaining at any one village longer than it took to 
impart this message. The local authorities - the adalatiskardarSj and 
thanadars - had been given strict instructions to seize him. It had 
become apparent, however, that many of them were turning a blind eye to 
his activities or were actually assisting him. The reward for his capture 
had been progressively raised - with each report that he had evaded capture - 
to the enormous sum of Rs 10,000, a clear proof of his importance. On 
receiving news of the Multan revolt Bhai Maharaj Singh decided to join 
Mul Raj. He paraded through the Manjha villages with drums, recruiting 
the disbanded soldiery, until his followers numbered five or six thousand.
In June he set off for Multan, which he reached safely, despite having lost 
many of his men along the way in engagements with the nazim of Jhang’s 
troops and some Muslim jagirdars whom the Resident had despatched to 
destroy him.1^
The Multan revolt also stirred up the chieftains of the northeast 
foothills (the Rajas of Datarpur, Jaswan, Kangra and Nurpur) and the
Jullundur jagivdars, all of whom were anxious to overthrow British rule
143 ^in the Trans-Sutlej States. Perhaps the most noteworthy of these
disgruntled chieftains was Baba Bikram Singh Bedi, whose lineal descent
from Guru Nanak gave him exceedingly high status within the Sikh community.
After the annexation of the Jullundur Doab in 1846 the Baba had run headlong
141. Currie to Elliot, 25 May 1848, no 105: LRL, WE 27 May 1848, no 515 (PS).
142. For details see "PP", inclosure 33 in no 27, inclosure 5 in no 28, 
inclosure 18 in no 29.
143. For details see "PP", inclosure 14 in no 38, inclosure 24 in no 42.
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into a confrontation with John Lawrence. He had refused to surrender
to the British his guns and his forts; John Lawrence had confiscated his
jagirs (the offer to the Baba of a compensatory pension was haughtily
declined) and forcibly evicted him from his forts. When the Multan
revolt broke out the Baba turned his hometown of Una, in the Hoshiarpur
District, into a centre of revolt and incited the hill Rajas into open
revolt. When these revolts were smashed by John Lawrence's soldiers the
144Baba crossed the Beas with his followers to join the main revolt.
Still, there was at this stage little to suggest that the trouble at
Multan and in the Jullundur Doab might blow up into a political crisis
of national proportions. The Sikh soldiery, disaffected though they
undoubtedly were, were unlikely to mutiny en masse without the leadership
of the chieftains: the rank and file unity of the panchayat days had long
since been eliminated. The chieftains, for their part, were not as yet
ready to assume such a leadership role. Edwardes confidently asserted
that they were still "heart and soul on our side, which is the side of
145jagheers, titles, employments and whole throats." It would be more
valid to say that they were not as yet faced with a real crisis of authority.
They were unanimous in believing that the Multan revolt could and should
be subdued at once, although they pointed out that given the excitability
of the Sikh troops plus the fact that the darbar paid Rs 22 lakhs annually
for the maintenance of a British peace-keeping force, it was a job for the
146British. Currie was in agreement on both counts. But both Lord
Dalhousie, the new Governor-General, and Lord Gough, the British Commander-
i in-Chief, were against an immediate assault on Multan: they preferred
to postpone any such move until the winter months - the optimum campaigning
147season for British soldiers in India. Five months passed before the
144. Ahluwalia and Singh, The Punjab's Pioneer Freedom Fightersj chap 5.
145. Edwardes to Currie, 13 July 1848: reproduced in Herbert Edwards,
A Year on the Punjab Frontier in 1848-49 (London, 1851), vol 2, pp. 515-16.
146. Currie to Elliot, 10 July 1848: "PP", inclosure 24 in no 32; Currie 
to Major-General Whish, 10 July 1848: "PP", inclosure 25 in no 32.
147. Elliot to Currie, 11 July 1848: "PP", inclosure 27 in no 32.
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siege of Multan was begun, and during that time several developments 
occurred which created a real crisis of authority for the chieftains.
When that crisis arrived a large number of them opted for rebellion 
regardless of the dangers to their jagirs, titles, offices or their lives.
Two developments helped to weaken the resolve of many chieftains to
oppose the Multan revolt. Both were consequences of the decision not to
put the British troops into action right away. The first was Currie's
despatch - against the darbar's advice - of a large Sikh force under the
command of Raja Sher Singh Atariwala to Multan. Not being equipped with
the heavy siege guns that could have enabled it to oust Mul Raj from the
Multan fort, there was little that this force could do except contain the
revolt and engage the rebel soldiers in the occasional skirmish. The
morale of the darbar force steadily declined: small groups of soldiers
began deserting to Mul Raj's camp, while Raja Sher Singh and his fellow
officers complained that they were constantly being vilified by the rebels
148as being Muslims for betraying the cause of the Khalsa. The second
development was the unauthorised raising of Muslim levies for service at
Multan by Herbert Edwardes, the Resident's Assistant at Bannu. Immediately
after receiving news of the Multan revolt Edwardes began enlisting Pathan
and Biloch tribesmen, promising them plunder and high pay. This was
carried out through an intermediary named Faujdar Khan, described by
Edwardes as being "an exceedingly clever Puthan...who is related to many
of Mooltan's chief officers, and knows every mercenary on both sides of 
149the Indus." Just as he was preparing to cross the Indus and march
towards Multan with his tribesmen, Edwardes received a note from Currie 
directing him to confine his operations to the far bank of the Indus. 
Edwardes contemptuously dismissed Currie's justification of inaction150 
and, true to his training in the John Lawrence school of administration, 
took matters into his own hands. On 14 June he crossed the Indus and 
the Chenab, inflicted a crushing defeat on part of Mul Raj's force and
148. Edwardes to Currie, 19 Aug 1848: "PP", inclosure 30 in no 35.
149. Edwardes to Currie, 27 April 1848: "PP", inclosure 6 in no 27.
150. The siege of Multan, he angrily wrote to Hodson, the Resident's 
Assistant at Lahore, "could not be put off like a champagne tiffin, 
with a three-cornered note to Mulraj to name a more agreeable date!": 
quoted in Khilnani, British Power in the Punjab, p.135.
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surrounded the Multan citadel. Of course these daring exploits showed 
just how easy it would be to suppress the Multan revolt: all that was 
now required was a few siege guns and a team of sappers. But the fact 
that these exploits had been carried out by Muslim irregulars, whose 
religious and militaristic passions had deliberately been whipped up, 
under the command of a British officer who had ignored the Resident’s orders 
(not to mention the darbar's advice), gave great offence to the Sikh 
chieftains, and from this time onwards the whole Multan affair began to 
assume a distinct communal aspect in the minds of many Sikh chieftains: 
perhaps, they began to think, there was some fundamental truth in the claims 
of the rebels that they were making a stand in defence of the Khalsa.
The turning point in the making of the ensuing crisis came with the
outbreak of a sympathetic revolt at Hazara in August. There James Abbott,
the Resident's Assistant, had grown convinced - long before there was ever
any real evidence for it - that the local Sikh brigade was conspiring with
the Multan rebels. His solution to the problem was amazingly shortsighted:
he too began enlisting Muslim mercenaries, and reviving a jihad (holy war)
mentality amongst them by appealing to "the memory of their murdered parents,
friends and relatives to rise and aid me in destroying the Sikh forces. " 151
What is more, he suspected that the Sikh nazim of Hazara, Sardar Chatar
Singh Atariwala, was plotting for a general uprising against the British.
When Chatar Singh complained to Lahore about the Assistant’s bellicose
and arrogant behaviour Abbott attempted to expel him from his position of
civil and military authority at Hazara. Privately, Currie delivered Abbott
a sound reprimand for his unwarranted suspicions and his unauthorised 
152actions. Publicly, however, he stood by his Assistant. Chatar Singh
was offered terms that amounted to his dismissal and the resumption of his
jagirs. Finding that his professions of loyalty and friendship were being
ignored, and smarting from the Resident’s continued refusal to arrange
153the marriage of Maharaja Dalip Singh with his daughter, Chatar Singh
151. Abbott to Currie, 17 Aug 1848: LRL, WE 26 Aug 1848, no 1353 (PS).
152. Currie to Abbott, 24 Aug 1848: "PP", inclosure 19 in no 36.
153. Chatar Singh's daughter was betrothed to Dalip Singh. On several 
occasions Raja Sher Singh had approached the Resident with a view 
to arranging a marriage date, but nothing had been done: Ahluwalia 
and Singh, The Punjab's Pioneer Freedom Fighters, p.61.
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called upon the Sikh regiments at Hazara, Peshawar, Attock, and Bannu to
join him in a war of liberation. He also implored his son, Raja Sher
Singh, to join the Multan patriots. For several weeks the Raja resisted
his father's pleas. It was only on 14 September when Edwardes dismissed
him from service at Multan, implying that he could no longer be trusted,
that Raja Sher Singh Atariwala and a number of other chieftains went over
to Mul Raj's side.
Hitherto [Sher Singh wrote to his brother, Sardar Gulab Singh, 
the next day], Captain Edwardes has treated me with great kindness; 
but, within the last week, his feelings towards me have changed.
I resolved, therefore, yesterday, to join the Sing Sahib [Chatar 
Singh], and devote myself to the cause of our religion...God is 
between us. If we live we shall meet; if not, God wills it. ^ ^4
Thus, the failure of the British to deal promptly with a local revolt 
at Multan, together with their disparaging treatment of some of the darbar’s 
leading officers, drove a number of chieftains into open resistance. For 
these chieftains the fruits of collaboration had gone sour, and their 
proclamations, calling on the Hindustani and Sikh soldiers in the Punjab, 
the British Sikh regiment at Hoshiarpur, and the protected Cis-Sutlej 
chieftains to join their rebellion, all referred to the price which the 
kingdom had paid by allowing the British to gain control of it. 155 A 
general manifesto issued by Raja Sher Singh and nine other Sikh chieftains 
accused the "tyrannous and crafty Feringees" of having maltreated Rani 
Jindan, of having reduced the glory of the kingdom founded by Ranjit Singh, 
and of having oppressed the Sikh religion - all of which were, to a certain 
extent, true. The manifesto called on all "servants of the Khalsajee, 
of the holy Gooroo, and the Maharajah" to rise up and kill the farangis, 
cut off the daks (postal systems) and proceed to Multan without delay, on 
pain of being "excluded from the pale of the Sikh f a i t h . D a l h o u s i e  
regarded Sher Singh's defection and his manifesto as a declaration of war 
against the British Government and began the mobilisation of an army of 
reconquest.
154. For a translation of this letter, see "PP", inclosure 29 in no 38.
155. For translations of these proclamations, see "PP", inclosures 26-31 
in no 40.
156. "Manifesto issued by Shere Singh", no date: "PP", inclosure 32 in 
no 38.
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I have drawn the sword [he wrote to Sir George Couper on 8 
October 1848], and this time, thrown away the scabbard.
If the Sikhs, after this is over, rise again, they shall 
intrench themselves behind a dunghill, and fight with their 
finger-nails, for if I live 12 months, they shall have nothing 
else left to fight with. 157
Before we examine the conduct and outcome of the second Anglo-Sikh
war we should try and develop our analysis of the rebellion a little
further. On the face of it, the rebellion was a xenophobic and conservative
reaction against the changes of displacement engineered by the British
since 1846. This reaction began at the lower levels of society, amongst
the disbanded soldiery and the superior peasant castes of the Manjha, and
was taken over by the chieftains once popular support for the Multan revolt
and the idiosyncratic behaviour of the British demonstrated to them that
their own position was in danger of being destroyed both from below and
above. In Africanist terminology, the rebellion was an instance of
"primary resistance" - that is, the violent anti-imperialist reaction of
158an essentially unmodified tribal society. On closer examination,
however, the rebellion turns out to have been a much more complex affair.
In the first place, not all chieftains joined the rebellion. At
the time it was estimated that thirty-four chieftains, or jagirdars with
the rank of Sardar or its equivalent, were openly "loyal" to the British-
159dominated darbar at Lahore; later, the number was put at more than
157. Dalhousie to Couper, 8 Oct 1848: Hasrat (ed) , The Punjab Papers, p.190.
158. "Primary resistance" is a form of resistance that is both logically 
and temporally antecedent to "secondary resistance" (the more organised 
protest of millenarian movements, reform associations, trade unions, 
and independent churches) and "nationalism" proper (modern mass-based 
political parties). For a discussion of these concepts, including 
"post-pacification revolt" (which we will examine in a moment), see 
Eric Stokes, "Tradition Resistance Movements And Afro-Asian Nationalism: 
The Context Of The 1857 Mutiny Rebellion in India", in Past and Present, 
no 48, Aug 1970, pp. 100-18. For a critical application of these terms 
to the history of resistance in the German Pacific empire, see Peter J. 
Hempenstall, Pacific Islanders Under German Rule: a study in the meaning 
of colonial resistance (Canberra, 1978).
159. "List of Sirdars and others attached to the Lahore Government, who 
have not openly joined the Rebels": "PP", inclosure 53 in no 44.
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sixty-two. 1^0 Sixty-three chieftains (together with another thirty-six 
who ranked as Sardars but held commissions as Generals or Colonels in 
the Sikh army) were deemed to be "rebels" . 1 *^1 Thus, the crisis of 
authority which produced the rebellion divided the chieftain class.
Second, there was no direct correlation between material deprivation
and socio-political displacement on the one hand and rebellion on the other.
It is true that some "rebel" chieftains - for example Diwan Mul Raj, Diwan
Hakim Rai, and Sardar Ranjor Singh Majithia - had experienced a loss of
wealth and influence because of British interference in the administration
of the kingdom. Several chieftains had earlier complained that the new
summary settlement of the land revenue had reduced the value of their 
162jagirs. But, as we have already seen, the British had been careful to
treat all jagirdars equally. What is especially significant is the fact
that many of the leaders of the rebellion were chieftains who had actually
benefited from British interference; they were, as Dalhousie told the
Secret Committee, "those who have received the most marked consideration
and favor, and have derived the most substantial benefit from the
163establishment of British authority." Among the "rebel" chieftains were
164eight who had received titles at Lawrence’s recommendation. Among 
them were several who had received high administrative posts: Lai Singh 
Moraria, for example, who was one of the ringleaders of the rebellion, had 
been made adalati of the Sind Sagar Doab by Lawrence in 1847. Further 
proof that those who rebelled the most were not those who had lost the 
most is afforded by an examination of the jagirs^^ held by thirty-eight
160. n 167 below.
161. "List of the openly-disaffected Sirdars of the Lahore State, ascertained 
to be in rebellion and insurrection": "PP", inclosure 21 in no 43.
162. LTD, vo1 3, pp. 412, 420.
163. Dalhousie to Secret Committee, 22 Nov 1848, no 3: "PP", no 40.
164. Mul Raj, Chatar Singh Atariwala, Sher Singh Atariwala, Gulab Singh 
Atariwala, Hira Singh (Rani Jindan's brother), Rattan Singh Kerchakia, 
Kahan Singh Majithia, and Arjan Singh of Rangar Nangal.
165. After the annexation of the kingdom Raja Dina Nath was instructed to 
prepare returns of the jagirs held by the principal chieftains. These 
returns were submitted to the Government of India for its decision on 
the confirmation or resumption of the jagirs: FP, Part "A", Feb 1861, 
nos 297-8 (NAI).
171
"rebel" chieftains1^  and sixty-two "loyal" chieftains. On average,
the "rebel" chieftain's jagirs (Rs 19,572) were only slightly less 
valuable than those of the "loyal" chieftain (Rs 20,961). As a group 
the "rebel" chieftains were actually more financially secure than their 
"loyal" counterparts: only 34 per cent of the "rebel" chieftains held 
jagirs worth Rs 10,000 or less, while for the "loyal" chieftains the 
corresponding figure was 61 per cent.
How, then, are we to explain the fact that some chieftains joined 
the rebellion whilst others did not? Unless we are to believe that the 
patriotic, communal, and personal sensitivities of some chieftains - and 
they were not all Sikh by religion - were more hurt by the presence of 
the British than were those of other chieftains, we shall have to look 
to the situations and experiences of individual chieftains. Of course 
we will never know what was in each chieftain's mind when he made his 
decision whether to join the rebellion or not. But we can isolate three 
important general factors.
First, where a chieftain was at the time of the outbreak was of crucial 
importance. Most of those who remained "loyal" were at Lahore when the 
Multan and Hazara revolts broke out, and they stayed there under the 
watchful eye of the British throughout the early and critical phase of 
the ensuing war. Even had they wished to join the rebellion it is unlikely 
that they would have been able to break through the tight security the 
British imposed on the capital. The "rebel" chieftains, on the other hand,
166. "Return of Sikh Chiefs engaged in the late Rebellion, showing the amount 
and value of their Jageers lately resumed and the Allowances it is 
proposed to grant to each": FSP, 26 May 1849, nos 68-71 (NAI);
"Appendix to Statement No 1 (forwarded to Government on 1 June 1849)": 
FSP, 28 July 1849, nos 46-48 (NAI). I have excluded from the first 
return the jagirs held by various Afghan chieftains.
167. "A List of the Principal Jagheerdars of the Punjab not concerned in the 
Insurrection of 1848-49, shewing what they have enjoyed hitherto, and 
what provision is recommended for them hereafter": FSP, 29 Dec 1849, 
no 49A (NAI); "First Supplementary List of the Principal Jagheerdars 
of the Punjab...": FPP, 3 April 1850, nos 279-82 (NAI); "Second 
Supplementary List...": FPP, 31 May 1850, nos 108-10 (NAI); Revenue 
Department Proceedings [hereafter RDP], 27 July 1850, nos 127-8 (PS).
I-have excluded from the first return two jagirs held by royal ladies.
In addition to these four returns a small number of individual cases 
of "loyal" jagirdars was submitted to the Government of India.
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were nearly all in the countryside, either before Multan or at some
provincial post, when they decided to go over to the rebel side. They
had the opportunity to join the rebellion - or, in some instances, given
the mood of the troops, had almost no choice in the matter. We may note
here, moreover, that the kardars who joined the rebellion were generally
those whose ta'aluqas lay in rebel-controlled territory, that is, in the
southwest and northwest of the country. In suba Multan the kardars
were Mul Raj’s own men, and - as might be expected - they enthusiastically
threw in their lot with that of the rebel soldiers. Of them, Edwardes
wryly observed: "It is a new thing these men of the pen buckling on the
168sword. Moolraj’s rebellion has made all the Kuthrees mad." In
the north Chatar Singh Atariwala received the support of most of the 
d a r b a r appointed kardars; where he did not he appointed his own kardars 
in their place.
Second, a number of chieftain families quite deliberately chose both
resistance and collaboration as a way of ensuring their political and
economic survival. The younger male members of the family - or perhaps
the members of a cadet branch, if there existed extended family solidarity -
might join the rebellion with the family's contingent of jagirdari horsemen,
while the senior members supported the darbar and the British. That way
the family's fortunes were secured whatever the outcome of the conflict.
In the Chhinah family of Amritsar District, for instance, seven men
170became "rebels" and three remained "loyal". Many of the supposedly
"loyal" kardars in those tracts that remained under the direct authority
of Lahore also hedged their bets by working for both the British-dominated
171darbar and the rebels. This suggests that for many the general crisis
of authority was not so much a do-or-die crisis of existence as it was
168. Edwardes to Currie, 5 June 1848: reproduced in Edwardes, A Year on 
the Punjab Frontier, vol 2, p.301.
169. LPD, vol 4, p.252; vol 6 , p.354.
170. Case no 2 of "First Supplementary List of Principal Jagheerdars":
FPP, 3 April 1850, nos 279-82 (NAI).
171. LPD, vol 4, pp. 171-2, 176, 194; Edwardes, A Year on the Punjab Frontier, 
vol 2, pp. 262, 574.
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just another - albeit particularly violent - factional crisis to which 
they responded in much the same manner as they had in the past.
Third, a number of chieftains opted for either resistance or
collaboration as much out of a desire to humiliate and destroy personal
enemies as out of a desire to either expel or retain the influence of
the farangis. Resistance to, or collaboration with, the imperialists
was often an extension of a local, indigenous power struggle. The
Muslim tribesmen along the Indus frontier who rallied to the calls of
Abbott and Edwardes for military service against the Sikhs were not prompted
solely by their religious and mercenary proclivities: in many cases they
had - or at least their tribal leaders had - an issue of local magnateship
172to settle. Several Sikh chieftain families were divided over the
rebellion primarily owing to some long-standing internal family feud.
For instance, the descendants of Sardar Sham Singh Atariwala actively
participated in the war against Chatar Singh Atariwala and his sons - who
belonged to a cadet branch of the family - in order to avenge an old 
173family dispute. Similarly, two branches of the Sodhi family of
Jhelum District joined the rebellion and plundered the houses of a third
"loyal" branch of the family by way of settling an ancient rivalry; when
the war began to go against the rebels, however, the third branch was
174quick to repay the injury. And, most significantly, the leaders of
the rebellion eventually identified their rivals at the darbar - rather 
than the British - as their real enemies, and in so doing revived the old 
antagonism between "traditional" and "new staff" chieftains. On 24 
November 1848, as the Sikh and British armies stood poised for battle,
Raja Sher Singh Atariwala and his fellow "rebel" chieftains sent a lengthy 
note to Frederick Currie. In it they praised the British for their 
kindness towards Ranjit Singh and his successors. How, then, they asked 
the Resident, had the present confrontation come about? "The reason",
172. For a classic example of this, see Edwardes to Currie, 20 May 1848: 
"PP", inclosure 6 in no 28.
173. FSC, 24 Nov 1849, nos 55-64 (NAI).
174. Griffin, et al., Chiefs and Families , vol 2, p.248.
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of the members of the Durbar, who have neither regarded the credit of
175their own kingdom, nor respected the good name of the British."
They proceeded to list some fifteen grievances, chief amongst which were
the maltreatment of Rani Jindan, the oppression of the Sikh religion,
and the reduction of the kingdom's former glory. The British Government,
"acting on the suggestion of evil-disposed persons", had contravened all
the treaties. The real villains of the piece were singled out:
Raja Tej Singh, whose incapacity was well known to Maharajah Runjeet 
Sing, and who only received an appointment in the army on account 
of the Maharajah's affection for Jemadar Khosal Sing [Tej Singh's 
uncle], has been promoted to the highest station in the kingdom 
[the presidency of the Council of Regency], notwithstanding that 
he never led the troops of the Khalsa, as...[others] have done, 
and, in no instance, has been known to display any ability, or 
courage, or to have been entrusted with any share in the government 
of the country.176
Moreover, Mul Singh, who had been a common clerk on Rs 30 per month in
the service of Tej Singh's family, was now entirely in the confidence of
the British Resident. "This has greatly grieved, and disgusted, the
Sirdars and others", continued the leaders of the rebellion. Their
note concluded with an invitation to the British to investigate these
177grievances so that peace and stability within the kingdom might be restored.
In the light of the foregoing discussion, it must be queried seriously 
whether "primary resistance" is the correct term to apply to the rebellion 
of 1848. One thing is certain - the rebellion was in several respects a 
quite different type of resistance from that offered by the Sikhs just three
they continued, "is to be found in the evil dealing, and faithlessness,
175. "Raja Shere Sing and the Sirdars of his Camp to the Resident at Lahore",
24 Nov 1848: "PP", inclosure 24 in no 41.
176. Ibid.
177. Ibid. Currie did not reply directly to this note but simply issued 
a rubakari to the effect that the British would enter into no 
communication with the rebels until they laid down their arms:
"Roobukaree of the Resident at Lahore", 27 Nov 1848: "PP", inclosure 
27 in no 41. Elliot informed Currie that he had been right to refrain 
from giving a direct reply, and wrote that "the Governor-General directs 
me to request that you will inform the memorialists that you have been 
instructed to state that the memorial has been received by the Governor- 
General, and that his only answer will be the advance of the British 
army": Elliot to Currie, 2 Dec 1848: "PP", inclosure 36 in no 41.
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years previously. In 1845 the resistance to the British came from a 
traditional power structure that, although it was on the verge of total 
collapse due to its own inherent weaknesses and the external pressure 
of the imperial power, nevertheless managed to gather sufficient strength 
for a concerted bid for its own survival. The resistance was relatively 
straightforward and united, involving most of the members of the power 
structure in a common purpose. In 1848, however, the traditional power 
structure had been substantially dismantled and reorganised following the 
pacification. Imperial power had engaged the society more directly and 
had evoked in consequence a more disjointed reaction. The resistance 
was a rally of dissimilar elements, reflecting diverse interests and strategies, 
and was held together loosely by a xenophobic sentiment expressed in the 
form of religious ideology and the glorification of a now extinct socio­
political order, but was limited to only part of the country and portions 
of its population. At the same time, it cut across class and communal 
divisions, and bore some resemblance to a civil war situation. These 
differences between the two instances of resistance suggest that 1845 was 
closer to "primary resistance", whereas 1848 was more like a "post-pacification 
revolt"; that 1845 (despite the complexity of its origins) was a fairly 
straightforward response of an indigenous power structure under threat of
imperialist conquest, whereas 1848 was a reaction of a certain section of
178that indigenous power structure to conquest. In later chapters we
shall attempt further to refine these Africanist categories of resistance 
(including that of "secondary resistance"); here we would argue that the 
distinction between "primary resistance" and "post-pacification revolt" 
serves basically to remind us of the extent and direction of the changes 
that had occurred between 1845 and 1848.
We may now examine briefly the war that the rebellion of 1848 had
produced. Like the first Anglo-Sikh war it was a short but extremely
bitter one. From the start it was an unequal war. The combined fighting
strength of the rebels could not have been more than 30,000 men and about
179160 guns. By contrast, the British had a main "invasion" army of 24,404,
178. n 158 above.
179. Hasrat has shown that Lord Gough’s estimates of Sikh strength were once 
again grossly exaggerated, but his own estimate of 23,000 men makes no 
allowance for Mul Raj’s force or the Afghan force that joined the rebels 
at the battle of Gujrat: Hasrat, Anglo-Sikh Relations, pp. 327-8.
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an "occupation" force at Lahore of 10,000, a Sutlej "frontier" force of
5,962, a "seige" force at Multan of 21,030, supported by a Lahore darbar
force of 5,300, and various units of Muslim mercenaries whose total strength
was 38,000. Taken together, these figures give the stupendous total of
104,696 men. Of course these forces were deployed at various places in
the country. Still, the regular "Army of the Punjab" - exclusive of the
darbar troops and the Muslim irregulars - which converged on Gujrat for
the decisive battle of the war had a massive strength of 45,404 men and
180145 guns.
Given their numerical inferiority and limited supplies, the rebels
ought perhaps to have fought a guerilla war in the Manjha and the northern
Bari and Rachna Doabs where they had strong grass-roots support. Raja
Sher Singh's cavalry were keen to prosecute such a war since their families
and property were mostly in those regions. Sher Singh, however, was
anxious to join his father at Gujrat in the Chaj Doab, and having broken
through Edwarde's cordon around Multan on 9 October he set off in a
181northwesterly direction. This meant that when Lord Gough's army crossed
the Ravi on 16 November the rebels were forced to fight a series of pitched
battles against a superior foe in the inhospitable and isolated environment
of the northern Chaj Doab. Nevertheless, the rebel soldiers acquitted
182themselves like the veterans they were. At Ramnagar on 22 November a
battle was fought with each side sustaining only minor losses and claiming 
in consequence a victory. At Chillianwala on 13 January 1849 Sher Singh's 
force came within an ace of destroying Gough's army. The Sikhs had 
entrenched themselves in the ravines and dense jungle that lay to the west 
of Chillianwala village. Gough drew up his army in the orthodox pattern - 
heavy elephant-drawn guns in the centre, infantry and field-guns to the left
180. Ibid, pp. 326-7.
181. According to British intelligence, Sher Singh parted company with part 
of his cavalry over this issue, leaving them, without artillery, on 
the left bank of the Chenab: Currie to Elliot, 1 Nov 1848: "PP", 
inclosure 12 in no 40.
182. For details on the war, see Gough and Innes, The Sikhs and the Sikh Wars, 
pp. 198-250; Hasrat, Anglo-Sikh Relations3 pp.328-46. Selections
from the British military despatches are reproduced in Hasrat (ed),
The Punjab Papers, pp. 247-80.
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and right, cavalry and horse-artillery upon his flanks. After an hour 
of cannonade Gough ordered the infantry forward. The result was disaster. 
Once inside the jungle the British infantry lost order and formation, and 
fell prey to the Sikh musketry and cavalry. After three hours of confusion, 
during which the British lost 697 men killed and 1,641 injured, Gough 
called a retreat. Chillianwala was a clear victory to the Sikhs.
But British superiority in numbers, equipment, and supplies soon began
to tell. On 22 January the British siege of Multan, which had been carried
on for the past month, succeeded and Mul Raj and his 4,000 bodyguards were
183captured. Strengthened and re-supplied, Gough's army then moved forward
to meet the combined forces of Sher Singh Atariwala and his father, Chatar 
Singh. The two armies came face to face at the town of Gujrat in the 
Chaj Doab on 21 February 1848. Sheer fire-power won the day - and the war - 
for the British. A sustained cannonade of three hours broke the back of 
the Sikh resistance and enabled the British infantry to drive through the 
enemy positions. The Sikhs lost between 3,000 and 5,000 men and fifty-three 
guns. British casualties were ninety-six killed and 700 wounded. On
10 March the Atariwalas and their 16,000-strong army abandoned their attempt
184to flee from General Sir Walter Gilbert's pursuing force and surrendered.
The war was over.
All that remained to be settled was the crisis of authority. Since
the beginning of the war Dalhousie had sought to convince the home authorities
185of the need to destroy not only the rebels but the Sikh power as a whole.
To this suggestion, Sir John Hobhouse, the President of the Board of Control, 
had merely replied that the Government of India's recommendation would be 
considered when the time came to re-evaluate the administrative arrangement
183. Mul Raj was tried for the murder of Vans Agnew and Anderson and found 
guilty. On account of extenuating circumstances, the sentence of 
death was commuted to one of life transportation. Mul Raj died near 
Benares in August 1851.
184. GG's Secret Despatch to Secret Committee, no 18 of 1849: FD (NAI).
185. Dalhousie to Hobhouse, 8 Oct 1848: Hasrat (ed), The Punjab Papers, 
p.190.
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however, Dalhousie pushed ahead with his plans to annex the kingdom,
187without waiting for the approval of the London authorities. On 27
March he sent Henry Elliot, the Foreign Secretary of the Government of
India, to Lahore to negotiate the terms of the annexation with the Council 
188of Regency. On the morning of 29 March 1849 the ceremonial ratification
of the annexation took place. The great Hall of Audience inside the Lahore
fort, where Ranjit Singh - and, before him, the Mughal emperors - had sat
amid pomp and splendour, was on this occasion crowded with military and
civil officers. Europeans stood on the right; Indians on the left. A
paper, proclaiming the annexation of the Punjab, was read aloud in Persian,
then in Urdu. The ten year-old Maharaja Dalip Singh stepped forward and
affixed his signature and seal to the document that deprived him and his
heirs and successors of "all right, title, and claim to the sovereignty of
189the Punjab, or to any sovereign power whatever." Elliot described this,
the last Sikh darbar, in the following way:
The whole ceremony was conducted with grave decorum.
No Sirdar was armed. The costly jewels and gaudy robes, 
so conspicuous in the Sikh Court on other public occasions, 
were now thrown aside.
The whole announcement appeared to be received with a 
degree of indifference bordering on apathy, and not a word 
or whisper escaped, to betray the real feelings pervading 
the hearts of that solemn assembly, which had met to 
witness the ratified dissolution of the great empire, established 
by the fraud and violence of Runjeet Sing.
186provided for by the Treaty of Bhyrowal. Now that the war was over,
186. Hobhouse to Dalhousie, 7 Dec 1848: ibid, p.197. Many Company officials 
in London felt that the British were morally and legally bound to 
uphold the Treaty of Bhyrowal, that the minor Maharaja and the darbar 
should not be punished on account of a rebellion that was as much 
against their authority as it was against that of the British Resident: 
Hobhouse to Dalhousie, 7 Nov 1848 and 24 Nov 1848: ibid, pp. 194, 196-7.
187. For his justification of this, see Dalhousie to Hobhouse (Private),
7 April 1849: ibid, pp. 227-30.
188. "Note, by Mr Elliot, of a Conference with the Members of the Council 
of Regency, held at the Lahore Residency, on the 28th of March, 1849": 
"PP", inclosure 7 in no 51.
189. The document is reproduced in full in Hasrat, Anglo-Sikh Relations, 
appendix 16. Soon after the annexation Dalip Singh was removed to 
Hindustan. In 1853 he was baptised a Christian. For details of 
his subsequent life in England and his reconversion to Sikhism, see 
Khushwant Singh, History of the Sikhs, vol 2, p.87, n 6 . Rani Jindan 
joined her son in England in 1861 and died there two years later.
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As I left the Palace, I had the proud satisfaction of 
seeing the British colours hoisted on the citadel under a 
Royal salute from our own artillery - at once proclaiming 
the ascendency of British rule, and sounding the knell of 
the Khalsa Raj.190
The "Koh-i-Nur" diamond, Ranjit Singh's emblem of sovereignty, was
confiscated and presented to Queen Victoria. Imperialists had once again
annexed the Punjab.
Conelusion
After two wars with the Sikhs the English East India Company emerged 
as the supreme authority in the land of the five rivers - the fourteenth 
principal dynasty (and the thirteenth non-Punjabi one) in 850 years.
However, the British had not set out purposefully to subjugate the Punjab 
and seize the mantle of rulership from the Sikhs, even though many - perhaps 
most - Company officers believed that the Punjab would eventually become 
a British province. Had they been committed to an annexationist ambition 
and plan, the Punjab would have become part of British India long before 
1849.
Since the turn of the century the British had wanted influence over 
the region rather than ownership of it. After Ranjit Singh's death in 
1839 they had felt obliged to interfere, minimally at first but in an 
increasingly more detailed way, in the politics and administration of the 
kingdom in order to maintain that influence. The two Anglo-Sikh wars 
were manifestations of the disruptive impact of that interference. They 
were fought, by the British, not to acquire more territory or even more 
power over an independent kingdom but essentially to re-establish an 
influence they were in danger of losing. At the end of each war the 
British acquired more power than had originally been intended. In the 
previous chapter we saw that the first Anglo-Sikh war was fought to settle 
a "local crisis" that had arisen from the twin pressures of an internal 
collapse of monarchical authority and an external buildup of imperial military
190. "Report, by Mr Elliot, of the Proceedings held at a Durbar in the 
Palace of Lahore, on the 29th of March, 1849": "PP", inclosure 8 
in no 51.
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strength. In this chapter we have seen that after 1846 the British moved
steadily from a position of "informal control" to "formal rule". To be
sure, they knew what they were about (witness Hardinge’s description of
his Punjab policy as one of "sliding gradually into annexation"). To
be sure, also, they skillfully used every opportunity to extend their
influence and power, by adapting themselves to the internal socio-political
conditions necessary for the accumulation of influence and power, by
utilising their role within the inner logic and dynamics of the kingdom's
power structure (witness Henry Lawrence’s ritualised distribution of titles
191and his efforts to portray himself to the people as a neo-Maharaja ).
But, in the last analysis, the transition from "informal control" to "formal 
rule" was governed by the outbreak of fresh "local crises" that pulled the 
British still deeper into domestic politics. Each of these crises was a 
crisis of collaboration and resistance that was as much an extension of 
ongoing tendencies within domestic politics within the Punjab as a direct 
response to the presence there of the British.
We have seen too that after the Treaty of Lahore a crisis developed 
over the waziv1 s attempts to impose his will upon the davbav. The British 
Agent (Henry Lawrence) had been drawn into a showdown with the waziv largely 
because of the encouragement and support that he had received from the 
waziv 's enemies. After the banishment of the waziv and the signing of a 
new treaty Lawrence (now Resident) worked through the traditional power 
structure, acting like a surrogate waziv, to implement his reforms. The 
paradox of the situation, however, was that while Henry Lawrence was 
subverting Punjabi politics to British ends he was himself being subverted 
to the ends of some Punjabis. The amount of influence over him achieved 
by some persons provoked a crisis of resistance by others, notably the 
former queen regent, who resented the growing influence of the sycophantic
191. It is interesting that Henry Lawrence, who had returned to India just 
before the end of the second Anglo-Sikh war, and who was much averse 
to the annexation of the kingdom, suggested to Dalhousie that a 
proclamation be issued in his own name with the words: "I wish it 
to be known that I have returned to this country with a desire to 
restore peace to the Punjab", after which he would negotiate a more 
liberal peace settlement with the rebels. He also suggested that 
Rani Jindan be allowed to return to the Punjab. Dalhousie scotched 
both suggestions and described Lawrence as being "plus Sikh que les 
Sikhs": Dalhousie to Hobhouse, 6 March 1849: Hasrat (ed), Tine Punjab 
Papevs, pp. 220-1.
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Tej Singh. After the removal of the queen from Lahore the new Resident 
(John Lawrence) set about dismantling and restructuring the traditional 
system of government. By this stage the British were, to all intents 
and purposes, the real rulers of the kingdom. Resistance to them 
developed, nonetheless, beginning with a groundswell of popular and 
millenarian protest. This became a general crisis of authority, and a 
conjuncture for civil war, when a number of chieftains dropped collaboration 
and opted for resistance. The British went into the second Anglo-Sikh 
war to uphold the authority of the British-dominated darbar and came out 
of it the legal masters of the Punjab.
Indigenous collaboration and resistance, then, are the two main themes 
of the period 1846-49. Together they constituted the mechanism that 
determined the rise, penetration, and culmination of British imperial power 
in the Punjab. More than that, they were to exercise a profound influence 
on the style of imperial rule after 1849. Those Punjabis who had resisted 
the British in 1846-49 were not to be provided with an opportunity to regain 
favour until 1857, while those who had collaborated had mostly collaborated 
themselves out of political effectiveness. Consequently, as we shall see 
in the next chapter, British rule in the eight years after annexation was 
an experiment in exclusivity and authoritarianism.
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The years of Lord Dalhousie's term as the English East India Company's 
Governor-General (1848-56) were years of supreme imperial confidence and 
action. Dalhousie was a shameless expansionist who seized every 
opportunity to extend British rule in India. By a series of annexations, 
beginning with that of the Punjab in 1849 and ending with that of Oudh 
in 1856, he pushed out the empire's frontiers to what were virtually their 
final limits. Dalhousie was also a zealous reformer. He planned and 
began work on the Indian railway system. He introduced the telegraph, 
and developed roads and canals. Schools, hospitals, court-houses, and 
jails were built where they had not existed before. And social legislation 
designed to effect a moral regeneration of Indian society, such as the 
prohibition of widow-burning (sati) and female infanticide, was pushed 
through. Dalhousie provided able and energetic leadership in an age 
when most Englishmen - much influenced by the doctrines of muscular 
Christianity and crude Benthamite Utilitarianism - believed firmly that 
they had a civilising mission in India.
Dalhousie's crowning achievement was the creation of what became 
known as the Punjab "system" of colonial government, operated by a handful 
of dedicated British officers: the "Punjab School". The annexation of 
the Punjab provided Dalhousie with a clean slate - an opportunity to 
introduce all his reforms more thoroughly and more quickly than was possible 
in the older British provinces. It was an opportunity that was not lost. 
Dalhousie appointed his best officers to the Punjab, and he provided them 
with unprecedented executive powers. Nowhere in the empire had a 
programme of development and modernisation ever been attempted on the scale 
that was tried in the Punjab after 1849. In 1851 the Board of Administration
- the body that had been established to supervise the government of the 
new province - described this programme of reform as "an imperial experiment, 
imperially conducted. " 1
CHAPTER FIVE
THE IMPERIAL EXPERIMENT3 1849-56
Introduction
1. Quoted in Khushwant Singh, History of the Sikhs, voi 2, p.94, n 16.
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To the British, the success of this experiment was obvious right
from the start. In 1853 an anonymous contributor to the influential
Calcutta Review asserted that reforms which had taken at least twenty-
five years to be implemented elsewhere in British India had taken only
four years in the Punjab. All past errors of British rule, it was
further asserted, had been avoided in the Punjab, and the result was
little short of spectacular:
We know not where else to look, in order to find a parallel to 
this metamorphose, from riot to tranquillity, to peace from 
misrule, that has taken place in India, before our very eyes, 
over the plains of the Punjab.2
Certainly, the achievements of the "Punjab School" between 1849 and 1856
were considerable: the new province was pacified and the foundations of
3its later prosperity were laid. And yet, conditioned as we have often 
been by the imperialist tradition of a golden Punjab age and heroic Punjab 
administrators, we have often paid insufficient attention to the cake 
beneath the icing. For instance, it has not always been appreciated 
that the greater portion of the "Punjab School’s" work in the early years 
was of a conservative, political nature and not at all undertaken with a 
view to material or moral progress. The viability of a Pax Britannica 
in the Punjab rested ultimately on the ability of the British to consolidate 
their political position, to maintain law and order, and to extract the 
State’s share of the agrarian surplus, rather than on their pursuit of 
modernisation. Similarly, it has not always been allowed that the work 
of the "Punjab School" often proceeded with very little of the smoothness 
and certitude that is claimed in the official British records. Many 
Punjabis resisted British reforms vigorously, while within the ranks of 
the "Punjab School" itself there was a good deal of disagreement over the 
necessity of these reforms and the manner of their implementation.
2. The Calcutta Review, vol xix, no xxxvii (1853), pp. 305-6.
3. The standard account is Y.B. Mathur, British Administration of Punjab 
(1849-75), (Delhi, no date). For a study of the official mind of 
the "Punjab School", see P.H.M. van den Dungen, The Punjab Tradition: 
Influence and Authority in Nineteenth-Century India (London, 1972).
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In this chapter we shall attempt to redress this imbalance. It 
is our contention that the "imperial experiment" that was conducted 
in the Punjab between 1849 and 1856 was essentially an experiment in 
authoritarianism and political exclusiveness. The British attempted 
to rule the Punjab more directly - with less reliance upon political 
intermediaries - than had the Sikhs. The political, economic, and 
social transformation that occurred during these years was due primarily 
to this exclusiveness and the methods employed to sustain it. In 
seeking to measure and explain this transformation, we shall concentrate 
upon five areas of political reform that have not, in our opinion, been 
explored adequately in the existing historical literature. These areas 
are: the construction of a new "provincial" system of government; the 
renovation of the traditional "local" system of government; the quest 
for a permanent pacification; the curtailment of revenue assignments; 
and the introduction of a new land revenue system.
Non-regulation administration
Having annexed the Punjab, the British had to govern it. How would 
this be done, and by whom? The answers to these questions were supplied
4by Dalhousie on 31 March 1849. The Punjab Territories were to be placed 
under a new, five-tiered, provincial system of government (headed by a 
Board of Administration), designed to be superimposed upon, and interlocked 
with, a renovated version of the traditional "local" system of government 
(see Fig 5:1). Before we examine the different levels of this new 
provincial system, which replaced the "national" system of the Sikhs, we 
may notice three general features of the new system. First, although it 
involved, at each successive level, the same non-separation of fiscal, 
judicial, and police powers that had characterised the Sikh "national" 
system, the new provincial administration was a much more centralised 
and bureaucratic system, with a clear line of command stretching down from 
top to bottom and a fairly clear delimitation of responsibilities and 
rewards at successive levels. Second, only the subordinate levels were 
open to Indians. Third, it was a system of government whose day-to-day
4. The erstwhile Sikh kingdom (now called the "Punjab proper") and Cis- 
Sutlej and Trans-Sutlej Territories jointly were called the "Punjab 
Territories" until the formation of the Punjab Province in 1859.
Fig 5:1 Principal Offices in the British Government of the Punjab
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operation was based upon an extremely flexible interpretation of basic 
administrative percepts contained in printed codes and circulars, rather 
than upon a strict observance of legislative Regulations, as was the 
case elsewhere in British India. 5 For this reason, the Punjab "system”  ^
of colonial government was often termed the Non-regulation System of 
administration.
Non-regulation administration was the instrument and theoretical 
touchstone of that unique paternalistic despotism practiced by the "Punjab 
School" between 1849 and 1856. It was cheap and quick government carried 
out primarily by means of executive order. Dalhousie's concern to make 
it work in the Punjab led him to assign the cream of his administrative 
talent to the newly-annexed region. Henry and John Lawrence were appointed, 
along with Charles Mansel,^ to the triumvirate that was the Board of 
Administration. The older provinces were ransacked for additional talent. 
Forty-nine British civil and military officers of the Company, representing 
"as efficient a body of public servants as have ever been employed in a
7single province in India", were chosen to serve under the Board. At 
the same time, Dalhousie maintained a tight, personal control over the 
Punjab administration. For example, the Board was required to submit 
to Calcutta weekly abstracts of all its paper-work, and to obtain the prior 
sanction of the Governor-General before implementing any important decisions. 
As we shall see, Dalhousie's intervention in certain crucial matters, upon 
which the Board's members were divided, was to prove decisive.
The Board was the apex of the new administrative system. Its three 
members (each of whom received a salary of Rs 3,500 per month) were 
empowered to conduct foreign relations with the neighbouring "native"
States (for example, Kashmir, Bahawalpur, and the Protected Sikh States
5. For the codes, circulars, and ad hoc rules upon which civil and criminal 
justice and land revenue administration in the Punjab were to be based, 
see Dalhousie's instructions to the Board of Administration (hereafter 
BOA), conveyed in Elliot to BOA, 31 March 1849, no 418: FSC, 28 April 
1849, no 73 (NAI).
6. Manse 1 was a civil administrator who, like most of the new Punjab officers, 
had previously served in the North-Western Provinces (later U.P.). In 
1851 he was eased out of the BOA and replaced by Robert Montgomery.
7. Elliot to BOA, 31 March 1849, no 418: FSC, 28 April 1849, no 73 (NAI). 
Twenty-five of these British officers were military men: the highest 
rank was that of Major.
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of the Cis-Sutlej region), and within the Punjab Territories to 
settle the land revenue demand, regulate the excise, supervise the 
police, and impose the death penalty for serious crimes (and, typically, 
just what constituted a "serious crime" was something that was left 
to their discretion). Why did Dalhousie place the administration 
of the Punjab under the supervision of a three-man Board when a single 
officer might have performed the same function? Dalhousie claimed, 
in a letter to the President of the Board of Control in London, that 
had Henry Lawrence, in his opinion, been as fit to administer alone 
the civil government of the Punjab as he was to direct the necessary 
political and military arrangements, the three-man Board would not 
have been constituted. "But", Dalhousie concluded, "Sir Henry 
Lawrence is not Sir Thomas Munro [the great administrator of South 
India]; and he had neither the experience nor the qualifications which 
would have justified me in continuing all the civil government to him 
g
alone." In view of the conflict that was to develop between the 
Board's members over the question of jagirs, we can only suppose that 
what Dalhousie meant by Lawrence's lack of "qualifications" was his 
inability to see eye-to-eye with his brother, and with the Governor- 
General, on the need for fiscal stringency.
Henry Lawrence accepted the post of President of the Board - a post 
that conferred no overruling powers - and took on responsibility for 
political and military affairs. John Lawrence became the Junior Member 
and occupied himself with his first love: revenue affairs. Charles 
Mansel (and later Robert Montgomery), as the Senior Member, concerned 
himself with the administration of justice and the police.
This arrangement was short-lived, however. One of the less 
savoury experiences of the Residency period had been the discovery 
that over certain matters the Lawrence brothers could not agree: 
fundamental differences in temperament and political viewpoint lay 
between them. So long as the Board of Administration was directly 
accountable to him, so Dalhousie reasoned in 1849, these differences 
might be kept in check. But, as we shall presently see, the nature
8. Dalhousie to Hobhouse (Private), 25 May 1849: Hasrat (ed), The 
Punjab Papers, p.239.
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of the Board's work only intensified these differences, and in 1853 
both Lawrences submitted their resignations. By this stage the 
Punjab was thoroughly pacified, and Henry Lawrence's strengths, in 
particular his political connections with the Sikh chieftains, were 
no longer of such great value. John Lawrence's dispassionate 
clerical efficiency was much needed, however. Dalhousie therefore 
dissolved the Board of Administration, appointed John Lawrence as Chief 
Commissioner of the Punjab Territories, and dispatched Henry Lawrence 
to Rajputana as Governor-General's Agent. Structurally, the change 
was not a great one, because as Chief Commissioner, John Lawrence continued 
to work with two high-ranking colleagues - a Financial Commissioner 
and a Judicial Commissioner. But effectively, as we shall see, the 
dissolution of the Board of Administration signalled the ascendancy of 
John Lawrence's personal style of administration.
At the next level down in the new administrative system were seven 
Commissioners, the heads of the seven Divisions - Cis-Sutlej, Trans- 
Sutlej, Lahore, Jhelum, Leiah, Multan, and Peshawar - into which the 
Punjab Territories were now divided. The Commissioner (who received 
a salary of Rs 2,750 per month) acted as Civil and Sessions Judge over 
his Division, hearing appeals from the courts below him and referring 
to the Board (or Chief Commissioner) only those criminal cases that 
involved a sentence of death or transportation for life. In addition, 
he exercised general superintendence over the police and revenue 
administration of his Division. But his primary duty would seem to 
have been that of acting as a check against excessive administrative 
zeal on the part of his Deputy Commissioners, the officers at the next 
level down. Dalhousie's instructions to the Board of Administration 
in March 1849 stressed this point: each Commissioner would be required 
to "exercise a stricter supervision and control over the Deputy 
Commissioners than would be required where a regular routine of business
9is well established and understood."
9. Elliot to BOA, 31 March 1849, no 418: FSC, 28 April 1849, no 73 
(NAI).
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Representing the third level were twenty-seven (later twenty-nine) 
Deputy Commissioners (on monthly salaries of between Rs 1,000 and 
Rs 1,600), each in charge of a single District. In revenue and 
criminal justice matters, the Deputy Commissioner exercised the powers 
of Collector and Magistrate: he supervised the collection of the land 
revenue and excise, and he could sentence to up to four year's 
imprisonment. In matters of civil justice, he was empowered to try 
suits for property of unlimited value. All these powers made the 
Deputy Commissioner an almighty figure in his District. Thorburn 
called him "a little king within his own domain, subject to loosely 
defined limitations. " 10 In the popular imagination, he was ma-bap - 
the embodiment of authority - a paternalistic figurehead who spent most 
of his day on horseback, touring his district, inspecting the local 
administrative establishments, listening to the grievances of "his 
people", and always on the look-out for any sign of political unrest. 11
The fourth level was occupied by two classes of magisterial assistant 
to the Deputy Commissioner: the Assistant Commissioner (monthly salary 
Rs 500-700) and the Extra Assistant Commissioner (monthly salary 
Rs250-500). These officers were empowered to try middle-order criminal 
and civil cases. Their raison d'etre was simply to relieve the great 
burden of magisterial work that would have otherwise been placed upon 
the Deputy Commissioners. In the Lahore Division (the subregion of 
central Punjab) during the first year of British rule, for example, the 
twenty Assistant Commissioners and Extra Assistant Commissioners (EACs) 
handled 45 per cent of all the criminal and civil cases disposed of,
12which was more than twice that handled by the five Deputy Commissioners. 
These two offices represented the highest point in the new administration 
to which Indians could aspire. However, the assistant Commissioner was
10. Thorburn, The Punjab in Peace and War, p.165.
11. For an excellent description of the life of a Deputy Commissioner 
(hereafter DC) in the early 1860s, see G.R. Elsmie, Thirty-Five 
Years in the Punjab3 1858-1893 (Edinburgh, 1908), pp. 114-15.
12. Montgomery, Commissioner and Superintendent (hereafter C and S) 
Lahore Division, to P. Melvill, Secy to BOA, 16 July 1851, no 400: 
FM, no 359 (NAI).
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generally a European, often a young civil servant being trained for
a higher post. Out of sixty-four Assistant Commissioners holding
13office in the Punjab in 1855, only five were Indians. The EAC,
an uncovenanted civil servant, was, on the other hand, generally
an Indian. In 1852 nineteen out of thirty, and in 1855 twenty-four
14out of forty-two, EACs were Indians.
This raises the important question of the extent to which Punjabis -
as opposed to other Indians - entered the lower reaches of the new
administration after annexation. One historian has advanced the
thesis that although the establishment of British rule in the Punjab
created a host of openings for experienced, educated, Indian subordinates,
these men had to be recruited from the older provinces because they
"were not available within the Punjab. " ' 1'5 To what extent is this a
valid thesis? Certainly, the predominance of non-Punjabis in the
lower reaches of the administration is unmistakable. In the Lahore
Division at the start of 1857, for instance, five out of the six
Indian EACs, "about one-half" of the nineteen tahsildars (upon whom
more, in a moment), one-third of the Indian police officers, and
between one-third and more than one-half of the clerks and record-
keepers in the various revenue and police officers were Hindustanis -
Kayasthas from the North-Western Provinces and Baidays, Brahmans,
16and Kayasthas from the Bengal Presidency - rather than Punjabis.
13. For lists of Indian Assistant Commissioners and EACs employed in 1855, 
see Montgomery, Judicial Commissioner (hereafter JC), to R. Temple, 
Secy to Chief Commissioner (hereafter CC), 21 July 1855, no 259: 
Judicial Department Proceedings (hereafter JDP), 4 Aug 1855, nos 
15-17 (PS).
14. Selections from the Records of the Government of India (Foreign 
Department), no vl, General Report on the Administration of the 
Punjab Territories3 Comprising the Punjab Proper and the Cis- 
and Trans-Sutlej States3 for the years 1851-52 and 1852-53 
(Calcutta, 1854), (hereafter PAR 1851-53), para 504; also, JDP, 4 
Aug 1855, nos 15-17 (PS).
15. Kenneth W. Jones, "The Bengali Elite in Post-Annexation Punjab: 
an Example of Inter-Regional Influence in Nineteenth-Century 
India", in Indian Economic and Social History Review, vol 111, 
no 4 (Dec 1966), pp. 376-93.
16. Punjab Government Records, vol vlll, Mutiny Records: Reports 
(hereafter MRR), (Lahore, 1911), pt 1, p.227.
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But is this predominance of non-Punjabis to be explained solely
in terms of the absence of suitable men in the Punjab? Returning
to the thirty-one Indian EACs employed in the Punjab between 1849
17and 1855, we may note that the three who can positively be identified
as Punjabis - Jaimal Singh Khunda, Harcharan Das, and Jodh Singh Rariala -
had all served the Sikhs as either adalatis (judges) or naib-adalatis 
18(deputy judges). However, at least ten others had held the same
19posts in the pre-annexation period. What had become of them? By 
1849, or othereabouts, one had died, another had left the Punjab, and 
two had gained employment as tdhsildars. The remaining six were retired; 
but of these six, four would have been barred from employment under the 
British anyway, because they had opposed the British in the war of 1848. 
This suggests that Jones’s ’’incompetency" thesis is not a sufficient 
explanation for the low representation of Punjabis in subordinate 
administrative offices after 1849: that some eminently - qualified 
Punjabis would have been politically unacceptable to the British must 
also be taken into account.
Two further observations regarding the Indian EAC may be made.
First, his religion would seem to have been an important factor in
his appointment, for the British maintained a proportional representation
for the three religious communities. Of the eleven Indian EACs mentioned
in the first annual administration report, five were Muslims, five
20were Hindus, and one was a Sikh. Of the nineteen mentioned in the
21next report, nine were Muslims, nine were Hindus, and one was a Sikh.
17. n 14 above.
18. Griffin, et al., Chiefs and Families, vol 2, pp. 40, 50, 106.
19. These are: Devi Dayal Akalgarhia, Jhanda Singh Butalia, Ram Singh 
Julawala, Lena Singh Majithia, Ranjor Singh Majithia, Kahan Singh 
Man, Lai Singh Moraria, Diwan Hakim Rai, Sodhi Nihal Singh, and 
Mangal Singh Siranwali. Information on the post-1849 fortunes of 
these ten men is to be found in a variety of sources, but especially 
Griffin, et al. 3 Chiefs and Families, 2 vols.
20. ’’PAR 1851”, para 355: FM, nos 356-7 (NAI).
21. PAR 1851-53, para 504.
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And of the twenty-four in the 1855 list, eleven were Muslims, eleven
22were Hindus, and two were Sikhs. Second, the Indian EAC who gave
23satisfaction - and most would seem to have done - was rewarded with
periodic salary increments and promotions (usually within the several
grades of Extra Assistant Commissionership, but occasionally to the rank
24of Assistant Commissioner ).
The fifth level in the new administration - the point of meshing
with the "local" system - was the office of the tahsildar. Each
district was divided into three, four or even five administrative and
fiscal subdivisions called tahsils. Each tahsil was under the charge
of a tahsildar, an Indian officer (the lowest gazetted officer) on a
monthly salary of Rs 150-200. He was supported by a staff of record-
25keepers, clerks, and messengers. In 1856 there were 108 tahsildars
in the Punjab Territories. Under them were 576 record-keepers and
26clerks and 2,317 messengers. The tahsildar had a variety of duties.
As subcollector, he collected the land revenue and excise, and inspected
the records of "local" system officers like qanungos and patwaris.
As submagistrate, he tried petty criminal cases carrying punishments of
small fines or up to eight week's imprisonment. In judicial matters
he decided civil suits for property valued at up to Rs 300. During
the first year of British rule the thirteen tahsildars posted to the
Lahore Division dealt with almost 36 per cent of all the criminal and
27civil cases disposed of these.
If the European Deputy Commissioner provided a vital link between 
provincial and district administration, the Indian tahsildar linked
22. JDP, 4 Aug 1855, nos 15-17 (PS).
23. I have encountered only one instance of an Indian EAC being dismissed 
for corruption: SR Lahore 1865-69, p.95. In another case, charges of 
corruption were investigated but dropped: JDP, 1 March 1856, nos 15-17;
15 March 1856, nos 11-12 (PS).
24. For examples, see History of Services of Gazetted Officers Employed in 
the Punjab (Lahore, 7th edn 1887), p.122; FP General "B", Feb 1862, 
nos 67-9 (NAI); Griffin, et al. 3 Chiefs and Families, voi 1, p.478.
25. For details of a new tahsildari established in Gurdaspur District in 
1853, see FPC, 18 March 1854, no 28 (NAI).
26. PAR 1854-56, p.31.
27. n 12 above.
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district administration with the "local" system. This meant that
like the Deputy Commissioner - to whom he was immediately responsible,
and with whom he was expected to forge a close working (but not social)
relationship - the tahsildar had a political, as well as administrative,
role to play. For example, the tahsildar was encouraged to exert a
28general influence (but not a direct control) over the local police.
His value to the British lay not just in his administrative expertise 
but also in his knowledge of the locality; his insight into the 
character of the people; his familiarity with their institutions and 
traditions.
Given the tahsildar’s duties, it would seem reasonable to suppose
that a large proportion of them were Punjabis. Unfortunately, we
29cannot establish this with any degree of certainty. All that we
can say - looking through the names that appear in various reports - is
that many of them were former kardarSj naib-adalatis 3 and munshis
("loyal" ones, of course) or were relatives - often sons or nephews -
of men who had held such positions under the Sikhs. Many Punjabi
30tahsildars went on to become EACs in the 1860s. Moreover, the
principle of proportional representation for the three religious
communities was applied to the appointment of tahsildars, too. Of
the 113 tahsildars employed in the Punjab Province in 1862, forty-eight
31were Muslims, fifty-six were Hindus, and eight were Sikhs.
There are three important conclusions to be drawn from our study 
of the new "provincial" system of government created by the British 
after 1849. First, the British reserved the three top levels - the 
provincial, divisional, and district levels - for themselves; Indians 
•were admitted to only the subordinate levels, as Assistant Commissioners,
28. "PAR 1851", para 105: FM, nos 356-7 (NAI).
29. Except that, as already noted, about one-half of the tahsildars in 
Lahore Division were Punjabis.
30. For examples, see Griffin, et al. 3 Chiefs and Families, vol 1,
pp. 260-1, 278, 302, 304-5, 324; vol 2, pp. 15, 40, 49, 95, 115-16,
186, 385.
31. JDP, 5 April 1862, nos. 20-1 (PS).
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EACs, and tahsildars. Clearly, British rule in the Punjab was to 
be ruled by the British: it was to be direct, British decision making, 
not a delegation of substantial authority to middle-men like the 
nazimsj diwans3 ijaradars 3 and kardars that had existed under Sikh rule.
Second, the subordinate levels that were open to Indians were 
dominated in the early years of British rule by non-Punjabis. This 
is to be explained in part by the fact that suitably experienced men 
were not plentiful in the Punjab, and in part by the fact that many 
potential Punjabi recruits, having recently been in rebellion against 
the British-dominated, Sikh darbar, were unacceptable. But this was 
by no means a permanent situation: in time Punjabis gained both the 
experience and the trust of the British necessary to allow them to oust 
the Hindustanis from these subordinate offices. By 1887, for instance,
32all but nine of the 119 Indian EACs employed in the Punjab were Punjabis.
Third, the careful maintenance of a communal balance between the
Indians appointed to the offices of EAC and tahsildar during the early
years of British rule benefitted Muslims at the expense of Hindus.
We have seen that during the latter years of Sikh rule, offices like
those of diwarij kardar, and munshi had been monopolised by urban Hindu
families, especially Khatri and Arora families with long traditions of
administrative service. During the early years of British rule, Muslims
(especially those from professional zats like the Sheikh, Sayyid, and
Saddozai) were provided with the opportunity to squeeze some Hindus out
of their monopolistic position. It is true that in the 1870s and 1880s,
Hindus were able to reassert their dominance at the lower levels of
provincial administration, because they were quick to acquire the Western
educational qualifications that had by then been made a pre-condition of
33of service. But from the 1890s onwards, Muslims - particularly those
32. History of Services of Gazetted Officers Employed in the Punjab (1887), 
pp. 119-43.
33. According to an imperial return of civil service appointments to positions 
worth not less than Rs 150 per month (the starting salary of a tahsildar 
in the Punjab), Hindus held 53 per cent in 1867 and 62 per cent in 1871: 
Sir Patrick O ’Brien, "Amended return showing number of appointments in 
India, of not less than 150 Rs a month in value, filled up during the 
years 1867-71 by the appointment of Natives of India, distinguishing 
those held by Hindoos from those held by Mahomedans": Great Britain, 
Parliamentary Papers, vol 54, 1875 (Accounts and Papers, vol 13), p.249.
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belonging to the rural elites - along with Sikhs, took more to Western
education. By 1910 Muslims outnumbered Hindus in the provincial civil
34service.
The renovation of "local" government
We saw in the second chapter that the Sikhs had inherited from their 
predecessors an essentially traditional system of local government - 
the offices of qanungo, patwarichaudhari, and lambardar - which they 
did not change, or attempt to place under direct and constant supervision 
from the political centre. But it was not in the nature of British 
ideas about rulership to tolerate the fiscal inefficiency and political 
ambiguity that such non-interference had generally given rise to.
After the annexation, with the commencement of the regular, district 
revenue settlements, they took the opportunity to overhaul this "local" 
system of government and interlock it with their new "provincial" 
system. This reflected a desire on their part to extend their power 
down to the grassroots level of Punjabi society. Just how successful 
they were, is the question that must engage our attention here.
35Ideally, the structure of local government under the British was 
to be the same as under the Sikhs (though different administrative terms 
were sometimes used). That is, each tahsil was to be divided into two 
parganas (with a qanungo to each pargana); each pargana was to be divided into
two or more chaklas (with a chaudhari to each chakla); each chakla was 
to be divided into several tappas (with a patwari to each tappa); and
each tappa was to be made up of seven or eight mauzas (with a lambardar
36to each mauza). In practice, however, such a neat hierarchy was 
seldom if ever established, while the tasks of appointing suitable men
34. The story is told in detail in Patricia A. Thompson, "The Provincial 
Service in the Punjab in the Late Nineteenth Century" (unpub M.A. 
dissertation, Sussex University, 197 ).
35. Our discussion in this section is limited to rural local administration. 
For details on urban self-government (municipalities, "notified areas" 
and small towns), see A Brief Account of the Administrative System
of the Punjab (prepared for the members of the Indian Statutory 
Commission, 1928; Lahore, 1928?), pp. 27-9.
36. SE Sialkot 1863, p.107.
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to the different offices, and of ensuring that they actually adhered 
to the responsibilities with which they were charged, proved more 
arduous than was at first expected. Let us examine each grade of 
office, beginning with that of qanungo - the highest officer in the 
non-gazetted "local" system.
In the Lahore Division, where the regular land revenue settlements
were first commenced, it was initially decided (on the grounds of fiscal
efficiency) that only one qanungo should be appointed to each tahsil.
The qanungo's main duties were to supervise the annual preparation of
village revenue accounts, and to check periodically the records maintained
by the village accountants, the pa'uwaris. He received a monthly salary
of Rs 25 (in other Divisions, Rs 20) and was usually recruited from the
ranks of either the traditional qanungoi families or especially talented
patwaris. It was soon discovered, however, that a single qanungo was
simply not able to maintain the revenue records of a tahsil that might
embrace as many as 700 mauzas, for whose accounts as many as 100 patwaris
might be responsible. Edward Prinsep, who was increasingly to become
37the authoritative figure in central Punjab land revenue matters,
described the existing qanungoi system in 1854 as a "useless, because
38inefficient, agency." He proposed the division of each of the four
tahsils in Sialkot District into two parganas, with one qanungo to each
pargana and a head-qanungo (on Rs 50 per month) at the district
39headquarters. This proposal was approved in 1855, and then adopted
37. Prinsep served in the Punjab between 1850 and 1874. He was 
successively Settlement Officer (hereafter SO) in the Lahore Division, 
DC Sialkot District, and Settlement Commissioner (hereafter SC) for 
Amritsar, Gurdaspur, and Sialkot. From 1866 to 1874 he was SC for 
the Punjab Province, and the champion of the "Aristocratic Reaction" 
(which we shall investigate in the last chapter).
38. Prinsep to C. Raikes, C and S Lahore Division, 11 Dec 1854, no 155:
FPC, 10 Aug 1855, nos 341-61 (NAI).
39. Extract from the proceedings of the President of Council of India
in the Financial Department, 3 Sept 1855, no 3381: FPC, 14 Sept 1855, 
nos 132-40 (NAI); SR Sialkot 1863, p.107. It should be noted here 
that the regular settlement of Sialkot District was completed in 1856, 
but that the records were destroyed by the "mutineers" in 1857, thus 
allowing for a revision of the settlement,the report on which was 
submitted in 1863.
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in other districts. Thereafter, it would seem, this qanungoi
41system operated with tolerable efficiency.
Beneath the qanungo, in the traditional set-up, was the chaudhari,
or headman of a group of contiguous villages. Hitherto, the chaudhari fs
importance rested on the fact that he was a man of local prestige and
influence, whose collaboration with respect to the collection of revenue,
the extension of cultivation, and the settlement of local disputes the
State officers like the kardars were anxious to purchase through inams
and other, non-official, bribes. Would the British also patronise him
as the Sikhs had? Initially, it seemed that they would not. The
services of a few, individual chaudharis were retained where they were
judged to be especially "influential" - where, in other words, it was
considered preferable to have their influence working for, rather than
against, the British settlement officer's authority. As a general
class, however, the chaudharis were by-passed in the administrative
restructuring that occurred at the time of the first regular settlements:
a clear indication that the British meant to rule the Punjab countryside
without employing non-specialised middle-men. The disposition of
chaudharisr claims to inams (to be investigated presently) provide
further evidence that as a class the chaudharis were on the road to
official extinction. Still, not every settlement officer recognised
42the wisdom in excluding these men from the local administration. In 
the 1860s, as we shall see in a later chapter, there developed a concerted 
effort on the part of officers like Prinsep to reinstate the local notables 
on a regular basis.
There was one class of local administrators that the British could 
not possibly by-pass, however: the patwaris. British land revenue
40. SR Gujranuala 1856, p.58.
41. In Jullundur District two of the original eight qanungos had to be 
dismissed on account of "inefficiency": SR Jullundur 1892, p.139.
But, otherwise, I have encountered no evidence of British 
dissatisfaction with qanungos after 1855.
42. For example, Prinsep noted that the chaudharis were "about the only 
class not satisfied with my Settlement." He expressed the opinion 
that their inams had been reduced due to an "oversight", and hoped 
to restore their status and improve their renumeration: SR Sialkot 
1863, p.108.
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administration in the Punjab required detailed survey and settlement
records (village boundaries had to be defined and recorded, fields
had to be surveyed and mapped, tenurial rights had to be recorded
and kept up-to-date) and it was to the patwaris that the British
looked for the compilation and maintenance of these village records.
It may be said that the British re-created the patwari class in the
Punjab after 1849, since the old patwaris were invariably found to
be insufficiently educated for the job, and new men - preferably Persian-
43literate men from the locality - had to be recruited and trained.
Thus, in the Sialkot District the patwaris were "altogether a new class,
44raised and educated by [the] settlement."
Because they wanted to attract the best possible candidates, the 
British offered their patwaris high salaries. Patwaris in the Punjab 
received a commission of between 4 and 7 per cent on the revenues paid 
by the villages whose records they maintained (in the Lahore Division 
most patwaris looked after the records of between five and seven
45villages, and received an annual salary of between Rs 98 and Rs 126 ),
which was two or three times the percentage traditionally received by
46patwaris in India. This relatively large alienation of State revenue 
was thought to be worth it if a superior patwari agency resulted.
In the early 1850s it was claimed (at the level of official propaganda, 
anyway) that such a superior agency had been established. The second
43. Though the son of an old patwari or "dhurwaee" (weighman) was 
preferred to an outsider if he showed signs of talent and a readiness 
to undergo training in the patwari "schools" that were established:
SR Lahore 1858, pp. 4-5; Temple, C and S Lahore Division, to 
Financial Commissioner (hereafter FC), 23 Jan 1860, no 15: 
reproduced in SR Gujranwala 1856, para 15. From the 1860s onwards
a working knowledge of Urdu was a prerequisite for employment as a 
patwari: SR Gujrat 1861, p.130.
44. SR Sialkot 1863, p.106.
45. SR Amritsar 1856, pp. 6-8 ; SR Gujranwala 1856, p.58; SR Gujranwala 
1866-67, p.49; SR Gurdaspur 1856, pp. 8-10; SR Lahore 1858, p.15;
SR Sialkot 1863, appendix 17.
46. FC to Secy to Govt, Punjab, 2 Feb 1865, no 65-413: reproduced in
SR Rawalpindi 1864.
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Punjab Administration Report spoke of the formation, in the Lahore
Division after 1849, of "a class of village accountants such as are not
to be met with anywhere, even in Hindoostan", and went on to praise
these patwaris for their uniformly high skills in Persian, accountancy,
47arithmetic, mensuration, and mapping. It was not long, however, 
before a different and disturbing picture emerged.
It turned out that the vast majority of patwaris were nowhere near 
as competent as the British first thought. In Lahore District, for 
instance, the patwaris appointed at the commencement of the regular 
settlement operations were unable to fill out the settlement forms
48correctly, and consequently nearly every village had to be re-measured.
Moreover, the high salaries offered to patwaris, together with the powers
vested in them, tended to attract the wrong sort of men to the office,
and to encourage corruption. The patwaris in Sialkot District exhibited
49a marked tendency to "lord it" over their villages. In the Hafizabad 
tahsil of Gujranwala District the patwaris became non-resident patwaris, 
and often combined some other profession with that of village accountant. 
Their possession of the settlement papers containing information on 
tenurial rights enabled them to exercise a despotic influence - Nisbet 
called it the "patwaris* 'raj1** - over the zamindars. When the revised 
settlement of the District was begun in the 1860s, many of these patwaris 
were replaced, residence in the tappa was made compulsory, and the 
completed settlement papers were handed over to the lambardars, or 
village headmen. 50
The worst feature of patwari corruption was the formation of cliques 
between Hindu patwaris and their caste-fellows in qanungoships, 
tahsildarshiips, and private moneylending businesses. This became 
almost the norm from the 1870s onwards, when the increasing sophistication 
of civil court procedure, the decreasing vigour of British administrative 
vigilance, and the rising value of agricultural land and produce all 
combined to encourage the Hindu commercial castes to monopolise and 
exploit subdistrict administration. Many patwaris took to moneylending 
and to forging entries relating to mortgages in their records so that
50. SR Gujranwala 1866-67, p.48.
47. PAR 1851-53, para 290.
48. SR Lahore 1858, p.15.
49. SR Sialkot 1863, p.106.
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they or their relatives could initiate civil court actions to expropriate
their peasant debtors. These cliques proved extremely difficult to
break up. In Jullundur District, where Khatris and Brahmans made up
more than two-thirds of the patwari staff in the early 1890s, a British
settlement officer reported:
The Patwari is in reality ’Hakim' [ruler], though the District 
Officer may be so in name. These cliques, combined with the 
system of subscriptions (chanda) to help each other, so common 
among our subordinate officials, and the extensive banking and 
trading carried on by the Patwaris or their near relations, render 
small fines perfectly devoid of effect. Dismissal is the only 
thing a Patwari dreads, and he is practically safe from that, 
as only in the most extreme case will a District Officer take 
a step so fraught with risk to any authority he may have, as 
to remove a Patwari.51
And in the Gujranwala District, where the British settlement officer
attempted to break the monopoly of the Hindu moneylenders by appointing
agriculturalists to patwariships, the Khatris and Aroras holding most
of the qanungoships and tahsildarships went out of their way to criticise
the work of the new appointees. "It will therefore be necessary", the
settlement officer concluded in 1894, "for deputy commissioners hereafter
to watch carefully future appointments, and see that things do not revert
52to their old groove."
Of course, not all patwaris were incompetent and corrupt. But
these traits were sufficiently common to ensure that the re-creation
of the patwari class after 1849 was anything but a success story.
In fact, until the day the British left the Punjab the patwaris were
53a source of trouble and frustration. In the twentieth century a 
number of reforms, like the reservation of at least half of all new
51. SR Jullundur 1892, pp. 139-40.
52. M.F. 0 ’Dwyer, Final Report on the Revision of the Settlement of 
Gujranwala District 1889-1894 (Lahore, 1894), (hereafter SR Gujranwala 
1889-94) , p.31.
53. Clive Dewey has drawn a direct link between patwari incompetence and 
the unreliability of official agricultural statistics in British 
Punjab: "Patwari and Chaukidar: Subordinate Officials and the 
reliability of India's Agricultural Statistics", in Clive Dewey and
A.G. Hopkins (eds), The Imperial Impact: Studies in the Economic 
History of Africa and India (London, 1978), chap 17.
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patwariships for members of the agricultural tribes, were introduced.
But the opportunities for patwari vice remained, and were taken.
In 1928, for instance, sixty-nine patwari were dismissed, and many
more were suspended or degraded, on counts of record falsification,
absenteeism, misappropriation of revenue, and so forth. In 1929
and 1930 forty-eight and fifty-one patwaris respectively were dismissed
54from office.
The base of the "local" system was the office of lambardar, or
village headman. At the commencement of the regular settlement
operations the plan of the British was to avoid the Sikh practice of
recognising a separate lambardar for each clan section (taraf or patti)
in the village: to recognise, instead, only one lambardar per village
or, at most, one lambardar per Rs 500 of revenue. 55 Thus, in the first
few years of British rule a large number of claims to the office of
lambardar and to inams granted by the Sikhs were disallowed.5  ^ But
the settlement officers soon ran into difficulties. The office of
lambardar was a highly prized one - not, it would seem, for the perquisites
that went with it (since the British resumed all but a few inams and
allowed only the pachotra, or commission of 5 per cent on the revenue
collected), but rather for the status and hidden benefits that it
conferred. Competition for lambardar ships was intense and disruptive:
everywhere settlement officers reported the readiness of claimants to
resort to litigation. Consequently, it was often found expedient to
57reinstate those whose claims had earlier been disallowed. In central 
Punjab a separate lambardar therefore came to be appointed to each clan 
section in the village, and the average amount of revenue collected by
54. Government of Punjab, Report on the Operations of the department of 
Land Records> Punjab: for the year ending 30th September 1929
(Lahore, 1930), pp. 4-7: Report on --  Land Records3 Punjab: for
the year ending 30th Septembery 1930 (Lahore, 1931),  pp. 3-7.
55. SR Amritsar 1856, p.104; SR Gurdaspur 1892, pp. 57-8.
56. SR Gujranwala 1856, p.57.
57. In 1855 the FC ruled that lambardars could not be replaced simply 
on the grounds that the revenue collected by them was too small,
and that new lambardars could not be appointed without a full inquiry 
into their claims and qualifications: ibid.
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each lambardar varied, across the districts, from Rs 332 to as little
58as Rs 214; in Rawalpindi District the average collection was only 
59Rs 186. Most settlement officers found it more expedient to
maintain the existence of two or three lambardars than to risk creating
60a feud in the village by retaining one and dismissing the others.
In 1865 the Financial Commissioner argued that British district
officers should be given wide discretionary powers with respect to
the appointment of lambardars, since it was, in his opinion, desirable
to reduce the number of lambccrdccrs and prevent the office from becoming
an automatic, hereditary one. ^ 1 But this was easier to theorise about
than put into practice. It was exceedingly difficult for a settlement
officer to reduce the number of lambardars or overthrow the traditional
pattern of hereditary succession when, as Prinsep found in Sialkot
District, "appeals went up as far as the Financial Commissioner, and
62some rejected candidates even paid a visit to Calcutta." In some
districts, where intra-village factionalism was high, the settlement
officers more or less handed the selection of the lambardars over to
6 3the assembled village communities themselves. And with the subdivision
of village holdings over time, the number of lambardars actually increased
64quite dramatically in many districts.
58. SR Amritsar 1856, p.104; SR Gujranwala 1856, p.57; SR Lahore 1858, 
p.1 2.
59. SR Rawalpindi 1864, p.139.
60. SR Lahore 1858, p.12.
61. FC to Secy to Govt, Punjab, 2 Feb 1865, no 65-413: reproduced in
SR Rawalpindi 1864.
62. SR Sialkot 1863, p.9 4.
63. See, for example, SR Gujrat 1874, pp. 158-9.
64. For example, in Gurdaspur District, which contained 1,380 mahals,
or revenue "estates" (usually coterminous with the mauza, or village), 
in the 1850s, there were 4,348 lambardars and 2,135 ala-lambardars, 
or chief headmen (whose introduction we shall examine in the last 
chapter), in the early 1890s: SR Gurdaspur 1856, pp. 3-5; SR 
Gurdaspur 1892, p.57.
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From the evidence brought forward in the foregoing paragraphs, 
it would have to be concluded that the renovation of "local" government 
after 1849 fell well short of British expectations. The British had 
been desirous of a subdistrict administrative system that was more 
streamlined, more efficient, and more controllable than that which they 
inherited from the Sikhs. But when they came to undertake the necessary 
renovation they discovered that they had underestimated the strength 
of local-level administrative traditions and the relative weakness of 
their own position at that level. Consequently, they were obliged to 
retreat, in practically every instance, further and further from their 
original administrative blueprint. We do not mean to imply that, as 
a result, their ability to govern the Punjab countryside was drastically 
threatened. What we do claim is that for all their deliberate and 
systematic interference, the British were unable completely to impose 
their bureaucratic vision of "good government" on rural Punjabi society.
On that score alone, we would suggest, the paternalistic tradition has 
to be re-evaluated.
In search of a permanent pacification
There can scarcely be any more striking feature of early British 
rule in the Punjab than the extent to which it was bolstered by a reservoir 
of coercive power. After annexation the greater portion of the regular 
army that had been used to conquer the Punjab in 1848-49 was retained 
there as an occupying force. At the beginning of 1857 the authority 
of the British in the Punjab was backed up by no fewer than 59,000 
soldiers (63 per cent Hindustains, 20 per cent Europeans, 17 per cent 
Punjabis) and about 9,000 military police. ^ 5 The purpose of this 
occupying force was, of course, to keep the Punjab in a state of 
subjugation while the "Punjab School" pushed ahead with the tasks of 
disbanding the erstwhile Sikh army, disarming the population, and raising 
and administering a civil police force.
Following the battle of Gujrat and the general surrender of the rebel 
army, large numbers of armed Sikh soldiers had begun returning to their
65. MRR, pt 2, p.328.
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villages in the Manjha. Fearing a renewal of hostilities, Dalhousie
had ordered the British Commander-in-Chief, General Gough, to take
steps to disarm "this turbulent population while they are still
66disheartened and in fear of punishment." A general muster of the
Sikh soldiery was therefore called at Lahore shortly after annexation.
Ten regiments (five of infantry, five of cavalry) and three batteries
of artillery were taken into British service. The remaining troops,
numbering scores of thousands, were disarmed, paid up, and disbanded.
67Pensions were granted to the long-serving and the infirm.
The Board of Administration then issued a proclamation for the
disarming of the general population, to be carried out by British 
68military officers. Within a year of annexation the Board reported
the results of this disarming operation: nearly 1 20 ,0 0 0 weapons (mostly
swords and matchlocks) had been collected from the districts lately
annexed, and nearly 1 , 0 0 0 persons had been punished for concealing
weapons. By far the most weapons had been collected from the two
most martial tracts of the Punjab - the Manjha and the Salt Range tract
69in the Jhelum Division.
The Board also ordered the demolition of 172 of the 248 mud forts 
that existed in the Lahore Division. Of the 76 left intact, many were
6 6. Dalhousie to Gough, 12 March 1849, no 117: FSC, 31 March 1849, no
171 (NAI).
67. "PAR 1851", pp. 71-2: FM, no 356 (NAI).
6 8. For the orders given to these officers, see Gough and Innes, The Sikhs 
and the Sikh Wars, p.272.
69. FSC, 31 May 1850, nos 42-3 (NAI). The following is an abstract of 
the statement in the report:
Division Total arms seized Total persons punished
Lahore 38,994 432
Lei ah 1,991 1
Jhelum 72,653 511
Multan 5,794 12
Peshawar 407 -
Total 119,839 956
N.B. Figures for Cis-Sutlej and Trans-Sutlej- Divisions not provided. 
Figures for Peshawar Division refer to Hazara District only.
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in the Manjha. Dalhousie feared that these forts would be used
in any insurrection that might break out in the Manjha, so he ordered
their demolition, too, except where they could be used to quarter
71troops or police establishments. Sir Charles Napier, who was the
Commander-in-Chief in India after 1849, ridiculed Dalhousie's phobia
about the military importance of these forts and the possibility of
a serious insurrection in the Manjha (he also ridiculed just about
72every aspect of Dalhousie’s administration). Despite the fact 
that the Manjha was now completely surrounded with British troops,
Dalhousie's concern lest the defeated Sikhs resort to guerilla warfare 
there was not entirely without foundation, however.
With the disbanding of the Sikh army, thousands of Sikh Jats were
once again penned up on the marginal land of their Manjha villages.
Their situation was worsened by a dramatic fall in agricultural prices
immediately after annexation, and by a punitive revenue demand imposed
by the British settlement officers. These conditions led to a revivial
73of dacoity, or social banditry, the "favorite crime" of Sikh Jats.
The Board of Administration punished captured dacoits with monitory
severity, in some cases inflicting capital punishment even where death
or serious injury had not been caused, but lethal weapons had been used.
For example, in Amritsar District thirty-seven sentences of capital
punishment were handed down in the first year after annexation. The
74number in the second year was seven. Nearly all were for dacoity.
Nor could the possibility of an insurrection in the Manjha be 
discounted while the leaders of the late rebellion were still living 
there or had connections there. Bhai Maharaj Singh - the prophetic 
leader who had raised the Manjha in 1848 - was not captured until
70. FSC, 29 Dec 1849, nos 45-8 (NAI).
71. FSC, 31 May 1850, nos 47-9 (NAI).
72. Lt-General Sir Charles James Napier, Defects3 Civil and Military of 
the Indian Government (London, no date), pp. 396-7, 406.
73. "PAR 1851", pp. 128-9: FM, no 356 (NAI).
74. "The Administration of the Punjab” (no author), in The Calcutta Review, 
vo1 21, pt 41 (1853) , p.232.
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December 1849, by which time he had already begun a millenarian movement
among the Sikhs of the Bari and Jullundur Doabs aimed at ejecting the
British from the Punjab and restoring Khalsa rule. Bhai Maharaj
Singh was not brought to public trial, but was transported to a
75Singapore jail, where he died in 1856. The other rebel leaders -
the Atariwalas, the Morarias, Surut Singh Majithia, Diwan Hakim Rai -
were not placed on trial with Diwan Mul Raj after annexation, because
Dalhousie recognised that they had neither started the rebellion nor
mistreated their European prisoners, and that they had surrendered 
76unconditionally. But they were stripped of their titles and jagirs,
and placed under what amounted to house-arrest. The Atariwalas, for
example, were ordered to retire to their village, 20 miles east of
Lahore, where their activities were to be strictly limited, on pain
of being "punished as enemies of the British Government, and on no
77account pardoned."
Chatar Singh Atariwala soon ran afoul of these restrictions. In 
early September 1849 the government informer stationed at Atari village 
reported that Chatar Singh had used the occasion of a religious festival 
to assemble a large number of Brahmans at his house, and that his servants 
were maintaining communication with that part of the Sind Sagar Doab 
which he had previously held in jagir. Other reports suggested that 
the Morarias and Surut Singh Majithia had been corresponding with the 
Atariwalas, and that Diwan Hakim Rai had been receiving unauthorised 
visitors at his house in Sialkot. This information scarcely represented 
evidence of seditious intent on the part of these chieftains (indeed, 
the authenticity of the reports of the government informer at Atari 
village was not above question, for it appeared that he might have been 
bribed by the rival branch of Chatar Singh’s family). Nevertheless, 
when he received copies of these reports, Dalhousie ordered the Board
75. For further details, see Ahluwalia and Singh, The Punjab’s Pioneer 
Freedom Fighters, pp. 44-57.
76. Dalhousie's Minute, 18 Sept 1849: FSC, 24 Nov 1849, no 55 (NAI).
77. "Translation of a Roobakaree from Sir H.M. Lawrence K.C.B., Agent
to the Governor General and Resident at Lahore, dated 7th April 1849": 
FSP, 26 May 1849, no 70 (NAI).
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On 1 October 1849 the Board conducted lightning-quick dawn raids
on the homes of these chieftains. The chieftains and the adult males
of their immediate families were arrested. Denied even the ceremony
of a public trial, these men were just as quickly transported out of
the Punjab to jails in various parts of northern India. It was only
in 1853 that they were released. By then they were broken men. Their
79pensions were increased quite handsomely, but they were forbidden to 
return to the Punjab. Their exile was symbolic of the supremacy of 
the British over their homeland. Most of them spent the last few years 
of their lives at either Benares or Calcutta - as forgotten champions 
of a forgotten cause.
We conclude this section, with a look at the police force raised
by the British after 1849 and at the suppression of crime. In the
early years of British rule the police were ranged under two different
heads: the "preventative” police with a military organisation, and the
"detective" police with a civil organisation. The former, comprising
infantry for guarding jails and treasuries, and cavalry for guarding
civil stations and highways, were largely recruited from the darbar
regiments that had supported the British in 1848. Muslims outnumbered
81Sikhs and Hindus in both infantry and cavalry wings.
The "detective", civil police fell under three heads: a regular
establishment paid for by the State, the town and city watchmen paid
for by the urban communities, and the chowkidccrs, or rural constables,
paid for by the village communities. The regular establishment was
made up of 6,900 policemen. Police and revenue jurisdictions were so
arranged that two or more of the 228 police subdivisions - each with an
inspector, a couple of deputies and about thirty constables - coincided
82with one of the seventy-five tahsils . This enabled the tahsildars
of Administration to make a preemptive strike against these chieftains.
78. Elliot to BOA, 18 Sept 1849, no 285 (A): FSC, 24 Nov 1849, no 56 (NAI).
79. For details, see FSC, 26 Aug 1853, nos 80-92 (NAI).
80. For details, see FD, Political despatch to Secretary of State for India 
(hereafter SS), 8 Aug 1860, no 94 (NAI); FPP (A series), Dec 1869, nos 
171-6 (NAI); Griffin, et al. Chiefs and Families, vol 1, pp. 417,492.
81. "PAR 1851", pp. 49-50: FM, no 356 (NAI).
82. For tabular statements of fiscal and police jurisdictions in Sialkot 
District, see FPC, 14 Sept 1855, nos 132-40 (NAI).
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to exercise a general supervision over the local police. Throughout
the Punjab, and particularly in the western districts, the regular
police establishment was linked to the local, social power structure
83through the recruitment of tribal leaders as deputy inspectors.
Furthermore, a rough communal balance was maintained within the ranks
of the police: in 1871 the non-European component of the Punjab Police
Force (the military police and the regular civil police having been
amalgamated in 1861) was made up as follows - Muslims, 52 per cent;
84Hindus, 31 per cent; Sikhs, 17 per cent.
The other two heads of the civil police were urban watchmen, of
whom there were more than one thousand, and rural chowkidars, of whom
there were more than 30,000. These men were generally drawn from the 
85lower castes. Their duties were to make night patrols around the 
city wards or villages, and to report to the regular police on movements 
of strangers and on local disturbances. in 1851 chowkidars
86were armed with spears; in 1855 they were provided with swords.
The strength of the combined police force in the Punjab at the end
of the first year of British rule was around 46,000. At the end of 1856
it had risen to more than 53,000, which gave a police-population ratio
87of one policeman to every 239 people. The Punjab was a more intensely
policed province than any other in British India. In 1865 the ratio
of police (excluding urban watchmen and chowkidars') to population in the
Punjab was 1: 757. At that time the ratio in Oudh was 1: 1,087; in
the Central Provinces, 1: 1,153; in the North-Western Provinces, 1: 1,189;
88in Bengal Presidency, 1: 1,633 (and in England and Wales, 1: 907).
83. See, for example, SR Rawalpindi 1864, pp. 140-65; SR Gujrat 1861, p.153.
84. Report on the Administration of the Punjab and its Dependencies for 
the Year 1870-71 (Lahore, 1971), (hereafter PAR 1870-71), appendix
II. D. 3.
85. See, for example, SR Gurdaspur 1856, p.8 .
8 6. SR Amritsar 1856, sections dealing with Parganas Sowrian and Amritsar;
SR Gurdaspur 1856, pp. 8-10; SR Sialkot 1863, appendix 16; SR Gujrat 
1861, pp.149-52.
87. PAR 1854-56, p.10.
8 8. General Report on the Administration of the Punjab Territories for 
the year 1865-66 (Lahore, 1866), (hereafter PAR 1865-66), para 49.
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If we add to the strength of the combined police force in 1856 (53,226) 
the 59,656 troops of the army of occupation, we get the incredible 
ratio of one armed servant of the State for every 113 persons.
Clearly, early British rule in the Punjab was propped up by a massive 
amount of coercive force.
What was the extent of crdme, and how successful were the police
in combatting it? The official figures show that crime increased
annually during the first six years. By 1854 the number of reported
crimes per annum stood at 45,715: a ratio of one crime to every 278
persons. The following year the number dropped to 41,268, which gave
a ratio of one crime to every 308 persons; and this ratio continued
to fall thereafter. The official explanation of this pattern was that
the increase until 1854 was attributable to the ever-improving reporting
system (rather than any actual increase in the criminal tendencies of
the population), and that the decline after 1854 was attributable to the
89growing efficiency of the detective system in discouraging crime.
There would seem to be some truth to this. In Gujranwala District,
for instance, 844 cases of cattle-theft were reported in 1850. Only
25 per cent of these cases were brought to trial, however, and only
42 per cent of those persons apprendended were convicted. But by
1856 the number of reported cattle-thefts in the district had declined
90to 197, while 75 per cent of those apprendeneded were convicted.
But we cannot be sure that the British did not manipulate some of the
crime statistics in order to justify the imposition of their rule.
They claimed, for example, that thugi (ritualistic robbery and murder)
had flourished in the Punjab during the period 1845-49, there being in
excess of 100 of these murders in each of those years. During the
first three years of British rule 552 men were arrested (328 were executed
or imprisoned) on suspicion of thugi activities. By 1852 only thirty-five
91such murders were reported; by 1853 the figure had fallen to one.
89. PAR 1854-56, pp. 6-14.
90. PAR 1861-62, paras 41-3.
91. PAR 1851-53, paras 166-8; "The Administration of the Punjab" (no 
author), in The Calcutta Review, vol 21, pt 41 (1853), pp. 233-4.
210
It is worth noting that the volume of reported crime was considerably 
higher in the Lahore Division than elsewhere. During the year 1850-51, 
for instance, the number of reported crimes was 7,982 in the Lahore 
Division, while the comparative numbers were 3,235 in the Jhelum 
Division, 3,330 in the Multan Division and 2,535 in the Leiah Division. 
Serious crime was more prevalent in the Lahore Division, too. During 
the first two years eighty-three capital sentences were handed down in 
that Division, whereas in Jhelum, Multan, and Leiah Divisions the
92comparative numbers were nineteen, thirteen, and twenty-three respectively.
Part of the explanation of this pattern has to do with Lahore Division's
greater population. Yet we cannot overlook what the first Punjab
Administration Report called "the more violent nature of the people of 
93the Manjha." We have already seen that one result of the disbanding
of the Sikh army after 1849 was the flooding of the agriculturally
insecure Manjha with disgruntled Khalsa soldiers who found, for a few
94years at least, an outlet for their thwarted ambitions in aacoity.
The British were by no means unaware of the connection between crime and
agricultural insecurity. It was precisely for that reason that the
first major public works scheme to receive official sanction after 1849
was the Bari Doab canal system, which was to run through the heart of
the Manjha, and which was viewed as the best measure for ensuring the
95"permanent tranquility" of that tract.
The question of revenue assignments
The Sikhs, once they had conquered the Punjab, had supported their 
public servants and conciliated the rural elites by granting them revenue 
assignments (jagirs and inams), revenue-free lands (ma'afis) and pensions.
How would the British, now that they were masters of the Punjab, treat
92. Taken from a "more or less perfect" return of crime in "PAR 1851",
p. 125: FM, no 356 (NAI). See also PAR 1851-53, paras 181, 206, 209.
93. "PAR 1851", p.126: FM, no 356 (NAI).
94. Davies, settlement officer in the Bari Doab, claimed that former
Khalsa soldiers were "extravagant— bad cultivators-- litigious and
false--given to intoxication": SR Amritsar 1856, p.37.
95. FSC, 28 April 1848, nos 57-66 (NAI); FPP, 4 Aug 1849, nos 87-93 
(NAI).
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these grants? Would they recognise any of them, and on what terms?
Would they permit recognised jagir grantees to retain any administrative 
powers within their grants? These are vitally important questions, 
for the answers to them tell us a good deal about the extent to which 
the British were concerned to maintain and ultilise an extra-bureaucratic 
power system. In particular, the answers to these questions provide 
an insight into the great friction that developed between the Lawrence 
brothers and led Dalhousie to dissolve the Board of Administration.
When he came to issuing his general instructions to the Board, 
Dalhousie had, on the question of assignments, to choose between the 
radically divergent policies espoused by the two Lawrence brothers.
Henry Lawrence held that it would be both politically sensible and 
morally just to uphold in full and in perpetuity the grants and powers 
of those Punjabis who had stood by the British in 1848-49, while 
those who had opposed the British should be conciliated through practicable 
magnanimity. John Lawrence, on the other hand, was intrinsically 
opposed to the notion of alienating, especially on a permanent basis,
State revenues to persons he would have regarded as unproductive 
"hangers-on". His policy had not changed since 1846, at which time 
he had, as Commissioner of the Trans-Sutlej~ Territories, forcefully 
advocated the strategy of abrogating
every Jageer possible, simply granting to the occupants of
any number of years, a life interest, so as gradually and
steadily but without a convulsion, to ensure^ghe annihilation
of every Jageer tenure in a course of years.
Dalhousie opted for John Lawrence’s line of policy. His instructions 
to the Board of Administration specified that no grant should be upheld 
in favour of any person who had joined the late rebellion. No person 
confirmed in his grant should be permitted to retain any administrative 
or magisterial power within that grant. All grants upheld should be 
subjected to the normal revenue assessment so as to prevent rack-renting. 
Every person confirmed in his grant should be obliged to yeild up all 
documents (sanads), and should be issued with a new sanod, under the 
Board's seal, declaring the grant to be a gift of the British Government 
(the purpose of this instruction was to help disabuse grantees of the 
notion that they possessed inherent rights in their grants by virtue of
96. "Note by the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Trans-Sutlej 
Territories", 16 Nov 1846: FPC, 31 Dec 1847, no 2195 (NAI).
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long occupancy of special consideration on the part of former rulers).
Finally, the maximum period for which various types of grants might be
97upheld, and the conditions that should be imposed, were set out.
Over the four years of its existence, the Board supervised, in 
general accordance with these instructions, the disposition of many 
thousands of claims - the value of grants claimed ranged from just a 
few rupees per annum to several lakhs of rupees per annum. In its 
first administration report the Board classified these claims into three 
broad groups of grants
1. PERSONAL GRANTS
- pensions
- royal ladies 
family provision
- influential landholders
2. RELIGIOUS GRANTS
endowments
charity
- holymen
3. SERVICE GRANTS
household
military
civil
- feudal
97. Elliot to BOA, 31 March 1849, no 418: FSC, 28 April 1849, no 73
(NAI). It is interesting to note that this last set of rules was 
practically a verbatim replica of the rules Lord Hardinge had provided 
John Lawrence with in 1847 to govern the disposition of claims in 
the Jullundur Doab: GOI, FD, to C and S Trans-Sutlej States, 23 
Feb 1847: FPC, 31 Dec 1847, no 2197 (NAI). The fundamental condition 
demanded by both Hardinge and Dalhousie was the relinquishment to the 
State of one-quarter of the jagiv grant as nazvana (offering).
John Lawrence, it would seem, was responsible for the installation 
of the (mistaken) notion that the levying of nazvana was a strict, 
systematic practice on the part of the Sikhs: see, for example,
John Lawrence to Henry Lawrence, 28 Nov 1846, no 690: FPC, 31 Dec 
1847, no 2443 (NAI); John Lawrence, quoted in Melvill to Offg Secy 
to GOI, 3 March 1853, no 6 8: RDP, 5 March 1853, no 4 (PS).
98. "PAR 1851", para 235: FM, no 356 (NAI).
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Such a classification was, of course, a device for administrative 
convenience, not an accurate taxonomy of revenue assignments and pensions 
under Sikh rule. Nevertheless, it may be adopted as a framework for 
our discussion of the disposition of claims.
We begin with "personal grants". State pensions were small
cash/jagir allowances that the Sikhs had granted in superannuation to
former servants, or in recognition of either hardship or special service.
Most of these pensions had been paid by the kardars out of the district 
99treasuries. The British maintained certain portions of these pensions, 
according to length of service and related considerations. 100 Cash/ 
jagir grants held by royal ladies were generally upheld for life, though 
the jagir portions were commuted, wherever possible, into cash pensions 
of equivalent value. 101 Family provision grants - especially where they 
had been made by jagirdars themselves, rather than by the Sikh rulers - 
were usually disallowed.10^
The most important "personal grants" were inams, or revenue deductions 
in favour of influential landholders (in particular, chaudharis and 
lambardars). Many of these inams, especially the smaller ones, represented 
recent grants from the Sikh kardars. However, almost as many were of 
long standing, held by hereditary lambardars and members of the proprietary 
lineages whose ancestors had founded villages in the wastelands. There 
was scarcely a village in the Punjab that did not contain at least one 
inam lambardari or inam zamindari. These inams were investigated and 
disposed of at the time of the regular land revenue settlements. We 
have already seen that after 1849 the British tended to by-pass the 
chaudharis, and that those lambardars whose services were retained were 
rewarded with small cash deductions from the village revenues. Presumably,
99. For examples, see FPP, 8 April 1853, no 165 (NAI). In 1849 these 
pensions were worth, in total, about Rs 3 lakhs per annum: FSP,
28 July 1849, no 39 (NAI).
100. For examples, see FPP, 3 April 1850, nos 227-9 (NAI); FPC, 11 Feb 1853, 
nos 53-5 (NAI).
101. "PAR 1851", para 240: FM, no 356 (NAI).
102. For example, FPC, 12 March 1852, no 95 (NAI); FC, 27 April 1854, no 15 
(NAI).
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claims to inams (especially those granted by the kardars) would not
103now be recognised. Generally, this was in fact the case - the
inamdars whose grants were upheld were invariably those chaudharis
104and lambardars who had assisted with the settlement operations.
In only a few instances were inams (or portions of them) upheld on 
account of the local importance of the claimants. 105
The second of the Board's categories was that of "religious grants". 
Incorporated under this heading were many thousands of jagir, cash, 
grain, and revenue-free land (ma'afi) grants made by the Sikhs in charity 
(dharmarth) or piety (madad-i-ma'ash). The vast majority of these grants, 
being of small value, were investigated and reported by the officers 
who conducted the regular settlement operations. The presentation of 
the results of these investigations makes it difficult for us to analyse 
the treatment of these grants.10  ^ Therefore, we shall concentrate on 
the larger "religious grants", which were reported to the Board, and 
thence to the supreme government, for a final decision.
Endowments, the first of the Board's subcategories, were grants 
made by the Sikhs (and, in some cases, the Mughals) for the support of 
mosques, temples, shrines, and places of shelter (sarais or dharmsalas) 
for travellers, the sick, and the poor. By and large, the British 
appreciated the social importance and utility of these institutions, and 
upheld in perpetuity their maintenance grants, subject only to the upkeep
103. For example, only one-quarter of the combined rupee value of 107 
inams claimed in Amritsar and Gurdaspur Districts was upheld (for 
life), even though more than one-third of these inams had been 
granted prior to Ranjit Singh's period: FPP, 11 July 1856, no 211;
8 Aug 1856, no 207; 5 Sept 1856, nos 111, 113 (NAI).
104. RDP, 8 Nov 1856, nos 41-6 (PS). For the upholding of the inams 
of fifteen chaudharis who had given this kind of assistance, see 
SR Amritsar 1856, p.28.
105. For an example, see FPP, 5 Sept 1856, no 111 (NAI), case no 5.
106. In the settlement reports enormous numbers of small cases are often 
lumped together under the term ma'afi (sometimes lakhiraj) without 
reference to either form {jagir 3 ma'afi, or cash) or purpose (personal, 
religious, service) of bestowal. In addition, usually only the 
aggregate value of grants upheld (and not grants claimed) is specified.
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of the institutions and the good conduct of their wardens. But
not all British officers looked upon these institutions with toleration.
One Assistant Settlement Commissioner described them as "the residence
of certain idle hereditary servitors--the resort often of vagrants or
108ill-disposed vicious persons." Dalhousie's instructions to the
Board had specified that endowments of "great value" were to be restricted
109to a smaller amount "from obvious motives of political expedience."
Consequently, many of the larger endowments were reduced in value by
one-half or more. 110 Even so, none of these grants were treated with
anything like the severity shown elsewhere. In several cases, where
the grantees were later acknowledged to have been treated unfairly,
the earlier decisions on their claims were set aside and new ones were
handed down. 111 And British officers were expressly forbidden to
interfere in the internal affairs of the institutions supported by these
endowments. "The people must manage their own religious institutions",
ran a Chief Commissioner's Circular of 1858. "If such institutions
112suffer from internal disputes, that is their business not ours."
Charitable grants were small subsistence allowances, worth between 
Rs 20 and Rs 80 per annum in most instances, which the Sikhs had made 
in dharmarth to individuals for a variety of religious purposes: for 
giving water to travellers, for lighting tombs, for reading prayers, 
for making offerings, and so forth. Most of these grants were now resumed.
107. For examples, see RDP, 17 Sept 1853, nos 48-53; 25 Feb 1854, nos 
62-5; 6 June 1857, nos 16-18; 4 Dec 1858, nos 22-4 (PS).
108. SR Gujranuala 1866-67, p.13.
109. Elliot to BOA, 31 March 1849, no 418: FSC, 28 April 1849, no 73 (NAI).
110. For the example of a grant held by a Sikh temple in the Manjha, see 
RDP, 14 May 1853, nos 38-41 (PS).
111. For an example, see RDP, 30 Dec 1854, no 35; 25 Oct 1856, nos 6-8 (PS)
112. Secy to CC to all C and S's, 25 Aug 1858, Circular no 23: FPC, 21 
Jan 1859, no 351 (NAI).
113. For example, 207 charitable grants in Lahore and Gujranwala Districts 
were treated thus: 75 per cent of the total allowances claimed was 
resumed, and small cash donations were sometimes made instead: RDP,
10 April 1852, no 193 (PS); FPC, 21 May 1852, nos 141-4; 18 June 
1852, nos 181-6 (NAI). For other examples, see FPP, 7 Jan 1853, 
nos 243-4 (NAI); RDP, 29 Oct 1853, nos 38-42 (PS).
107
113
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Grants to holymen, though they were also dharmarth subsistence 
allowances, were distinguished from charitable grants on account of 
their greater value and their hereditary nature. Also, they were held 
almost exclusively by Sikh holymen - Bhais, Granthis, Akalis and Nihangs - 
and leading representatives of the gots to which the Sikh Gurus had 
belonged - Bedis, Bhallas, Sodhis. In a sense, they were as much 
political as religious grants, for many of their recipients, far from 
having led cloistered lives, had been warrior-priests and militant 
champions of the principle of Sikh theocracy. There can be no doubt 
that Ranjit Singh had looked upon these jagir grants as a means of 
conciliating the Sikh ultra-orthodoxy. How would the British view them?
Not surprisingly, this question had produced two quite different 
answers in 1846, at the time of the investigation into the Jullundur Doab 
jagirs. Henry Lawrence had argued that jagirs held by holymen represented 
religious gifts from the Sikh rulers and that, like endowments, they 
should be upheld in perpetuity where no offence against the British had 
been committed. John Lawrence, on the other hand, had asserted that 
the maintenance of these jagirs was inconsistent with the spirit of 
British rule: to uphold them in perpetuity would be to preserve a class 
of men "too proud and self sufficient to work for [their] own bread.1,1^
He had advocated the resumption of as many of these jagirs as was possible, 
and the imposition on the remainder of the nazrana levy of one-quarter.
In 1847 the supreme government had decided in favour of John Lawrence’s 
policy. So it was in 1849, too. Dalhousie revived Hardinge’s earlier 
ruling that jagirs held by holymen were not inherently different from 
those held by the chieftains, and that claims to them should be adjudicated 
according to the same principles. 115
It would seem that, by and large, these principles were followed: 
holymen who had remained aloof from the 1848 rebellion were confirmed in
114. "Note by the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Trans-Sutlej 
Territories", 16 Nov 1846: FPC, 31 Dec 1847, no 2195 (NAI).
115. Elliot to BOA, 31 March 1849, no 418: FSC, 28 April 1849, no 73 
(NAI).
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their jagirs - usually for their lives only - subject to the relinquishment 
of one-quarter as n a z r a n a But there were certain cases where the 
Board recommended the release of some portion of the jagirs in perpetuity. 
To these recommendations, the supreme government responded in a quite 
arbitrary fashion, sanctioning some but rejecting at least as many -
117especially those where John Lawrence's full concurrence was missing.
Arbitrary decisions like these were neither understood nor appreciated
by the Court of Directors in London. In April 1854 the Court drew the
Government of India's attention to the fact that on numerous occasions
the Governor General had sanctioned the Board's perpetuity recommendations
while yet rejecting the same recommendation in cases of what appeared
to be "exactly parallel circumstances".
The impossibility [continued the Court's letter] of tracing
any fixed principle through the various decisions--induces
us now to lay down as a rule that if a Jagheer has been in 
the uninterrupted possession of one family for 60 years, a
part of the Estate-- shall descend in perpetuity to the lineal
male heirs of the Jagheerdar, who held the Estate at the time 
when the Country came under our Government.
The Court did not intend that this be taken as an inflexible rule:
obviously, there would be cases where it could not be applied fully,
or at all. But in all such instances of deviation from the new rule,
the Court was entitled to receive a special report. Furthermore, all
cases where the final decision was pending were to be re-examined in
119the light of this new rule.
120Dalhousie's official response to the Court's letter was so 
indignant and hostile, however, that the Court backed down. In 
February 1855 it claimed, rather half-heartedly, that its instructions
116. For the disposition of jagir claims by 109 Bedi families, see FPP, 
14 Jan 1853, nos 212-23 (NAI). For the disposition of twenty-five 
cases of claims by Granthis, see FPP, 14 Jan 1853, nos 234-5 (NAI). 
For the disposition of claims by Bhallas in various districts, see 
RDP, 3 Sept 1853, nos 54-9 (PS).
117. For examples, see RDP, 16 Nov 1850, no 26; 19 Feb 1853, no 23; 4 
April 1857, nos 4-5 (PS).
118. Political Despatch from COD: FC, 27 April 1854, no 15, paras 40-4, 
79-82, 84, 90 (NAI).
119. Ibid.
120. The greater portion of Dalhousie's reply is quoted in Political 
Despatch from COD: FC, 7 Feb 1855, no 5 (NAI).
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had in no way been intended (as Dalhousie had suggested) as a revocation
of past decisions. The Government of India was free to disregard the
sixty-year rule. All that the Court wished now to suggest was that
in future a more lenient attitude be shown towards those jagirdars who
121had enjoyed long possession of their grants. But for the majority
of jagir claimants this request came too late: by 1855 most medium and
large jagir claims had already been decided. It was extremely unlikely -
during Dalhousie's term of office at any rate - that the Government of
India would reconsider those decisions voluntarily. Only those few
individuals who knew how to tap the higher levels of influence in London
122stood any chance of getting a reconsideration of their claims.
We turn now to "service grants", the most important class of grants
from a political as well as fiscal viewpoint. Household grants were
small jagirs and cash allowances held by khidmatgars (personal servants -
cooks, gardeners, musicians, and so forth) of the Sikh royal families.
These grants were resumed, long-serving claimants being pensioned off
123at rates determined by length of service. Military grants were
jagirs held by officers of the erstwhile Khalsa army. Where these men 
had joined the late rebellion, the Board's duty was clear: no jagirs 
could be upheld. Table 5 : 1 shows the sanctioned disposition of claims 
by 184 rebel officers. The entire jagir portion of these claims was 
resumed. Slightly more than one-quarter of the cash portion was released 
as life pensions. These pensions represented less than 10 per cent of 
the total grants previously enjoyed. At one stroke, then, the annual 
income of these men was reduced, on average, from Rs 1,665 to Rs 163.
Where the soldiers had not joined the rebellion, the Board's duty 
was more complicated. According to the rules, "service grants" claimed 
by "loyal" grantees were to be upheld, subject to the relinquishment of
121. Ibid.
122. For the example of two Sodhi brothers of Gurdaspur District who in
1857 successfully petitioned the British Parliament for the release 
of part of their jaqir in perpetuity, see RDP, 4 April 1857, nos 4-5; 
28 Nov 1857, nos 24-6 (PS).
123. The scale of pensions was as follows: for 25-30 years of service, 
one-quarter of the former grant; for 30-35 years, one-third; for 
35 or more years, one half. Where the grant was a superannuation 
allowance, it was maintained in full: "PAR 1851", para 235: FM, no 
356 (NAI).
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Table 5 : 1 Disposition of jagir and cash grants held by two groups
of regular army officers involved in the late rebellion
Group 1 Group 2 Total
1. Number of cases 93 91 184
2. Annual value of grants 
(Rs)
Jagir 103,856 93,671 197,527
Cash 53,500 53,577 107,077
Total 157,356 147,248 304,604
3. Disposition of grants 
(Rs)
A Resumed
i Jagir 103,856 93,671 197,527
ii Cash 33,490 43,633 77,123
iii Total 137,346 137,304 274,650
B Upheld
Cash pensions 20,010 9,944 29,954
Sources: Group 1: "Statement of the Resumed, or Proposed to be Resumed, 
Jagirs of Officers of the Regular Army who fought against the 
British with Amount of Pensions Proposed to be Conferred upon 
Them": FSP, 28 July 1849, nos 46-8 (NAI); Group 2: "Roll of
91 Rebel Sirdars and Petty Officers who were concerned in the 
Rebellion": FPP, 27 Sept 1850, nos 73-4 (NAI).
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one-quarter as nazrana, each case to be open to reconsideration at
the grantee’s death. In addition, the Board was entitled to recommend
more favourable treatment in certain cases, such as where the grant
had been enjoyed for a long and unbroken period (as with small jagir
patrimonies won by the sword of the grantee's ancestor), or where the
grantee had performed some special act of loyalty to the British during
the late rebellion. It seems that what often happened, when the Board
came to consider these claims, was that a compromise was reached between
the extreme wishes of the Lawrence brothers: Henry Lawrence accepted a
higher rate of resumption in the case of some claims in return for
preferential treatment in the case of others. The disposition of claims
by 350 "loyal" irregular soldiers, shown in Table 5 : 2 ,  makes this clear.
Sixty-three per cent of the combined (jagir and cash) claims was resumed.
The incidence of resumption was higher in the case of jagir claims (41
per cent) than cash claims (16 per cent). On the other hand, 41 per
cent of that amount upheld was upheld beyond the lifetimes of the claimants
(39 per cent on a perpetuity basis). Not that this entailed any great
fiscal sacrifice by the State: within a few decades fully 76 per cent
of the combined grants claimed in 1849 would be recovered, first by
resumptions and later by lapses. The real sacrifice was therefore borne
by the majority of the claimants. The disposition of these claims
terminated, for many military families of medium social and political
status, an era of comparative prosperity and secure employment that had
124begun with the rise of the Sikhs.
Civil grants were jagirs and cash allowances held by civil servants 
of the old regime. Where, for reasons of old age or incompetency, these 
men were not taken into British service, they were upheld in one-quarter,
124. Case no 3 in pt 1 of the statement, that of Gurdut Singh, provides 
a typical example. Gurdut Singh was a 46 year-old Jat, of Kurial 
village in Gujranwala District, who had served in the irregular force 
for 30 years. His grand-uncle had ruled the district (Shekhupura) 
before the rise of the Sikh monarchy, and four successive generations 
of the family had served the Sikh State. In 1849 Gurdut Singh held 
a jagir worth Rs 360 and a cash grant of Rs 161 per annum. The 
BOA's decision on his claim was to concede a life pension of Rs 360 
per annum in lieu of both.
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Table 5 : 2 Disposition of jagir and cash grants held by a group of
irregular soldiers not involved in the late rebellion
1. Number of cases 350
2. Annual value of grants (Rs)
Jagir 139,472
Cash 27,834
Total 167,306
3. Disposition of grants (Rs)
A. Resumed
i Jagir 56,969
ii Cash 4,352
iii Total 61,321
B. Upheld
i Jagir
For life only 38,979
For two lives 2,651
In perpetuity 40,873
ii Cash pensions
For life only 23,282
For two lives 200
iii Total 105,985
4. Cash donations given (Rs) 11,185
Source’. Pension roll no 44, pts 1, 2 and 3, "Statement of Jageerdar 
and Mushmool Sowars (or Military Rent-free Tenantry) of the 
Irregular Force of the Late Lahore Durbar" : FPP, 26 Dec 1851, 
nos 254-5 (NAI).
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one-third or one-half of their former grants, according to length of
125service. But wherever possible, this was on a life basis only,
and cash pensions were substituted for jagirs. A statement of the
disposition of claims by twenty-three munshis (writers), for example,
shows that 25 per cent of the total grants claimed was upheld (on average,
the munshi's grant was reduced from Rs 3,423 to Rs 872 per annum).
Fully 98 per cent of that upheld was upheld for life only. And about
65 per cent of that upheld was in the form of cash pensions rather than 
126jagirs. Kardars who had remained "loyal" in 1848 and were not taken
into British service were treated with slightly more indulgence. Table 
5 : 3 shows the disposition of claims by sixty-four kardars and family 
members. Only 58 per cent of the total grants claimed was resumed; 
nine per cent of that upheld was upheld in perpetuity; and 62 per cent 
of that upheld was in the form of jagirs. On average, the kardar's 
annual income was reduced by 60 per cent - from Rs 3,045 to Rs 1,226.
Feudal grants, being jagirs held by the chieftains, were in every 
way the most important of the "service grants", and we intend spending a 
little time examining their treatment by the British. The crucial 
question that we hope to be able to answer is this: just how interested 
were the British in maintaining a chieftain class in the Punjab? Given 
that there was room for only a few chieftains in the new administration 
and police force, would the British be prepared to lend the financial 
support necessary to ensure the survival of the rest?
So far as the rebel chieftains were concerned, the Board's duty was
quite clear: these chieftains were to be stripped of their titles and
127jagirs, and granted life pensions not in excess of Rs 300 per month.
Table 5 : 4 shows the disposition of claims by thirty-eight rebel chieftains 
and their families. All the jagirs were resumed. Cash pensions, the 
average value of which was Rs 128 per month, were bestowed. In only
125. For pensions to a former naib-adalati and an acting adalati, see 
GDP, 14 July 1849, no 795 (PS); RDP, 16 Feb 1850, no 18 (PS).
126. Pt 1 of "Statement No 1 of Jageers and Cash Allowances of Certain 
Durbar Munshees and Kardars": FPP, 3 April 1850, nos 193-5 (NAI).
127. Elliot to BOA, 10 May 1849, no 199: FSP, 26 May 1849, no 71 (NAI).
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Table 5 : 3 Disposition of jagir and cash grants held by two groups
of kardars and their families
Group 1 Group 2 Total
1. Number of cases 26 38 64
2. Annual value of grants 
(Rs)
Jagir 53,015 72,075 125,090
Cash 31,260 38,514 69,774
Total 84,275 110,589 194,864
3. Disposition of grants 
(Rs)
A. Resumed
i Jagir 28,345 46,763 75,128
ii Cash 22,639 16,090 38,729
iii Total 50,984 62,853 113,837
B. Upheld
i Jagir
For life only 23,170 20,772 43,942
In perpetuity 1,500 4,540 6,040
ii Cash
For life only 8,621 21,424 30,045
In perpetuity ----  1,000 1,000
iii Total 33,291 47,736 81,027
4. Cash donations given (Rs) ----  4,025 4,025
Sources: Group 1: Pt 2 of "Statement No 1 of Jageers and Cash Allowances 
of Certain Durbar Munshees and Kardars": FPP, 3 April 1850, nos 
193-5 (NAI); Group 2: "Statement No 2 of Jageers and Cash 
Allowances of Certain Kardars and Others in Service of the 
Lahore Durbar at Annexation": FPP, 6 Sept 1850, nos 31-2 (NAI).
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Table 5 : 4 Disposition of jagir grants held by two groups of chieftains
involved in the late rebellion
1. Number of cases
2. Annual value of jagirs 
(Rs)
Service
Personal
Total
3. Jagirs resumed (Rs)
4. Cash pensions given (Rs)
Group 1 Group 2 Total
24 14 38
331,059 87,800 418,859
287,022 37,850 324,872
618.081 125,650 743,731
618.081 125,650 743,731 
42,670 15,640 58,310
Sources'. Group 1: "Return of Sikh Chiefs engaged in the late Rebellion, 
showing the amount and value of their Jageers lately resumed 
and the Allowances it is proposed to grant to each": FSP, 26 
May 1849, nos 68-71 (NAI); Group 2: "Appendix to Statement 
No 1 (forwarded to Government on 1 June 1849)": FSP, 28 July 
1849, nos 46-8 (NAI).
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one case did the Board recommend the maximum pension of Rs 300 per month.
The annual income of these chieftain families was thus reduced, on average,
by 92 per cent - from Rs 19,572 to Rs 1,536. How did they cope with
such a drastic diminution in income? Most of them simply pulled in
their belts and went back to the agricultural livlihood from which they 
129had risen. But some, who had large families to support and inadequate
landed resources, struggled to adapt to their new circumstances. For
example, in October 1849 Saunders, who was the magistrate at Amritsar,
reported that one chieftain, Surut Singh Majithia, was in financial
difficulty: since the resumption of his jagirs he had been unable to
pay for "the common necessities of life", and had been running up an
account with the local shopkeepers while awaiting his first pension 
130payment. Clearly, the British intended to humble the rebel chieftains.
The palaces of many a rebel chieftain were confiscated or destroyed -
the idea being, as one Commissioner put it, to force him to "resort to
131a meaner abode, and thus diminish his importance."
The "loyal" chieftains received more favourable treatment. Whether 
they were treated fairly, however, was a keenly disputed question in the 
early 1850s. Let us consider the facts. Table 5 : 5 shows the 
disposition of jagirs claims by sixty-two loyal chieftains and their 
families. Altogether, nearly half of the jagirs claimed were resumed.
The service portion of each jagir was, of course, automatically invalidated 
by the post-annexation dissolution of feudal levies. And, according to 
Dalhousie's rules, one-quarter of each personal jagir should have been 
relinquished in nazrana. As it turned out, each case was decided on 
its own merits, so that the nazrana demand was sometimes imposed, sometimes 
not. Altogether, only 11 per cent of personal jagirs was resumed.
128. That of Kahan Singh Majithia, case no 19 in group 1 of the table.
The BOA recommended the full pension because Kahan Singh had only 
joined the rebellion from timidity. Dalhousie objected, but finally 
sanctioned the recommendation.
129. Kahan Singh, for example, used his two ceremonial elephants to plough 
the ancestral fields in Majithia village: Griffin, et at., Chiefs 
and Families, vol 1, p.416.
130. Saunders to Montgomery, C and S Lahore Division, 6 Oct 1849: FSC,
24 Nov 1849, no 61 (NAI).
131. Edward Thornton, C and S Jhelum Division, to Melvill, 25 Sept 1851, 
no 479: annexed to "PAR 1851", p. 175: FM, nos 356-7 (NAI).
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Table 5 : 5 Disposition of jagir grants held by four groups of chieftains
not involved in the late rebellion
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Total
Number of 36 10 3 13 62
cases
Annual value 
of jagirs (Rs)
Service 493,013 49,837 3,513 16,565 562,928
Personal 604,661 96,873 5,219 29,880 736,633
Total 1,097,674 146,710 8,732 46,445 1,299,561
Disposition of 
jagirs (Rs)
A. Resumed
i Service 490,653 49,837 3,513 16,565 560,568
ii Personal 66,281 10,208 415 6 , 1 0 0 83,004
iii Total 556,934 60,045 3,928 22,665 643,572
B. Upheld 
i For life 415,314 72,112 443 14,480 502,349
only 
ii For two 6,050 4,953 11,003
lives 
iii In per­ 119,376 9,600 4,361 9,300 142,637
petuity 
iv Total 540,740 86,665 4,804 23,780 655,989
Cash pensions 
given (Rs)
For life only 38,822 4,225 3,850 46,897
For two lives 3,625 6,840 10,465
In perpetuity 3,456 2,040 5,496
Total 45,903 13,105 3,850 62,858
Sources: Group 1: "A List of the Principal Jagheerdars of the Punjab not 
concerned in the Insurrection of 1848-49, showing what they have 
enjoyed hitherto, and what provision is recommended for them 
hereafter": FPC, 29 Dec 1849, no 49A (NAI); Group 2: "First
Supplementary List of the Principal Jagheerdars of the Punjab--":
FPP, 3 April 1850, nos 279-82 (NAI); Group 3: "Second Supplementary 
List---": FPP, 31 May 1850, nos 108-10 (NAI); Group 4: RDP,
27 July 1850, nos 127-28 (PS). Case no 8 of Group 2, involving 
total jagirs of Rs. 16,780, does not specify the amounts granted 
in service and personal jagirs. I have divided the total amount 
according to the usual proportions, ie. 2/5 service, 3/5 personal.
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This moderate application of the nazrana rule, together with the
bestowal of Rs 62,858 worth of pensions, meant that the "loyal"
chieftain's annual income was reduced, on average, by only 45 per
cent (compared with 92 per cent in the "rebel" chieftain's case) -
from Rs 20,961 to Rs 11,594. But - and this was the point of bitter
dissension between the Board's members - the provision made for the
heirs of the "loyal" chieftain was negligible. Some time after the
disposition of these claims, John Lawrence maintained that it had been
the Board's policy and practice to recommend the release of "about
132one-third" of large jagirs in perpetuity. While such a rule of
thumb might have been applied to a few cases included in Table 5 : 5 ,  
the composite picture is a quite different one. Only 11 per cent of 
the total jagirs claimed, and only 22 per cent of those upheld, was 
upheld in perpetuity. Only 9 per cent of the cash pensions substituted 
for jagirs was bestowed in perpetuity. This meant that, within three 
generations, the State would recover no less than 89 per cent of the 
jagir revenues claimed by loyal chieftains in 1849.
It would seem, therefore, that John Lawrence and Dalhousie were 
not particularly concerned to preserve a loyal aristocracy in post­
annexation Punjab. The treatment of the claims of the six "loyal"
133members of the erstwhile Council of Regency provides further proof
of this. These chieftains, it will be recalled, had been placed in
high administrative offices during the Residency period: two of them,
Tej Singh and Dina Nath, had been created Rajas. We may expect to see
their cooperation during the pre-annexation period rewarded after 1849,
not least because they possessed written guarantees, given to them by
Henry Elliot on the eve of annexation, that their jagirs and cash salaries
would not be reduced during their own lives, and that where their grants
134conveyed a perpetual title they would be upheld in perpetuity. But
132. Quoted in Melvill to Offg Secy to GOI, 3 March 1853, no 6 8: RDP,
5 March 1853, no 4 (PS).
133. Raja Tej Singh, Raja Dina Nath, Faqir Nur-ud-Din Bokhari, Bhai Nidhan 
Singh, Atar Singh Kaliwala, and Shamsher Singh Sindhanwalia.
134. PP, inclosure 8 in no 51.
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the British failed to honour these pledges. Elliot's guarantees
brought these chieftains no special treatment whatever. Table 5 : 6
gives the details. On average, each of these chieftains lost 38 per
cent of his previous jagirs (this included nearly Rs 2,000 worth of
personal jagirs). Only 11 per cent of the total jagirs claimed, and
only 18 per cent of those upheld, was upheld in perpetuity. In 1862
Lord Canning, who was Dalhousie's successor after 1856, noted that the
non-observance of Elliot's earlier guarantees Mis not, so far as the
135official papers go, clearly explained."
However, we can gain some appreciation of how these guarantees
came to be set aside by examining the official correspondence on the
claims of two of these chieftains: Raja Dina Nath and Faqir Nur-ud-Din 
136Bokhari. Raja Dina Nath claimed jagirs worth Rs 46,550 per annum.
The members of the Board were unanimous that these jagirs should be upheld 
for life. What they could not agree upon, however, was whether any 
portion should descend to the Raja's heirs. Henry Lawrence argued that 
at least Rs 4,000 worth should be upheld in perpetuity "as a politic 
measure". Charles Mansel agreed with this. But John Lawrence disagreed 
entirely. "My objection to giving the Rajah Jagheers in perpetuity", 
he wrote on the statement, "is simply that he is but a man of yesterday, 
of no connection or local influence in the Country, and has only risen 
to what he has lately been since Runjeet Singh's death." Faqir Nur-ud- 
Din Bokhari claimed jagirs worth Rs 13,225 and a cash salary of Rs 7,660. 
Henry Lawrence recommended that both be upheld for life, and that each 
of the Faqir's sons and nephews be granted Rs 1,000 per annum in perpetuity 
as "good policy". Mansel agreed with the first part of Lawrence's 
recommendation, but thought that all that would be required at the Faqir's 
death would be an increase in the cash pensions elsewhere provided for 
his youngest sons. Predictably, John Lawrence argued that only the 
Faqir's jagirs ought to be upheld, and then only for the Faqir's own life.
135. Canning's Minute, 10 March 1862: FPP "A" series, March 1862, nos 
318-20 (NAI).
136. This paragraph is based on Melvill to Elliot, 9 Oct 1850, no 541: 
FPP, 22 Nov 1850, no 117 (NAI).
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Table 5 : 6 Disposition of jagir and cash grants held by six members 
of the former Council of Regency not involved in the late 
rebellion.
1. Number of cases 6
2. Annual value of grants (Rs)
Jagir
i Service 173,650
ii Personal 320,240
iii Total 493,890 
Cash 13,660 
Total 507,550
3. Disposition of grants (Rs)
A. Resumed 
Jagir
i Service 173,650
ii Personal 11,984
iii Total 185,634
Cash
Total 185,634
B. Upheld
Jagir
i For life only 253,585
ii In perpetuity 54,671
iii Total 308,256
Cash
i For life only 13,660
Total 321,916
Source: "Statement showing the Emoluments in Land and Cash of certain 
Principal Chiefs of the Punjab, as enjoyed by them before the 
Annexation of the Punjab, and upheld to them by the British 
Government after Annexation": FPC, 20 Jan 1860, nos 20-24 
(NAI).
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Because the Board was split on these two cases, the decision on
each was left to the Governor-General. This provided Dalhousie with
an opportunity to air his objections to perpetuity grants, and to
demonstrate, once again, his support of John Lawrence. In an official
Minute, dated 7 November 1850, he reaffirmed his opposition to the notion
of permanent alienations of public revenues. There were, he admitted,
certain situations (such as that of chieftains whose families had held
their jagirs in hereditary succession under Sikh rule) where he was
prepared to be more flexible; but the cases of the Raja and the Faqir
did not fall within that category:
These two officers [he continued] are entitled to great 
consideration at the hands of the British Government 
and so far as regards themselves and their immediate 
heirs, I think that their interests should be liberally 
provided for.
But neither of them represent [old chieftain] families 
in the Punjab: they can possess no local influence: they 
do not command any general attachment or sympathy, and I am, 
therefore, unable to see any weight in the considerations of 
policy which are urged as inducements to settling upon their 
families possessions in perpetuity.
When we have provided handsomely for Rajah Deenanath and 
for the Fukeer during their lives and for their immediate 
connexions after them, we have done, in my judgement, all 
that justice or policy can require.137
Dalhousie's decisions were as follows. Raja Dina Nath was to retain
for his life all his jagirs (except the sum of Rs 3,240 which he paid
in pensions and for the police in his estate at Kalanaur: these would
now be paid by the State). Nothing was to be upheld after his death,
although at that time his son's pension might be increased slightly.
Faqir Nur-ud-Din Bokhari was to retain both his jagirs and his cash
138salary. But nothing was to be upheld after his death.
Now a moment's reflection will reveal the historic irony in the 
position taken by Dalhousie and John Lawrence on these claims. In 
1847 chieftains like Dina Nath and the Faqir had been courted and 
pampered by the British because they were "new staff" chieftains and
137. Dalhousie's Minute, 7 Nov 1850: FPP, 22 Nov 1850, no 118 (NAI).
138. Ibid.
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could be relied upon not to identify with the "traditional" and 
largely anti-British chieftains. Now, four years later, they were 
ditched because they possessed no "local influence". It is difficult 
to avoid the conclusion that Dalhousie and John Lawrence would have gone 
to almost any length to discredit Henry Lawrence’s views on the necessity 
of maintaining a "loyal" aristocracy.
Three further points of evidence may be mentioned briefly. First,
in 1849 the Board recommended - John Lawrence’s dissent notwithstanding -
that Raja Tej Singh be permitted to retain limited magisterial powers
in his estates at Sialkot, in recognition of his good services.
139Dalhousie refused to sanction the proposal. After the dissolution
of the Board, the Raja petitioned against this decision, alluding to 
Elliot's written guarantee on the inviolability of his jagirs and titles. 
But John Lawrence, now Chief Commissioner, declined even to forward the
petition to Calcutta, since, in his opinion, Dalhousie's earlier decision
. 140 was final.
Second, in 1849 the Board recommended - again, John Lawrence's
dissent notwithstanding - that in order to help "soften" the impact
of British rule in the Cis-Sutlej Division, the more important jagirdars
there should be granted personal exemption from the jurisdiction of
the new civil and criminal courts: it was hoped that such a boon might
give these jagivdccrs "something of the character of the privilege of
141the Peerage in Great Britain." Though he was sympathetic to John
Lawrence’s objections, Dalhousie sanctioned this proposal. But he made
it perfectly clear that no such exemption could be extended to the
142jagirdars of the Trans-Sutlej Division or the "Punjab proper".
Third, in 1852 the Commissioner of the Trans-Sutlej Division, D.F. 
McLeod, sent the Board a statement of thirteen pensions that he proposed
139. GDP, 21 July 1849, no 837; 29 Sept 1849, nos 32-3; 20 Oct 1849, 
nos 82-3 (PS).
140. FP, Part "A", Feb 1861, nos 297-8 (NAI).
141. G. Christian, Secy to BOA, to Elliot, 10 Oct 1849, no 238: FPC,
17 Nov 1849, no 91 (NAI).
142. Elliot to BOA, 5 Nov 1849, no 2234: FPC, 17 Nov 1849, no 92 (NAI); 
GG’s political letter to COD: FC, 4 June 1851, no 36 (NAI).
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to grant to families whose jagirs had recently lapsed. These jagirs
belonged to a special class, being grants originally acquired by
conquest and later confirmed by the Sikh rulers. Under Hardinge's
jagir rules of 1847, these jagirs should have been upheld in perpetuity.
But at that time, and largely owing to John Lawrence's insistence, they
had been upheld for one life only. Many jagirdars of this class who
were still alive were now petitioning McLeod and the Deputy Commissioners
of Hoshiarpur and Jullundur Districts for an upgrading of their grants
to grants in perpetuity. McLeod suggested that in future these jagirs
should not be resumed automatically on the death of the grantees, but
that each case be re-investigated to determine whether a further release
143was in order. If implemented, this suggestion would almost certainly
have led to a questioning of the validity of many of John Lawrence's 
earlier jagir recommendations in the Jullundur Doab.
It seems quite possible that the issues raised by McLeod contributed
to the final split between the Lawrence brothers, for the file was not
sent to Calcutta until more than one year later. By that time John
Lawrence, as Chief Commissioner, had Punjab affairs - and Dalhousie's
ear on them - to himself, and he had no difficulty in persuading the
Governor-General to veto McLeod's proposal. The Jullundur jagirdars,
the Chief Commissioner argued, in what was now familiar language, were
but parasites on both the State and the "people of the-soil". They
were strangers to the Doab, unconnected with, and generally disliked by,
its population. They were "in no respect a source of strength to the
144British Government."
It should not be imagined that there were no chieftains who were
treated with liberality by the British after annexation. In the
western Muslim-majority districts especially, the collaboration of
individual tribal patriarchs was sought quite deliberately. In Shahpur
District, for example, the Tiwana Maliks were rewarded for their past
services and bound to the new regime by the creation of new jagirs in
145their ancestral tracts. Other chieftains were able to secure better
143. McLeod to Melvill, 21 May 1852, no 843: RDP, 28 May 1853, no 17 (PS).
144. Quoted in Melvill to Offg Secy to GOI, 2 July 1853, no 323: RDP,
28 May 1853, no 20 (PS).
145. SR Shahpur 1866, p.43.
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than usual terms for themselves because they enjoyed close, personal
relations with British officers. Sardar Nihal Singh Chhachhi was one
such chieftain. The son of a trader, and married into an old chieftain
family, Nihal Singh did not command much "local influence”. But he
had served the Residency at Lahore in the pre-annexation days as a sort
of aide-de-camp, and he was able, when his jagir claim came up for
consideration in 1849, to produce no fewer than eight testimonials from
various British officers referring to his "character" and "services".
The Board treated his claim as a "special case", granting him a life
146pension of Rs 2,000 and upholding his jagirs in their entirety.
Nihal Singh was thus the only chieftain not to be deprived of the service
147portion of his jagirs.
But these were exceptional cases. By and large, Dalhousie and John 
Lawrence were in no way intimidated by the collective influence of the 
chieftains. It was not their intention that the British would share 
power in the Punjab with a chieftain class, and it was still less their 
intention to alienate State revenues in preservation of a non-governing 
chieftain class. The disposition of the claims of the chieftains to 
jagirs reflected and confirmed this policy. By the mid-1850s the 
Punjab chieftains were, if not exactly a class doomed to complete 
extinction, at least a class whose fortunes had never been at a lower 
ebb, and would only get worse as jagir lapses occurred. The Sikhs, for 
all the levelling tendencies of their rule, had never managed to achieve 
such a massive, and apparently permanent, humbling of the chieftains.
To sum up, then: the treatment of claims to revenue assignments in 
the early years of British rule was, essentially, the story of the triumph
146. Case no 16 in "List of Principal Jagheerdars": FPC, 29 Dec 1849, no 
49A (NAI).
147. Apparently, Nihal Singh had, during the Residency period, incurred 
certain, unspecified "extra expenses", as a result of which he was 
saddled with debts of Rs 10,000 by 1849. In 1852 he submitted that 
he was Rs 27,000 in debt. To help him out of these "embarassing 
circumstances", the British relieved him of his obligation of supporting 
four of his eight troopers: PDP, 11 Dec 1852, no 17; 22 Jan 1853,
no 37 (PS). But by 1869 Nihal Singh’s debts had increased to Rs 114,667. 
Lord Mayo, who was then GG, sanctioned the Punjab Government's proposal 
to grant Nihal Singh a loan of Rs 1 lakh (at 5 per cent interest), 
in order that he might repay his debts: FPP "A" series, June 1869, 
nos 281-3 (NAI).
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of John Lawrence's policy of abrogating as many assignments as possible.
Under Sikh rule, we concluded earlier in this study, between 35 and 45
per cent of the State revenues had been alienated in the form of
assignments. Under early British rule the percentages dropped quite
dramatically. In 1851 the Board estimated the annual value of grants
upheld, or likely to be upheld, in the "Punjab proper" at about Rs 30
lakhs - or slightly more than 20 per cent of the total revenues - and
pointed out that in time, as compulsory lapses occurred, this figure
148would be reduced still further. Indeed, with the announcement of
the regular and revised land revenue settlements, the long-term results
became apparent. In Montgomery District the amount of land revenue
149alienated through grants had fallen from 60 to 12 per cent by 1854.
In Gujranwala District the amount had fallen from about 50 to 25 per
cent by 1867.150 In Lahore District the amount had fallen from 66 to
20 per cent by 1858.151 And over the whole of the Punjab Province less
than 10 per cent of the gross acreage of all revenue-paying tenures was
152held in assignments by 1870.
The greater part of this reduction was sustained, of course, by the
chieftains. We have seen that, as a class, the chieftains - like those
lesser middle-men, the chaudharis - had little or no role to play under
early British rule. Consequently, the British were able to cut back
on revenue assignments to a degree that the Sikhs had never been able to.
The theory was that the savings made on assignments would enable a
reduction on the land revenue demand simultaneously to be made. Thus
the British would be the better placed to protect that stratum of rural
society that really mattered - the substantial, revenue-paying peasantry.
The policy of the Sikh Government [runs a passage in the third 
Administration Report] was to tax heavily the agriculturists, 
and to make large assignments of Revenue to the nobility as payment 
for service and support. But the policy of the British Government 
is to tax lightly the agriculturists, to pay its servants from its 
own Treasury, to excuse the native nobility from service, and to 
gradually reduce their assignments of Revenue.153
148. "PAR 1851", paras 244-5 and Appendix B: FM, nos 356-7 (NAI).
149. Montgomery DG 1883-84, p.62.
150. SR Gujranwala 1866-67, p.12.
151. SR Lahore 1858, p.23.
152. PAR 1870-71, pp. 22-4.
153. PAR 1854-56, p.27.
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The most pressing problem facing the British after 1849 was that
of land revenue. It was not just that land revenue furnished three-
quarters of total State revenues in the early years of British rule.
The fact that it was paid by a peasantry which comprised three-quarters
of the region's population - a peasantry whose contentment and prosperity
were more vitally affected by the manner in which it was assessed and
collected than by any other circumstance - made land revenue a highly
154important political, as well as fiscal, question. It is therefore
no exaggeration to say that the very viability of British rule in the 
Punjab rested upon the ability of the new rulers to formulate and 
administer an efficient and equitable land revenue policy.
Dalhousie believed that such a policy existed ready-made in the 
land revenue system of the North-Western Provinces; and after annexation 
this system was imported, along with a number of its most experienced 
practitioners, into the Punjab. 155 There were three cardinal principles 
to this system. Let us examine them briefly. First, the jama, or 
revenue demand, ought to be a moderate one. At the first regular 
settlement, inhabited lands were to be divided into assessment circles, 
the basic unit of which was the mahal, or estate (the mahal was usually, 
not not necessarily, coterminous with the mauza, or village). Upon each 
mahal there was to be assessed, on general considerations (such as soil 
type and irrigation facilities), for a term of twenty or thirty years, 
a cash sum, so calculated as to leave "a fair surplus profit over and 
above the net produce of the land."15^
Land revenue and peasant protection
154. Ibid, pp. 21-2.
155. Douie noted that altogether nineteen of the best of James Thomason's 
officers were sent to the Punjab (Thomason was the principal architect 
of the North-Western Provinces system): James M. Douie, Punjab 
Settlement Manual (Lahore, 4th edn 1930), p.8 .
156. J. Thomason, "Remarks on the System of Land Revenue Administration 
Prevalent in the North-Western Provinces of Hindoostan" (1849), 
reproduced in D.G. Barkley, Directions for Revenue Officers in the 
Punjab (Lahore, 1875), pp. vii-xvii.
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Second, that surplus profit was held to be an heritable and 
transferable right: a private proprietary right in the land. At 
the time of settlement, registers of land titles were to be drawn 
up, showing which persons enjoyed this right. The position of 
hereditary tenant cultivators was to be recognised and secured.
But full proprietary rights were to be conferred upon only those persons 
who could claim the right to engage to pay the jama - the dominant 
cultivators possessing traditionally recognised, pre-emptive rights 
of cultivation. In this respect the North-Western Provinces system 
differed markedly from the Bengal system, where the old Mughal revenue 
farmers or their successors had been recognised as great landlords, 
from the Central Provinces system of village landlords, and from the 
Oudh system of a revenue-paying territorial nobility.
Third, in view of the cohesive strength of the north Indian village
and the prevalence of customary shares in lands and wells, the mauza
was held to be a coparcenary community, and wherever possible joint
responsibility in revenue matters was to be upheld. That is, the
revenue engagements were to be taken not from each individual peasant
proprietor, as was the case under the vyotwari system of Madras and
Bombay, but from representatives of the village community, while the
community as a whole was to be responsible for the internal distribution
of both the revenue demand and the surplus profit. Given the complexity
of most north Indian village tenures (mahals were generally held by a
number of cultivating proprietors with overlapping rights), joint
responsibility was an administratively sensible principle. It was
also politically expedient, in that it allowed the village communities
to continue to manage many of their own affairs, and - to a certain
extent - it helped to protect the peasant proprietor from the moneylender
and forced sales of land. Joint responsibility was therefore seen as
157an important mechanism for preserving traditional rural society.
The introduction of this land revenue system into the Punjab was, 
it would seem, a great success. Despite their moderation of the jama
157. According to Thomason, one of the chief virtues of the North-Western 
Provinces system was that "it professes to alter nothing, but only 
to maintain and place on record what it finds to exist": ibid.
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and their expenditure on public works, the British still managed to
extract a clear profit of more than £4 millions from the Punjab
158Territories between 1849 and 1856. And adherence to the principles
of tenant protection, peasant proprietorship and village joint 
responsibility brought the administration into particularly close touch 
with the agricultural classes and their problems, gaining for the "Punjab 
School" that enviable reputation for sympathetic and successful paternalism. 
A closer look at land revenue administration in the Punjab between 1849 
and 1856 reveals a somewhat different picture, however. The introduction 
of the North-Western Provinces system was no easy matter. Agricultural 
distress - the result of unfavourable seasons and over-assessment at the 
time of the summary settlements - forced the British to make several 
reductions on a jama that was already thought to be sufficiently low.
Peasant resistance to cash settlements, together with a tendency on the 
part of many settlement officers to apply the letter of North-Western 
Provinces revenue law jn circumstances where this was clearly inappropriate, 
led to the commission of numerous judicial mistakes which had subsequently 
to be rectified. By 1856 a viable land revenue policy was beginning 
to emerge, but only after considerable difficulties and dangers had been 
experienced.
159The first regular settlements in the "Punjab proper" were begun 
in circumstances that were anything but propitious. The summary 
settlements of 1847-48, rough and ready though they were, had worked 
well enough for a year or so: the zamindars, buoyed up by high 
agricultural prices, had managed to pay their revenue with regularity, 
if not with ease. But shortly after annexation, just as the new 
settlements were being negotiated, these summary settlements began 
breaking down almost everywhere. As a result, the new settlements 
were thrown into turmoil.
158. Calculated from the revenue and expenditure statements in the first 
three Administration Reports. Military expenditure, being an 
imperial charge, is excluded from these calculations.
159. The regular settlements east of the Beas and Sutlej were begun before, 
and finished soon after, 1849. The regular settlements in the 
central and southwestern districts were completed shortly before
or shortly after 1857. In the northwestern districts the regular 
settlement work was interrupted by the events of 1857, and was not 
completed until the mid- 1860s.
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The immediate cause of the breakdown was a dramatic collapse of 
agricultural prices. The return of thousands of ex-soldiers to the 
land, together with a couple of wet seasons, produced a run of unusually 
abundant harvests; the markets became flooded with produce, and prices 
dropped by almost 50 per cent. This cheapness of grain meant that the 
zamindars experienced great difficulty in obtaining cash to pay the 
revenue - a situation that was exacerbated by the fact that large sums 
of money which would previously have remained in the Punjab were now 
being remitted outside by non-Punjabi soldiers and government employees. 1^0
It was soon realised, however, that the root cause of the breakdown
was over-assessment at the time of the summary settlements. In 1847-48
the jama had been based upon the average of Sikh collections in kind
over the previous three years, the money value having been calculated
upon the average prices of those same years. A reduction of 10 per
cent had been allowed and all abwabs, or extra cesses, had been abolished.
But what had not been realised at the time was that prices in the years
1844-46 had been exceptionally high. Prinsep later found, by going
back over the prices for thirty years in sixteen large towns, that the
1844— 46 prices were "the very worst" that could have been taken: the
two staples, wheat and barley, had then been selling at 40 per cent
above the thirty year averages. 1^ 1 With the collapse of prices and
the shortage of cash after 1849, the highly cultivated and highly assessed
villages of the moist zone were faced with great hardship; these villages,
where labour and capital investments in agriculture were often considerable,
had now to compete in a glutted market against the villages of those
tracts which had been fertilised by a casual abundance of rain. "Hundreds
of fine villages", it was reported, "unable to get a price for a produce,
162failed to pay their highly assessed revenue." Matters were brought
160. PAR 1854-56, p.28. The pay of the army of occupation alone was about 
Rs 165 lakhs: "PAR 1851", p. 190: FM, no 356 (NAI).
161. SR Sialkot 1863, pp. 55-6. In Sialkot District at the regular 
settlement lists were prepared showing the villages "heavily", 
"moderately", or "lightly" assessed at the summary settlement, and 
more than one-half of the villages were placed under the first 
heading: ibid.
162. PAR 1851-53, paras 301-3.
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to a crisis with the outbreak of an epidemic of murrain amongst cattle
in 1851, which carried off thousands of animals, and with a failure
of the rains in the arid zone in 1852-53, which dried up wells and caused
pasturage in the Bar to fail. All over the newly acquired territories,
land fell out of cultivation, wells were deserted, and revenue balances
accumulated. In the Gujranwala tahsil, for instance, a balance of over
16317 per cent accrued and more than 300 wells were deserted in one year.
Zamindar hostility towards fixed assessments and money payments
became widespread. When Henry Lawrence travelled through Gujrat District
164he received numerous petitions against the prevailing assessments.
In 1852 the zamindars of Rawalpindi District "turbulently clamoured for
reduction. " 1^5 In Sialkot District the revenue machinery began to break
down: the tahsildars, who were ex-kardars, "played into the hands of
headmen, who very often wilfully withheld payments and deterioration
led to degenerate practices. And in Muzaffargarh District the
derangement of the summary settlement was intense:
The district correspondence between 1850 and 1857 reads as 
if there was continued famine in the district, while at the 
same time magnificent harvests are reported. During these 
years revenue defaulters were in jail for three months or more. 
Lambardars threw down their pattas [revenue agreements] in 
court and clamoured for reduction. Proposals were made to 
sell villages for arrears of revenue.167
Ironically, distress and unrest were least severe in those districts, such
as Lahore, where large tracts were still in the hands of jagirdars, who
168continued, for the time being, to receive their payments in grain.
163. Gujranwala DG 1883-84, p.144; SR Gujranwala 1856, pp. 23-4;
FAR 1851-53, para 319; Sialkot DG 1883-84, p.95.
164. For the reproduction of a memorandum, "On Goojerat Assessments, 
by the President of the Board of Administration" (no date), see 
SR Gujrat 1861, pp. 47-8.
165. PAR 1851-53, paras 306-14.
166. SR Sialkot 1863, p.56. Prinsep noted that much of the takavi (loan) 
money doled out to the zamindars of Sialkot District for the replacement 
of cattle and repair of wells between 1852 and 1854 was only paid back 
as revenue. "Tehseeldars even did not hesitate to encourage this 
practice, to shew that they were doing their best to get in the 
outstanding Revenue": ibid, p.57.
167. Muzaffargarh DG 1883-84, p.122.
168. Lahore DG 1883-84, p.129.
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had no choice but to grant immediate relief. In some districts a
revision of the summary settlement was made, which allowed for a
169reduction on the jama. In other districts temporary remissions
170were granted. Over the whole of the Punjab Territories (excluding
the Trans-Sutlej and Peshawar Divisions) revenue balances totalling
Rs 15 lakhs (13 per cent of the jama) were written off as remissions
171in the period 1851-52 to 1852-53. It was against this background
that the regular settlement operations were begun.
Not surprisingly, the opportunity was taken at the new settlements
to lower the jama on a more systematic basis. In Amritsar District,
for instance, a reduction on the summary jama of more than 30 per cent
172was made in one tahsil, while over the whole District the reduction
173was more than 5 per cent. In two tahsils of Gurdaspur District the
174reduction amounted to nearly 18 per cent. In both Sialkot District
175and Gujranwala District the reduction was more than 18 per cent.
It was thought that these reductions were sufficiently large to avert 
further distress, partly because Dalhousie, in looking to rapid economic 
development in the Punjab, had ordered ten-year, rather than twenty-year 
or thirty-year, terms of operation for the regular settlements west of 
the Beas, and partly because it was anticipated that agricultural prices 
would soon recover from their post-1849 slump.
Faced with the spectre of widespread rural disorder, the British
169. For instance, in Gugeira (later Montgomery) District, where the 
drought of 1852-53 had caused the failure of the Khanwa canal, a 
revision was made, reducing the demand by 23 per cent: PAR 1851-53, 
para 319.
170. In Rawalpindi District relief was twice afforded on a general basis 
in 1852, and thereafter numerous occasional or partial remissions 
were granted: ibid, paras 306-14.
171. Ibid, paras 341-2.
172. SR Amritsar 1856, pp.83-118 (report on Narowal Tundi).
173. Amritsar DG 1883-84, pp. 52-3.
174. SR Gurdaspur 1856,p.47.
175. SR Sialkot 1863, p.71; SR Gujranwala 1856, p.44.
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approved for slightly longer terms, and agricultural prices, though
they began to pick up from about 1855-56, did not undergo any substantial
176rise until the end of the decade. This meant that when signs of
distress reappeared, the authorities were prepared quickly to grant
further reductions on the jama. For instance, in Gujranwala District,
where fresh revenue balances had begun to accrue by 1857, a reduction
of about 4 per cent on the regular jama was made in 1858 in 157 mahals.
(It is worth noting that at the time of the revised settlement in the
1860s about one-quarter of the District's villages were classified as
177having been "heavily" assessed at the regular settlement.) In
Sialkot District in 1858-59 the reduction on the summary jama was
178increased from 18.2 per cent to 22.8 per cent. In 1860 the Financial
Commissioner, Robert Cust, made the sweeping remark that "our Punjab
179settlements have all been pitched too high." That year the general
standard for Punjab assessments was lowered from two-thirds to one-half
180of net mahal assets. Thus the experience of the 1850s produced in
Punjab administrators a marked predisposition towards great moderation
in assessment. That predisposition remained a key feature of British
policy thereafter, so that in the year 1904-05 the incidence of land
revenue demand upon cultivation in the Punjab was nearly 6 per cent lower
181than it had been in the year 1854-55.
As it turned out, however, many of the new settlements were
176. For prices, see SB Amritsar 1856, p.102, Appendix B; SB Jullundur 
1892, p.155, Appendix Xll (report on Now Shehr); SB Montgomery 1878 
pp. 154-5; BAB 1871-72, p. 150; Punjab Census 1881, p.53.
177. SB Gujranwala 1894, pp. 15-16.
178. SB Sialkot 1863, p.71.
179. Quoted in Douie, Punjab Settlement Manual, p.27.
180. Ibid, p.25.
181. G0I (Dept, of Revenue and Agriculture) to Secy of State for India,
6 Feb 1908, no 4, enclosure no 1, "Statement showing Land Revenue 
Assessments, Cultivated and Irrigated Areas of Each District of 
the Punjab in 1855 and at Each New Settlement up to date", and 
enclosure no 3, "Statement showing the Relative Burden of Taxation 
on the Land in the Punjab at each Quinquennial Period from 1854-55": 
British Sessional Papers, House of Commons, 1908, Cd 3991, vol 74, 
pp. 733-38, "Land Revenue Assessments in the Punjab since 1855."
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The second key feature of British land revenue policy in the Punjab
was the investment of the dominant peasantry with the proprietary right
in land, and the protection of hereditary tenants. The Sikhs, it will
be recalled, had generally recognised two classes of proprietors -
"primary" zamindars and "intermediary" zemindars - although they had
always preferred to deal with the former and try and reduce the importance
of the latter. In their refurbishing of sub-district administration,
and in the process of their regular settlements, the British carried
this levelling tendency one stage further. As we have already seen,
the office of chaudhari, which in the past had been monopolised by
"intermediary" zamindars, was more or less done away with in the early
years of British rule. The allocation of proprietary rights confirmed'
the obsolescence of "intermediary" zamindars (in the settlement literature
they were called ala maliks, or superior proprietors, as distinct from
adna maliks, or inferior proprietors).
The tendency [writes Douie] was to commute the superior 
rights where they were established into a moderate percentage 
on the revenue, and to take engagements from the inferior 
proprietors and allow them the sole management of the estate.
The latter were looked upon as the valuable element in the 
community, the former as an interesting survival of a state 
of society which had passed away and should not be revived.
Still less were our officers disposed to assist in the process 
which had been making the mukaddims or headmen virtual proprietors 
in some parts of the country; and the allowance of 5 per cent on 
the revenue, which they were allowed to collect from the community 
as lambardar’s fees or pachotra was a small recompense for the 
privileges which they were forced to r e l i n q u i s h . 182
The result of the judicial work of the regular settlements was thus a
more thorough and immutable levelling of rural society down to the level
of the "primary" zamindars than the Sikhs had been able to achieve.
Except in the western districts, where for political reasons the British
upheld many "intermediary" zamindars, the social structure of the
Punjab after 1856 could be compared to a broad pyramid of "primary"
zamindars, sitting on a smaller base of tenant cultivators (about one-
half of whom had been entered in the records as hereditary tenants and
were, therefore, virtually indistinguishable from "primary" zamindars'),
topped off by an even smaller obelisk of landlords. In 1870 less
than 3 per cent of the 55,000 villages which paid land revenue were owned
182. Douie, Punjab Settlement Manual, p.58.
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by landlords, whereas nearly 56 per cent (incorporating 83 per cent
of the gross acreage) were owned by "primary" zamindars (the remaining
42 per cent, incorporating less than 12 per cent of the acreage, were
mostly owned by "primary" zamindars but had an intermediary, such as
a jagirdar or taluqdar, interposed between occupant proprietors and 
183government).
Let us examine some of the difficulties that were experienced in
bringing about this fundamental levelling of rural society, beginning
with the creation of proprietary rights in the pastoral zone. After
1849 the pastoral tribes of the Bar - the Bhattis, Chathas, and Tarars -
were restored to most of their ancient possessions, from which they had
been ousted by the Sikhs; and as a reward for their services in 1848-49
184they were permitted more or less to define their own boundaries.
Knowing the great respect which the British attached to proprietary
rights, and anticipating the great rise in land value following the
extension of irrigation canals, these pastoralists quickly set about
appropriating vast portions of the Bar. In the Hafizabad tahsil of
Gujranwala District, for instance, estates of between 5,000 and 10,000
acres were staked out during the regular settlement; one pastoral village,
185which contained only two working wells, even appropriated 23,000 acres.
The government's decision to sell off blocks of waste land (rukhs) to 
local and outside entrepreneurs at what were, considering the extremely 
low revenue demand in this zone and the possibility of access to canal
186water, ridiculously cheap prices, also produced a great scramble for land. 
Within a few years, however, the evils of this land craze - particularly 
its ruinous impact upon the long-established and highly assessed villages
183. PAR 1870-71, pp. 22-4.
184. For the story of the Multani Pathans, upon whom the British conferred 
a new superior proprietary right as a reward for their services with 
Edwardes at Multan in 1848-49, and how they managed to turn themselves 
into inferior proprietors, see SR Muzaffargarh 1873-80, pp. 92-3.
185. SR Gujranwala 1894, p.19.
186. SR Montgomery 1878, pp. 148-51.
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near the riverbanks - began to attract attention. At the revised
settlements (late 1860s) measures had to be taken, though they were
much resisted by the pastoral villages, to limit the size of estates
187and increase the revenue demand.
In the cultivated tracts to the north of the Bar, enormous
difficulties were encountered when it came to investigating, defining,
and recording proprietary rights. The enquiries into present and
past land usage, which the settlement officers had to make in order to
prepare accurate settlement records, had the effect of stirring up
thousands of old landed disputes, many of which had lain dormant since
the establishment of Sikh rule. Since they were usually unfamiliar
with Punjabi land tenures, and because they were unable to spend enough
time in a village to acquaint themselves with its organisation and history,
the settlement officers had to resolve these disputes as best they could.
(In Rawalpindi District, for example, local genealogists were called in
188to help settle old and complex disputes.) Not surprisingly, many
189mistakes in the initial recording of proprietary rights were made.
This is shown by the large number of summary suits relating to proprietary
190rights that were instituted in the revenue courts during the early 
1850s: in the year 1852-53, for instance, nearly 18,000 suits of this 
type were instituted throughout the Punjab Territories (excluding Peshawar
t v  • • ^ 1 9 1Division.)
187. Ibid., SR Gujranwala 1894, p.19; SR Shahpur 1866, pp. 62-3.
188. SR Rawalpindi 1864, pp. 120-9.
189. The second Administration Report warned: "No great reliability can, 
even now, be placed on the records of landed rights": PAR 1851-53, 
para 291.
190. Until 1865 suits relating to land and land revenue were heard in revenue 
courts which, though constituted in the same way as the civil courts 
and presided over by the same judges (Deputy Commissioners, Assistants, 
Extra Assistants, and tahsildars), operated under different procedural 
rules. Act xlx of 1865 established a Chief Court in the Punjab and 
made suits relating to land ordinary civil suits, to be judged under 
the Code of Civil Procedure for India: Y.B. Mathur, "Judicial 
Administration of the Punjab, 1849-75", in Journal of Indian History,
Vol XL1V, pt 3 (Dec 1966), p.721.
191. PAR 1851-53, para 347. Several settlement officers noted the readiness 
of the peasants to take their landed claims to the new British courts:
SR Lahore 1858, p.15; SR Jullundur 1852, p.55; SR Sialkot 1863, p. 111.
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One of the most fundamental errors concerned the recording of
tenant status. In the North-Western Provinces two classes of tenants
had been generally recognised. These were the maurusi (or occupancy
or hereditary) tenant, and the ghair-maurusi (or non-hereditary)
tenant-at-wil1. The maurusi tenant, whose status was usually recognised
by twelve years of occupancy, had a right to hold his land so long as
he paid the rent fixed by the settlement officer, and to pass it on to
his descendants on the same terms. The ghair-maurusi tenant, on the
other hand, held his land on a year-to-year basis only, and his rent
was determined by agreement between himself and his landlord. Because
of the abundance of cultivable land, tenants were not numerous in
nineteenth-century Punjab: in central Punjab, for example, there were
192nearly twice as many proprietors as tenants in the 1860s. Still,
under Sikh rule something very like occupancy tenant right had been 
recognised by both the kardar and the "primary” zamindar - by the former 
because it was important to have cultivation maintained at the highest 
possible level, and by the latter because permanent tenants were a 
measure of a proprietor's status, as well as sharers of the revenue 
burden - even though the degree of privilege and rental rates had differed 
in different parts of the country.
During the process of the first regular settlements, tenants were
recorded as being either maurusi or ghair-maurusi tenants. Until 1855
the rule of twelve years of occupancy was the foremost and almost the
sole criterion for granting the title of maurusi, and under that criterion
the tenant question in twelve out of twenty-seven districts was decided
in a most mechanical way. After 1855 it was admitted that other criteria,
such as the landlord's power of eviction, ought to be taken into
193consideration. But by then many tenants had been entered as maurusz.
192. The numbers were: proprietors, 601, 123; tenants, 312, 200: Punjab 
Census 1868, p.31.
193. For correspondence on this question between the settlement officer 
of Shahpur District, the Commissioner of Jhelum Division, and the 
Chief Commissioner, see RDP, 15 Dec 1855, nos 10-12 (PS).
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In Lahore District, for example, about 50 per cent of tenants had been
194given the right of hereditary occupancy. The fact that in most
districts the proprietors had not objected to this - in not a few
instances they had clamoured for it - and had even been reluctant to
195press their claims for malikana, or rent, was taken as an indication
that the generous granting of maurusi status was both just and politic.
In the 1860s, however, when the return of agricultural prosperity brought
more benefits to the zamindars, and they began to assert their claims to
malikccna, it was realised that large numbers of tenants who had been
classed as hereditary tenants during the early 1850s ought to have been
196classed as mere tenants-at-will. Whether or not the former records
of right should be altered then became - as we shall see in the last 
chapter - a matter of great controversy.
In the early 1850s there was a more perplexing problem associated
with proprietary rights, however, and that was the tendency of many
zamindars in central Punjab either to refuse to accept the revenue
engagements and be recorded as proprietors or, having accepted the
engagements, to renounce their proprietary rights. Some British officers
explained this as a hangover from the days of Sikh rule, when the
zamindars had frequently renounced their rights, thus threatening to
thrown their estates into confusion, as a means of persuading the kardar
197to moderate his extortionate demands. Certainly, in the districts
east of the Beas, where the regular settlements were begun prior to the
great collapse of prices, many zamindars had continued to play their old
game for no other reason than that of getting the best possible revenue 
198deal. But west of the Beas such behaviour was more the direct
194. SR Lahore 1858, p.7.
195. Many proprietors were happy to have their tenants pay just a share of 
the jama: ibid, p.14; SR Amritsar 1856, pp. 31-2, 82; Montgomery 
DG 1883-84, pp. 75-6.
196. In 1859 the Secretary to the Punjab Government, R.H. Davies, admitted 
that "it may perhaps have happened that the title of hereditary cultivator 
has been too easily granted, or that the rights attending it may have 
been unduly magnified": Davies to Offg FC, 26 Aug 1859, no 967 
(Revenue): reproduced in SR Gurdaspur 1856, pp. 60-1.
197. For example, PAR 1851-53, para 292.
198. For an example, which led to the creation of a new species of superior 
proprietary right (taluqdari) by the settlement officer, Temple, see
SR Jullundur 1852, pp. 42-3.
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consequence of British over-assessment. Once the fact of over-assessment
was acknowledged, the linkage was understood and many of the erroneous
judicial decisions that had been made in the face of zamindar recalcitrance
could be reversed. In Gujranwala District at the time of the regular
settlement, the zamindars were so sorely tried by the over-assessment
of 1847-48 and low prices, that they were utterly adverse to binding
themselves to any fixed cash assessment, even when a substantial reduction
on the jama was offered. They were adverse to the very idea of a new
settlement. In 1860 Temple, who had by that time been appointed
Commissioner of Lahore Division, painted a vivid picture of the difficulties
with which settlement officers in central Punjab had had to contend:
No officer who had not seen these people from 1853 to 1855, 
would believe how provoking and contumacious they sometimes 
were; some of them would even assemble in numbers and almost 
behave like a mob. Sometimes a circle of villages would 
combine to offer passive resistance to the progress of the 
settlement. Sometimes proprietors would desert their land, 
believing that no other occupant would be forthcoming; and 
that they would ultimately be re-admitted on reduced terms.
Sometimes they would say that they would renounce their 
proprietorship rather than engage for any fixed assessment.
And in this, as in all other proceedings, they shewed a strong 
tendency to combine .199
In Gujranwala District the settlement officer, Morris, dealt with 
zamindar recalcitrance in two ways. First, where the zamindars refused 
to engage for the revenue, he temporarily alienated management rights 
over the estate to a farmer (mustajir) who agreed to pay the revenue, 
making his own terms with the proprietors. There was nothing illegal 
about this course of action: indeed, it was resorted to wherever zamindars 
refused to engage. ^ 00 But in the late 1850s, when it was realised that 
even the regular jama had often been pitched too high, an opportunity 
was given to the proprietors of recovering their position by engaging 
for a reduced jama, provided that the mustajir could be induced to
199. Temple to FC, 23 Jan 1860, no 15 (original emphasis): reproduced in 
SR Gujranwala 1856, pp. 8-10. Prinsep also noted the tendency of
Jat zamindars "to combine when they wish to carry a point": SR Sialkot 
1863, section dealing with Chukla Aikwala (no page).
200. Eleven villages were put under mustajirs in Sialkot District: SR
Sialkot 1863, p.6 8.
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the twenty-odd cases where this applied, an arrangement satisfactory
201to both parties was easily and quickly reached.
Morris's second course of action, taken where the zamindars
voluntarily renounced their rights, was to transfer - often for a
nominal sum only - the proprietary rights over the estate to another,
more solvent, zemindar or some outsider who was willing to maintain
payment of the assessed revenue. In 280 cases, involving 14,000 acres
of land, proprietary rights were transferred to other zamindars. In
fifty-one estates proprietary rights in lands and wells were wholly
202or partly transferred to outsiders, usually urban capitalists. These
transfers, which expropriated the old proprietors in favour of capitalists
and speculators in land, were thought to be necessary, if the spread of
zamindar contumacy was to be checked. But they were quite illegal, and,
besides, they negated the principle of peasant protection. They became
the subject of a long and bitter controversy among revenue officers in
the mid-1850s. In 1858 the government sanctioned a proposal by the
Commissioner of Lahore Division to re-open these cases with a view to
reinstating the old proprietors at a reduced jama. Where the proprietary
rights had been transferred to other zamindars, reinstatement was generally
achieved through a system of compensation. But in many of the other
cases, where wealthy capitalists like the Diwans of Eminabad and the
Khatris of Gujranwala had taken over, reinstatement proved impossible,
203for the new proprietors flatly refused to relinquish the property.
For their part, the revenue officers learned a most salutary lesson: 
over-assessment could easily lead - as it had in the early settlements 
in the North-Western Provinces - to a disintegration of traditional rural 
society.
surrender his right before the expiry of his contract. In most of
201. SB Gujranwala 1856, pp. 8 , 47.
202. In Wazirabad tahsil an estate of 451 acres was sold up for an arrear 
of Rs 125. Another estate, where the owners, "a sturdy but 
contumacious body of Sikh Jats", had refused to engage and acknowledge 
proprietorship, was transferred in perpetuity to a Khatri, Jhanda 
Singh of Batala, for the nominal sum of Rs 500, and at Jhanda Singh's 
insistence the old proprietors were denied the right to cultivate:
SB Gujranwala 1894, pp. 14-15.
203. Ibid, p.15.
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The third key feature of British land revenue policy in the Punjab
was the recognition and maintenance of the village as a coparcenary
community. As has been mentioned, this had both administrative and
political advantages. In the North-Western Provinces three broad
categories of village tenure had been identified. These were the
zamindari tenure, where the estate belonged to a single proprietor (in
which case it was not a coparcenary tenure) or where the possession of
village lands was not separately defined among the different shareholders;
the pattidari tenure, where - to a lesser or greater degree - each
proprietor owned a specific ancestral share in the whole estate, which
regulated his revenue responsibility; and the bhaichara tenure, where -
to a lesser or greater degree - each member of the brotherhood was in
separate possession of his part of the estate and paid only that portion
of the jama which was assessed on the land in his possession. These
three categories of tenure, with their own sub-categories ("landlord"
and "communal" in the case of zamindari; "imperfect" and "perfect" in
the case of both pattidari and bhaichara), were held to correspond to
different historical stages of village evolution; that is, with the
passage of time and growth of civilisation most villages had changed -
or would change - from a simple "landlord" zamindari type through the
204pattidari type to a complex "perfect" bhaichara type.
Few villages in nineteenth-century Punjab conformed exactly to one
or other of these ideal types. It was far more common for a village
to be a mixed type, with different sections of the proprietary body
following different tenurial forms, or different tenurial forms being
followed in the cultivated lands, the wells, and the waste. Nevertheless,
at the first regular settlements every village was classified as being
either a zamindari, a pattidari or a bhaichara village. Countless
mistakes were of course made. Sometimes this was due to the determination
of the villagers, especially the lambardars and other members of the
village elite, who were used to enjoying the lion's share of the profits,
to withhold the detailed information that was necessary for an accurate
205classification. More frequently, however, mistakes were made because
204. SR Sialkot 1863, pp. 85-93.
205. SR Gujvanwala 1856, p.51.
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the subordinate settlement staff who were entrusted with this judicial
work (they were usually Indian EACs) did not fully understand the terms
zamindari, pattidari and bhaichara, and did not bother to investigate
206prevailing rights and customs. Since it was easy to say that possession
was the standard of every proprietor's right and responsibility, and
since many Sikh Jat villages declared themselves to be in agreement
with this principle, the tenure prevailing in most central Punjab
207villages was declared to be the bhaichara tenure.
Many settlement officers were amazed, however, by the strength of
attachment - even in the most recently founded Sikh Jat villages of the
Manjha - that was shown to the idea of ancestral shares. Villages
that had initially been classified as bhaichara often expressed a desire
to revert to the pattidari system of shares, even in the case of separate
holdings. The reason seems to have been a desire to distribute the
208burden imposed by a high, fixed jama. It was therefore necessary at
the revised settlements to eliminate the risk of village unrest by making
an investigation into past tenurial practices and re-classifying as
pattidari those villages that had wrongly been classified as bhaichara.
In Sialkot District, where the regular settlement was re-made after 1857,
this re-classification was undertaken in 120 villages in one tahsil, while
over the whole District minor adjustments to the records of possessions
209and shares were made in 881 estates. In Gujranwala District at the
revised settlement the number of pattidari villages was increased from
543 to 976 and the number of bhaichara villages decreased from 470 to 
210eighty-five. In Gujrat District the recorded tenure of 155 villages
211was changed, mostly from bhaichara to pattidari. But some influential
206. SR Gujranwala 1866-67, p.61.
207. Ibid; SR Lahore 1858, p.13. Outside central Punjab, however, the 
zamindari tenure was often prevalent: see, for example, Montgomery 
DG 1883-84, p.72.
208. SR Lahore 1858, p.26; SR Gurdaspur 1856, p.15; "PAR 1851", pp.201-2: 
FM, no 356 (NAI).
209. SR Sialkot 1863, pp. 89-90.
210. SR Gujranwala 1866-67, p.64.
211. SR Gujrat 1874, p.61.
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British officers regarded such a change as a retrogressive step - both
Temple and Prinsep, for example, thought that pattidari tenures hindered
212the development of land and accumulation of capital - and in general
the change was made only when the whole village expressed a wish for it.
The bhaichara tenure remained the predominant one: of the 30,740
villages listed as coparcenaries in 1870, about 41 per cent were classified
as bhaichara, 31 per cent as pattidari, 17 per cent as mixed bhaichara
213and pattidari, and 11 per cent as zamindari.
If the bhaichara tenure had the advantage of freeing the thrifty
and enterprising peasant proprietor from responsibility for the
insolvency of his coparceners, it had the disadvantage of making all
land in his village an object of mortgageable value. The British
countered this threat to village solidarity with the law of pre-emption.
In 1852 the Board of Administration directed that if a proprietor
wished to sell his share, he must first offer it to the whole community
or to an individual coparcener at a reasonable price, fixed by agreement
or, failing that, by the revenue authorities. Four years later the
214same rule was extended to unsufructuary mortgages. However,
the law of pre-emption did not prevent the peasant from becoming
indebted, to the moneylender. In the days of Sikh rule peasant
215indebtedness had been common. With the introduction of British
cash assessments and the fall of agricultural prices it increased 
greatly. At the same time, the introduction of British civil courts 
provided moneylenders with unprecedented facilities for the recovery 
of these debts. During the early years of British rule the number of suits
212. Temple, Secy to CC, to FC, 12 Aug 1856, no 695 (Revenue): reproduced 
in SR Gurdaspur 1856, p.47; SR Sialkot 1863, pp. 94-5.
213. PAR 1870-71, pp. 22-4.
214. Douie, Punjab Settlement Manual, p.186.
215. SR Gurdaspur 1856, p.12; SR Amritsar 1856, pp. 97-8.
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tried in the civil courts increased steadily, from 51,270 in 1852
216to 81,112 in 1857. By far the largest portion of these suits
related to bonded debts of agriculturists. In 1857 about 77 per
217cent of civil suits were suits for the recovery of debt. While
the money value of land remained low, and while the "Punjab School's" 
vigilance against moneylender intrusion into coparcenary villages was 
tight, sales of landed property in satisfaction of peasant debts were 
not frequent. But from the time of the revised settlements (middle 
and late 1860s) onwards, for reasons which we shall explore in the 
final chapter, such alienations began occurring on a wide scale.
Then, as we shall see, the British had a potentially serious political 
problem on their hands.
Conclusion
By late 1856 the Punjab of Ranjit Singh was considerably changed.
Gone were the Maharajas and their colourful retinues. Gone, too,
were the little kings of the countryside: the nazims and kardars.
In their place had come a group of foreign and more sober-minded rulers,
whose pleasures were more those of road-making and bridge-building,
than those of the court and the hunt. A couplet from the "Ballad of 
218Hari Singh Nalwa" presents a Punjabi vision of the new masters:
Straight from Lahore came the Firangi, with hat on head,
Employing many masons in metalling the roads, holding a 
stick in his hand.
Between 1849 and 1856 the British spent more than £3 millions on public
219works in the Punjab. Old roads were improved and new ones made.
Work was begun on the extension of the Great North-Western Railroad to 
Amritsar. Existing irrigation canals were repaired and the Bari Doab 
Canal built (it was completed in 1859). The electric telegraph was 
introduced. Schools, courts, and jails were established.
216. PAR 1851-53, p.82; PAR 1854-56, pp. 6-7; PAR 1856-58, pp. 3-4.
217. PAR 1856-58, pp. 3-4.
218. Reproduced and translated in Rose, Glossary of Tribes and Castes,
vol 1, pp. 720-2. For a vivid account of how many Punjabis perceived 
their new masters, see Tandon, Punjabi Century, pp. 11-12.
219. PAR 1854-56, p.65.
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But, as we have seen in this chapter, the real "imperial experiment"
that was conducted in the Punjab during these years was an experiment
in the accumulation and exercise of political power: the British set
out to rule the Punjab more directly and more exclusively than they
220had hitherto ruled any region in the subcontinent. The construction
of a new "provincial" system of government, the renovation of the old 
"local" system, the measures taken to maintain law and order, and - 
most importantly - the curtailment of revenue assignments were all proof 
of this. Of course, these political and administrative reforms may be 
seen as the basic prerequisites of "modernisation"; the British themselves 
certainly regarded them in this light. They were, however, essentially 
conservative reforms: their aim was not a revolution of "traditional"
Punjabi society but rather a strengthening of those aspects and elements 
that defined and confirmed British power, and a weakening of those that 
encroached upon it. It is here that the true essence of the "Punjab 
School's" paternalism, and the extent of the early transformation wrought 
by it, may be seen.
221Early British rule fell unevenly on social groups within the Punjab.
The old intermediaries - in particular, the chieftains and the "intermediary"
zamindars - bore the brunt of the impact, and by 1856 their position
was much changed. As a result of the restructuring of the administration,
the disbanding of the Sikh army, and the investigation into jagirs and
inams, large numbers of the privileged classes, including families whose
rise had pre-dated that of Ranjit Singh himself, were put on what seemed
222to be the road to obscurity. This enabled the British, who concentrated
all top-level governmental functions in their own hands, to attempt to
220. The comparisons and contrasts between early British rule in the Punjab 
and British rule elsewhere in nineteenth-century India will be 
discussed in the Conclusion of the thesis.
221. This point will be elaborated in the remaining two chapters; space 
does not permit it here - and, besides, the full impact of early 
British rule was not evident until well after 1856.
222. It should be pointed out that here the British were often only 
completing a process begun by the Sikh monarchs. In Sialkot District, 
for example, there were by 1849 only two chieftain families left whose 
fortunes had been established prior to Ranjit Singh's ascendancy;
and their jagirs were confiscated after 1849 on account of their 
"disloyalty" in 1848: SR Sialkot 1863, pp. 42-50.
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do what no previous rulers of the Punjab had done, which was to transfer 
almost entirely the base of their political support from the intermediaries 
to the upper stratum of the peasantry. Of course, the main purpose 
of the land revenue settlements made after 1849 was to regularise the 
extraction of the State’s share of the agrarian surplus; and, as we 
have seen, the paternalistic anti- ’’feudalism'' of the "Punjab School" 
was never so progressive as to be concerned with the plight of the 
non-proprietary peasantry, beyond a predilection for conferring upon 
many of them a superior tenant status. Nonetheless, the opportunity 
was taken at the time of the settlements to extend to the peasantry 
as a whole a degree of security and protection considerably greater than 
than which it had ever enjoyed. By 1856 - despite enormous difficulties, 
mistakes, and compromises - the foundations of a solidly pro-peasant 
colonial regime had been laid. The question was whether this "experiment" 
of political exclusivity and of by-passing the intermediaries of the old 
order in favour of the peasantry had succeeded in laying the foundations 
of a viable and secure colonial regime. At the beginning of 1857, that 
question was about to be put to the test in a most dramatic fashion.
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On 10 May 1857 the sepoy regiments cantoned at Meerut, a town about 
forty miles northeast of Delhi, rose against their white officers, 
liberated the jail and plundered the European quarter. They then marched 
to Delhi where, having overcome a small body of British soldiers, they 
forced their way into the royal palace and proclaimed the decrepit and 
unwilling Bahadur Shah - descendant of the Mughals and pensioner of the 
British - Emperor of a new, free Hindustan. Thus began the Great Rebellion 
(or Mutiny) of 1857, a conflagration that rapidly engulfed most of north- 
central India and was not extinguished until Gwalior, the last of the 
rebel strongholds, fell to the British on 20 June 1858.
The unexpectedness of its eruption, the savagery that it produced
on both sides and the completeness of its suppression were to make the
Great Rebellion the most written-about event of British Indian history. 1
Yet it remains an historical enigma. Today, after more than a century
of British imperialist and neo-imperialist writing on the subject, and
after about three decades of Indian and Pakistani nationalist revisionism,
the causes and character of the Great Rebellion - which has alternatively
been labelled a "sepoy mutiny", an "independence war", a "first freedom
struggle", a "Muslim rebellion", even a "revolution" - are still imperfectly
2understood and highly controversial. One of the more puzzling aspects
CHAPTER SIX
A TIME OF RECKONING^ 1857-58
Introduction
1. Shailendra DhariSingh, who has made a study of fifty English-language 
"Mutiny novels", estimates (conservatively, one imagines) that there 
exists more than two hundred non-fictional accounts of 1857 by British 
authors alone: Novels On The Indian Mutiny (New Delhi, 1973), p.33,
n 137. In the Select Bibliography of his Recent Writings on the Revolt 
of 1857: A Survey (New Delhi, 1975), Kalyan Kumar Sengupta lists 
forty-seven books and sixty-two articles on 1857 by Indian and Pakistani 
historians.
2. Hugh Tinker, "1857 And 1957: The Mutiny And Modern India", in 
International Affairs, vol. 34, no. 1 (Jan 1958), pp. 57-65. For 
a denunciation of the trend towards regionalism and communalism in 
modern Indian and Pakistani scholarship, see Sengupta, Recent Writings, 
pp. 56-7. For a series of superb analyses of 1857, which show that
a nonpartisan viewpoint is attainable, see Stokes's "Mutiny Rebellion" 
articles, which are reproduced in his Feasant and the Raj, papers 5-8.
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of the Great Rebellion, and perhaps the area where imperialist and 
nationalist cliches retain their greatest hold on the popular historical 
imagination, is the role of the Punjab in 1857. Did the people of the 
Punjab sympathise with the cause of the Hindustani rebels, and did they 
attempt to subvert British rule in the Punjab?
To the older imperialist historians like Cave-Browne, Gibbon, Kaye 
3and Malleson, whose principal concerns were to show that the rebellion 
was mainly a sepoy mutiny, and to recount the heroic deeds of those 
Englishmen who, with the assistance of Divine Providence, "saved" India, 
these questions had to be answered in the negative. To them, the Punjab 
was the province that acted as a breakwater against the storm in 1857: 
when the mutiny burst forth most Punjabis registered their satisfaction 
with British rule in a solid demonstration of loyalty both within the 
Punjab itself and in the military action to recapture Delhi, Lucknow and 
other strongholds of the mutineers. Of particular significance was the 
steadfast loyalty of the Sikhs, who relished the opportunity provided to 
them by the British to humble the purabiah ("easterner") sepoys who had 
defeated them in 1846 and in 1848-49, and to ravage Delhi, the city where 
nearly two centuries earlier their ninth Guru, Tegh Bahadur, had been 
executed at the order of the emperor, Aurangzeb. These ideas of the 
Punjab's loyalty in 1857 were generally accepted by the first generation
4of Punjabi historians writing in the post - Independence period.
The imperialist interpretation of the Punjab's role in the Great 
Rebellion does not prove satisfactory on closer inspection, however.
For one thing, it plays down the severity of many of the measures taken 
by the British to avert a general uprising in the Punjab; for another, 
it ignores, or quickly passes over the fact, that, these measures 
notwithstanding, several popular insurrections (of which at least one,
3. Rev. J. Cave-Browne, The Punjab And Delhi In 1857 (Languages Dept. 
Punjab reprint, 1970); Gibbon, The Lawrences Of The Punjab; Sir J. 
Kaye and G.B. Malleson, History of the Indian Mutiny (London, 1898), 
Vol. 2.
4. For example, Khushwant Singh, History Of The Sikhs, Vol. 2.
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the Gugera insurrection, assumed the proportions of a full-blown 
agrarian rebellion) broke out in the Punjab. Of late, therefore, a 
new generation of Punjabi historians has resolved to lift the stigma 
of loyalty from the Punjab. Hari Singh and Salahuddin Malik, 5 for 
example, have denounced the idea of Punjabi collaboration in 1857 as 
an imperialist myth: the facts, they suggest, show that in 1857 the 
Punjab was actually seething with discontent; that although some 
Punjabis collaborated with the British, most either participated in 
the Great Rebellion or were awaiting the right opportunity to do so; 
that the British held the Punjab only because they unleashed a reign 
of terror there.
|
But this regionalist/communalist interpretation, like the imperialist 
interpretation, is at best a half-truth. To assert that anti-British 
feelings existed in the Punjab on the eve of the Great Rebellion is valid 
enough; but to claim that these feelings were widespread, and that most 
Punjabis acted upon them, is to take a great liberty with the facts. 
Similarly, to note, as Malik does, that most of the civil disturbances 
occurred in the Muslim districts of the Punjab is sufficiently well-grounded; 
but to go on from there to suggest that the participants in those 
disturbances acted in the way they did primarily because they were Muslims, 
and because they desired the restoration of Mughal power, is crudely 
to oversimplify an historical situation that demands more subtle analysis.
In this chapter we shall try and put the Punjab’s role in the Great 
Rebellion in a better historical perspective. Our discussion of the 
important events (summarised in Table 6:1) will seek to answer three 
basic questions. Why did the people of the Punjab resist for so long 
the general tendency to rebellion? Why, at last, just as the rebellion 
in Hindustan was on the point of collapse, did outbreaks begin to occur 
in the Punjab? And how did the British reward those Punjabis who had 
stood by them in their hour of weakness?
5. The argument of Singh's unpublished dissertation is summarised in 
Sengupta, Recent Writings, pp. 38-9. Malik's arguments (to which 
we shall return later in this chapter) are published as "The Punjab 
and The Indian 'Mutiny'", in Journal of Indian History, vol 50, pt 2 
(Aug 1972), pp. 343-74; "The 1857 Gogira Rebellion In Southeastern 
Panjab: A Forgotten Muslim Response To British Rule In India", in 
International Congress of Orientalistss 29th Congress, 1973: 
Proceedings of Section Inde Moderne, vol 2 (1976), pp. 88-92.
TABLE 6:1 Chronology of Important Events3 1857
March Unrest and incendiarism at Ambala cantonment
May 10 Outbreak at Meerut
11 Massacre of Europeans in Delhi
12 Arrival of news from Delhi in Punjab
13 Disarming of sepoys at Lahore
14 Ferozpur mutiny
June 7 Jullundur mutiny
8 Siege of Delhi begun
July 7 Jhelum mutiny
9 Sialkot mutiny
26 Gugera jailbreak 
30 Lahore mutiny
August 28 Peshawar mutiny
September 2 Dhund attack on Murree station
3 Suppression of Dhund insurrection
14 Assault on Delhi
17 Outbreak of Gugera insurrection 
20 Fall of Delhi
October 29 Suppression of Gugera insurrection
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When the news of the massacre of Europeans in Meerut and Delhi 
was flashed up the telegraph line to Lahore on the morning of 12 May 
1857, the Punjab administration was caught almost completely unawares. 
Looking back, it was easy to see that there had been warnings: for 
several months prior to the Meerut rising it had been known that the 
sepoys cantoned in the Punjab were greatly disturbed about the introduction 
of the infamous "greased" Enfield cartridges; in March unrest and 
incendiarism had broken out at the Ambala cantonment, and this had soon 
spread to the Hoshiarpur, Jullundur and PhiHour cantonments; and in 
the first week of May government spies had provided information about 
plans for a general sepoy rising in the Punjab. But these warnings 
had been ignored by the military authorities, partly because most 
British officers in sepoy regiments had refused to believe that their 
own men were capable of mutiny,^ and partly because most Englishmen in 
general had been unable to appreciate the seriousness of the cartridge
7issue. Consequently, on 12 May 1857, the Punjab administration suddenly 
found itself confronted with four difficult tasks: men and supplies 
had to be assembled and sent down to Delhi; about 37,000 potentially - 
mutinous Hindustani sepoys had to be overawed; a long and troublesome 
frontier had to be guarded against outside attack; and a civil population 
of about thirteen millions had somehow to be kept back from insurrection.
Given that there were in the Punjab at the time only 10,000 European 
soldiers, and that the fidelity of the 10,500 Punjabi irregulars and
The turning of the general crisis
6 . When, subsequently, the 55th Native Infantry mutinied at Peshawar, 
their commanding officer, Colonel Spottiswoode, committed suicide:
MRRy pt 2, p.152.
7. Ibid, pt 1, pp. 3, 35-6, 47, 151, 277; pt 2, p.258. Once the 
Great Rebellion was over, Herbert Edwardes expressed a fairly typical 
British opinion on the cartridge issue when he observed that "it is 
lamentably characteristic of the conservative barbarism of India 
that a common piece of civilization - an improved rifle - has 
convulsed the empire, and called up 150,000 Asiatics to affirm by 
force of arms that spirit can be defiled by matter and religion 
converted in the stomach" : Edwardes, C and S Peshawar, to Montgomery,
23 March 1858, no 64: ibid, pt 2, p.143.
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9, 0 0 0 military police could only be hoped for, the situation demanded 
stern measures. The "Punjab School" responded with characteristic 
resoluteness and promptness. On the morning of 13 May four regiments 
of sepoys were disarmed at Lahore; simultaneously, the Ferozpur arsenal, 
which contained 7,000 barrels of powder and a large store of weapons, 
g
was secured. Over the next three months disaffected or "suspect"
sepoy regiments were disarmed at more than a dozen places in the Punjab.
Other precautionary measures were quickly taken. Following the issue
of a series of directives by the Judicial Commissioner, Robert Montgomery,
9to all Commissioners and Deputy Commissioners, a policy of strict
censorship, which included the opening of private mail and the gagging
of the native press, 10 was implemented; undesirable Hindustanis were
weeded out of the lower ranks of the administration and sent down to
Hindustan in caravans (by December more than 2,500 had been deported
from the Punjab)11; the guards at jails and treasuries were strengthened;
and at the riverbanks, boats were seized and ferries guarded, thus ensuring
the division of the Punjab Territories into "so many portions like the
12water-tight compartments of a ship."
But, despite these measures, the position of the British in the
Punjab was far from secure; until the fall of Delhi on 20 September
1857, it was, in fact, critical. Between May and September no fewer
than twelve sepoy mutinies occurred in the Punjab. On 14 May the 45th
Native Infantry rose at Ferozpur and attempted to capture the arsenal.
Having been driven off, they burnt the civil headquarters and, accompanied
13by a large portion of the 57th Native Infantry, made off to Delhi.
A week later the 55th Native Infantry mutinied at Hoti Mardan in the
8 . Ibid, pt 2, pp. 198-9.
9. Montgomery's Circulars are reproduced in ibid, pt 2, pp. 300-05, 313-16.
10. The editor of a Peshawar newspaper was imprisoned; one press was 
closed in Multan, another in Sialkot: PAR 1856-58, p.10.
11. MRR, pt 1, pp. 250-1. In addition, a system of passports was 
introduced, the aim being to restrict the movement of Hindustanis 
into the Punjab.
12. PAR 1856-58, p.9.
13. MRR, pt 1, pp. 48-51.
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Peshawar Division, just as they were about to be disarmed. The
mutineers escaped into the Hazara mountains; but they were pursued
and, with the assistance of the local tribes, hunted down and destroyed 
14like wild beasts. On 7 June the 6th Light Cavalry and the 36th and 
61st regiments of Native Infantry broke from Jullundur, marched to 
Phillour, where they were joined by the 3rd Native Infantry, and got 
away to Delhi. 15 With so many mutineers finding their way to Delhi, 
British authority in the Punjab seemed to be crumbling rapidly. As 
it turned out, however, few mutineers were to get further south than 
the Sutlej after June, because the rivers were rising, and because the 
British were now determined at all cost to use their available British 
troops to destroy mutinous sepoy regiments before they had travelled 
too far.
On 7 July the 14th Native Infantry mutinied at Jhelum when attempts
were made to disarm them. A pitched battle was fought and the mutineers
were defeated. Of the 500, forty escaped, three were imprisoned, 119
were transported for life and the remainder either perished in battle or
were executed after a drumhead court-martial.1  ^ The 46th Native Infantry
and part of the 9th Light Cavalry rose at Sialkot on 9 July. Having
massacred a number of Europeans, plundered the treasury, burnt the
courthouses, blown up the magazines, and released more than 300 prisoners
from the jail, the 1,200 mutineers marched off towards Gurdaspur.
Immediately, the local villagers swarmed into the Sialkot station and
plundered it. When order was restored, a day or so later, these villagers
were severely punished: about fifty of them were flogged or imprisoned,
and fines totalling Rs 7,000 were imposed upon their villages. As for
the mutineers, they were pursued by Brigadier-General Nicholson's Movable
Column of British and Punjabi troops, driven into the Ravi near Gurdaspur
17and annihilated: Nicholson hanged or shot every mutineer he caught.
On 14 July part of the 5th Native Infantry deserted the Thanesur station,
18in the Cis-Sutlej Division, and fled to Delhi.
14. Ibid, pt 2, pp. 113-20, 151-2, 277-8, 290-93.
15. Ibid, pt 2, pp. 345-6.
16. Ibid, pt 1, p.384; pt 2, pp. 245-6, 347-8.
17. Ibid, pt 1, pp. 239-44; pt 2, pp. 238-9, 240-42, 351-2.
18. Ibid, pt 1, p.32.
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On 30 July the 26th Native Infantry rose at Lahore, murdered their
commanding officer and set off across the Manjha towards the Ravi.
Unbeknown to them, the Deputy Commissioner of Amritsar District, Frederick
Cooper, and the Assistant Commissioner at Kasur, R.W. Thomas, acting
on instructions from Lahore, had already raised the people of the Manjha
against them by stirring up the Manjha's hatred of purabiahs, and, even
more effectively, by offering a reward of Rs 50 for every refugee sepoy
caught dead or alive. As Montgomery later observed, "the smothered
martial spirit of the people was kindled into a flame; escape for a
deserter was hopeless, for every village became to him as a nest of
19hornest." Consequently, on 31 July, the 26th were attacked by a large
party of police and villagers, led by the tahsildar of Ajnala, as they
attempted to cross the Ravi. More than 150 of the mutineers were killed.
Later in the afternoon, when they saw Cooper approaching at the head of
a unit of cavalry, they sought refuge on an island in midstream. Thirty-
five of them were drowned. The rest either were captured or gave themselves
up in the "insane" belief, as Cooper later put it, that they were going
20to be given a fair court-martial "after some luxurious refreshment".
But Cooper wanted blood, just as Nicholson had a few days earlier. Two
captured mutineers were hanged, and six were blown away from guns, by
the orders of their own British officers. The remaining 282 Cooper
sentenced to summary execution by firing squad (237 were so executed,
but forty-five suffocated to death in a small room in the Ajnala tahsil
office while awaiting their turn). The multitude of the 26th’s camp-
followers was "taken care of" (these are Cooper's euphemistic words) by
the local villagers. Cooper's actions were condoned by his superiors;
in fact, he was congratulated on his "energy and spirit". Montgomery
requested of him only that any remaining mutineers be sent to Lahore:
"You have had slaughter enough", the Judicial Commissioner wrote.
21"We want a few for the troops here and also for evidence." Most of 
the stragglers who were rounded up and sent to Lahore were blown away
19. Ibid., pt 2, p.235. See also ibid., pt 1, pp. 234-5; TAR 1856-58, 
p.1 2.
20. Frederick Cooper, The Crisis in the Punjab from the 10th of May until 
the Fall of Delhi (London, 1858), pp. 154-6.
21. Quoted in Christopher Hibbert, The Great Mutiny: India 1857 
(Penguin, Middlesex, 1978), p.132.
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from guns. One way or another, therefore, 568 of the 600 mutinous
22sepoys of the 26th were destroyed.
The later mutinies were equally inglorious affairs. On 19 August
the 10th Light Cavalry broke from Ferozpur and disappeared into the
23wastes of northern Rajasthan. A week later, at Peshawar, 871 men
of the 51st Native Infantry, which was widely regarded as having been
one of the finest sepoy corps in the Bengal Army, took up arms against
their European officers. Within thirty-six hours, however, they had
all been run down. Of the 697 men taken alive, 564 were executed by
24sentence of drumhead court-martial. On 21 September, at Mianwali in
the Leiah District, thirty men of the 9th Irregular Cavalry mutined.
25All were quickly destroyed. Finally, at Ambala, on the last day of 
September, remnants of the 5th and 60th regiments of Native Infantry 
fled the cantonment upon seeing that they were about to be confined in 
the jail. But the British soldiers gave pursuit, and within ten minutes 
135 sepoys had been butchered and thirty-three made prisoners. Only 
forty made good their escape.^
While these mutinies were taking place a considerable portion of
the civil population either broke into open rebellion (we shall examine
the Murree and Gugera insurrections presently) or drifted towards the
brink of rebellion. In the Cis-Sutlej Division, many of whose inhabitants
were linked by ties of kinship to the rebellious districts of the North-
Western Provinces, sympathy with the rebels was strong. The Muslim
Gujar clans in Ludhiana District, for instance, were "in constant
27communication from village to village with the Delhie rebels." With 
emissaries from Delhi (often disguised as fakirs) spreading word of the 
collapse of British authority in northern India, and with the constant
2 2. MRRt pt 1, pp. 246, 274-6 .
23. Ibid., pt 1, pp. 55-6.
24. Ibid., pt 2, pp. 174-5.
25. Ibid., pt 2, pp. 84-5.
26. Ibid., pt 1, p . 2 0.
27. G. Ricketts, late D.C. Ludhiana,
22 Feb 1858: ibid., pt 1 , p.108.
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passage of mutinous sepoys through the Division, most people became
convinced that the British cause was a hopeless one. Consequently,
with the notable exception of the Protected Sikh Chieftains (the rulers
of Patiala, Jhind, etc.), they displayed a marked reluctance to provide
2 8the British with supplies and recruits. Moreover, the belief that
British power was doomed led to a sudden upsurge of violent crime, not
only amongst the "hereditary thieving races" like the Harnis and Sansis,
29but also amongst a wide section of the rural population as a whole.
Close to the Umballa cantonment [the Commissioner of the Division 
later reported] a villager posted himself on the road with a gun 
in his hand, and plundered at his leisure...Villages in Thanesur 
[District], headed by their lumberdars, turned out in broad day 
fully armed and equipped, with drums beating and flags flying, to 
prey on the weaker villages. Frequent fights occurred, and the 
police were afraid even to report the state of affairs. The 
country was getting rapidly disorganized.30
The Commissioner and his subordinate officers took punitive action.
Several disobedient villages were heavily fined (one was burnt down);
and the city of Ludhiana, accused of having aided the Jullundur mutineers,
was disarmed - in the process of which two residential blocks were
31deliberately levelled - and fined Rs 55,000. A petty insurrection in
the Raja of Nabha’s territory was crushed by the Deputy Commissioner of
32Ferozpur District. The police were urged to attack robbers; an
order issued on 2 June stated that "no responsibility will be incurred
by the [police] man who takes the life of a robber in the act of crime,
33but, on the contrary, such bold deeds will be rewarded by promotion."
28. Ibid., pt 1, pp. 6-7.
29. Ibid., pt 1, p.108; PAR 1856-58, p.5.
30. Barnes to Montgomery, 5 Feb 1858, no 54: MRR> pt 1, pp. 10-11.
31. Ibid., pt 1, pp. 98-9; pt 2, pp. 214, 217. The populations of the 
Cis-Sutlej and Trans-Sutlej Divisions were not systematically and 
universally disarmed until 1858. Then nearly 110,000 weapons were 
collected: General Report on the Administration of the Punjab and 
its Dependencies for 1858-59 (Lahore, 1859), (hereafter PAR 1858-59), 
pt 3, para 12.
32. MRR, pt 1, p.53.
33. Ibid. , pt 1, p .9.
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Many robbers who were taken alive were summarily executed by the civil
34authorities, as provided for by Act XIV of 1857. Altogether, 123
35"criminals" were executed in the Cis-Sutlej Division in 1857.
Elsewhere in the Punjab Territories (with the exception of the
Murree hills and the Gugera District) there was, despite extensive rebel
propaganda, relatively little sympathy with the cause of the Hindustan
36rebels. Nor were most people yet convinced that the time had come to 
feign sympathy. Edward Thornton, Commissioner of Jhelum Division, found 
the popular response to the news of the Meerut and Delhi uprisings "very 
peculiar":
Great interest was exhibited [he continued], but there seemed 
less of the shock of surprise than I had expected to see.
The explanation seemed to be that their eyes had witnessed 
political convulsions so frequently that they did not regard 
it as probable that the course of any Government would be 
equable and undisturbed.
A time of peril to the Government of the day was to them 
so common that they conveyed to each other the whole case by 
use of a single word. There was a "Roulah" or it was a time 
of "Shorish". Either of these terms sufficed to explain our 
state to a native of the division. All "Roulahs" did not 
according to their experience subvert the Government, nor, on 
the other hand, were all "Roulahs" successfully tided over by 
the Government. So a prudent man would be observant and profess 
loyalty until he saw his way clearly.37
There were, however, signs to indicate that some men looked upon the 
present difficulties of the government as providing an opportunity to
34. The Act empowered any two civil officers sitting in commission to try 
and execute any traitor or participator in violent crime. Typically, 
John Lawrence had delegated these powers to his junior officers at 
the outset of the crisis, before Act XIV reached Lahore: ibid., pt 2, 
p.204.
35. Ibid., pt 1, p .21.
36. For translations of rebel placards and proclamations in the Punjab, see 
ibid., pt 1, pp. 255-60. For wild rumours spread by Delhi emissaries, 
see ibid., pt 1, pp. 327-8, 369; pt 2, p.247. Munshi Jiwan Lall, 
who kept a diary of events inside Delhi in 1857, noted on 3 June, "In 
the Punjab, it was stated [at darbar], there was...little sympathy 
with the mutiny": C.T. Metcalf (trans), Two Native Narratives of the 
Mutiny in Delhi (Delhi, reprint 1974), p.112.
37. Thornton to Montgomery, 23 Feb 1858, no 80: MRRy pt 1, pp. 315-16.
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revive old factional disputes, and that the dominant tribes were
preparing to defend their interests, should British power be annihilated.
Towards the end of May it was rumoured, for instance, that the clan heads
in the Bar tract of Shahpur District had met secretly to pledge themselves
to a common course of action should the locally - cantoned sepoys rise
39in mutiny. It was also discovered that throughout the Jhelum Division
the fighting tribes were simultaneously manoeuvring for a trial of 
strength between themselves, and reasserting their old seigneurial rights 
over ordinary cultivators. ^ 0
At this juncture, with their loyal police and military establishments 
stretched to the limit, the British could not hope forcibly to suppress 
this factionalism. But it could be manipulated. Here is Thornton, 
speaking after the crisis was over:
The numerous factions into which the population is divided 
forms a remarkable feature in the upper part of the Sind 
Sagur Doab. Heretofore our endeavour had been to soothe 
and obliterate if possible the feelings that kept up these 
divisions. Now, however, the want of unanimity in the 
people was an advantage we could not forego, and one faction 
was to a certain degree played off against another.41
Recruitment of soldiers and additional police was the key to this divide -
and - rule strategy. In the Shahpur District the Tiwana chieftains
were encouraged to raise about 1 , 0 0 0 horsemen for service as additional
police in various parts of the Punjab. Many of these horsemen were heads
of villages or were related to the headmen. "The presence of such a
number of these among our armies," wrote the Deputy Commissioner, Gore
Ouseley, "afforded an excellent guarantee for the good behaviour of those
42who remained at home." In the Rawalpindi District the people were
38
38. Thornton noted that in some instances if a man sided with the British, 
"it in itself rather inclined his opponent to disloyalty": ibid.
39. MRR, pt 1, p.395.
40. Ibid., pt 1, pp. 323-6; SR Gujrat 1861, pp. 147-8.
41. Thornton to Montgomery, 23 Feb 1858, no 80: MRRS pt 1, p.324.
42. Ouseley to Thornton, 25 Feb 1858: ibid., pt 1, pp. 396-7.
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reluctant to enlist for distant service. But they were keen to serve
as additional police in their own district for short periods. This
was agreed to, since, as Thornton later put it, it "gave us the means
of rewarding the well disposed and of inducing them to repress the
43remainder of the population."
Recruitment was, in fact, the strategy that swung the Punjab as
a whole around from crisis to loyalty in 1857. It channelled the
inter-clannic rivalries, growing uncertainties and frustrated ambitions
of a large section of the population into acceptable competition and
adventure. As soon as the news of the Meerut and Delhi massacres reached
Lahore, John Lawrence got Nihal Singl Chhachhi (that old and faithful
friend of the British) to draw up a list of the leading chieftains who
had been deprived of their jagirs on account of their disloyalty in
1848-49. Lawrence then wrote to each, urging them, as Lawrence's
personal secretary, Arthur Brandreth, later expressed it, to "retrieve
their character" by coming in to Lahore with a specified number of retainers.
As these chieftains came in, Lawrence organised them and sent them off
44to join the British camp on the Ridge above Delhi. The district
45officers successfully mobilised the lesser chieftains. "As almost
a general rule", Thornton reported, "men who had been against us in the
war of 1848-49, and who had lost wealth and rank in consequence, behaved
46especially loyally on this occasion." Between them, the various
chieftains of the Punjab produced about 14,000 irregular levies for
47service within the Punjab and under the walls of Delhi.
43. Thorton to Montgomery, 23 Feb 1858, no 80: ibid., pt 1, p.317.
44. Brandreth, quoted in R. Bosworth Smith, Life of Lord Lawrence 
(London, 1901), vol 2, p.13.
45. For examples, see MRR, pt 1, pp. 7-8, 160-62, 365-6, 386; SR Gujrat
1861, p.153.
46. Thornton to Montgomery, 23 Feb 1858, no 80: MRR, pt 1, p.327.
Some formerly disgraced chieftains even began to readopt their old 
titles of honour, and to assume new ones, without British permission: 
ibid.
47. Ibid., pt 2, p.339.
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Once the Punjab’s general lack of sympathy with the Hindustan
rebellion began to show, the British set about recruiting additional
regular police and soldiers. Nearly 5,000 new men were induced into
the regular, civil police force (an increase of about 52 per cent)
48between May and September. And eighteen new regiments of infantry
49(about 34,000 men) were raised in the Punjab in 1857. Nearly half
of these recruits were drawn from the Lahore and Jhelum Divisions (the
two Districts which had the highest recruitment figures were those of
Lahore and Rawalpindi) 50 - from, in other words, the preeminently martial
tracts of the Manjha and the Salt Range. 51 By recruiting the hereditary
peasant-soldiers of these tracts and sending them off to Delhi at once,
the British probably ensured the survival of their rule in the Punjab.
"The fiercer spirits", it was later observed, "were everywhere enrolled,
and the very class most likely to create disturbance at home was drained
52off to serve abroad."
The Murree and Gugera insurrections
About the time that the Delhi rebels were making their final stand 
against the British siege machine, two desperate insurrections broke out 
in the Punjab. Neither of these insurrections, it must be said, amounted 
to much: each was a fairly limited-scale affair, involving a small number 
of people living in a backwater part of the Punjab, and each was speedily 
suppressed. But how are they to be explained, with respect both to their 
causes and to their characters? To contemporary British officials, who 
were inclined to see "treachery" almost everywhere at this time, these 
insurrections were nothing more than instances of opportunism - according 
to John Lawrence, for example, they "arose from no grievance or special 
cause whatever" but "merely sprang from the popular belief that British
48. PAR 1856-58, p.9.
49. MRRy pt 2, pp. 339-40.
50. For a return showing the number of "extra Establishment" recruited 
in the various Divisions and Districts, see ibid., pt 2, p.317.
51. Montgomery observed that many villages in the Manjha "have been almost 
decimated by the number of recruits who have flocked to form our new 
regiments in memory of the bygone days when they bravely fought against 
us under the banners of the Khalsa": Montgomery’s Report: ibid.,
pt 2, p.231.
52. PAR 1856-58, p.53.
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power was mortally stricken." To a modern, nationalist-communalist
historian like Malik, on the other hand, the insurrections are further
proof that in 1857 most Punjabis, and especially Muslim Punjabis, were
ardently hopeful of, and in some cases actively working for, a Mughal
54restoration. Each assessment, we would maintain, is somewhat short 
of the mark.
The first insurrection broke out amongst the Dhunds of the Murree
and Hazara hills in the northwestern corner of the Punjab. A proud,
independent mountain people, 55 the Dhunds had risen against the Sikhs
in 1837, and had been crushed as a result.5 *^ In 1851 the British had
established a sanatorium for their European soldiers at Murree. Although
the mountain people had gained a new market for their agricultural products
and their labour, the establishment of the sanatorium and the construction
of roads through their territory had not been to their liking. They
particularly disliked the government's banning of their traditional
practice of firing the mountain slopes to fertilise the soil. In 1858
57Thornton noted that this ban "had always been a grievance."
The first sign of trouble came in May, when the people openly flouted
this order by lighting many forest fires. Between May and July the
British authorities received several reports suggesting that about eight
Dhund villages had formed a "dua-i-khair", or solemn compact, for the
5 8defence of the hills. The authorities responded to these reports by
53. From Lawrence's "Mutiny Report", conveyed in R. Temple, Secy to CC, 
to G. Edmonstone, Secy to GOI (with the GG), 25 May 1858, no 75-322 
(Political): MRR, pt 2, p.364.
54. n 5 above.
55. According to the 1881 Census, the Dhunds numbered about 12,000 in 
Rawalpindi District and about 38,000 in Hazara District: Ibbetson, 
Panjab Castes, Abstract 81, pp. 150-51.
56. Griffin et al. 9 Chiefs and Families, voi 2, pp. 306-7.
57. Thornton to Montgomery, 23 Feb 1858, no 80: MRR, pt 1, p.320.
58. MRR, pt 1, pp. 329-31, p.333; pt 2, p.247.
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calling about a dozen village headmen in to Murree, ostensibly to
advise the Assistant Commissioner, Lieutenant Battye, at the sanatorium,
59but in reality to act as hostages. On 18 July a sweeper boldly hinted 
to an English lady that all Europeans at Murree would soon be slaughtered. 
After that, rumours of a Dhund "conspiracy" became almost commonplace. 
Finally, on 1 September, one of Lady Lawrence's bodyguards warned the 
British that an attack on Murree was imminent. With only 180 able-bodied 
soldiers to defend the sanatorium, to which a large number of European 
women and children had by this stage been evacuated, the Assistant 
Commissioner thus found himself in a grim situation.
Early in the morning of the next day a party of 300 Dhunds attacked 
the European quarters at the sanatorium. But they were driven off by 
the Assistant Commissioner and his men, who had maintained an all-night 
vigil. One man was killed on each side. The next day the Commissioner 
of Jhelum Division, Edward Thornton, arrived at Murree with reinforcements 
and dispersed the main body of attackers. Members of those tribes which 
had a history of opposition to the Dhunds, such as the Dhanials, together 
with jagirdars like the Pirs of Palassi, whom the Dhunds recognised as 
religious superiors, were called upon to assist with the suppression of 
the Dhunds. Over the next few weeks most of those who had participated 
in the attack were hunted down and punished. Eleven Dhund villages were 
burned to the ground, and about 3,000 cattle and 350 acres of land were 
confiscated. Fifteen men were executed, and 202 were imprisoned.^0
Once the Dhund insurrection was over, the British discovered that 
the "conspiracy" had been a much more extensive one than had been thought. 
Not only had many of the Hindustani servants at the sanatorium been in 
league with the Dhunds (two Hindustani doctors employed at Murree were 
subsequently executed for their part in the insurrection), but plans for
59. Ibid., pt 1, pp. 318, 322, 329-30; pt 2, p.247. In July these 
hostages complained to Battye that an American missionary had been 
preaching in the bazaar, where they were then residing, and that he 
had told them that both their religion and their Prophet were false. 
Battye apparently took no action on their complaint: ibid., pt 1, p.329.
60. Ibid., pt 1, pp. 341-6, 357, 360; pt 2, pp. 124-7, 248; SR Rawalpindi 
1864, pp. 89-90.
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the attack on Murree had extended far beyond the territory of the Dhunds, 
well into Hazara and down to the plains around Rawalpindi; a general 
rising of hill tribes, in other words, had been planned. *^1 Fortunately 
for the British, the other tribes - which, because they possessed clearer 
political structures (the Dhunds had no paramount chieftain), were
62capable of speedier and more organised mobilisation than the Dhunds 
had pulled out from the wider Mdua-i-khairM at the last moment. Had 
the Dhund insurrection been successful, however, these tribes would 
almost certainly have risen, too.
A larger and more serious insurrection, in which different tribes
did combine, with considerable effectiveness, occurred in Gugera (later
Montgomery) District. Situated in the lower Bari Doab, between Lahore
and Multan, Gugera District was for the most part a wild expanse of
stunted brushwood and waving grass - the natural home of the pastoralist.
The lands along the west bank of the Sutlej were held by the Rajput
Wattus. The Ravi valley, in Gugera, Jhang and Multan Districts, was
occupied by the Great Ravi tribes - the Joyas, Khatias, Kharrals, Sials 
6 3and Wattus - and clans - the Baghelas (a Khatia clan), Wahniwals (a Jat 
clan), Fattianas and Murdanas (both Sial clans). Each of these tribes 
and clans occupied a distinct domestic tract, within which there were
61. MBR, pt 1, pp. 337, 343-4, 347, 357; pt 2, p.249.
62. Ibid., pt 1, p.344.
63. These were mostly Rajput tribes. According to the 1881 Census,
their numbers in the three districts of Multan Division were as
follows:
Joyas Khatias Kharrals Sials Wattus
Gugera 6,562 3,809 21,448 7,886 11,644
Jhang 2,203 774 3,216 36,811 353
Multan 5,532 7,558 3,356 23,597 100
Source: Ibbetson, Panjab Castes, Abstract 80, pp. 140-41; p.174.
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also located the villages of the socially inferior cultivators, and
exercised dominance over general portions of the Bar grazing grounds
in the Bari and Rachna Doabs. Although they were united by the ties
of occupation, religion and, in some cases, inter-marriage, and by a
common disdain towards outsiders, these tribes and clans were much
given to factionalism. Between the Sials and the Kharrals, for example,
there existed a long history of bitter rivalry, while the Kharrals were
themselves divided into two factions (based on the Upera and Lakhera
64gots), between which there was a long-standing feud.
The commonest expression of this factionalism was cattle-theft.
Purser, who conducted the revised settlement in Gugera District in the
1870s, categorised these pastoralists as "the last of the essentially
robber tribes" and claimed that they were "more or less addicted to
cattle-stealing."^*5 However, these tribes and clans were quite capable
of sinking their differences in order to defy their two common enemies:
the State revenue collector and the Hindu moneylender. They used to
speak with pride of the kardars they had killed during the years of Sikh
rule, and of the long periods when they had paid no revenue because the
Sikhs had been unable or afraid to collect it. 66 In 1843 the Ravi tribes
and the Wattus along the Sutlej had risen en masse against the Sikhs.
The Kharrals and Sials had risen again in 1845-46. And in 1848-49, at
the prompting of the British, all the Ravi and Sutlej tribes had plundered
the Hindu and Sikh villages, whose property they had been allowed to
67divide up amonst themselves. Ahmad Khan Kharral, head of the Upera
got, had led no fewer than five insurrections against the authority of
the Sikhs, and had gained a reputation far and wide as a fearless robber
68baron. It was he who initiated the insurrection of 1857.
64. Ibid., p.174.
65. SR Montgomery 1878, p.47.
6 6. Ibbetson, Panjab Castes, p.146. This perhaps explains the complex 
story of how, between 1800 and 1849, the different ta’aluqas of 
Gugera District were constantly switched back and forth between khalsa 
(under a kardar), jagir and ijar: for details, see SR Montgomery 
1878, p.39.
67. SR Montgomery 1878, p.38; MRR, pt 2, p.45.
68. Ibbetson, Panjab Castes, p.175.
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Basically, what happened in 1857 was this. At the commencement of
the general crisis the civil station of Gugera was occupied by a company
of the 49th Native Infantry and a unit of mounted police. The officiating
Deputy Commissioner, Lieutenant Elphinstone, used the police to disarm
the sepoys, who were then sent off to Lahore, about 75 miles away.
When the flames of rebellion spread to Sirsa District, to the east of
the Sutlej, in the first weeks of June, a large portion of the police
was sent across the Sutlej. A troop of Biloch Horse, recently dispatched
to Gugera, was found to be mutinous, and had to be sent back across the
Indus to be disbanded. A new unit of mounted levies, raised amongst
the Sials of Jhang District, was substituted and this allowed the remainder
69of the Gugera police to be sent to the North-Western Provinces.
It would seem that these changes, particularly the gradual removal
of the local police and the substitution of Sial levies, had an unsettling
effect on Gugera District. In the first week of July a Sutlej village
refused to pay a balance of revenue, and cattle-theft and highway robbery
flared up in that portion of the District. On 26 July a mass breakout
from the Gugera jail was attempted. About twenty prisoners escaped,
but fifty-one were killed or wounded by the police. Ahmad Khan Kharral,
who had - along with the other pastoral chieftains - been obliged since
the beginning of the crisis to reside at the civil station, took the
opportunity to slip away. He was captured and brought back to Gugera,
however, and was forbidden to leave the station without Elphinstone's
70permission.
The insurrection began on 17 September, just three days before the 
fall of Delhi, when Ahmad Khan and the other Ravi chieftains deserted 
the Gugera station. Ahmad Khan retired to his village, Jhamra, on the 
west bank of the Ravi. A small force of troopers, led by the Extra 
Assistant Commissioner, L. Berkeley, set off in pursuit of the Kharral 
chieftain. When Berkeley reached the Ravi, Ahmad Khan appeared on the
69. MRR, pt 2, pp. 10-11, 37.
70. Ibid., pt 2, pp. 43-4.
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opposite bank and shouted across "that he had renounced his allegiance 
to the British Government and considered himself a subject of the King
71of Delhi, from whom he had received orders to raise the whole country."
On the arrival of reinforcements, Berkeley's party crossed the Ravi
and marched on Jhamra. Ahmad Khan and his followers escaped, but his
village was burned down, the families were arrested, and 700 cattle were
seized. After the Ahmad Khan re-crossed the river to join forces with
the Wattus on the east bank. On 20 September the rebels,having attempted
to attack Gugera station, were driven into the dense thickets along the
riverbank. The next day a party of Sikh and British horsemen caught up
72with Ahmad Khan and killed him. Although the Kharrals now submitted,
and the Wattus soon retired to their villages, the insurrection was by
no means over, for about this time the Fattianas and Murdanas rose in
rebellion. On 22 September these clans ambushed and killed Berkeley
and about fifty of his men at a swampy spot beside the Ravi. And
towards the end of the month the Joyas, Khatias, Baghelas and Wahniwals
also rose. As Elphinstone later observed, "the whole country as far
73as Toolumba, in the Mooltan District, was in open insurrection."
The British poured reinforcements into Gugera District from Lahore 
and Multan in an effort to prevent the insurrection from spreading across 
the whole of the southern Bar. But the pursuing foot soldiers, slowed 
down by heavy artillery, could not keep up with the rebels, while the
71. Elphinstone to G. Hamilton, C and S Multan, 30 Jan 1858, no A: ibid., 
pt 2 , p.46.
72. Ibid., pt 2, pp. 46-9. The man who claimed to have killed Ahmad 
Khan was Dhara Singh Nakai. In 1848 Dhara Singh had joined the 
rebels at Multan. Ahmad Khan, having induced him to fortify his 
house at Satgarha in the lower Manjha, had then betrayed him to the 
British. In 1857 Dhara Singh betrayed Ahmad Khan and provided the 
British with information that ensured the conviction of many of Ahmad 
Khan's followers: Griffin, et al., Chiefs and Families, vol 1,
pp. 287-8.
73. Elphinstone to Hamilton, 30 Jan 1858, no A: MRR, pt 2, p.51. It 
was at this stage that many of the police began to surrender their 
weapons to the rebels. For an example, see FAR 1856-58, pp. 8-9.
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cavalry frequently found itself lured into the jungles and confronted
74with an enemy whose skill in guerilla combat was second to none.
At Chichawatni a relief force from Multan was besieged for three days by
about 2,000 rebels. Rebel marksmen moved about over the tops of the
75houses, concealed under the petticoats of the village women.
In the first week of October the Khatias, Baghelas and Wahniwals, 
having thoroughly plundered the town of Kamalia in the Jhang District, 
joined forces with the Fattianas and Murdanas and retired into the Jullee 
jungle on the west bank of the Ravi, "a place renowned as having
76successfully withstood the attack of the Sikhs in former insurrections."
For two weeks the rebels frustrated the attempts of the British to enter
their jungle stronghold. Finally, on 22 October the rebels broke out
of Jullee, crossed the Ravi and, driving their herds before them, fled
across the Bar towards the Sutlej. The British columns gave chase,
caught up with the main body of rebels at Churur Tezi Ka on 29 October
and inflicted a decisive defeat on them. The Gugera insurrection was
77over. It was now time for the British to teach the pastoral tribes
78the lesson that "rebellion is not a profitable speculation." The
rebel leaders were rounded up and executed or deported; the rebel tribes,
besides having thousands of cattle and camels confiscated, were fined
79more than Rs 5 lakhs. Military roads were cut through the jungles to
80enable new police posts to be established.
74. F.C. Marsden, who was DC of Gugera after November 1857, wrote of 
the Fattianas and Khatias: "few men understand bush-fighting better 
than they do or are better shots: they scatter and assemble by beat 
of dhole [war drum] in a very short space of time, with the different 
sounds of which they are as familiar as trained Light Infantry": 
Marsden to Hamilton, 31 Jan 1858: MRR, pt 2, pp. 62-3.
75. Ibid., pt 2, p.71.
76. Elphinstone to Hamilton, 30 Jan 1858, no A: ibid., p.2, p.54.
77. Ibid., pt 2, pp. 56-62, 75-8.
78. Edward Reike [?] to Hamilton, 28 Dec 1857, no 445: JDP, 2 Jan 1858, 
no 8 (PS).
79. SR Montgomery 1878, p.40; PAR 1856-58, p.11.
80. Montgomery DG 1883-84, p.39.
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How should the Gugera insurrection be interpreted? Neither the
81contemporary British view of it as a case of crude opportunism nor
Malik's assertion that it was "entirely Muslim, and quite nationalistic
82in character" will do. To be sure, the rebels waited until the
position of the British in the Punjab was weakest - when every available
man was under the walls of Delhi - before they rose. And it cannot be
doubted that they were fired by the idea of a Muslim political revival.
But there is a problem: not all the pastoral tribes and clans of the
southern Bar arose in 1857. The Sutlej Wattus, for example, remained
aloof from the rebellion, while the Lakhera got of the Kharrals actively
collaborated with the British, as did the Sials of Jhang District and
83the Langrials of Multan District. To a certain extent, the fact that
some tribes and clans rebelled, whereas other did not, can be explained
in terms of factional divisions within the pastoral community - divisions
between, for example, the Sials on the one hand and the Khatias and
Kharrals on the other, and between the two main Kharral gots. The
individual chieftain's decision either for rebellion or for collaboration
‘ 84would have been influenced by the course adopted by his traditional rival.
Economic conditions also help to explain the inconsistency of response. 
The greater portion of the southern Bari Doab was, by the mid-1850s, on 
the verge of a massive shift from pastoralism to peasant agriculture.
Under Diwan Sawan Mai's administration, great encouragement had been given 
to cultivators who were prepared to colonise the wastes. The British, 
through their policies of improving irrigation facilities, conferring 
proprietary rights in land and making waste-land grants on favorable terms,
81. For example, Montgomery explained the insurrection as a case of the 
pastoralists believing "that they might indulge their inborn love 
of plunder without any fear of a check": Montgomery to Temple, 24 
March 1858, no 149: MRR, pt 2, p.267.
82. Malik "The 1857 Gogira Rebellion", p.90.
83. SR Montgomery 1878, p.45; Griffin, et al. 3 Chiefs and Families, 
vol 2, pp. 359-62, 369; FC, 30 March 1860, nos 121-4 (NAI).
84. For example, it was the head of the Lakhera got of the Kharrals, 
Safraz Khan, who provided Elphinstone with the news that Ahmad Khan 
had deserted the Gugera station on 17 September: MRR, pt. 2, p.45.
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had accelerated the transition to settled cultivation. The immediate
social and economic consequences of these policies were not uniform,
however; and this was reflected in the pattern of political response
in 1857. For example, the Sutlej Wattus, who had recently taken to
agriculture and were enjoying the considerable benefits brought by the
the upgrading of the old Khanwah and Sohag inundation canals, did not join 
85the insurrection. Throughout the remainder of the Gugera District,
however, economic conditions were far less auspicious. The Bari Doab
Canal was in the process of being constructed through the heart of Gugera
District (on its completion, in 1859, this canal extended into Multan
86District). At the same time, thousands of acres of waste land were
being leased by capitalists in anticipation of the profits to be made
once the canal was operating. Purser later noted that "there was a
mania for acquiring land in those days; and land anywhere near the canal
87would have been taken on any terms." To cultivate, these lessees had 
to lure tenants away from the old, established villages. This had a 
"disastrous" impact on most of the old villages, where barely one-third g
of the land within the village boundaries was under the plough as it was.
Added to this was the fact that agricultural prices in Gugera 
District remained low for many years after annexation, whereas elsewhere 
in the Punjab they were on the rise again by the mid-1850s. Table 6:2 
shows the average annual prices paid for the main crops by the Hindu 
shopkeepers (banias or kirars) in the district towns of Dipalpur and 
Hujra between 1839 and 1857. Clearly, although prices had made a slight 
recovery from their post-annexation slump by 1857, the agriculturists 
of Gugera District were still having to part with twice as much produce 
for the same amount of money as they had had to in the years before 
annexation. Low agricultural prices hurt the Great Ravi pastoral tribes, 
too, because they reduced the value of the one-quarter or one-third share 
of the produce which the pastoralists received from the cultivators as
85. SR Montgomery 1878, p.45.
8 6. PAR 1858-59, p.20.
87. SR Montgomery 1878, pp. 148-51.
8 8. Ibid.
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Table 6:2 Agricultural Prices in Gugera District3 1839-57
Year Price in Seers per Rupee
Unhusked
Rice
Wheat Gram Millets
Jowar Kangni China
1839 28 34 40 24 33 33
1840 22 29 38 35 30 26
1841 35 31 40 44 60 47
1842 35 50 57 49 115 90
1843 32 47 60 62 120 105
1844 34 42 51 42 70 55
1845 35 40 51 45 75 60
1846 35 36 50 35 61 54
1847 47 32 40 35 70 52
1848 36 47 60 26 45 37
1849 28 23 26 20 32 25
1850 60 37 45 51 61 52
1851 51 60 80 60 95 70
1852 56 52 60 62 82 57
1853 51 50 80 40 80 51
1854 48 40 52 48 90 69
1855 63 50 69 56 105 85
1856 50 45 61 36 99 70
1857 59 50 85 60 90 70
Source: SR Montgomery 1878, pp.154-5.
279
landlord's rent {malikana). Taken together, low prices and the 
encroachment of capitalist lessees explain a good deal about the sacking 
of Kamalia by the Khatias, Baghelas and Wahniwals in the last week of 
September 1857. The pastoralists caused little or no physical harm to 
the townspeople, but they did plunder all the valuables and burn the 
stores of grain. Most significantly, they destroyed the records of 
the hated moneylenders.
On visiting the town [wrote a British officer] it presented 
one scene of misery, desolation, and wilful destruction; the 
streets from one end to the other were literally paved with 
the shredded books of the bunneeahs. The rebels it appears 
revelled for several days at the expense of the inhabitants, 
and, as the cultivators [sic]...are always deeply indebted 
to the money-lenders and bunneeahs, it was an object with 
them to efface all proof of their indebtedness. They did 
so most effectually.89
In the final analysis, both the Gugera and Murree insurrections 
can be seen as instances of "delayed primary resistance". Both 
occurred in isolated tracts where Sikh authority had always been weak, 
and where most of the inhabitants had taken the side of the British in 
1848-49. Both were tribal insurrections, led by tribal chieftains 
(or village headmen, in the case of the Dhunds). And both were limited- 
scale affairs: the Murree insurrection involved fewer than twenty Dhund 
villages; and even the much larger Gugera insurrection was not joined 
by all the pastoral tribes and clans, or - with only a few exceptions - 
by the cultivating tenants of those pastoralist who did rebel. The 
Gugera and Murree insurrections were essentially conservative and 
elitist movements which emerged from within traditional, local power 
structures that had only just begun to be challenged and undermined by 
British colonial rule. They were, in a broad sense, smaller, Muslim 
versions of the "primary resistance" that the Sikhs had already offered 
in 1845-46.
89. "Narrative of the movements of Major C. Chamberlain's Column" 
(no author, no date): MRR, pt 2, p.74.
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Delhi fell to a combined army of British and Punjabi soldiers on 
20 September 1857. But the Great Rebellion was not over yet. Large 
parts of the Gangetic plain and central India remained in rebel hands.
In the winter of 1857-58 the British, using troops sent out from Britain 
and the cream of the Punjabi recruits, broke the rebel strength in a 
series of set campaigns in Rohilkhand, Oudh and Bundelkhand. It was 
not until the first week in July 1858 that the Governor-General, Lord 
Canning, was able to proclaim peace.
Once the rebellion in the northwest was over, many of those Punjabis 
who had played a conspicuous part in its suppression were rewarded by 
the British. At least forty-seven prominent chieftains were rewarded 
for their "loyalty" in 1857 with titles like Khan Bahadur or Sardar 
Bahadur (both mean "Great Chieftain"), with military honours like the 
Order of British India or the Order of Merit, with cash khil’ats 
(presentations), with jagirs, with pensions, with land grants (wherein 
either a proprietary title or a landlord title was conferred), or with 
a combination of these prizes. Table 6:3 provides the available details 
in a composite form.^°
Table 6:3 Rewards to a group of chieftains who remained "loyal" in 1857
The rewards of collaboration
Number
of
Chieftains
Rewards
Number
of
titles
and
honours
Cash khil ’ats Jagirs Pensions
Number of 
land grantsNumber ValueRS
Number Value
RS
Number Value
RS
47 19 18 22,900 19 25,250 8 6,260 8
90. The sources are: Griffin, et al. 3 Chiefs and Families, vol 1, pp. 195-6, 
220, 250-51, 356, 363-4, 416-17, 453, 468-9, 492, 500; vol 2, pp. 40,
91, 108-9-, 118, 188, 203-5, 224, 234, 238, 248, 276, 290-91, 294, 315, 
324, 328, 331, 333-4, 339, 345, 359-62, 369, 376-7, 381, 385; SR 
Lahore 1858, pp. 22-3; Titled Gentlemen and Chiefs other than Ruling 
Chiefs (no author, Government Civil Secretariat Press, Lahore, 1878), 
pp. 100-01, 112-13. Unfortunately, the value of khil’atsjagirs 
and pensions is not always specified; the details provided in Table 
6:3 are therefore incomplete.
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It is worth noting that several of these chieftains received large
land grants in Oudh, and became principal taluqdars (landlords) there.
For example, Ali Reza Khan Qizilbash of Lahore District, who had, at
his own expense, raised a troop of horsemen for service before Delhi,
was granted a taluqdari of 147 villages (worth Rs 15,000 per annum)
91in Oudh. It is also worth noting that fourteen of these chieftains
came from families whose jagirs and titles had been confiscated following
their "disloyalty” in 1848-49. For many such families, the Great
Rebellion presented a golden opportunity to regain at least some of their
former wealth and official standing; and the importance of their "loyalty”
at this time, particularly the example they set other Punjabis who might
otherwise have wavered, cannot be underestimated. Take the case of
Kahn Singh Rosa, a former Colonel in the Sikh army, who had fought the
British in 1848-49, and had lost jagirs worth Rs 2,880 at annexation.
When the Great Rebellion broke out in 1857, Kahn Singh was one of the
first chieftains selected by the Chief Commissioner for service before
Delhi. Kahn Singh was wounded at Delhi, but he saw out the campaign,
serving as an informant and propagandist for the British. In 1858
the British rewarded him with the grant of several villages (including
92his own) in jagiv, and a confiscated house in Delhi worth Rs 4,000.
Another good example is provided by the case of Jawahir Singh, the son
of the famous Sikh general, Hari Singh Nalwa. In 1849 Jawahir Singh
had led the dashing charge of Sikh irregular cavalry at Chilianwala;
and after annexation, he and his two brothers had lost jagirs worth
Rs 14,200. In 1857 Jawahir Singh was selected for service in Hindustan.
He was in action against the rebels on no fewer than eighteen occasions;
and at the end of the campaign he was rewarded with the Order of British
93India and a jagir worth Rs 1,200 per annum (half in perpetuity).
91. Griffin, et al. 3 Chiefs and Families, vol 1, pp. 250-51. For 
other examples, see ibid., vol 1, pp. 468-9; FAR 1858-59, p.31.
92. Titled Gentlemen, pp. 112-13.
93. Griffin, et al., Chiefs and Families, vol 2, p.91; Gujvanwala 
DG 1883-84, pp. 34-6.
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chieftains - minor jagirdars, clan heads and lambardars - who were
rewarded for their services in 1857. Many of them had served as extra
police, or had played a key role in the pursuit and destruction of
fugitive sepoys. Rewards received by these men included small cash
khil'ats, plots of revenue-free land, jewelry, firearms and ceremonial
94turbans. Those who received land grants were also presented with a
sanad (deed), in which it was specified that the continuance of the grant
95would be conditional on the good conduct of the grantee and his family.
96A few Punjabi soldiers received official rewards, too. But
most of those who had been recruited as additional soldiers in 1857
were expected to be satisfied with the large share of booty that had
fallen to them - they were ’’never backward in its acquisition" - after
97the capture of Delhi, Lucknow and other rebel centres. However, with
98the reorganisation of the Indian Army after 1858, a good many of those
peasant recruits found permanent employment as soldiers. By 1860
there were many villages in the Manjha, for example, that had twenty-five
99or fifty men in military service. (It was estimated at this time that,
Besides these prominent chieftains, there were numerous lesser
94. There are numerous examples in Griffin, et al. 3 Chiefs and Families,
2 vols. For petty rewards in Multan Division, see FC, 30 March 1860, 
nos 121-4 (NAI); Political Department Proceedings (hereafter PDP),
27 Nov 1858, nos 1-6 (PS). For the same in Lahore Division, see 
PDP, 19 June 1858, nos 1-3; 14 Aug 1858, no 7, (PS).
95. FPC, 2 July 1858, nos 195-200 (NAI); RDP, 3 July 1858, no 44 (PS).
96. For the example of a waste-land grant to a soldier, see FDP, Revenue 
B, Dec 1862, no 26 (NAI).
97. PAR 1858-59, p. 12. For an eyewitness account of Sikh looting and 
plundering in Delhi, see Hibbert, The Great Mutiny, p.319, quoting 
Richard Barter.
98. This reorganisation was based upon a report from a commission under General 
Peel (1858). Peel's commission recommended that the proportion of 
Indian to European troops should be fixed at two to one, and that no 
Indians should be taken into the artillery. The following figures
show the changes within the Regular army in the Punjab - the Punjab 
Irregular Force, which comprised 29,500 men (16,000 Europeans, 13,500 
Punjabis), is excluded - between early 1857 and 1862:
Early 1857 1862
Europeans (Men 12,650 16,000
(Guns 70 90
Indians (Men 41,500 13,500
(Guns 36 -
Source : PAR 1861-62 , para 183.
SR Lahore 1858, p.17.
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including soldiers, there were about 60,000 Punjabis in the employ of 
the British, and that their combined pay was about Rs 72 lakhs, or the 
equivalent of half the land revenue demand in the Punjab Province) . 100 
The "loyalty" of Punjabi recruits in 1857 was in fact an important 
factor behind that change of British military policy whereby, from the 
1880s onwards, the "martial races" of the Punjab - and in particular,
Sikhs and Muslims - were deliberately recruited to form the backbone of 
the armed forces in British India. For example, in 1862 Punjabi 
battalions made up 21.4 per cent of the Indian infantry. By 1892 the 
figure had increased to 29.6 per cent; and by 1914 it stood at 43.8 
per cent. 101 The Punjab’s reputation as the "swordarm" of the modern 
State in South Asia - it is a reputation that is still largely warranted 
today - can therefore be dated back to 1857.
Conclusion
It would be quite wrong to maintain that the authority of the 
British was not seriously threatened in the Punjab in 1857. The 
upsurge of violent crime in the Cis-Sutlej Division, the general 
restlessness of the population in the Jhelum Division, the numerous 
mutinies of Hindustani sepoys, the marked reluctance of the urban
102business community to contribute to the financing of the Delhi campaign,
the fact that in June the Chief Commissioner was prepared to abandon
Peshawar in order that the rest of the Punjab Territories might the
103better be garrisoned and, finally, the Murree and Gugera insurrections -
100. PAR 1858-59, p.12.
101. Based on figures provided in T.A. Heathcote, The Indian Army: The 
Garrison of British Imperial India3 1822-1922 (Melbourne, 1974), p.104; 
S.P. Cohen, The Indian Army: Its Contribution to the Development of
a Nation (Berkeley, 1971), p.44.
102. For the unwillingness of the merchant-banker class to invest in the
6 per cent Loan opened in the Punjab in 1857, see MRR, pt 2, p.201.
103. Portions of John Lawrence's private correspondence with Herbert 
Edwardes (C and S Peshawar) and Canning (GG) on this subject are 
reproduced in Bosworth Smith, Life of Lord Lawrence, vol 2, chap. 2.
It is interesting that the subject receives no mention in any of 
the official "Mutiny Reports".
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all these developments demonstrated the tenuousness of British authority 
in the region in 1857.
In the event, however, the Punjab - as a whole - held for the 
British. We would suggest that there were three basic reasons for 
this. First, as we have seen, the Punjab authorities took prompt 
and resolute action to check the drift towards mutiny and civil 
lawlessness. One of the reasons why they were able to do this was, 
of course, that they had at their disposal a relatively large number 
of British troops (about one-quarter of all regular British soldiers 
in India, and almost one-half of those in the Bengal Army, were cantoned 
in the Punjab at the beginning of 1857). Though most of these British 
troops were eventually sent down to Hindustan, the role that they played 
in disarming the sepoy regiments and in pursuing fugitive sepoys in the 
period between May and August 1857 would appear to have been crucial.
The official statistics on the punishments meted out, under the terms 
of Act XIV, by the civil and military authorities in 1857 give at least 
an idea of the extent to which "anti-public" behaviour was, wherever 
possible, firmly repressed: altogether, 2,384 persons were executed,
and 3,244 persons were imprisoned, flogged or fined, in the Punjab in
1041857. Second, the Punjab simply was not sufficiently combustible
for a full-scale civil rebellion in 1857. Many individuals may have 
had reason to feel less than satisfied with British rule; but there 
was no general grievance, or set of grievances, to unite the whole of 
Punjabi society against the British: to make the sub-imperialism of 
the Hindustanis an attractive alternative to British rule. It is worth 
noting here that, although the spring and autumn harvests of 1856 had 
not been abundant, agricultural prices in most districts had at least 
risen to something like their pre-annexation levels. In the spring of 
1857, however, the harvest had been a bumper one; and since the markets 
were not overstocked from the previous year, prices had remained high. 105 
It is also worth noting that the worst effects of British land revenue 
law in India - notably, forced sales and transfers of proprietary titles -
104. PAR 1856-58, p.7.
105. Ibid., p.16.
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had not yet appeared in the Punjab (here the difference between the
Punjab and the North-Western Provinces in the decades before 1857 is
particularly striking). In 1856-57 there had been only three forced
sales, and only fourteen transfers (to a revenue farmer) in the Punjab.
In 1857-58 there were no sales, and only seven transfers. In 1857
fully 99 per cent of the land revenue demanded, was collected in the
106Punjab. Clearly, agricultural security, even prosperity, was an
important factor behind the Punjab’s general "loyalty” in 1857.
Third, and most importantly, the British forestalled any proclivity
that the Punjab as a whole might have been developing towards independence
of action by deliberately reviving the Punjab’s old martial traditions
and directing them towards the defence of the empire. It is certain
that without Punjabi assistance the British would not have reestablished
their authority in northern India as quickly as they did. Fortunately
for the British, the old martial traditions were not so dead, and the
Punjab was not (despite the general disarmament after 1849) so destitute
of weapons, that the old, chieftain - based military establishments that
had been such a prominent feature of Ranjit Singh's army could not be
revitalised in 1857. Indeed, after the call for levies had gone out,
the British were often agreeably surprised at the rapidity with which
107both men and arms were produced. But we should be most wary of
ascribing this "loyalty" to the British cause to any deep-seated attachment
to British rule, or belief in its legitimacy. Even John Lawrence was
not so impressed by the flocking of Sikh soldiers, old and new, to the
recruitment stations as to suppose that "thoughts of future triumphs and
future independence did not cross the imaginations of these people; that
aspirations of restoring the Khalsa were not excited during the summer
108of 1857." Basically, those Punjabi chieftains who, together with
their old retainers, stood by the British in 1857 - and this applies 
particularly to those who had rebelled in 1848-49 - did so on the basis
106. Ibid., pp. 14-15.
107. Ibid., p.11.
108. Temple to Edmonstone, 25 May 1858, no 75-322 (Political): MRR, pt 2, 
p.364.
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of what, in another context, Ajayi has called the ’’politics of survival." 
With the memory of two, recent defeats of the Sikhs behind them, most 
Punjabi chieftains were anxious to stay with the British in 1857, even 
when it appeared that the British had only a minimal edge over the rebels. 
For their part, the British learned an important lesson in 1857: when 
it came to a political crisis as serious as that of the Great Rebellion, 
they really could not afford to be without the support of the "influential" 
sections of Indian society; and after the Great Rebellion was over, they 
were quick to acknowledge this through their distribution of rewards.
Since 1849 the British had, in the interests of their "imperial experiment" 
in the Punjab, deliberately avoided sharing power with that class in 
Punjabi society that proved so supportive in 1857. The question to which 
we must now turn is this: how far was the "Punjab School" prepared to 
modify its political strategy in the decade after the suppression of the 
Great Rebellion?
109. J.F. Ade Ajayi, "The Continuity of African Institutions under
Colonialism", in T.O. Ranger (ed.), Emerging Themes of African History 
(Dar es Salaam, 1968), pp. 197-9.
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Once the Great Rebellion had been suppressed, the British set about 
rebuilding and safeguarding their political position in the subcontinent. 
This involved three broad changes. First, following Queen Victoria's 
Proclamation of 1858, the East India Company was abolished in favour of 
direct control of British India by the home government. In London the 
Company's Board of Control gave way to a new ministerial office, that 
of Secretary of State for India, and the Company's Court of Directors 
was merged into a new advisory department known as the India Council.
In India the Governor-General became also the Viceroy, or personal 
representative of the British monarch. 1
Second, the army in India was reorganised along the lines of the 
Peel Commission's recommendations: the proportional strength of European 
troops was increased; the artillery was placed in European hands; the 
recruitment of sepoys was directed away from high-caste Hindustanis 
towards those communities - such as Sikhs, Punjabi Muslims and Gurkhas - 
which possessed unmistakable "martial" traditions and whose continued 
"loyalty" could, it was felt, be counted on; and a policy of strict 
noninterference with the religious and social customs of the sepoys 
was adopted.
Third, and this was the most important change, British political 
policy in India was widened to accommodate the interests of those elite 
groups which had, less than ten years ago, been branded by Dalhousie as
CHAPTER SEVEN
THE RETREAT FROM THE EXPERIMENT, 1859-72
Introduction
1. Governors-General after 1858 are usually referred to as Viceroys, 
and we shall follow this convention. The Viceroys holding office 
during the period covered in this chapter were: Lord Canning (until 
March 1862) , Lord Elgin (March 1862 - Nov 1863), Sir Robert Napier 
(temporary, Nov-Dee 1863), Sir William Denison (temporary, Dec 1863 - 
Jan 1864) , Sir John (later Lord) Lawrence (Jan 1864 - Jan 1869),
Lord Mayo (Jan 1869 - Feb 1872) and Lord Northbrook (1872-76).
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the selfish, reactionary and eminently displaceable classes in Indian 
society. Dalhousie’s old programme of material improvement was not 
by any means abandoned after 1858; in fact, the construction of public 
works, the refinement of the imperial bureaucracy and the development 
of overseas trade were all pursued with extra vigour - now that the 
paper planning stage had been passed - in the decade after the Great 
Rebellion. What was largely abandoned after 1858 was Dalhousie's old 
programme of social and moral improvement, which had been based on the 
notions that the more India was "westernised" the better, and that only 
the middle and lower social classes were deserving of British protection. 
British political policy in the decade after 1858 was essentially elitist 
and conservative.
Lord Canning, upon whom the storm of 1857 had burst, stayed on in
India until 1862 to lay the foundations of this new policy. His wooing
of the remaining ruling princes into a formal, subordinate partnership
with the British (which put an end to Dalhousie’s doctrine of lapse),
his settlement with the taluqdars of Oudh (a concession to the elite in
northern India that would have been anathema to Dalhousie) and his
remodelling of the Governor-General1s Legislative Council (an instrument
created by Dalhousie in 1853) to include a few Indian members, selected
from the ranks of the leading princes and the landed gentry - these
are just the best-known manifestations of that "aristocratic reaction"
which reshaped British thought and action in India in the decade after
2the Great Rebellion.
Our task in this last chapter is to assess the impact of this
"aristocratic reaction" in the Punjab Province (the Punjab now became
3.a Lieutenant-Governorship J between 1859 and 1872. Given Dalhousie's 
special interest in, and close association with, the administration of
2. The best general study is still Thomas R. Metcalf, The Aftermath of 
Revolt: India} 1857-1870 (Princeton, 1965).
3. The Lieutenant-Governors holding office during our period were:
Sir John Lawrence (Jan-Feb 1859), Sir Robert Montgomery(Feb 1859 - 
Jan 1865), Sir Donald McLeod (Jan 1865 - Jan 1870), Sir Henry Durand 
(June 1870 - Jan 1871) and Sir Henry Davies (1871-77). In 1858 
Delhi and its surrounding territories became part of the Province.
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the Punjab between 1849 and 1856, it might be supposed that the Punjab 
would have been the region least likely to be affected by the abandonment 
of the old political policy. On the other hand, the Punjab had weathered 
the storm of 1857, and had helped "save" the empire at that time, primarily 
because, at the critical moment, the British authorities in the Punjab 
had been prepared to revive the old, elitist military formations within 
Punjabi society. We have already seen that after 1858 Punjabi militarism 
was preserved, institutionalised and channelled to serve British imperial 
needs. To what extent, it must now be asked, was there a broader 
retreat after 1858 from the earlier "imperial experimenf'in the Punjab?
There are four sections to the chapter. Section one examines the 
efforts made by the British to shore up their authority in the Punjab in 
the early 1860s by associating "influential" Punjabis with their 
administration both at the provincial level and the local level. Section 
two examines the great controversy that developed within the Punjab 
Government in the late 1860s, between the "Aristocratic School" and the 
"Punjab School", over the question of superior tenants' rights. The 
following two sections examine the material conditions of the Punjabi 
peasantry in the late 1860s and early 1870s, and the political implications 
of those conditions. Section three is concerned with the origins of 
wide-scale peasant indebtedness and land alienation, while section four 
looks at the causes, character and significance of the Kuka outbreak of 
1872.
The enlistment of "influence"
On 14 February 1860 a grand imperial darbar, presided over by 
Lord Canning, was held at Lahore. On behalf of the assembled chieftains, 
the Raja of Kapurthala rose to thank the Government of India for the 
rewards it had recently distributed amongst the chieftains of the Punjab 
in recognition of their services in 1857-58. The chieftains were 
particularly grateful, the Raja said, for the clemency and kindness shown 
by the Government to those of them who had fought against the British 
in 1848-49: the trust reposed in those formerly "disloyal" chieftains 
in 1857 had enabled most of them to restore themselves to honour. The 
chieftains of the Punjab now prayed, the Raja concluded, that the Government
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would add to the many blessings of British rule the establishment of 
a college at Lahore for the education of their sons. In his reply 
to the Raja's address, Canning thanked the chieftains for their latest 
professions of loyalty, and observed that the Government had already 
been thinking about the need for a chieftains' college: such a college, 
he assured them, would be founded as soon as the state of education in 
the Punjab was sufficiently advanced. He also announced that it was 
his intention to authorise the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab to confer
4certain administrative powers on the leading chieftains.
As it turned out, the chieftains had to wait twenty years before 
they got their own college (the Aitchison Chiefs College) at Lahore.
The administrative powers promised by Canning were forthcoming, however.
In April 1860, in reply to the Government of India's earlier call for a 
report on whether there were in the Punjab any chieftains or prominent 
landholders who might safely be entrusted with limited fiscal and judicial 
powers within their estates, the Punjab Government forwarded to Calcutta 
the reports of the various Commissioners in the Punjab. Most of the 
Commissioners were enthusiastic about the contemplated measure, and 
nominated several men from each of the Districts in their Divisions as 
suitable candidates. It was the possibility of political advantage, 
rather than administrative convenience, that made the contemplated measure 
so attractive. As the Commissioner of Lahore Division, Richard Temple, 
put it:
Those who know the actual condition of the Punjab nobility will 
have been struck by the sad consequences of forced idleness which 
enervates all the manlier qualities, and induces first dissipation 
and sometimes leads ultimately to disaffection [original emphasis].
The Punjab Government agreed that it was time for a change of policy
towards the chieftains. R.H. Davies, who was the Government Secretary,
expressed it thus:
4. Political Despatch to Secretary of State for India (hereafter SS):
FD, 23 Feb 1860, no 17 (A); FC, 24 Feb 1860, nos 51-3 (NAI).
5. Temple to Secy to Government of Punjab (hereafter GOP), (no date), 
no 37: FDP, Part A, May 1860, nos 167-76 (NAI).
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The total deprivation of all power sustained by the principal 
chiefs and natural leaders of the people has heretofore been 
one of the embarrassments of our administration. It may be 
that immediately after conquest they would not value and might 
possibly abuse a limited and responsible jurisdiction, inferior 
to that which they had recently exercised without control. But 
in the interval which has elapsed they have experienced the 
humiliation of diminished importance and the irksomeness of 
forced idleness. They are ready therefore gratefully to accept 
a share of power which they might formerly have disdainfully
declined. 6
On 26 May 1860 the Punjab Government announced the names of
twenty-five prominent chieftains (twelve of whom had their estates in
the Cis-Sutlej Division) who were to be given limited administrative
powers. These chieftains were to be invested with the special powers
of an Assistant Commissioner, which meant that they would be able to
decide revenue and criminal cases whose value did not exceed Rs 300.
They were also to be placed in charge of the village constabulary within
their estates; and in return for performing these police duties, they
7were to receive small inarns. A year after these limited powers had 
been conferred, the Punjab Government reported that the measure seemed
g
to be working extremely well.
Still, not every British officer in the Punjab regarded the measure
as a good thing. For example, in 1860 the Commissioner of the newly-
created Amritsar Division, R.N. Cust, had argued that it would be "a
dangerous and unpopular measure with the inferior classes to vest these
Chiefs with powers which they are personally unfit to wield,
9and which their followers will abuse."
6 . Davies to Secy GOI, FD, 3 April 1860, no 272: ibid.
7. Davies to Secy GOI, FD, 26 May 1860, no 326: FDP, Part A, June 1860, 
nos 71-5 (NAI).
8 . FDP, Judicial A, Nov 1861, nos 83-4 (NAI).
9. Cust to JC, 18 Feb 1860, no 22: FDP, Part A, May 1860, nos 167-76 
(NAI). Cust also drew the JC's attention to the fact that "throughout 
this Division the Village system of Revenue management prevails, based
on the prescription of centuries and the consent of a willing population, 
and the name of Talooqdar is unknown": ibid.
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Four years later, shortly after he had taken up the Viceroyalty, John 
Lawrence expressed his concurrence with the view, which was now also 
shared by the Commissioners of Ambala and Jullundur Divisions, that 
the exercise of fiscal powers (especially the right of some chieftains 
to collect their revenue in kind) by chieftains within their estates 
was definitely open to abuse. 10 Lawrence’s personal view was that 
”it is, perhaps, the first principle in equity that a man shall not 
be allowed to sit in judgement in a case in which his own interests are 
involved. ” 11
Nevertheless, so strongly had the tide of "aristocratic" opinion
set in, that the number of these Jagirdari Magistrates (as they were
called) was actually increased after 1860: there were thirty-eight of 
12them by 1865. More than that, the principle of conferring limited
judicial powers was extended to permit the appointment of other chieftains
and "influential" Punjabis as Honorary Magistrates, empowered to investigate
and decide petty criminal cases (except those in which Europeans were
13implicated) that came before the regular courts in the cities. By
1866 there were twenty-two of these Honorary Magistrates, sitting in
Boards; and between them, they handled about 6 per cent of all the criminal
14cases in the Province. After a short time, their powers were broadened
10. For an example of abuse, which came to the Government’s attention in
1866, see FDP, Revenue A, Jan 1867, nos 7-10 (NAI). By 1864 two 
chieftains had been deprived of their administrative powers on account 
of their mismanagement: General Report on the Administration of
the Punjab Territories for the Year 1863-64 (hereafter PAR 1863-64'), 
para 25.
11. Lawrence's "Observations on Revenue Administration Report of Punjab,
1862-63", in Secy GOI, FD, to Secy GOP, 31 May 1864, no 72: FDP, 
Revenue A, June 1864, no 22 (NAI).
12. General Report on the Administration of the Punjab Territories for 
the Year 1864-65 (hereafter PAR 1864-65), para 29.
13. For rules for guidance of Honorary Magistrates, see JDP, 11 Jan 1862, 
nos 12-12^ (PS). For the appointment of two Honorary Magistrates
at Gujranwala in 1862, see JDP, 24 May 1862, no 20 (PS).
14. General Report on the Administration of the Punjab Territories for 
the Year 1865-66 (hereafter PAR 1865-66), para 24.
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to cover certain civil cases (such as those relating to marriage and 
betrothal) as well; and gradually the whole system of Honorary 
Magistrates was extended to the smaller, district courts. 15
Throughout the 1860s, and into the 1870s and 1880s, dozens of 
Punjabi chieftains and prominent landholders were appointed Honorary 
Magistrates.1  ^ This must be regarded as an exceedingly adroit move 
on the part of the British, for it turned the Punjabi elite's attention 
towards the fact that they could best serve their own interests by 
serving the British. The position of Honorary Magistrate did not carry 
any stipend, and the work was tedious in the extreme; yet it was a 
much sought-after position, because the British endowed it with elite 
status. In 1868 an old jagivdar, Pandit Radha Kishen, who had been 
head Brahman priest at Ranjit Singh's darbar, wrote to the Lieutenant- 
Governor, requesting the appointment of his son as an Honorary Magistrate. 
He pointed out that many of his social and religious inferiors had 
already received such appointments, and that it was a matter of honour 
to him that his family should not be upstaged. "The respectability 
of my family”, he asserted, "is well known to Your Honor, but without 
some honorary post no consideration is bestowed by European Officers
\T +■ ’  I Ion a Native."
Two other administrative measures designed to strengthen the 
chieftain class and attach it to British rule were introduced during 
Canning's Viceroyalty. First, there was an attempt to restrict the 
constant fragmentation of chiefly patrimonies. During the first decade
15. JDP, 23 Nov 1867, no 41 (PS).
16. For numerous examples, see Griffin, et al.3 Chiefs and Families,
2 vols. In Sialkot District in the 1880s there were eight Honorary 
Magistrates: Sialkot DG 1883-84, p.84.
17. PAR 1864-65, par 30.
18. Pandit Radha Kishen to Sir D.F. McLeod, Lahore, 13 Jan 1868: JDP,
25 Jan 1868, nos 49-51 (PS). It would seem that the Pandit's 
son was given a position on one of the new municiple committees 
that were created at this time: ibid.
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of British rule, the Punjab administration had scrupulously avoided
interfering with the various customary rules that regulated succession
to landed estates and to jagirs and pensions granted for more than one
life, beyond insisting that grants from, or confirmed by, the Government
of India should descend to "heirs male of the body". In 1859 there
arose a situation that tested the utility of this rather vague ruling.
It involved the lawfulness of two possible distributions of the jagirs
of a chieftain who had, before his death, taken out a customary will,
bequeathing his property in equal shares to his three wives and their
families. Strictly speaking, the property should have been apportioned
equally between the three "heirs male" of the deceased chieftain; but
the local British authorities, whose interest in the case was far more
political than legal, tried to have the will overruled in favour of the
elder son, arguing that he possessed "superior moral qualifications",
and that he was of "purer" tribal descent than his two half-brothers
(whose mothers belonged to socially inferior clans). The British-sponsored
claim of the elder son was - as it should have been - thrown out of the
civil courts. But the case induced the Punjab and Indian Governments
to toy with the idea of making future grants of perpetuity jagirs
conditional on the right of the British authorities to withhold recognition
19of certain, politically undesirable inheritance arrangements.
In 1860 the Punjab Government resolved to substitute, wherever
possible, the law of primogeniture for the various customary rules
followed by the chieftains. Accordingly, the Commissioners were instructed
to explain to the chieftains the "advantages" of primogeniture in the
maintenance of the wealth and status of chieftainships, and to try and
persuade the chieftains to sign a formal deed binding them to an
20observation of this law. The success of the Government in converting 
the chieftains to the principle of primogeniture in the early 1860s was 
but partial: quite a few chieftains bound themselves to an observation
19. FPC, 16 Dec 1859, nos 45-9 (NAI).
20. FDP, Financial A, May 1864, no 14 (NAI).
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mainly out of consideration for their younger sons, who would otherwise
21be reduced to a position of dependency on the elder brother. The
Government was unwilling to force a change to a law of succession that
was so much at odds with customary practice. But, with the passage of
the Punjab Laws Act of 1872, it took the opportunity to bring chiefly
estates within the jurisdiction of the Courts of Wards, which gave
Deputy Commissioners considerable scope for intervention in the affairs
22of these estates.
of the new law of succession; but at least as many refused to do so,
The second measure was an improvement in the position of some of
the leading and conspicuously ’’loyal" chieftain families through an
enchancement of the value of their perpetuity jagirs. In November 1859
the Government of India sent the Punjab Government a list of the names
of twenty-four chieftains who had supported the British in 1848-49, and
called for information on the provisions made after annexation for the
heirs of these chieftains. This information was submitted by the Punjab
Government in January 1860. A year later, the Lieutenant-Governor of
the Punjab was invited to suggest whether the old jagir claims of any
of these families were deserving of reconsideration. In communicating
this invitation, the Secretary to the Indian Government noted that
His Excellency [Canning] is of the opinion that a more liberal 
arrangement might with advantage be made for the heirs of 
deceased Chiefs in the Punjab than that which was made in 1849, 
perhaps by assimilating their position to that of the heirs of 
Sirdars in the Cis-Sutlej States who succeed to the entire estates 
of their fathers.23
21. Lepel Griffin, "The Law of Inheritance to Chiefships, as observed
by the Sikhs previous to the Annexation of the Punjab" (Lahore, 1869), 
para 71: reprinted in The Panjab Past And Present, vol vi, pt 1 
(April 1972), pp. 141-98.
22. The Act provided for Deputy Commissioners to be Courts of Wards 
within their respective Districts, subject to the control of their 
Commissioner and the Financial Commissioner. As a Court of Wards, 
the DC was empowered to take charge of the management of the estates 
of females, minors, idiots, lunatics and inheritors considered 
otherwise to be unfit for direct management. In the case of minors 
(under the age of eighteen), the jurisdiction of the Court of Wards 
extended to the education of wards. The Act (i v  of 1872) is reproduced 
in Mathur, British Administration of Punjab, appendix 1. Trevaskis 
noted that the Act provided for the "almost wholly political" 
interference of the State in the estates of chieftains who were of 
"vicious or spendthrift habits": Trevaskis, The Punjab Of To-Day,
vol 1, p.177.
23. Secy GOI to Secy GOP, 11 Feb 1861: FDP, Part A, Feb 1861, nos 297-8 (NAI).
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In January 1862 the Punjab Government resubmitted the original
list, to which it had added the names of five more chieftains, together
with the Lieutenant-Governor's recommendations. The Punjab Government
agreed that the post-annexation disposition of the jagir claims of
"loyal" chieftains had been too harsh, especially in the light of the
good services performed by many of these chieftains and their sons in
1857-58, and the duties that many of them were now performing as Honorary
Magistrates. Unless the provisions made after annexation were now revised,
the Punjab Government's letter continues, "the Punjab must soon lose the
services of an aristocracy which it would be wiser to preserve than fling
24aside." The jagirs and pensions of fourteen of these twenty-nine
families had already been considerably reduced, on account of recent
deaths of chieftains, while nine families possessed no perpetuity jagirs
at all. The Lieutenant-Governor, Sir Robert Montgomery, therefore
proposed that perpetuity jagirs be granted to those families that had
none, and that the value of the perpetuity jagirs held by the other
families be increased. Taken together, his proposals involved the
25alienation of an additional Rs 123,032 per annum in perpetuity.
For reasons that are not clear, Canning was unwilling to sanction
these proposals in their entirety. Instead, he made a selection from
Montgomery's list of "some of the more influential Sirdars whose position
26it is considered expedient to improve." Table 7:1 shows the eleven
27chieftains selected, and the jagir increases sanctioned. New jagirs
totalling Rs 12,620 were granted. However, the most significant change
was the convertion of pensions and life jagirs into perpetuity jagirs.
The total annual value of perpetuity jagirs previously held by the eleven
families was increased by Rs 25,341 (87 per cent). Not surprisingly,
Canning insisted that these perpetuity jagirs were to descend according
2 8to the law of primogeniture.
24. Secy GOP to Secy GOI, 11 Jan 1862, no 27: FDP, Political A, Feb 
1862, no 159 (NAI).
25. "Estates of Punjab Chiefs", dated 15 Feb 1862: FDP, Political A,
Feb 1862, no 158 (NAI).
26. Secy GOI to Secy GOP, 25 Feb 1862, no 188: FDP, Political A, Feb
1862, no 160 (NAI).
27. From a tabular statement: ibid.
28. It is interesting to note that in 1862 Canning also conferred the 
right of adoption on at least three chieftains: FDP, Political A,
Feb 1862, no 159 (NAI); Griffin, et al. 9 Chiefs and Families, vol 2, 
p.501.
Families Grants presently held Proposed changes sanctioned
No Name of Chieftain
Jagirs 
Rs
Vv _ _
Pensions
Rs
Jagirs 
Rs
Pensions
Rs
^Perpetuity Life
""N
2 Lives
c --------
Perpetuity
A
Life
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10 
11
Raja Dina Nath (dead)
- 2 sons
Sardar Atar Singh 
Kalianwala (dead)
- 1 son
Nawab Iman-ud-Din 
Khan (dead) - 1 son 
Sardar Mehtab Singh 
Majithia
Sodhi Nihal Singh (dead)
- 4 sons
Diwan Ajudhia Nath
Rai Misr Meg Raj
Sardar Nihal Singh 
Chhachhi
Col. Jagat Singh Man 
(dead) - 2 sons 
Sardar Kahan Singh 
Nakkye
Nawab Sarfraz 
Khan
3,400
11,937
4.200 
2,500
7.200
4,200
4,742
2,750
3,825
5,975
1,637
11,980
13,164
4,742
4.000
7,500
2. 0 00
3,840
7,400
15.000
5,600
4,742
3,794
1 ,0 00
405
10 .00 0
1,637
5,000
2,800
4,742
2,750
3,420
3,175
6,980
20,427 
to be re­
considered 
at death
6,500
2 ,0 0 0
3,840
11 Total 29,237 48,273 4,742 17,340 54,578 44,294 12,340
Table 
7:1 
Perpetuity 
jagir 
increases 
sanctioned 
by 
Canning 
in 
1862
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When John Lawrence returned to India in January 1864, after five 
years’ home leave, to take up the Viceroyalty, he therefore found 
himself to be the successor to an official policy towards the chieftains 
of the Punjab that was markedly different from the policy which he had - 
as Dalhousie's man "on the spot" - helped push through just over a decade 
ago. In the mid-1860s the old, radical Evangelical-Utilitarian ideas 
about jagirdars being "parasites" on the "people of the soil", and about 
the duty of the British being to ensure the gradual annihilation of all 
jagirdari tenures in the Punjab, were definitely at a low premium.
As we shall see in the next section, Lawrence had not by any means abandoned 
the essentially pro-peasant stance of the "Punjab School". But he had 
reconciled himself to the general principle of the "aristocratic reaction" 
that had swept official India during his absence: the principle that 
the British could not hope to hold India in times of political crisis 
without the support of a contented aristocracy. That, of course, had been 
Henry Lawrence's point, made so frequently during the years immediately 
after the annexation of the Punjab.
Had Henry Lawrence been alive in the mid-1860s (he had been killed
during the siege of Lucknow in 1857), he would, no doubt, have been
enormously satisfied to see his younger brother going along with the
new policy towards the chieftains of the Punjab. As Viceroy, John
Lawrence sanctioned a number of the Punjab Government's proposals for
a better deal for chieftains excluded from Canning's select list, thereby
overturning earlier jagir decisions that he himself had argued for so 
29strenuously. As Viceroy, he also presided over two imperial darbars
at which the new alliance between the British and the chieftains was
publicly and symbolically affirmed. The first of these darbars, which
was officially described as having been "the greatest the Punjab has seen
30since the time of the Mughals," was held at Lahore on 18 October 1864.
29. For examples, see: RDP, 16 April 1864, nos 5-7; 10 Dec 1864, nos 
3-5 (PS); FDP, Financial A, Dec 1865, nos 3-5; Sept 1867, nos 
7-9 (NAI).
30. PAR 1864-65, para 340.
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public relations exercise. In a sense, it was also a moment of
posthumous triumph for Henry Lawrence. When John Lawrence rose to
address the assemblage, he spoke in Urdu, and he used words that could
easily have been those of his brother:
Princes and Chiefs! It is with great satisfaction that I find 
nearly six hundred of you assembled around me in this Durbar.
I see before me the faces of many friends. I recognise the 
sons of my old allies, the Maharajas of Kashmere and Puttiala; 
the Sikh Chiefs of Malwa and the Manjha; the Rajpoot Chiefs of 
the Hills; the Mohammedan Mullicks of Peshawur and Kohat; the 
Sirdars of the Deraj at, of Hazara, and of Delhi. All have 
gathered together to do honour to their old ruler.31
At the close of his speech, Lawrence resumed his seat (actually a throne,
placed in the centre of a platform which was covered with cloth of gold),
and each of the chieftains was brought forward, in due order of precedence,
to present his nazr (offering) of gold coin. The khil'ats from the
Viceroy - "silver vases, gold clocks, inlaid rifles, silk dresses, strings
32of pearls and other jewels" - were then distributed. The Raja of
Kapurthala received a British insignia, the Star of India, and three
33Muslim chieftains were created Nawabs. At the second darbar, held
at Agra on 19 November 1866, Lawrence knighted two Punjabi chieftains:
Raja Sahib Dial (who had earlier been appointed to the Viceroy's
Legislative Council) and Sardar Nihal Singh Chhachhi (who, it will be
34remembered, had started life as the son of a shopkeeper). From this
time onwards, insignia and titles like these were a standard feature of
a British imperial reward system, and were regularly conferred on "loyal"
35Punjabi chieftains.
It was, as most imperial darbars held by the British were, a grand
31. Lawrence's address is reproduced in Bosworth Smith, Life of Lord 
Laurence3 vol 2, pp. 330-1.
32. Bosworth Smith, ibid, p.332.
33. Griffin, et al.3 Chiefs and Families, vol 2, p.501; Titled Gentlemen, 
pp.100-1, 106-7.
34. General Report on the Administration of the Punjab Territories for the 
Year 1866-67 (hereafter PAR 1866-67), para 376.
35. For some examples from the 1870s and 1880s, see Griffin, et al.3 
Chiefs and Families, vol 1 , pp. 417-17, 432, 478-9; vol 2, pp. 204-5, 
234, 339, 381; Titled Gentlemen, pp. 106-7.
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At the same time that a new relationship was being forged with
the leading chieftains, steps were being taken to resurrect that old
class of lesser chieftains and middlemen - the chaudharis. When the
British restructured the administration in the Punjab after 1849, the
services of the chaudharis were almost totally dispensed with. By
the early 1860s, however, it was becoming apparent that the British
had by no means been completely successful in integrating the "provincial"
and "local" systems of government, and that there was therefore a need
for the same sort of linkage between the two systems that the chaudharis
had provided under Mughal and Sikh rule. As the Punjab Government's
general administration report of 1860-61 noted: "The absence of a
privileged class of representative men, whose welfare is identified with
that of the Government, makes a gulf between us and our subjects productive
36of mutual misunderstanding."
The resurrection of the chaudhari class after 1858 actually proceeded
in a somewhat haphazard fashion. It began when several British district
officers recommended the restoration of inams to former chaudharis.
For instance, in 1860 Temple, who was the Commissioner of Lahore Division,
suggested that inams be granted to certain "influential" landholders who
would assist the police and revenue authorities and would "form a link
much needed at present, between the authorities and the mass of the
37agriculturalists." And in Shahpur District, where the British officer 
first appointed to the settlement operations had rejected virtually all 
claims to inams, Davies, who subsequently took over as Settlement Officer, 
recommended the restoration of inams, varying in value between Rs 50 
and Rs 250 per annum, to fifty-five "principal land-holders and men of 
influence" as a politic measure.5**
36. General Report on the Administration of the Punjab and its Dependencies 
for 1860-61 (hereafter PAR 1860-61), pp. 12-13.
37. Temple to FC, 23 Jan 1860, no 16: reproduced in SR Lahore 1858, p.25.
38. SR Shahpur 1866, pp. 99-101.
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proposed by the local authorities in Gujranwala District whereby incons,
ranging in value from Rs 150 to Rs 200 per annum, and debitable to the
Police Department, would be granted to selected zamindars who, as
Honorary Police Chaudharis, would be responsible for the suppression of
39crime in isolated rural areas. Within a few years, this experiment 
had been extended to other Districts in the Lahore Division, and Honorary 
Police Chaudharis - whose duties had gradually been widened to those of 
general intermediaries - had come to be known, officially, as zaildars.
In the mid-1860s these zaildars were described as being "the channel
40 41of communication," or "the missing link", between a mainly British
"provincial" system of government and an entirely Punjabi "local" system
of government. In truth, the zaildars - along with their assistants, the
ala-lambardars (chief village headmen), who also came into being at 
42this time - were more than this: they were, essentially, semi-official
collaborators at the local level. The British, wanting to push their
authority deeper into village society, were prepared to pay fairly
handsomely for such collaborative services; and "influential" Punjabis
43were not backward in offering them.
In 1861 the Lieutenant-Governor gave his approval to an experiment
39. PAR 1860-61, p.13.
40. Secy GOP to Inspector-General of Police, Punjab, 27 Oct 1865, no 1500: 
JDP, 28 Oct 1865, nos 27-9 (PS).
41. SR Lahore 1865-69, pp. 68-9.
42. The system of ala-lambardars (chief headmen) was introduced in 1865. 
The idea was to create in each village a superior lambardar who would 
carry out government orders and ensure peace and order. After some 
time, however, it was realised that the system was not working: it 
was unnecessarily expensive and it was creative of much internal 
village friction. In the 1890s the Punjab Government therefore 
decided gradually to abolish the office as the occupants died and
to grant, instead, so fed-posh ("clad in white") inams to deserving 
village notables (ordinary proprietors as well as lambardars) on an 
occasional basis: Punjab Government, Selections from the Records 
of the office of the Financial Commissioner, Punjab (New Series, 
no 18), no 44, "Papers relating to the Ala-Lambardari Inams in 
Six Districts of the Lahore and Rawalpindi Divisions" (Lahore, 1896).
43. Given that, in Gujranwala District, each zaildar received an inam 
of Rs 100-200 per annum, a small cut (usually 1 per cent) from the 
land revenue and a grant of about fifty acres of land, it is little 
wonder that the office of zaildar was "an eagerly coveted one":
SR Gujranwala 1866-67, pp. 47-9.
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Finally, in 1872 the Punjab Government decided to rationalise the
zaildari system by establishing guidelines for the renumeration, appointment
and duties of zaildars. The semi-official collaborative role of zaildars
was, in other words, formalised. It was affirmed that zaildars were not
salaried government servants, but that their allowances (which ought to
represent a deduction of 1 per cent from the local land revenue) were
granted to meet expenses "incidental to their position". The Deputy
Commissioner, who was to appoint them, was to consider, besides their
suitability for the job, their popularity and tribal importance within
their zails (circles). Their duty, broadly, was to act as "representatives
of Government": they were to communicate government notices, report
crime, assist the tahsildars, keep an eye on the patwaris and lambardars,
44attend on British officers visiting their zails, and so forth.
From this time onwards, the zaildari system was introduced everywhere
45in the Punjab. Since zaildars were usually appointed from the ranks
of zamindars who already possessed considerable social and political
standing at the local level, it is scarcely surprising that the zaildari
system provided the means for the resurgence of the old chaudhari class.
In Gujrat District, for example, the ten zaildars holding office in the
mid-1870s were all men - or sons of men - who had been ohaudharis
46under the Sikhs. It would seem that the old, local elite in rural
Punjabi society had no difficulty whatsoever in moving into, and taking
over, the new positions of zaildar and ala-lambardar created by the
British after 1858. Once these positions were filled, the British soon
discovered that dismissal for inefficiency or corruption was, on political
47grounds, "practically out of the question".
44. Resolution of Lieut-Gov, Punjab, in the Dept, of Agriculture, Revenue 
and Commerce, 29 Feb 1872, no 273: reproduced in Barkley, Directions 
for Revenue Officers, appendix iv, pp. 113-14.
45. It would seem that most zails incorporated between twenty-five and 
thirty villages, and that most zaildars were granted inams worth 
(at 1 per cent) between Rs 200 and Rs 300 per annum: J.A. Grant,
Final Report on the Revision of Settlement (1888-1893) of the Amritsar 
District (Lahore, 1893), (hereafter SR Amritsar 1893), p.58; SR 
Gurdaspur 1892, pp. 57-8; SR Jullundur 1892, p.140; SR Lahore3 
1865-69, pp. 68-9.
46. SR Gujrat 1874, p.xv.
47. SR Jullundur 1892, p.140.
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The resuscitation of the old elites at the regional and local levels 
in the early 1860s was a paradoxical move on the part of the British.
On the one hand, it undoubtedly strengthened the efficacy and legitimacy 
of their administrative authority in the Punjab. But, on the other 
hand, it necessarily reduced their room for political manoeuvre, and it 
cast a shadow of doubt over their claim that they were primarily concerned 
with the welfare of the subordinate classes in Punjabi society. In 
the mid-1860s the question of which social classes were most deserving 
of British protection was about to become the subject of an extremely 
bitter and protracted controversy.
The tenant-right controversy
We saw in the fifth chapter that, in accordance with the North- 
Western Provinces land revenue system, two categories of tenants were 
recognised in the Punjab by the British after annexation: hereditary 
(maurusi) tenants and non-hereditary (ghair-maurusi) tenants-at-will. 
Between 1849 and 1855 hereditary tenant status was conferred almost 
solely on the basis of twelve years' occupancy prior to the regular land 
revenue settlement. After 1855 it was admitted that other factors 
besides length of occupancy ought to be taken into consideration, and 
that in the twelve Districts already settled, the patwaris - to whom 
it had generally been left to make the final entries in the village 
land records - had mistakenly recorded many tenants as hereditary tenants. 
At the time, the British had been content to let matters stand. Most 
proprietors had been happy enough to see their tenants recorded as 
hereditary tenants (only later was it realised that this was because 
they wanted their tenants to share the burden of a high revenue demand). 
And, in any case, the existence of a large number of privileged tenants 
fitted the "Punjab School's" ideal of a secure and contented peasantry.
All this changed when, in 1863, Edward Prinsep was appointed 
Settlement Commissioner, with the task of revising the regular land 
revenue settlements, the terms of which were expiring, in the Districts
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of central Punjab. Prinsep at once challenged the validity of the
records of the earlier settlements with respect to hereditary tenant
status, arguing that there were very few tenants who, during the Sikh
period, would have enjoyed immunity from what had then been recognised
as the proprietor's right of eviction. He requested permission to alter
the settlement records accordingly, and restore the status of tenants
to that which it had been before the annexation of the Punjab. Instead
of giving Prinsep clear instructions on the matter, the Punjab Government -
evidently thrown into confusion by Prinsep's challenge - called upon
all district officers to make enquiries as to the status of tenants under
Sikh rule. The result was the collection of "an appalling mass of
49correspondence" and the initiation of a controversy that was to split 
the members of the Punjab Government, the Government of India and - 
eventually - the Secretary of State's India Council.
In a way, the bitterness of the controversy was out of all proportion 
to the objective importance of the tenant-right question in the Punjab, 
for in the Punjab proprietors outnumbered tenants two to one; and only 
one-fifth of all tenants had been recorded as hereditary tenants; so 
that the question affected only a small number of proprietors and tenants, 
and less than one-twentieth of the cultivated and cultivable land.^°
But the tenant-right question brought into the open the fundamental 
cleavage between the two parties which represented the "aristocratic" 
and "paternalistic" Schools of thought on matters relating to land tenures. 
The forces of the "aristocratic reaction" were strong in India at this time.
48
48. Prinsep was personally in charge of the revision in the three Districts 
of Amritsar Division (Amritsar, Gurdaspur and Sialkot), and supervisor 
of the officers appointed to Lahore, Gujranwala, Gujrat and Montgomery 
(Gugera) Districts.
49. Report on the Administration of the Punjab and its dependencies for 
the Year 1868-69 (hereafter PAR 1868-69), pt 2, p.36. The greater
part of this "correspondence", consisting of reports, circulars, 
statistics, minutes, memorials and treatises, is reproduced in "Papers 
Relating To The Punjab Tenancy Act": Great Britain, House of Commons, 
Parliamentary Papers, Sessional Sets, Accounts and Papers, vol Llll, 
1870, pp. 389-802 (hereafter "PPTA").
50. PAR 1868-69, pt 2, p.36.
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In the contemporaneous Oudh tenancy controversy the "Aristocratic
School" in the Government of India was carrying all before it. ^ 1
Prinsep's challenge was therefore regarded by the paternalistic "Punjab
School" as an intolerable one, regardless of the merits of his case.
In 1869 the Secretary of State for India, the Duke of Argyll, aptly
described the tenant-right controversy in the Punjab as having "involved
a radical difference between two schools of theoretical opinion, who
regard from two opposite points of view the slender basis of fact which
52alone appears to be ascertainable."
Whilst awaiting instructions from his superiors on what was to be
done about apparently negligent recordings of hereditary status, Prinsep
had, with characteristic thoroughness, instituted a quasi-judicial
investigation into the validity of 60,000 cases of hereditary status in
Amritsar Division, whereby proprietor and tenant were cross-examined
before the assembled village as to the extent of their customary rights,
disputed questions of fact being settled by the village panchayat. On
this basis Prinsep decided that, out of the 60,000 tenants formerly
recorded as having hereditary rights of occupancy, 46,000 were in fact
53mere tenants-at-will. This empirical investigation led him to question
the soundness of his training in the paternalistic tradition of land
revenue administration. In January 1865 he wrote to the Financial
Commissioner, Edward Lake, as follows:
It is upon evidence of so extensive and overwhelming a character 
that I have been led step by step, and month by month, in a 
period of 18 months, to give up my old views, and to make a 
ready confession to Government that I have hitherto worked upon 
insufficient knowledge. I perceive distinctly now what I did 
not realise before, that considerations of revenue management 
have influenced me too much when dealing with the right's of 
the landed classes.... 54
51. Bosworth Smith, Life of Lord Lawrence, vol 2, pp. 414-21.
52. Argyll to GG in Council, 28 Oct 1869, no 80 RD: "PPTA", no 1.
53. PAR 1868-69, pt. 2, p.37.
54. Prinsep to Lake, 12 Jan 1865, no 12: "PPTA", no 11, pt 2.
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refutation of the arguments of those who were opposed to any revision of
55the record of rights, provided handy ammunition to the members of the
"Aristocratic School" in the Punjab - such as the Lieutenant-Governor,
Sir Donald McLeod, and the post-1857 generation of British officers -
who were convinced that a section of the Punjabi proprietary class had
been dispossessed as a result of the favour shown to the actual occupants
of the soil at the time of the regular settlements. Considerable
weight was lent to their case by the reports of the official Landlord
and Tenant Inquiry Committee, which had met at Batala, Amritsar and
56Lahore between 1863 and 1865, and of the Law Branch of the Punjab
57Anjaman (a small organisation of the Punjabi gentry and urban elite).
The "Aristocratic School’s" case was vigorously disputed by the
"Punjab School", represented by men like Brandreth, Lake and Temple -
men who had actually conducted the regular settlements, and who were
close friends of the new Viceroy, Sir John Lawrence (who was himself
much displeased about the prospect of the overturning of his life's work
58in the Punjab). The "Punjab School's" reply to Prinsep consisted of
three arguments. First, there was the factual argument: under Sikh
rule, the proprietor's right of eviction had existed only in theory,
59since the kardar had generally refused to allow it. Second, there 
was the policy argument: even if the regular settlements had erred in 
favour of some tenants, a greater agrarian upheaval would now result if 
the record of rights was altered. Lake contended, for instance, that
The results of Prinsep's investigation, together with his devastating
55. Prinsep, "The Arguments on the Tenant Side with their Refutation"
(1866): ibid, no 11, pt 3.
56. The Committee, having interviewed British and Punjabi revenue officials, 
members of the "native gentry" and representatives of all the 
agricultural classes, concluded that "hereditary" tenants' rights
were a creation of British rule: for the Committee's reports, see 
ibid, no 11, pt 1, and Appendices 2-5.
57. The Punjab Anjuman (more correctly, the Anjuman-i-Punjab) was founded 
in 1865 by Dr G.W. Leitner (formerly Professor at King's College,
London), who had recently been appointed Principal of the Lahore 
College. Its main aim was to pressure government into founding a 
university in the Punjab. For the Anjuman's submission that "hereditary" 
tenants had few rights under Sikh rule, see ibid, no 14.
58. Lawrence's Minute, 30 Aug 1866: ibid, no 11.
59. Sir Frederick Currie's Minute, 22 Nov 1869: ibid, no 7.
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if the flow of the tide of opinion set in formerly in the 
Punjab too strongly in favour of the class we have called 
hereditary cultivators, there is great danger lest the ebb 
of the tide, which has now set in as strongly in the opposite 
direction, should leave them stranded and ruined.60
Third, there was the procedural argument: Prinsep's settlements, based
as they were on Regulation VII of 1822 (which provided for the correction,
at the time of revision, of errors made at the regular settlement), were
invalid, for the simple reason that Regulation VII did not apply in the
Punjab. But this objection was overruled by the Punjab Chief Court
(which was established in 1866). At the same time, however, the Court
also ruled that, with respect to some of the steps he had taken (such
as the granting of long leases to tenants who had been reduced from
maurusi to ghair-maurusi status), Prinsep had exceeded his powers as
Settlement Commissioner. ^ 1
It was against this background of mounting controversy and confusion 
that the Government of India decided to step in, cancel Prinsep's 
settlements and draft the Punjab's first tenancy legislation. Having 
been defeated in the Oudh tenancy debate, Lawrence was determined to 
throw the full weight of his reputation and his office behind the struggle 
for tenant protection in the Punjab.
The members of the Viceroy's Legislative Council were divided as
62to whether such legislation was wise or even necessary. Nevertheless,
Lawrence went ahead and sketched out a Bill which had three main aims:
to define and safeguard hereditary-right, to regulate the enhancement
of rent paid by hereditary tenants, and to provide compensation for
evicted tenants-at-will. This draft Bill was then entrusted to Edward
Brandreth (the Commissioner of Rawalpindi Division and the Punjab member
of the Legislative Council), who introduced a polished version of it into
63the Legislative Council on 17 January 1868. But the opponents of the
60. Lake to Secy GOP, 26 May 1865, no 336: ibid, no 11.
61. Sir Erskine Perry's Minute, 30 Oct 1869: ibid, no 3.
62. For the different views, see "Notes by Members of Council of Governor- 
General" (23-30 Oct 1866): ibid, no 11, pt 3.
63. For Brandreth's draft, see ibid, no 14.
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Bill raised such objections that it had to be shelved, to allow time
64for further discussion. We do not have room here to describe all
the discussion that did occur over the following nine months, except
to note that during that time the Bill - which, with Brandreth's retirement,
was made over to Richard Temple (the newly-appointed finance member,
and one of Lawrence's most trusted colleagues^) - was considered and
amended by four different committees, was six times minuted upon by
high Punjab Government functionaries, and was three times discussed in
the Legislative Council.^ Finally, on 19 October Temple reintroduced
the Bill into Council at Simla, where - without any representatives of
the Punjab Government or the Punjabi gentry present, and with standing
6 7orders having been suspended - he and Lawrence pushed it through.
Two days later the Bill received the formal assent of the Viceroy and
/ i o
became the Punjab Tenancy Act (Act XXVIII of 1868).
However, opposition to the Act did not immediately subside, but
moved to London, where the Secretary of State, Argyll, was urged to
exercise his veto. Six members of the India Council opposed the Act.
Sir Erskine Perry, for example, described it as "a mischevious piece of
legislation, and opposed to the sound [post-1857] policy of not interfering
69with native customs." The Punjabi gentry, stirred up by Leitner, and
supported by McLeod, reminded Argyll of the services they had performed
70in 1857, and requested him to disallow the Act. In the end, the India
64. See an abstract of the Council's proceedings: ibid, no 22.
65. Temple's key role in the eventual passage of the Bill is carefully 
analysed in G.R.G. Hambly, "Richard Temple and the Punjab Tenancy 
Act of 1868", in English Historical Review, no LXXIX (Jan 1964), pp. 
47-66.
/
6 6. PAR 1868-69, p.37.
67. See an abstract of the Council's proceedings on 19 October 1868:
"PPTA", no 26.
6 8. Ibid, no 27.
69. Perry's Minute, 30 Oct 1869: ibid, no 3. For the five other 
minutes of dissent, see ibid, nos 4-9.
70. For a memorandum from 210 Punjabi chieftains and landowners to 
Argyll (Feb 1869) and a supporting memorandum from McLeod (18 April 
1869), see ibid, no 28.
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Council approved the Act, but only through the casting vote of the 
Secretary of State. On 28 October 1869 Argyll wrote to Lawrence's 
successor in India, Lord Mayo, informing him that the legislation 
would stand.^
What are we to make of the Punjab Tenancy Act of 1868? As a
piece of agrarian legislation, it was not at all innovative, since its
major purpose was simply to validate the "Punjab School's" earlier land
revenue work. Argyll recognised this when he wrote:
The first great leading feature of the measure is that it sets 
up, as presumably correct, the First Regular Settlement of the 
Province, thereby setting aside, as of authority, the records 
of right contained in the Revised Settlement which was being 
conducted by Mr Prinsep, and his o f f i c e r s .72
As a piece of tenancy legislation, the Act certainly proved effective in
protecting the rights granted at the regular settlements; yet it was
essentially only a stopgap measure, since its other provisions (relating
to rent, compensation, succession, etc.) were not able to be enforced
until a new, revised Punjab Tenancy Act (Act XVI of 1887) was passed
73two decades later. The historical significance of the Act of 1868 
is this: it was a great ideological victory for John Lawrence and the 
"Punjab School" in that - in one area of tenurial policy - it checked 
the ascent of the "Aristocratic School's" elitist and laisser-faire 
doctrines, thereby breathing some life back into the paternalistic, 
Utilitarian principles upon which British rule in the Punjab had been 
founded. But, ironically, at the same time that the theoretical aspects 
of the tenant-right issue were being contested, on paper and in the 
committee room, developments were occurring in rural Punjabi society 
that would - eventually - compel the two schools within the Punjab 
Government to join together to produce a truely innovative and thoroughly 
paternalistic statute: the Punjab Alienation of Land Act of 1900.
71. Argyll to GG in Council, 28 Oct 1869, no 80 RD: ibid, no 1.
72. Ibid.
73. For details, see Dietmar Rothermund, Government, Landlord and 
Peasant in India: Agrarian Relations under British Rule3 1865-1935 
(Wiesbaden, 1978), pp. 148-53.
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The decade after the Great Rebellion was a period of considerable
agricultural expansion in the Punjab. Agricultural prices rose steadily,
the area under cultivation increased and, with the development of
communications, an export market for Punjabi produce began to be opened
74up. This agricultural expansion is reflected in the fact that the
annual profit extracted from the Province by the British rose from
£863,149 in 1858-59 to £2,024,330 in 1871-72 (the total profit for these
75years being almost £23 millions). It is equally reflected in the
marked increase in peasant indebtedness at this time. For instance, in
Gujrat District the total value of registered debts of zamindars more than
trebled in the late 1860s, while by the early 1870s it was estimated
that the total value of all zamindari debt in the District was equal to
76more than one-half of the land revenue demand.
As we saw in the first chapter, peasant indebtedness had not by any
means been unknown in the Punjab before the advent of British rule. But
it cannot be doubted that the British land revenue system, which required
the payment of the revenue in a fixed cash sum by a specified date, greatly
77increased the zamindar's dependence on the rural moneylender. Other
developments contributed to the rise in indebtedness. In 1860-61
and again in 1868-69 the Punjab - especially that portion lying to the
south of the Sutlej - was afflicted by drought, famine and epidemics.
According to the British authorities, as many as 335,399 people died of
78cholera, smallpox and malignant fevers in 1869. The two famines also
The origins of peasant indebtedness
74. For a graph of price trends in the period 1857-71, see PAR 1871-72, 
p.150. The cultivated area increased by 31.6 per cent between 1855 
and 1868 (largely because of the extension of irrigation facilities):
H. Calvert, The Wealth and Welfare of the Punjab: Being Some Studies 
in Punjab Rural Economics (Lahore, 1922), p.102. In 1865 the railway 
line from Lahore to Multan (which was connected by steamboat with 
Karachi) was opened up. The wheat exported from the Punjab in the 
period 1871-73 was valued at Rs 4 lakhs: ibid, p.67.
75. Calculated from the revenue and expenditure statements in the general 
Administration Reports for these years. Military charges, being an 
imperial responsibility, are excluded from these calculations.
76. SR Gujrat 1874, p.102.
77. Even in the 1920s there was "a great deal of borrowing to pay the 
revenue": Calvert, Wealth and Welfare, p.131.
78. PAR 1869-70, p.l.
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resulted in a heavy loss of plough cattle , which drove many zamindars
79further into the clutches of the moneylender. At the same time,
the British provided the moneylender with unprecedented facilities for
the recovery of debt. Between 1865 and 1875 the judicial machinery
in the Punjab was substantially modified, the idea being to bring the
administration of the Punjab more into line with that of the Regulation
80Provinces. This swing towards administrative centralisation and
formalisation - which Thorburn later denigrated as being tantamount to
81a move from "paternal" to "machine" rule - definitely advantaged the
moneylender. In 1865 civil suits involving land were transferred from
the revenue courts of the Deputy Commissioner to the regular civil courts.
A year later the Judicial Commissioner was replaced by the Chief Court,
the Code of Civil Procedure (which asserted that all property was liable
to attachment and sale in execution of a civil decree) was, with special
modifications, extended to the Punjab and, thirdly, pleaders were admitted
into the courts of the Punjab. Other changes quickly followed: in
1872 the Evidence Act and the Contract Act were passed; and in 1874-75
small civil courts - presided over by subordinate, "native" judges
(munsifs) - were established to handle rural debt cases. These changes
82made moneylending a more secure occupation than it had ever been.
A direct consequence of this judicial reorganisation was a phenomenal
83increase in civil litigation in the Province during the late 1860s.
Whereas the number of suits instituted in the civil courts of the Punjab 
in 1860 had been 83,231, by 1866 it had risen to 165,970, and in 1870 it
79. PAR 1861-62, para 30; PAR 1868-69, pp. i-x. Many villages in 
Gujranwala District took a generation to recover from the drought 
and cattle losses of 1861: SR Gujranwala 1894, p.20.
80. For full details, see Mathur, British Administration of Punjab, chap 2.
81. Thorburn, The Punjab in Peace and War, chap 16.
82. It is scarcely surprising that, from the mid-1860s onwards, the number 
of moneylenders in the Punjab rapidly grew. Whereas the number of 
bankers and moneylenders (including dependents) returned at the census 
of 1868 was 53,263, the number returned at the census of 1911 was 
193,890: Calvert, Wealth and Welfare, p.128.
83. To give a District example, in Sialkot District the number of civil 
suits rose from 2,147 in 1853-54 to 17,755 in 1873-74, while the 
average value of each suit decreased from Rs 71 to Rs 39 over that 
period: Sialkot DG 1883-84, p.2.
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in 1866 was more than twice the number instituted in the North-Western
Provinces at that time, and more than the number instituted in Bengal,
85Oudh and the Central Provinces put together. About one-third of all 
the civil suits instituted in the Punjab between 1860 and 1866 were 
suits beteeen a moneylender (as plaintiff) and an agriculturalist (as 
defendant); and, since the account books of the moneylender were almost
the sole form of evidence acceptable to the courts, the case nearly
i • 86 always went against the agriculturalist.
This increase in civil litigation throughout the 1860s did not
immediately cause much concern on the part of the administration as to
the material well-being of the subordinate classes in Punjabi society.
On the contrary, many British officers regarded it as a sign of progress,
and attributed it to "agricultural prosperity", to "the expanding
transactions of the community at large" or to "the popularity of our
87courts." There was, however, one aspect of this civil litigation
that did begin to cause anxiety in the late 1860s, and that was the
growing tendency for agricultural land to be sold or mortgaged (frequently,
but not always, to professional moneylenders) in satisfaction of debt.
In most Districts the alienation of proprietary rights (or, in the case
of hereditary tenants, occupancy rights) began to occur on a noticeable
88scale after the famines of the 1860s. By the early 1870s this had
not yet become a major problem. In 1870-71, for instance, there were
in the Punjab only 17,714 recorded cases of alienation of proprietary
right by voluntary sale or gift (the average area involved was 10 acres)
and only 137 recorded cases of alienation by compulsory sale (at an
89average of 78 acres). Thereafter, however, as the value of land
84stood at 205,606. The number of civil suits instituted in the Punjab
84. PAR 1862-63, para 2: PAR 1866-67, para 3; PAR 1870-71, para 118.
85. PAR 1866-67, para 3. The' ratio of civil suits to population in the 
Punjab in 1866 was 1:90. The ratios in the four other Provinces were 
much lower: Bengal (1:320), Central Provinces (1:260), North-Western 
Provinces (1:403), Oudh (1:390): ibid.
8 6. PAR 1860-61, p.l; PAR 1866-67, para 5. There were no checks against 
moneylenders tampering with their account books so as to alter the 
terms of the original debt.
87. PAR 1864-65, para 4.
8 8. See, for examples, SR Amritsar 1893, p.3; SR Gujranwala 1894, pp. 23-6;
SR Gurdaspur 1892, p .8 .
89. PAR 1870-71, p.25. See also PAR 1869-70, p.33.
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and more of the cultivation came under the direct control of the
90moneylender. It was then that the British became convinced that
land alienation was threatening the stability of rural society - that
it was a serious political problem, for which a legislative remedy
91would probably have to be found.
Thus, the decade after the Great Rebellion was at once a period 
of general agricultural expansion and a period of adversity for a 
large section of the Punjabi peasantry. Agricultural prices and the 
value of land rose, cultivation was expanded and an export market was 
acquired; but an inflexible land revenue demand, two periods of drought 
and famine, and a civil judiciary which advantaged the banking and 
trading classes all encouraged the growth of peasant indebtedness and 
expropriation. To a considerable extent, it is against this background 
of peasant adversity at a time of general agricultural expansion that 
the Kuka outbreak of 1872 must be understood.
continued to rise, alienations occurred at an alarming rate, and more
The Kuka outbreak
In the middle of January 1872 an outbreak of the Kuka sect occurred
92in Ludhiana District in the Ambala (formerly the Cis-Sutlej) Division.
90. For instance, in Gujranwala District 13.5 per cent of the total 
cultivation was in the hands of the moneylender by the early 1890s:
SB Gujranwala 1894, p.23. For the rise in the value of land after 
1860, see PAB 1862-63, para 298; Calvert, Wealth and Welfare, p.6 6.
91. The story is taken up in Norman G. Barrier, The Punjab Alienation 
of Land Bill of 1900 (Durham, North Carolina, 1966) and in van den 
Dungen, The Punjab Tradition.
92. The following summary narrative is based on two collections of British 
records. Records relating to the Kuka movement between 1863 and 
1871 are contained in Nahar Singh (comp.), Gooroo Bam Singh and the 
Kuka Sikhs (Bebels Against the British Power in India): Documents
1863-1871 (New Delhi, 1965). This collection (hereafter Kuka 
Documents) comprises, in the main, documents drawn from the NAI. 
Records relating to the events of 1872 are contained in "Copy of 
Correspondence, or Extracts from Correspondence, relating to the 
Kooka Outbreak": Great Britain, House of Commons, Parliamentary 
Papers, Sessional Sets, Accounts and Papers, vol XLV, 1872, pp.
645-706 (hereacter "CKO").
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The Kukas (or Namdharis) are an unorthodox sect of Sikhs. They
trace their history back to 1847, when an Arora Sikh named Balak Singh,
a member of the Udasi order (the oldest, and perhaps the most quietist,
of the various Sikh orders), inaugurated a movement at Hazro in Rawalpindi
District to rid Sikhism of Brahmanical influences - which were, with
the waning of Sikh political dominance, beginning to blur the distinction
between Sikhism and Hinduism. Balak Singh died in 1863, by which time
he had been recognised by his followers - but certainly not by the rest
of the Sikh community - as the eleventh Guru. At Balak Singh's death,
the leadership of the movement passed to one of his principal disciples,
94Ram Singh, who was by caste a Tarkhan (carpenter). Ram Singh
transferred the centre of the movement from Hazro to his own village
of Bhaini in Ludhiana District, where he carried on Balak Singh's
95monotheistic and moral teachings.
The essential features of the Kuka doctrine were - and still are - 
pious and reformist: converts were enjoined to spurn idolatry, caste 
distinctions and the taboo on widow remarriage, to abstain from the use 
of intoxicants, and, generally, to lead devout and virtuous lives.
However, Ram Singh was no ordinary reformer but, like Balak Singh, a 
man who was happy to have his followers believe that the divine spirit 
which had dwelt in the bodies of the ten Gurus had once again assumed 
a human form. Ram Singh's followers put it around that he possessed 
miraculous powers, and that he was a reincarnation of Guru Gobind Singh. 
The latter claim was a particularly important one, because it suggested 
the possibility of a resurgence of theocratic militancy. In the eyes 
of the Punjab Government, this was confirmed when, in 1863, the following
93
93. The term Kuka means "Crier", and was applied because, during their 
devotions and religious dances, Kukas would work themselves into
a state of ecstasy and cry out the name of God. From the end of 
the nineteenth century the term Namdhari ("Adherent of the Divine 
Name") was more commonly applied.
94. For a report on the sect's history to 1867, see T.H. Thornton,
Secy to GOP, to J.W.S. Wyllie, Offg Secy to GOI, FD, 2 Feb 1867,
no 157-54: Singh (comp.), Kuka Documents, no X1A. Thornton notes
that Ram Singh served in the army of the Sikh kingdom between 1844
and 1846; but, in a footnote, it is observed (by Singh?) that Ram 
Singh took service in 1836-37.
95. For accounts of Kuka teachings see the Memoranda compiled by J.W. 
Younghusband, Offg Inspector-General of Police, 28 June 1863: ibid, 
no I.
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(translated) document was given to a police informer by one of Ram 
Singh’s lieutenants:
The "Sakhi [testimony] of Guru Govind Singh"
I, Guru Govind Singh, will be born in a carpenter's shop, 
and will be called Ram Singh. My house will be between the 
Jamna and Sutlej rivers. I will declare my religion. I 
will defeat the Faringhis and put the crown on my head, and 
blow the sankh [conch-shell]. The musicians shall praise me 
in 1921 [1864]. I, the carpenter, will sit on the throne.
When I have got one lakh and twenty-five thousand Sikhs with 
me, I will cut off the heads of the Faringhis. I will never 
be conquered in battle, and will shout "Akal, Akal [God, God]." 
The Christians will desert their wives and fly from the 
country when they hear the shout of 1* lakhs of Khalsas.
A great battle will take place on the banks of the Jamna, and 
blood will flow like the waters of the Ravi, and no Faringhi 
be left alive. Insurrections will take place in the country 
in 1922 [1865]. The Khalsa will reign, and the Rajah and ryot 
[peasant] will live in peace and comfort, and no one shall 
molest another.
Day by day Ram Singh's rule will be enlarged. God has 
written this. It is no lie, my brethren. In 1922 [1865], 
the whole country will be ruled by Ram Singh. My followers 
will worship Wahaguru [God]. God says this will happen.96
The Punjab Government was not, at this stage, inclined to see
much that was threatening in Ram Singh's activities: indeed, it
regarded many of his teachings as being positively beneficial. But
it was concerned about the activities of his more turbulent followers,
who had been reported as having spoken seditious words. From 1863
onwards, the authorities therefore maintained a careful watch on all
97the affairs of the Kukas. It is from the regular reports of the
district officers, the police and government spies, that we can 
reconstruct the sect's progress towards a confrontation with the colonial 
State apparatus.
96. From a report (11 June 1863) in ibid.
97. Minute (no date) by T.D. Forsyth, Offg Secy to GOP, on Younghusband's 
Memoranda: ibid, no II.
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Between 1863 and 1868 Ram Singh transformed the Kuka movement
into a disciplined and well-organised sect. Kukas participated in
elaborate rituals, and were recognisable by their distinctive dress -
white clothes, a horizontally-tied turban and a necklace of white
wollen cord, knotted to represent beads. Ram Singh set up a private
postal system, whereby verbal and written messages were carried by
runners, and a territorial organisation, composed of lieutenants and
98sub-lieutenants (subhas and naib-subhas). The sect acquired a strong
following in the eastern and central Districts, particularly Ludhiana,
99Ferozpur, Jullundur, Hoshiarpur and Sialkot Districts. It was in
these Districts that there were large numbers of the menials, artisans
and poor cultivators who would be likely to find the most solace in
Ram Singh's message. 100 At least four British officers observed that
Kuka converts were drawn mainly from the ranks of Tarkhans, Chumars
(outcaste leather workers), Mazhabis (outcaste sweepers who have become
Sikhs) and the lower orders of Jats, while very few converts had been
made from the professional and mercantile castes (Khatris, Brahmans
and Banyas) . 101 The majority of Ram Singh's lieutenants were Jats and
Tarkhans. Of the twenty-two lieutenants who attended Ram Singh during
the Diwali festival at Amritsar in 1867, fourteen were cultivators by
102caste, and five were carpenters. Of the fifty lieutenants whose
98. "A brief Narrative of the Kuka Sect, with some account of Ram Singh 
of Bhaini" (no author, no date): ibid, no XI. This territorial 
organisation worried the British, who thought that "in the hands
of designing and unscrupulous men it can easily be made an engine 
of political danger": ibid. But it has been pointed out that 
the Subha system was only an extension of earlier organisational 
forms, introduced by the Gurus as a means of propagating the Sikh 
faith: Ganda Singh, "Was the Kuka (Namdhari) Movement A Rebellion 
Against the British Government?", in The Punjab Past and Present, 
vo1 8, pt 2 (1974), pp. 325-41.
99. Memorandum by G. McAndrew, Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Ambala 
circle, 20 Nov 1871: Singh (comp.), Kuka Documents, no XLVII.
100. In 1868 it was contended that "it is only amongst a people steeped 
in ignorance that a movement so full of anomalies could spread and 
find favour": Offg Secy to GOP to Secy to GOI, FD, 1 Feb 1868,
no 50-117: ibid, no XXI.
101. n.94 above.
102. Appendix II to Inspector-General of Police to Secy GOP, 20 Jan 1868, 
no 11-188: Singh (comp.), Kuka Documents, no XXB.
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particulars were known to the British in 1871, twenty-eight were Jats
and seven were Tarkhans (of the remaining fifteen, twelve belonged to
103ten different castes, while the caste of three is not specified).
In 1867 Ram Singh estimated his followers at 100,000; but the District
Superintendent of Police at Ludhiana considered 60,000 to be an outside
104estimate.
In the late 1860s Ram Singh’s more excitable followers were 
responsible for a number of public disturbances: there was a spate of 
desecrations of Hindu temples and Muslim tombs by Kukas between 1866 
and 1868, a brawl between Kukas and Akalis nearly occurred when Ram 
Singh visited the shrine at Anandpur in 1867, and a minor Kuka riot 
took place in Ferozpur District in 1 8 6 9 . The Punjab Government took 
no proscriptive action towards the sect as a whole, because it recognised 
that these disturbances were the work of a small lunatic fringe. Besides, 
by 1868-69 intelligence reports indicated that the popularity of the 
Kukas was on the decline.10^
The Government's confidence was short-lived, however, for in June
1871 a party of Kukas attacked the Muslim slaughter-house at Amritsar
and murdered four butchers (three others were severely wounded). A
month later a similar attack occurred in Ludhiana District, whereby a
man and a woman were killed, and seven women and children were wounded.
The perpetrators of these crimes were eventually rounded up, and seven
107of them were sentenced to death. It was from this point onwards that
the Government began to equate the Kuka sect as a whole - and not just 
its more extremist members - with sedition. In September 1871, for
103. See a statement in ibid, no XLVIII..
104. See T.D. Forsyth, C and S Jullundur Division, to Thornton, 11 March 
1867, no 108: ibid, no XVI; also n.94 above.
105. See n. 94 above; an Abstract of police reports received in 1867:
Singh (com.) Kuka Documents, no XXA; Thornton to Forsyth, 27 March
1867, no 279: ibid, no XVII; G. Hutchison, Inspector-General of 
Police, to Secy to GOP, Civil Dept, 14 Jan 1871, no 7-201: ibid, 
no XXXV.
106. Hutchinson to Thornton, 19 Jan 1869, no 10: ibid, no XXIX; Hutchinson 
to Secy to GOP, 30 Jan 1871, no 12-376: ibid, no XXXVI.
107. L.H. Griffin, Offg Secy to GOP to E.C. Bayley, Secy to GOI, 9 Sept 
1871 (Confidential): ibid, no XLII.
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example, an order was issued, prohibiting the enlistment of known
108Kukas into the police force.
The culmination of this growing tension was not far away. On
14 January 1872 a party of more than 100 Kukas launched an attack on
the small town of Malodh in Ludhiana District. Apparently, their
object was to obtain weapons - Malodh was the residence of an old Sikh
chieftain family - but, having caused some damage and a great deal
of commotion, they were repulsed. The next day they attacked the
neighbouring town of Malerkotla, the capital of the little Muslim
principality which bore the same name. Again, however, they were
repulsed. By the time that the Deputy Commissioner of Ludhiana District,
109L. Cowan, arrived on the scene, sixty-eight Kukas had been captured.
Cowan then proceeded to mete out a form of "justice" which, in its 
barbarity, was rivalled only by the earlier action of Frederick Cooper 
at Ajnala in 1857 and the subsequent action of General Dyer at Jallianwala 
Bagh in 1919. Having decided - as he later put it - "that a terrible 
example was needed to put a stop at once to what was assuming the 
proportions of a rebellion, and to prevent a recurrence of similar outrages 
at a future time, " 110 Cowan summarily ordered forty-nine of the prisoners 
to be blown away from guns. The next day the Commissioner of Ambala 
Division, T.D. Forsyth, arrived at Malerkotla, hurriedly tried sixteen 
more prisoners, and executed them in the same manner. 111
Meanwhile, Ram Singh and his surviving lieutenants had been arrested. 
Evidence of their complicity in the attacks on Malodh and Malerkotla 
was scanty, to say the least. In any case, the British were concerned 
that a trial of Ram Singh might be seen as a political, not as a criminal,
108. Central Police Office, Lahore, to all Deputy Inspectors-General of 
Police, 28 Sept 1871, Memo no 4505: ibid, no XLIII. All Kukas then
in the police force, in Districts where the sect had a strong following, 
were to be transferred to non-Kuka Districts.
109. GOI to SS, 19 Jan 1872, no 7: "CKO", p.3 (of the collection).
110. Cowan to T.D. Forsyth, C and S Ambala Division, 21 Jan 1872 
(original emphasis): ibid, p.23.
111. Forsyth to Secy to GOP, 20 Jan 1872: ibid, pp. 19-20.
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trial. And so, just as they had transported Bhai Maharaj Singh out
of the Punjab in 1849 without any public trial, the surviving leaders
of the Kuka sect were transported to various British jails in 1872.
112Ram Singh was sent to Burma, where he died in 1888.
The actions of Cowan and Forsyth at Malerkotla caused a great
uproar in official circles, however. This is understandable: Cowan
had obviously exceeded his duties, and Forsyth’s judicial inquiry into
the guilt of the sixteen men he subsequently executed had been altogether
too hasty; but were these two officers to be disciplined? Both men
claimed that they had acted in the interests of public safety. Although
he considered the executions to have been unnecessarily severe, the
Lieutenant-Governor, Sir Henry Davies, adopted the time-honoured principle
113of the "Punjab School" of standing by the junior officer "on the spot".
But the days when British officers in the Punjab could with impunity
act fairly much as a law unto themselves were fast coming to an end.
The Government of India overruled the Punjab Government on the matter
of the Malerkotla episode, and pointed out that
The one thing which cannot be permitted to any civil or military 
officer in any case whatever, is the regular assumption of the 
office of the judge and of the legislator. No such officer 
has right to punish his prisoners, still less has he any right 
to punish them according to a law made by himself, after the 
fact, and in reference to the circumstances of a particular case.114
Consequently, Cowan was dismissed from government service, and Forsyth 
was transferred to Oudh. The Secretary of State for India sanctioned 
j • • 115 this decision.
How should the Kuka outbreak itself be interpreted? In the decade 
or so after 1947, the tendency was for nationalist Punjabi historians
112. Rose, Glossary of Tribes and Castes, vol 2, pp. 560-61.
113. Griffin to Bayley, 7 Feb 1872, no 59c: "CKO", pp. 26-8.
114. Bayley to Secy to GOP, 30 April 1872, no 857: ibid, pp. 54-8.
115. SS to GOI, 18 July 1872, no 32: ibid, p.60. Cowan was granted a 
pension of Rs 300 per month.
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to treat the Kuka outbreak as an early, but integral, stage of the
116great "freedom struggle" against British rule in India. This
interpretation has obvious weaknesses, not the least of them being
the fact that the victims of the Kukas's verbal and physical attacks
were nearly all fellow Punjabis, not Englishmen. More recently, the
political aspect of the Kuka movement has been played down. For example,
Ganda Singh has regarded the Kuka movement as "a purely religious movement".
Ram Singh, he says, "had no political aims and mission and preached no
rebellious ideas." It was the "ill-directed enthusiasm" of some of
Ram Singh's followers that brought the sect into a situation of confrontation
117with the authorities. McLeod, while he does not deny the political
aspects of the Kuka outbreak, also shifts the focus of attention towards
religious issues: he sees the Kuka sect as "a distinctively Sikh version
of a common millenarian pattern." He continues:
Social instability had produced discontent, and discontent had 
found the holy man to whom it could attach its aspirations.
Out of this there emerged the myth which drew together past 
glories, present frustrations, and future hopes. Battle was 
joined, not with deliberation but impulsively, and the movement 
was quickly crushed. The leaders were imprisoned, adherents 
quickly fell away and although a loyal remnant remained the 
discontent which had prompted the sect's rapid growth soon found
outlets elsewhere.
McLeod's thesis is an illuminating and vigorously argued one, and we 
would accept it more or less without reservation. What we do wish to 
do here, however, is to suggest that, typologically, there is an additional
way of looking at the Kuka movement - that is, as an instance of "secondary
• «. , , H 9  resistance."
116. See, for example, M.M, Ahluwalia, Kukas: the Freedom Fighters of the 
Panjab (Bombay, 1965) and Fauja Singh Bajwa, Kuka Movement: an 
important phase in Punjab's role in India's struggle for freedom 
(Delhi, 1965).
117. Singh, "The Kuka (Namdhari) Movement". In this article Singh 
rejects the arguments of those who had earlier criticised his 
interpretation.
118. W.H. McLeod, "The Kukas: A Millenarian Sect of the Punjab", in G.A. 
Wood and P.S. O'Connor (eds), W.P. Morrell: A Tribute (Dunedin, 1973), 
pp. 85-103.
119. See chap. 4, n.158 above.
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The point really is this: the Kuka movement was neither the first 
nor the last millenarian-type movement to emerge from within the larger 
Sikh community. Since the seventeenth century, at least, Sikhism has 
been a prophetic religion with a propensity to throw up full-fledged 
millenarian movements (or, in the twentieth century, revolutionary 
religious-political movements) whenever the fortunes and cohesion of the 
Sikh community have been seriously threatened by external pressures.
At the same time, however, the specific objectives, strategies and social 
constituency of these movements have varied, according to historical 
circumstances. Thus, these movements have succeeded one another in a 
logical, not merely temporal, progression. This becomes clear when we 
compare the Kuka movement with a slightly earlier millenarian-type Sikh 
movement: Bhai Maharaj Singh’s crusade in the Manjha in the late 1840s.
At first glance these two movements appear to have been remarkably
similar. Both prophesied the imminent return of Khalsa rule. And
both centred around a holy man who, it was claimed, was a reincarnation
of Guru Gobind Singh - it is interesting to note that in 1863 Ram Singh’s
lieutenant at Amritsar, Lai Singh, was preaching that Ram Singh was
actually the second reincarnation of Gobind Singh, the first having been
120Maharaj Singh, in 1847. But the differences are no less striking.
In the first place, Maharaj Singh's following was drawn essentially from
the middle and upper ranks of rural society in central Punjab: the
substantial Sikh peasantry, the disbanded Sikh soldiery and some of the
prominent Sikh chieftain families. Ram Singh's following, on the other
hand, was drawn almost exclusively from the lower ranks of rural society.
In 1867 Thornton observed that only a few "Sirdars and people of note"
121had joined the Kuka sect. By and large, the attitude of the elites
within the Sikh community, and of the Sikh orthodoxy, towards the Kukas 
was uncompromisingly hostile. In the second place, Maharaj Singh's 
movement was an anti-British and anti-collaborator crusade, as is seen 
in his involvement in the so-called Prema conspiracy, his decision 
immediately to join the insurrection at Multan in 1848 and his continued
120. See the report of Captain Menzies, District Superintendent of Police, 
Amritsar, 31 May 1863: Singh (comp.), Kuka Documents, no I.
121. Thornton to Wyllie, 2 Feb 1867, no 157-54: ibid, no XIA.
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resistance to British authority in the months after annexation. Ram 
Singh's movement, on the other hand, was essentially a crusade to 
restore the original purity and the social message of Sikhism. It 
was for Sikhism what the Ahmadiyya movement was later to be for north 
Indian Islam.
Maharaj Singh's movement occurred at a time of great political 
instability in the Punjab, when the British were in the process of 
superseding the Sikhs. His movement was an integral part of that 
’’post-pacification revolt" by which an important section of the old 
elite sought to turn back the tide of British dominance. Ram Singh’s 
movement occurred at a time of political stability, yet of great social 
and economic change, when the long-term implications of British rule were 
beginning to take shape. By the mid-1860s, as we have seen, the elites 
in rural Punjabi society had been reconciled to British rule, and were 
again doing quite well for themselves. But Sikhism, which had previously 
been for many the religion of warfare and conquest, was undergoing a
122crisis of confidence, due to a temporary slump in its number of adherents.
And the material conditions of a large section of the Punjabi peasantry
were undergoing a marked deterioration - especially in the eastern and
central Districts, where Ram Singh's following was strongest. The Kuka
outbreak was a response to these unique historical circumstances. It
was an instance of "secondary resistance" in that it was a relatively
mute and incoherent political protest (as well as a messianic religious
protest) against these circumstances, and in that it was - both temporally
and logically - a stage of Sikh resistance to British imperialism that
was transitional between the military resistance of the elite in the 1840s
and the radical peasant anti-imperialism of the Ghadrites and the Babar
123Akalis in the early decades of the twentieth century.
122. A decline in the popularity of Sikhism was noticed almost immediately 
after annexation: PAR 1851-53, para 498. Between 1868 and 1881 
the number of Sikhs per 1,000 of population in the five Districts
of central Punjab declined from 125 to 115: Punjab Census 1881, p.140, 
Abstract no 56. The number of baptisms performed annually at the 
Akal Bungah of the Golden Temple at Amritsar between 1860 and 1883 
reached its lowest point in 1871: Amritsar DG 1883-84, p.67
123. M.V. Harcourt has noted that several important members of the Ghadr 
party had previously been Kuka sympathisers: "Revolutionary Networks 
In Northern Indian Politics 1907-1935: A Case Study of the ’Terrorist’ 
Movement in Delhi, the Punjab, the United Provinces, and adjacent 
Princely States" (unpub. Ph.D. thesis, Sussex University, 1973):
see, for an example, p.195.
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The decade after the Great Rebellion saw the British make a 
considerable retreat from their earlier "experiment" in the Punjab.
In keeping with their perceived need to bolster their political authority 
and increase the efficiency of their administration, they took two 
important steps that were at complete variance with the style and spirit 
of the colonial regime which Dalhousie had set up in the Punjab after 
annexation. In a way, these two steps representa a new "experiment" 
in political control. First, the resuscitation of the old rural elites 
which had been undertaken in 1857, to meet a sudden emergency, was made 
permanent. The chieftains, great and small, who possessed the requisite 
"influence" were provided with new pecuniary privileges and employment 
opportunities - not, it must be admitted, to the extent that had been the 
case under Sikh rule, but certainly to a far greater extent than had been 
the case between 1849 and 1856. Henceforth, the chieftains were to 
regard their fortunes and status as being inextricably tied up with the 
maintenance of British rule. Second, the legal and administrative 
machinery in the Punjab was standardised with that of the Regulation 
Provinces. As the response of the supreme authorities to the Malerkotla 
executions showed, this meant that British officers in the Punjab were 
no longer to have the right to govern like little autocrats.
These two changes did not signify a complete departure from the 
paternalism of the "Punjab School". The passage of the Punjab Tenancy 
Act was a considerable victory for the "Punjab School", in that it checked 
in one area of agrarian policy at least - the spread of "aristocratic", 
laisser-faire dogma. Ideologically, and to a considerable extent in 
practice also, the Punjab Government was to remain firmly committed to 
the ideal of a contented and prosperous peasantry. But, as we have seen, 
the material well-being of the peasantry was beginning to be undermined 
by new forces (which had been released by the imposition of British rule) 
by the late 1860s. The Kuka outbreak of 1872 was both an expression of 
these frustrations and dislocations and a forewarning of the peasant 
militancy that was to come.
Conelusion
324
Ranjit Singh was once shown a British map of the subcontinent.
He asked what the red patches signified. On being informed by the 
cartographer that they represented the possessions of the East India 
Company, the Maharaja turned to his courtiers and remarked: "Ek roz 
sab lal ho jaiga - one day it will all be red. " 1 As it turned out, 
the British never painted more than three-fifths of the map red, the 
remaining two-fifths being the territories of the Princely States.
But the kingdom of Lahore was not destined to be among these: within 
ten years of Ranjit Singh’s death the Punjab was part of British India.
It would be fair to say that the pre-conditions of British conquest 
of the Punjab lay as much, if not more, in the social and political 
structure of the region in the early decades of the nineteenth century 
as in the freebooting nature of the East India Company at this time. 
Geographic location and the uneven distribution of natural resources 
for agriculture had combined to produce in the Punjab a society whose 
main features were heterogeneity, vertical cleavage and martial spirit - 
a frontier society. Following the dissolution of the Mughal empire in 
the middle of the eighteenth century, there was an upsurge of competition 
and conflict between clan-based, local-level political systems in rural 
Punjab. It was out of this situation that emerged the Sikh mists and, 
finally, at a higher level of political synthesis, the new regional 
system that was the Sikh kingdom. Although it was, to a considerable 
extent, based on Mughal administrative precepts and institutions and 
Mughal rulership traditions, the kingdom founded by Ranjit Singh was 
first and foremost a Punjabi military patronage State; and its real 
legitimacy was derived from its apparent commitment to the enduring, 
millenarian evocation of the Sikh community: "Raj Karega Khalsa - the 
Khalsa shall rule!" Nearly one-half of the kingdom’s revenue was spent 
on the army, whose task it was to defend and extend the Khalsa’s political 
hegemony.
Like all military patronage States, the Sikh kingdom required 
constant territorial expansion in order to retain the support of the
CONCLUSION
1. Khushwant Singh, History of the Sikhs, vol 2, 1829-1974, p.l.
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small but powerful elite groups in Punjabi society, especially the
chieftains. The chieftains, who were recruited both by ascription
(from the leadership structures of the erstwhile nrtsls and the dominant
tribes and clans) and by achievement (from the ranks of the army),
formed a loose regional political elite, with a near monopoly of top
administrative and military offices. Their allegiance - and hence
the dormancy of politically centrifugal forces within Punjabi society -
could be counted upon so long as there was an outlet for their martial
spirits and employment expectations. Towards the end of Ranjit Singh’s
reign, however, territorial expansion slowed down, and was then cut off,
as the geo-political limits to Sikh overlordship were reached. Here,
2as was generally the case in such circumstances, was the making of 
a potential crisis in the suzerain-vassal relationship ; with the 
cessation of military campaigns, there was every likelihood that the 
chieftains would attempt to establish themselves as a permanent territorial 
aristocracy, capable, perhaps, of overthrowing the Sikh monarch.
Ranjit Singh was perfectly aware of the dangers. He therefore 
built into the political structure of his kingdom a number of checks 
and balances, many of which resemble the rulership devices employed 
by African monarchs. Most important among these checks and balances 
was a "new staff" system, whereby non-Punjabis, and, in particular,
Rajput Dogras from Jammu, were elevated rapidly to top positions of trust 
and dignity at the darbar. The great rivalry that Ranjit Singh 
deliberately fostered between the "old", Punjabi chieftains and the 
"new", non-Punjabi, chieftains allowed him to play one faction off against 
another, and thus to avert any direct challenge to his own position.
But in adopting this strategy, Ranjit Singh had introduced into Punjabi 
darbar politics a fundamental tension that was to be exploited, with 
great effectiveness, by the imperialists. Of more immediate significance 
was the fact that this tension was to bring the imperialists into the 
kingdom in the first place.
2. For the crisis experienced by the Mughal empire in the 1660s, see 
Michael N. Pearson, "Shivaji and the Decline of the Mughal Empire", 
in Journal of Asian Studies, vol 35, no 2 (Feb 1976), pp. 221-35.
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After Ranjit Singh’s death in 1839, successive Maharajas proved 
unable to hold the rivalry between the two groups of chieftains in 
check, and practically the entire darbar was drawn into the vortex 
of factional conflict. Once started, the disintegrating proclivities 
of this conflict were almost incapable of being stopped. As the 
authority of the monarchy caved in, the army increasingly assumed a 
political role at Lahore, while in the countryside the forces of 
particularism, never far from the surface in rural Punjabi society, 
emerged : the Ravi and Sutlej pastoral tribes rose in rebellion; many 
villages refused to pay the revenue; and the kardars - mostly members 
of an urban elite - attempted to build up their wealth and independence.
It is significant that the earliest direct interference by the British 
in the kingdom’s internal affairs, and the buildup of British military 
pressure along the kingdom’s eastern border, coincided precisely with 
the intensification of the monarchy's crisis. This was, it would seem,
3a common "initial imperial situation". But it would be wrong to suppose 
that the British had clear territorial designs on the Punjab in the 
early 1840s. The British went to war with the Sikhs in 1845-46 not 
to acquire the Punjab, but rather to settle a "local crisis" : to pacify 
what had become an intolerably turbulent frontier. Their primary 
objective - and it was one that was, to a considerable extent, shared by 
the Sikh monarchy itself - was to destroy a now republican Sikh army, 
and in so doing, to restore the kingdom to its former role, in the British 
scheme of things, as a compliant buffer State between British India and 
Islamic central Asia.
If the transformation of the Punjab from a frontier kind of society 
in general to a politically turbulent frontier between 1839 and 1845 
set the stage for the first British conquest, the actual political situation 
that prevailed at the darbar in 1846 was to have a profound influence 
on both the style and the timing of the second and decisive British 
conquest. With the creation of a Dogra kingdom in Kashmir in 1846, the 
Sikh-Dogra antagonism was taken out of Punjabi politics. The underlying
3. The phrase is D.A. Low's : Lion Rampant : Essays in the Study of 
British Imperialism (London, 1973), p.9. For an African example 
of the situation being described, see D.A. Low, Buganda in Modem 
History (Berkeley, 1971), p.35.
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rivalry between "old" and "new" chieftains remained unresolved, however. 
Consequently, the British officers who were sent to Lahore to supervise 
the implementation of the provisions of the peace treaty intruded into 
a situation almost tailor-made for manipulating rivalries and forging 
new alliances. Because they had at their disposal an army of conquest, 
but also because they were prepared to work within the existing power 
structure (witness Henry Lawrence’s support for chieftains who were trying 
to get lost jagirs restored, and his direct appeals to ceremonial 
legitimacy, as in his countersigning of sanads), these British officers 
proved remarkably adept at playing Punjabi darbar politics.
Yet it would be quite wrong to assume that they always had the 
upper hand. The different factions at the darbar were, in reality, 
anything but the passive objects of British manipulation. Frequently, 
the British officers found themselves being manipulated to serve Punjabi 
ends. Even the most obsequious collaboration offered to the British 
stemmed from what has, in another - but not dissimilar - context, been
4described as "rational calculations of interest and probable consequence." 
In the final analysis, there was an interplay between British and Punjabi 
initiatives in the Punjab during the period 1846-49. And it was the 
new "local crises" produced by this interplay that dragged the British 
ever deeper into the domestic affairs of the kingdom. That the upshot 
of all this interference by the British was a general crisis of authority, 
and that the ensuing war of 1848-49 split Punjabi society down the middle, 
is indicative of the degree to which Punjabis were themselves active 
participators in, and shapers of, the drift towards annexation. Imperial 
takeovers were rarely the straightforward and one-sided affairs that 
the popular historical imagination usually credits them with having been.
In the Punjab the transition from "informal" to "formal" imperial control - 
a transition that occurred by way of the four stages outlined in the 
fourth chapter of this thesis - was a highly complex process, in which 
the shifting forms and strengths of indigenous collaboration and resistance 
were crucial ingredients.^
4. John Iliffe, Tanganyika under German Rule3 1905-12 (Cambridge, 1969), 
pp. 5-6.
5. Studies of certain other regions have also shown this : see, for 
example B. Swai, "The British in Malabar, 1792-1806" (unpub D. Phil, 
thesis, Sussex University, 1974).
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The British colonial administration established in the Punjab in 
1849 was unique in the amount of importance it attached to the goal 
of rapid and thoroughgoing modernisation. Elsewhere in the subcontinent 
political uncertainty and administrative inexperience had frequently 
meant that the main changes brought by British rule - the subordination 
of the regional political elite; the elimination of many of the old, 
local intermediaries; the renovation of the indigenous revenue system; 
the introduction of a Western legal system; the development of public 
works - had proceeded in a piecemeal and haphazard fashion. But in 
the Punjab, which was one of the last regions to be annexed, imperial 
confidence, administrative experience and an Evangelical-Utilitarian 
zeal for reform all came together in a rush. The work of the "Punjab 
School” between 1849 and 1856, carried out according to the Non-regulation 
system of administration, and guaranteed by the presence of an army of 
occupation, constituted an "imperial experiment", whereby the British 
would rule the Punjab with but minimal assistance from the chieftains 
and other, local-level intermediaries. To be sure, not every British 
officer agreed with this strategy (witness Henry Lawrence's disturbance 
over the jagir decisions pushed through by John Lawrence and Dalhousie); 
and in overhauling the traditional "local" system of government, combatting 
crime and introducing a new land revenue system that recognised "primary" 
zamindars as proprietors, the "Punjab School" encountered many difficulties. 
Still, by 1856 the foundations of an authoritarian, exclusive and 
paternalistic colonial regime had been cemented.
However, the outbreak of the Great Rebellion in 1857 shattered 
the "Punjab School's" mood of self-congratulation. It is clear that 
British authority in the Punjab was severely tested at this time.
Not only were there twelve instances of mutiny on the part of the 
Hindustani sepoy regiments stationed in the Punjab Territories, but 
also a large portion of the province was swept by civil unrest of an 
order not experienced since the eighteenth century. (It does need 
to be understood, however - as an examination of the Gugera insurrection 
bears out - that the causes of this unrest often went much deeper than 
just crude opportunism or sympathy with the cause of the Delhi rebels.)
The British took a number of measures to ward off a full-scale rebellion
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in the Punjab. Without doubt, the most effectual of these was the 
reactivation of the martial tradition in Punjabi society in defence 
of the empire : the general call for recruits to serve before Delhi, 
and John Lawrence’s personal call to the formerly "disloyal” chieftains 
to come forward with their old military establishments. Such a golden 
opportunity for service, adventure, plunder and the recovery of lost 
jagirs, was presented that, before they realised how critical the position 
of the British really was, Punjabis had flocked in their thousands to 
the British standard and had been sent out of their homeland. The 
decision to mobilise the Punjab was, we have argued, a masterly stroke 
on the part of the British, and John Lawrence in particular. It 
probably saved the empire. But it also cast a long shadow of doubt 
over the "Punjab School's" earlier approaches to government. The 
lesson of 1857-58 for the British seemed to be that, when it came to 
the crunch, they could not seriously hope to wean the Punjab away from 
militarism; that they could not - just as the Sikhs could not - rule 
the Punjab without the support of the elites.
The lesson was not lost on the British. After 1858 their political 
strategy in the province changed in two important respects. First, 
many of those Punjabis who had joined up in the hour of crisis were 
given permanent employment in the armed services. From the 1880s, in 
fact, the "martial races" of the Punjab were purposefully recruited to 
form the backbone of the Indian Army. Imran Ali has shown how these 
Punjabi soldiers were pampered with land grants in the canal colonies 
that were established from this time onwards - how canal colonisation 
greatly contributed to the entrenchment of the military in rural Punjabi 
society.^ Second, the elites in rural Punjabi society were coaxed 
back into something like their old positions as intermediaries. The 
old chaudhari class was resuscitated and conciliated through appointments 
to the offices of zaildar and ala-lambardar. These new offices provided 
the British with what they perceived to be a much-needed link between
6. Imran Ali, "The Punjab Canal Colonies, 1885-1940" (unpub Ph.D. thesis,
Australian National University, Canberra, 1979).
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the upper and lower levels of their administration. The chieftains 
were conciliated with new jagirs, new titles and limited administrative 
powers. Many chieftains who had been deprived of their jagirs and 
titles after 1849 were restored to "honour" after 1858. British 
policy towards the chieftains in the decade after the Great Rebellion 
was essentially preservative. In fact, it could be said that whereas 
Ranjit Singh had, after the late 1820s, been concerned to prevent 
the chieftains from transforming themselves into an aristocracy, the 
British, thirty years later, took steps to ensure the survival of the 
chieftains as a limited provincial aristocracy. The broad explanation 
of the difference in policy is, of course, this : in the late 1820s 
the Sikh kingdom was a military patronage State whose growth had all 
but come to an end, whereas in the late 1850s British Punjab was part 
of a still-expanding empire. It should not be imagined that after 1858 
the British abandoned entirely their earlier "experiment" in the Punjab.
The continued emphasis on the importance of public works and, more 
significantly, the 1868 victory of the "Punjab School" over the "Aristocratic 
School" on the question of superior tenants’ rights preclude any such 
inference. Nonetheless, the deliberate association of "influential"
Punjabis with their administration, the remilitarisation of Punjabi society, 
the watering down of the Non-regulation style of government, the steady 
deterioration of the material condition of a large section of the Punjabi 
peasantry - these post-1858 developments are indicative of at least a 
retreat by the British from the brave new world of 1849.
What, then, had the Punjab's return to empire come to mean after 
two decades of direct British rule? By the early 1870s the Punjab 
had undergone a number of important changes. There had been a shift 
from the "traditional'* patrimonial government of the Sikhs to the "modern" 
bureaucratic regime of the British. Proprietary rights in the land 
had been given a legal definition; the land revenue demand had been 
fixed for ten-year or twenty-year periods; land revenue assignments 
and other privileged land tenures had been curtailed greatly.
Communications, trade and public works had been expanded. In fact, 
the Punjab was at this time entering a period of quite phenomenal material
growth. All these changes may be summed up in a single phrase: an 
expansion of political scale. By 1872 most Punjabis had adjusted to 
British rule and were beginning to make use of the imperial connection.
A fair degree of new horizontal mobility (increasingly manifested, from 
this time onwards, in the politicisation of communal culture) had begun 
to destroy the old vertical alignments in Punjabi society. The Punjab, 
once a frontier society, was being integrated into the cultural and 
political heartland of north India.
And yet all these changes were offset by a number of equally 
fundamental continuities. The history of the Punjab between 1849 and 
1872 shows that the process of "modernisation" sparked off by colonial 
rule was a complex and frequently contradictory process. Rarely was 
it a case of colonial rule blowing apart a static 'traditional" society 
to produce a new socio-cultural order. Rather, colonial rule attempted, 
wherever it could, to stretch the existing society to accomodate new 
goals; and socio-cultural change was essentially a multidimensional, 
non-linear process of adaption, whereby indigenous social groups, 
institutions and value systems made adjustments to the new circumstances. 
In the Punjab the British tried at first to bring into existence a new 
socio-cultural order; but the Great Rebellion caused them to question 
the wisdom of this "experiment", and after 1858 they scrupulously avoided
g
tampering further with the "traditional" social structure. In the 
final analysis, the significance of the Punjab's return to empire lies 
in the continuity of an indigenous, dominant power structure. While 
it has not been much concerned with urban politics, this thesis has shown
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7. For example, the acreage under cultivation in the Punjab doubled 
between 1855 and 1921; the acreage irrigated by canals increased 
by nearly 600 per cent between 1868 and 1919; the land revenue 
doubled between 1872 and 1920; the gross value of produce increased 
by 200 per cent between 1868 and 1921: Calvert, Wealth and Welfare, 
pp. 54, 67-8, 102.
8 . It is interesting to note that after forty years of British rule only 
3.27 per cent of the whole population (and only 1.44 per cent of the 
landowning and agricultural population) was literate; while only
0.18 per cent (o.03 per cent) knew English: Punjab Census 1891, 
Appendix C, Abstract 60. R.A. John has argued that British 
educational policies were dictated by political considerations:
"The Contribution Of British Educational And Administrative Policies 
To The Rise Of Nationalism In Nineteenth Century Punjab, 1835-1878" 
(unpub M.A. thesis, University of Newcastle, 1978).
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that the old urban elite which provided the Sikhs with their kardars
managed to retain its position in rural Punjabi life under British rule.
Indeed, the very nature of the British land revenue system guaranteed
the importance of the urban moneylender in rural society, and his
monopolisation of local administrative offices like that of patwari.
More substantively, the thesis has shown that the old rural elite, both
at the regional level (the chieftains) and the local level (the chaudharis),
was most successful in adjusting to the shift from patrimonialism to a
more bureaucratic regime that British rule produced. This rural elite
survived as a privileged and powerful group through the British and into
9the post-independence period. Ironically, it was the very class in 
Punjabi society that the British claimed they were most concerned to 
protect - the peasantry - that suffered the most during the first two 
decades of British rule. 10 The Kuka outbreak of 1872, while not a true 
peasant revolt, hinted that serious challenges to British authority in 
the early decades of the twentieth century would be mounted not from 
the top, but from the bottom of Punjabi society.
9. See, for example, Ronald J. Herring, "Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and 
'Eradication of Feudalism' in Pakistan", in Economic and Political 
Weekly, vol xv, no 12 (22 March 1980), pp. 599-614.
10. For a useful summary of the (as yet, largely unsynthesised) data 
on declining peasant living standards in early-twentieth-century 
British Punjab, see Bhagwan Josh, Communist Movement In Punjab 
(1926-47), (Delhi, 1979), pp.4-41.
GLOSSARY
abwab: a cess paid by the cultivator to the Kardar, in addition 
the land revenue, under Sikh rule.
adalati: an administrator of justice under Sikh rule.
Akali: also Nihang: a militant follower of Guru Gobind Singh.
'canil: under Mughal rule, the equivalent of a kardar.
arnin: under Afghan rule, the equivalent of a kardar.
azan: public call to Muslims to prayer.
bagh: a garden.
bania: also kirar: a Hindu shopkeeper.
batai: under Sikh rule, a method of assessing the land revenue 
by a simple division of the harvest.
Bhai: a Sikh title denoting religious learning; a Sikh priest.
bhaichara:under British rule, a tenure in which land was held in 
severalty by different proprietors whose shares were 
regulated by the revenue payable.
biradari: a caste brotherhood; an institution for the settlement of 
village disputes.
chaharam: a remission of one-quarter of the land revenue.
"ohcanoha": a modern Hindi word meaning "flatterer” or "opportunist"
chaudhari: a minor chieftain; the hereditary headman of a tappa.
abcudi: in the northwest of the Punjab, a village.
chowt: "one-fourth"; protection money levied by the Marathas.
crore: ten million.
daooit: a bandit.
dak: post; postal system.
darbar: court; under British rule, a ceremonial occasion. 
deorhiwala:& royal chamberlain.
dhok: in the northwest of the Punjab, a hamlet.
dhol: a war drum.
diwan: under Sikh rule, the head of the finance department; also 
a revenue collector.
doab: the tract between two rivers.
faqir: a Muslim mendicant.
farangi: a foreigner, especially a European.
farman: a royal command.i
gaddi: a throne.
ghee: clarified butter.
got: also mooee: an exogamous descent group; a subcaste; a clan.
granthi: a "reader" of the Guru Granth Sahib, the Sikh sacred scripture.
guru: a religious teacher.
chowkidar: a rural, village-paid constable.
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haveli: a palace or large house.
ijar: a revenue farm; ijaradar: a revenue farmer under Sikh rule.
inarn: a deduction from the land revenue in favour of an influential
landholder; inamdar: the holder of an incan.
izzat: honour.
jagir: an assignment of land revenue (under Sikh rule, in lieu of 
salary); jagirdar: the holder of a jagir.
jcona: the land revenue demand.
jihad: the Islamic principle of internal and external struggle; an 
Islamic "holy war".
jirgah: the tribal equivalent of a biradari.
kaohohu: a surveyor of lands and crops.
kamin: an artisan or menial.
kaniya: under the kanlcut system, an appraiser.
kankut: under Sikh rule, a method of assessing the land revenue by 
estimating the value of the standing crop.
Kanwar: prince.
kardar: under Sikh rule, a district revenue collector and administrator.
gurdwara: a Sikh temple.
harijan: Mahatma Gandhi's term for an untouchable.
karkun: a managing agent.
Khalsa: the Sikh order, brotherhood, instituted in 1699 by Guru 
Gobind Singh; generally, the collective Sikh community.
kharif: the autumn crop.
khet khusrah: the patwari's field book.
khidmatgar: a personal servant.
khil 'at: a costume of honour (including robes and sometimes arms 
or horses) bestowed by a superior on an inferior as a 
mark of distinction.
kotwal: a city police chief.
kshatriya: the warrior section of the classical Hindu caste hierarchy.
lakh: one hundred thousand.
Lalla: also Misr and Rai: a Hindu title denoting literacy and 
administrative expertise.
lambardar: also muqaddam: a village headman; ala-lambardar: under 
British rule, a chief village headman.
ma'afi: also lakhivaj: (a grant of) revenue-free land; ma'afidar: 
the holder of a ma'afi.
ma-bap: "mother-father": authority.
madad-i-ma'ash: also dharmarth: a. ma'afi granted to a pious individual 
or a religious institution.
mahal: under British rule, a revenue-paying estate; generally 
synonymous with mauza.
Maharaja: king; Maharani: also Rani: queen.
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makhtar-i-kar: also muharir: a deputy.
malik: under British rule, a proprietor; malik ala: a superior 
proprietor; malik adna: an inferior proprietor.
malikana: rent.
maund: a unit of weight, about 82 lbs.
maurusi tenant: under British rule, a superior, hereditary tenant; 
ghair-maurud tenant: a tenant-at-wil1 .
mauza: a village.
misl: a Sikh warband of the eighteenth century; misldar: a
member, sometimes leader of a misl.
mohalla: also katra: an urban residential block.
mulk-giri: territorial possession.
munshi: a clerk.
munsif: under British rule, a "native" judge.
mustajir: under British rule, an estate manager and revenue farmer.
naib: a deputy.
nakshah: an official report.
Nauab: also Khan and Sultan: a Muslim chieftain title.
nazim: under Sikh rule, a privincial governor.
nazr: an offering or a present.
malguzcœ: under British rule, a revenue payer.
nazrana: the tribute paid by a vassal; under Sikh rule, the
relinquishment of a portion of a jagir by a successor 
to that jagir.
paarti: a faction.
pachotra: a commission of 5 per cent on the land revenue collected, 
received by the chaudhari and lambardar as remuneration 
for their services.
panchayat: a committee of five; a village council.
Pandit: a Hindu title denoting religious learning; a Hindu priest 
pata-nama: a deed or a contract.
pattidari: under British rule, a tenure in which land was held in 
severalty by different proprietors whose shares were 
regulated by ancestral or customary shares.
patwari: a village accountant and record keeper.
purabiah: an ’’easterner".
qanungo: an accountant and record keeper at the ta'aluqa level.
qazi: an administrator of Islamic law.
rabi: the spring crop.
Raja: a Hindu and Sikh chieftain title.
rakhi: protection money levied by a mist,
rubakari: a pronouncement.
rukh: a block of waste land controlled by the State.
vyotwari: under British rule, a land revenue system whereby the
engagement is made with the individual peasant proprietor.
sahukar: also shah and mahajan: a village moneylender.
sailab: floodwaters.
sanad: a title deed.
sarai: also dharmsala: a place of shelter for travellers.
Sardar: a Sikh chieftain.
"Sarkar": government; Ranjit Singh's preferred form of address. 
sati: widow self-immolation.
shukka: a royal letter.
sofed-posh:”clad in white"; under British rule, a type of inam. 
sowar: a cavalryman.
suba: under Mughal and Sikh rule, a province.
subha: a Kuka lieutenant.
ta’aluqa: also pargana: under Sikh rule, a district; a clan 
territory.
tahsil: under British rule, an administrative unit below the
District; tahsildar: the officer in charge of a tahsil.
takavi: an agricultural loan.
taluqdar: a superior proprietor; in the North-Western Provinces, a 
member of a revenue-paying territorial nobility.
tappa: under Sikh rule, a subdivision of a ta'aluqa; a seal.
taraf: also patti and pana: a village caste section. 
thanadar: under Sikh rule, a governor of a military fort. 
thok: also thula: a village caste subsection.
thugi: ritualistic robbery and murder. 
tika: a forehead marking.
timi: grazing tax.
tope: also ohakla: under Sikh rule, a subdivision of a tappa.
toshakhania: sl keeper of a treasury.
vakil: an agent.
waziv: a chief minister.
zabti: under Sikh rule, a method of assessing the land revenue by
applying fixed cash rates to certain perishable and superior crops.
zail: under British rule, the circle of a zaildar3 an influential
landholder who assisted the regular civil authorities.
zamindar: in the Punjab, a peasant proprietor.
zamindari: under British rule, a tenure held by one or more "landlords". 
zat: an endogamous descent group; a caste or tribe.
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